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PREFACE.

The cases contained in this volume have been selected with a

view of assisting both the student and the instructor, with illus-

PREFACE.

trations of the practical application of the general principles and

rules of equity pleading and practice. Only so much of the state-

ment of fact and of the opinion of the court have been retained in

each case as is sufficient to make the decision upon the question

of pleading before the Court intelligible and clear. As far as

possible all padding has been excluded.

In the selection of these cases and in the preparaiion of this

volume, we are greatly indebted to the valuable assistance of

John W. Dwyer, LL. M., Insstructor of Law in the University of

Michigan.

Littleton has said: "And know, my son, that it is one of the

most honorable, laudable, and profitable things in our law to have

the science of well pleading; and, therefore, I counsel thee espe-

cially to employ thy courage and care to learn this."

We hope that this collection of cases will be of some practical
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assistance to the teacher in giving instruction in this very difficult

branch of the law and that it will stimulate the courage of the

student to master the "science of well pleading."

B. M. Thompson.

University of Michigan, March 1, 1903.
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The case~ contained in thi volume have been elected with a
view of a i ting both the tudent and the in tructor, with illu tration of the pra ti al application of the general principle and
rule of equity pleading and practice. Only o much of the statement of fact and of the opinion of the court have been retained in
each case as is uffici nt to make the deci ion upon the que tion
of pleading before the Court intelligible and clear. As far a ~
po.: ible all padding ha been excluded.
In the election of the e ca e and in tl:e preparation of thi ~
volume, w are greatly indebted to the valuaible a si tance of
John W. Dwyer, LL. M., Instructor of Law in the Univer ity of
Michigan.
Littleton ha aid: "And know, my son, that it is one of the
mo t honorable, laudable, and profitable things in our law to have
the science of well pleading; and, therefore, I counsel thee e pecially to employ thy courage and care to learn thi ."
We hop that thi coll ction of ca e will be of ome practical
a i tance to the teach r in giving instruction in thi very difficult
branch of the law and that it will timulate the courage of the
~ tud nt to ma t r the " cience of well pleading. '
B. M. TROMPSON.
Univer ity of Uichigan, March 1, 1903.
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ON

EQUITY PLEADING AND PRACTICE

CHAPTER I.

CASE

PERSONS CAPABLE OF SUING AND BEING SUED IN

EQUITY.

Suits by Aliens.

ON

Bell V. Chapman, 10 Johns. (N. Y.) 1S3. (1813.)

Action on a covenant contained in a lease. Suit commenced by

a British subject during the war of 1812. The defendant put in

the plea that the plaintiff was an alien enemy. To this plea, the

plaintiff demurred, and the defendant joined in the demurrer.

Per Curiam:

EQUITY PLEADING AND PRACTICE

The plea puis darrein continuance avers that the plaintiff was, at

tlie commencement of the suit, and still is, commorant in Ireland ;

and that since the last adjournment he has become an alien enemy,

CHAPTER I.

being an alien, born within the allegiance of the King of Great

Britain, with whom we axe at war, and the plea concludes in bar

of the action. There is no doubt that the plea is a valid one in the

case of the alien's residence in the enemy's countn', and the plea

may be pleaded either in abatement or in bar, for the precedents

PERSONS CAPABLE OF UING AND BEI G
EQUITY.

UED I -
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arc both ways. (Hast. Ent. tit. Ejectment, 7. tit. Trespass per

Alien, 1. Cornw. Tab. tit. Abatement, 7. tit. Bar in Divers Actions,

SUITS BY ALIENS.

87. ^YcUs V. Williams, 1 Lutw. 34, 35. West v. Sutton, 1 Salk. 2.)

This plea conforms precisely to the opinion of the K. B. in Le Bret

Bell v. Chapman, 10 Johns. (N. Y.) 183.

V. Papillon (4 East, 502), in concluding in bar of the further

{1813.)

maintenance of the suit. Asth o disability of the plaintiff is but

tomporary in its nature (for a state of per petual war is not to be

presumed), the good sense and logic of pleading would seem to

Action on a cov nant contained in a lea e.
uit commenced by
a Briti h subject during the war of 1812. The defendant put in
th pl a that the plaintiff wa an alien enemy. To thi plea, the
plaintiff demurred, and the defendant joined in the demurrer.
P ER

0 URI.A.

I :

SUITS BY ALIENS

2 Suits by Aliens

be in fa vor of the ple aconcludino; i n abatement, wh e n the causej of

action i snot void or extinguished. But wh ether_the^jgl ea be in th( 3

one form or the other is, perhap s^no t material, for the jud gment

thereon would not be a bar to a new action on the return of peace .

A j udfflnent is no bar to a new suit, unless it involves th e merits

of the controversy, or be founded on matter which affords a perma-

nent avoidah'ce, or dischargeT Bu t tlie present plea only bars the

plaintiff , in his character of alien enemy commorant abroad, trom.

prosecuti ng the suit^ It does not so much as touch the meri ts of

the action. In a late case in chancery {Ex parte Boussmaker, 13

Ves. 71), Lord Erskine declared that the alien's right of action,

in such a case, was only suspended by the war, and that if the

contract was originally good, the remedy would revive on the

return of peace. This was even the ancient doctrine, according

to Lord Coke, who said (Co. Litt. 129. b.) that "true it is an

alien enemy shall maintain neither real nor personal action, donee

terrce fuerint communes^ that is, until both nations be in peace." It

is also admitted by the best modern authorities, on the law of na-

tions, that the plea of alien enemy is only a temporary bar to the re-
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covery of private debts, and that the right of action returns with

the return of peace. (Bynk. Quaest. Jur. Pub. b. 1. c. 7. Vattel,

b. 3. c. 5. s. 77.)

There is, then, no well founded objection to the plea, and the

defendant is entitled to judgment.

Judgment for the defendant.*

*In the case of Clark v. Morey, lo Johns. (N. Y.) 69 (1813), which

was an action on a promissory note, the plaintiff, at the time being an

alien enemy residing in this country, the court stated the law as follows :

"And it has now become the sense and practice of nations, and may be

regarded as the picblic lazu of Europe, that the subjects of the enemy,

so long as they are permitted to remain in the country, are to be protected

in their persons and property, and to be allowed to sue as well as to be

sued. It is even held, that if they are ordered away, in consequence of

the war, they are still entitled to leave a power of attorney, and to collect

their debts by suit."

b in fayor of th plea concluding in abat ment, when the cau e of
a~tion i · not 1oid or extingui hed. But whether the lea be in the
one form or the other i , perhap , not material. for the judgment
thereon would not be a: bar to a new action on the return of peace.
A judgm nt i no bar to a new uit, unless it involves the merits
of the controver ' or be founded on matter which a:ffo_!d a permanent avoidanice, or i c arge.
u
e present plea only bars the
plaintiff, in hi character of alie/i enemy commorant abroad, from
pro cuting the uit. It does not o much a touch the merits o.f
the action. In a late ca e in chancery (Ex parte Boussniaker, 13
Ve . 1), Lo.rd Erskine declared that the alien' right of action,
in uch a ca e, wa only suspended by the war, and that if the
ontract was originaHy good, the remedy would revive on the
r turn of peace. This wa even the ancient doctrine, according
to Lord Coke, who aid ( o. Litt. 129. b.) that "true it i an
alien enemy shall maintain neither real nor personal action, donec
terrre fuerint communes) that is, until both nation be in peace." It
i al o admitted by the best modern authorities, on the law of nation that the plea of alien enemy i only a temporary bar to the recovery of private debts, and that the right of action returns with
the r turn of peace. (Bynk. Qmest. Jur. Pub. b. 1. c. 7. Vattel,
b. 3. c. 5. s. 77.)
There i , then, no well founded objection to the plea, and the
defendant is entitled to judgment.
Judgment for the defendant.*
*In the case of Clark v. Morey, IO Johns. (N. Y.) 69 (1813), which
was an action on a promissory note, the plaintiff, at the time being an
alien enemy residing in this country, the court tated the law as follows:
"And it has now become the sense and practice of nations, and may be
regarded as the public law of Europe, that the subjects of the enemy,
o long as they are permitted to remain in the country are to be protected
in th ir per on and property and to be allowed to ue as well a to be
ued. It is even held that if they are ordered away in con quence of
the war they ar till entitled to leave a power of attorney, and to collect
their debts by suit."

KlXG V. KUEPPEE

Suits by and against Sovereigns.

^^

i

IT

BY

A;:~

King v. Kuepper, 22 Mo. 550. (1S5G.)

Error to St. Louis Circuit Court.

King

This was a suit brought by Frederick William IV, king of ^

. Kuepper,

Io. 550.

{1

Prussia', against Felix Coste, administrator of Frederick William

Kuepper, deceased. The petition is as follows: "The plaintiff

states that he is absolute monarch of the kingdom of Prussia, and

as king thereof is the sole government of that country; that he is*

unrestraincnl by any constitution or law, and that his will, expressed^

in due form, is the only law of that country, and is the only le<

power there known to exist as law. aV

"The plaintiff further states that by the law of Prussia any ^ ^ (

money or its equivalent sent or transmitted through the royal t^ J^ ,

post department of that country, or received to be so transmitted ^ ,1 i

or sent by any duly authorized officer of said department, if lost, q ^. \

stolen or embezzled, is to be refunded to the proper owners thereof '^

by the plaintiff, through his officers and agents, and that such

was the law on and long before the 10th April, 18-19. The plaintiiV
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further states that the said Kuepper was on and for a long time

before the 10th April, 1849, the plaintiff's sen^ant and post officer

at Wermelskirchen, in the kingdom of Prussia, and that while.

said Kuepper was such post officer, he received, in liis official

capacity, large sums of money, or its equivalent, portions of which

money, or its equivalent, were transmitted through such depart-

ment, and received by said Kuepper as aforesaid, to be delivered

by him to the true owners thereof at Wermelskirchen, and por-_

tions of which were deposited with him as aforesaid by persons at

Wermelskirchen, to be transmitted by him through said post de-

partment to persons at various places ; and the plaintiff, if required,

is willing and ready to give a statement of each item, by and to

whom sent, when, &c. The whole amount of the moneys or its

equivalent, so received by said Kuepper, was seven thousand four

hundred German dollars, or thereabout, which, in the currency of

the United States, are equal to sixty-nine cents each.

"The plaintiff further says that on or about the 10th April,

1849, said Kuepper did abscond with all said sums of money.

t
wa

ir ·uit iourt.
brou ht b ' r cl ri ·k William IV, king of ~
lix o te aclmini trator of r derick
Ku Ip r de ea
Th I titian i a follow
The plaintiff
tat that h i ab olut monarch of th kinO'dom of ru ia, ancl
as kinO' th r I i h ol g v ment of that country; that h i:
unr train b any on titution or laiw, and that hi will, expr
cl~ ()
in due form, i th only law of that countr ', and i the only 1 er,
pow r th r known to eri t a law.
Q -~
' Th plain ti further tate that by the law of Pru ia an v
vJ 1
mon y or it qui aJent ent or tran mitted th.rough th ro3 al
/
po t d partment of that country, or receiv d to be o tran mitt d ~
or ent b any duly authoriz d officer of aid departm nt if lo t O d .
tolen or mbezzl d i to be refunded to th prop owner th r of 7
by th plaintiff throuO'h hi offic r and a ent , and that uch
wa the law on aond long befor th 10th pril, 1 -±9. The plaintiff
furth r tat that th aid u pp r wa on and for a long time
befor the 10th pril 1 -±9, th plaintiff ervant and p t officer
at W rm 1 kirch n in the kingdom of Prus ia and th t whiL
aid Fu pper w
uch po t officer he r ceived in hi official
or it qui alent, portions of which
capa it· larO'e um of mon
quival nt w r tran mitt d through uch departmon
or i
ment and r iv d by aiid Ku pper a afore aid to be d livered
b ' him to th tru own rs th r of a Werm 1 kir hen and por-_
ti on of whi h w r d po it d with him a afor aid b pe on at.
W rm 1 kir h n t b tran mitt d b him throuO'h aid po t
partm nt t p r on at ariou pla · and th plaintiff if r quir d
i willinO' and r ad to gi e a tat men f a h it m by and to
whom nt wh n
Th whol amount of th money or i
quirn·l t . , r i d by aid u pper, wa e n thou~ and f ur
hun lr
rman d lla
or th r about, whi h in th curr ncy of
th
nit d tat
ar qual to ixty-nin
nt ach.
· h plainti forth r a · that n r ab ut the 1 th ~ pril
aid Ku p r did ab n 1 \Yi th a11 :--ai 1 "um. of mo y,
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4 Suits by and against Sovereigns

and did eiiibe2?zle and convert the same to his own use, and secretly

fled and escaped from the said kingdom and came to St. Louis,

Missouri, where he died in the summer of 1849, and letters of

administration on his estate were duly granted to the defendant

(Coste) by the St. Louis probate court, on the thirty-first day of

July, 1849. The plaintiff further states that he has, according to

the law and custom of his said kingdom, duly refunded and paid

to the various and proper owners thereof the various sums of

money or its equivalent, stolen and embezzled from them respect-

ively by said Kuepper as aforesaid, and that he therefore has,

according to said law and custom, and by justice and right ought

to and has a just and legal demand against the defendant, for the

sums of money by him and his officers so refunded and paid.

"The plaintiff says, therefore, that the defendant justly owes

him said sum of money, and he estimates his damages for said

money and interest at the sum of seven thousand dollars, for which

last sum he asks judgment against the defendant."

The defendant demurred to this petition, and assigned the fol-

lowing reasons : That the petition does not state facts sufficient to
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constitute a cause of action ; that it does not state any legal privity

between the plaintiff and defendant; that it does not state any

legal right in the plaintiff to recover the said sums of money

alleged to have been embezzled from certain persons living in the

kingdom of Prussia; that it does not state any legal right in the

plaintiff to recover for the money embezzled by the said Kuepper,

which, at the time of the embezzlement, belonged to other persons

than the plaintiff; that the plaintiff was not under any legal

obligation to pay to the persons from whom Kuepper embezzled

property as alleged, and the payment of such losses was merely

voluntary, and that the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue in

this court; wherefore the defendant prayed judgment and for

costs.

The court below sustained the demurrer, and gave judgment

for the defendant, to which plaintiff duly excepted. Plaintiff

brings the case here by writ of error.

ScoTT^ Judge, delivered the opinion of the court.

This case comes up on a demurrer, and raises the question

whether a foreign sovereign can sue in our courts. It seems to

be now well settled in England that a foreign sovereign can sue

in her courts both at law and in equity. In the case of HiiUet

SUITS

BY

AND AGAINST SOVEREIGNS

and did embe2Ylle and convert the same to hi own use, and secretly
fled and escaped from the aid kingdom and ca.me to St. Louis,
Missouri, where he died in the summer of 1849, and letters of
administration on his estate were duly granted to the defendant
(Co te) by the St. Louis probate court, on the thirty-fir t day of
July, 1849. The plaintiff further states thait he ha , acco.rding to
the law and cu tom of his said kingdom, duly refunded and paid
to the various and proper owners thereof the various sums of
money or its equivalent, stolen and embezzled from them respectively by said Knepper as aforesaiid, and that he therefore has,
according to said law and custom, and by justice and right ought
to and has a just and legal demand against the defendant, for the
sums of money by him and his officers so refunded and paid.
"The plaintiff says, therefore, that the defendant justly owes
him said sum of money, and he estimaites his damages for said
money and interest at the sum of seven thousand dollars, for which
last sum he asks judgment against the defendant."
The defendant demur.red to this petition, and assigned the following reasons: Tha,t the petition does not state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action; that it does not state any legal privity
between the plaintiff and defendant; that it does not state any
legal right in the plaintiff to recover the sa·id sums of money
alleged to have been embezzled from certain persons living in the
kingdom of Prussia; that it does not state any legal right in the
plaintiff to recover for the money embezzled by the said Kuepper,
which, at the time of the embezzlement, belonged to other persons
than the plaintiff; that the plaiintiff was not under any legal
obligation to pay to the persons from whom Kuepper embezzled
property as alleged, and the payment Olf such losses was merely
voluntary, and that the plaintiff has no legal ca.pacity to ue in
this court; wherefore the defendant prayed judgment and for
costs.
The court below sustained the demurrer, and gave judgment
for the defendaint, to which plaintiff duly x epted. Plaintiff
brings the ca e here by writ of rror.
SCOTT, J udg , deli er d the opinion of the court.
This case come up on a demurrer and rai es the que tion
whether a for ign overeign can ue in our courts. It seems to
be now well ettl d in England that a for ign overei n can ue
in h r court both at law and in quity. In th
of Hu:ZZet

KING

King v. Kuepper 5

& Co. V. The King of Spain, Lord Redesdale said: "I have no

doubt but a foreign sovereign may sue in this country, otherwise

there would be a right without a remedy. He sues here on behalf

of his subjects, and if foreign sovereigns were not allowed to do

that, the refusal might be a cause of war. (1 Dow & Clark, 175;

The King of Spain v. Machado, 3 Con. Eng. Chan. 645 ; 1 Clark

& Finnelly, 333; The Columbian Government v. Rothschilds, 2

Con. Eng. Chan. 48.)

Kings have been allowed to sue in the United States. In the

case of the King of Spain v. Oliver (1 Pet. C. C. R. 276), the

suit was entertained without question as to the right of a foreign

sovereign to sue. So the case of the Republic of Mexico v.

Arrangois and others (11 How. Prac. Rep. 1) was entertained by

the courts of New York. In our courts, a writ in the name of

the state of Indiana was brought and passed through all of them,

without any question as to the right to do so. {Tagart v. State of

Indiana, 15 Mo. 209.)

If the subjects of foreign gov ern ments will contract .oblijcations

or affcxit themselves with liabilities t o their k ings or princes, and
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after wards migrate to the Uni t ed States, t here is nothing in the

nature of our insti t utions whi ch shields them from their just

respons ibilities . While our government grants the rights and

privileges of citizenship to all foreigners who are naturalized under

our laws, there is neither policy nor justice in screening them from

the civil liabilities which they have contracted with the govern-

ment to which they were once subject. Our tribunals afford no

assistance in the enforcement of the penal codes of foreign nations,

nor would they aid despotic rulers, in the exercise of an arbitrary

power, in making special and retrospective laws affecting foreigners

residing here, who were once their subjects. But when laws haig

been made abroad, and debts^ have be en ^ontraxrted_jiiider_those

laws, ther e is no reason for refus in g our as sista nce in th eir eol-

lection. Though foreign laws may be enacte d by a po wer_and

in a w ay inconsistent with the spirit of our institutions, th at is no

reason why they should not be enforced against tj i^e_whaJiaz£

in curred respon sibilities in respect of them . Foreign nations have

t he same ri<3i;ht to determine the form of govornme nt^^iost con^

ducive to their happine ss that we have, and to d e ny the validity

of their laws, because they have not been made in a manner

conformable to our notions of government, would be to destroy

v. K

EPPER

& Co. v. The King of pain, Lord edesdale said : "I have no
doubt but a for ign overeign may ue in this country, otherwi e
e sues here on behalf
there would be a right without a remedy.
of hi ubj ct , and if foreign o er ign were not allowed to d
that, the r 1u al might b a au of war. (1 ow & lark, 1 5 ;
The King of pain . Machado, 3 on. Eng. han. 645; 1 Clark
& Finn lly, 3 · ; The olumbian Government
Rothsch 'lds, 2
Con. Eng. Chan.
.)
Kings have be n allowed to ue in th8 Unit
tate . In the
ca e of the King of pain v. Oliver (1 Pct. C. C. R. 2 6), the
suit wa entertained without qu tion a to the right of a for ign
sovereign to su . So the case of the Republic of Mexico v.
Arrangois and other (11 How. Pra-c. Rep. 1) was entertained by
the curt of N cw York. In our curt , a writ in the name of
the tate of Indiana was brought and pa sed through all of them,
without any que tion as to the right to do so. (Tag art v. State of
Indiana, 15 Mo. 209.)
If the subj ct of foreign governments will contract obligatjans
or affect themselve wit · iliti to their kin or rinces and
afterwards migrate to the United States, there is nothing__in th~
nature of our in titutions whi h hield them from their ·u t
respon ibilities. While our government grants the rights ancl
privileg of citizen hip to all for ign rs who are naituralized under
our law , there i neither policy nor ju tice in creening them from
the civil liabilitie which th y have contracted with the government to which they were once ubj ct. Our tribunal afford no
a i tance in th nfor ement of the p nal code of foreign nation ,
nor would th y ai d potic rul r in the exerci of an arbitrary
pow r in makin p cial and retro p tive law affecting foreigner
r iding h re, who w r once th ir ubject . But when law ha
b n made abroad and debt hav b
ontracted und r tho
.,...,._,"--"'-'
in~hcir cfil-.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-=---'---~'--""'-~
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all comity amon g nations and introduce endless^wars and quar -

rels. The averments in the petition show that by the laws of

Prussia, the defendant's intestate was indebted to his sovereign,

and he should be made to answer for it.

It was maintained that this suit should have been brought in

the courts of the United States, as the constitution of the United

States expressly provides "that the judicial power shall extend to

all cases between a state or the citizens thereof, and foreign states,

citizens or subjects."

The government of the United States being entrusted with the

power of peace and war, it was necessary to invest it with authority

to establish tribunals to which foreign states or subjects might

resort for injuries sustained by the conduct of those residing within

the limits of the United States. For the judgments of tribunals

thus established, the United States would be responsible to foreign

states. But if they, passing by the courts created by the general

government for the redress of grievances they may have sustained

at the hands of citizens of the United States, will litigate their

rights in courts for whose conduct the United States are not
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responsible, if they should be dissatisfied with the measure of

justice meted to them by the courts, they have no cause of com-

plaint against the federal government. The ready answer to any

remonstrances made on that score, would be that there should have

been a resort to the tribunals established by the United States.

The foreign prince has the right to resort to the courts of the

general government; this is a privilege the constitution and laws

secure to him; but he may renounce it like any other privilege,

and litigate his rights in the state courts.

Whilst commentators on the constitution maintain that it is

competent for congress to vest all of the judicial powers of the

United States exclusively in tribunals of its own creation, it is

nevertheless admitted that this has not been done, and that the

state courts, in cases in which they had cognizance before the

adoption of the federal constitution, may, concurrently with the

/courts of the United States, still entertain jurisdiction.

The state courts, undoubtedly, before the existence of the federal

government, had cognizance of causes in which foreign states were

plaintiffs. That jurisdiction remains, unless it has been taken away

by the constitution and laws of the United States. The grant of

judicial powers by the constitution, in some cases, is exclusive;

SUITS BY AND AGAINST SOVEREIGNS

all comity among nations and introduce endless wars and quarrels. The aiverments in the petition show that by the laws Of
Pi1lssia, the defendant's intestate was indebted to his sovereign,
and he should be made to Ml.Swer for it.
It was maintained that this suit should have been brought in
the court of the United States, as the constitution of the United
States expressly provides "that the judicial power shall extend to
all cases between a' state or the citizens thereof, and foreign states,
citizens or ubjects."
The go ernment of the United States being entrusted with the
power of peace and war, it was necessary to invest it with authority
to e tablish tribunals to which foreign states or subjects might
resort for injuries sustained by the conduct of those residing within
the limits of the United States. For the judgments of tribunals
thus estaiblished, the United States would be responsible to foreign
states. But if they, passing by the courts created by the general
government for the redress of grievances they may have sustained
at the hands of citizens of the United States, will litigate their
rights in courts for whose conduct the United States are not
re ponsible, if they should be dissatisfied with the measure of
justice meted to them by the courts, they have no cause of complaint against the federal government. The ready answer to any
remonstrances made on that score, would be that there should have
been a: resort to the tribunals establi hed by the United States.
The foreign prince has the right to resort to the courts of the
general government; this is a privilege the constitution and laws
secure to him; but he may renounce it like any other privilege,
and litigate his rights in the state courts.
Whilst commentators on the mnstitution maintain that it is
competent for congre s to vest all of the judicia1l powers of the
United States exclusively in tribunals of its own creation, it is
nevertheles admitted that this has not been done, and that the
state courts, in cases in which they had cognizance before the
adoption nf the federal constitution, ma•y, concurrently with the
courts of the United State , till entertain juri diction.
The state cour , undoubtedly, b fore the exi tence of the federal
government, had cognizanc of causes in which foreign state were
plaintiff . That jurisdiction remains, unl sit ha been taken aiway
by the con titution and laws of the United tates. The grant of
judicial power by the constitution, in ome cases i exclusive;

JARVIS V.

Jarvis v. Crozieb 7

in others, it is concurrent at the will of congress; that is, congress

may make it exclusive or concurrent, as it seems best. In cases

in which the state courts had cognizance before the adoption of

the constitution of the United States, that jurisdiction remains

unless it is taken away. Congress has conformed its action to this

principle, and has suffered a portion of the judicial powers of the

United States to be exercised by the state courts. (1 Kent, 398;

Story's Comm. § 1784.) The jurisdiction, in cases of the char-

a'cter of that under consideration, has not been exclusively vested

in the federal courts; hence the state courts may still exercise

jurisdiction in all such cases.

With the concurrence of the other judges, the judgment will

be reversed, and the cause remanded.

Suits by and against Infants.

t^

^^

Jarvxs V. Crozier, 98 Fed. Rep. 753. (1899.) jT^ r^ /X^

7

ROZIER

in oth rs, it i con urr nt at th will f ongr
that i , congre.
may mak it x lu iv or onG'Urr nt, a it
m b t.
n a e·
in which the tat our lad ognizance b fore the adoption of
the con titution of th Unit ,d 'tat , that juri diction r main·
ongr
ha conform d its action to thi··
unle it i taken away.
principle, and ha uff red a portion of the judicial power of the
United tat to be xerci d by th tate courts. (1 ent, 3 8;
Story's Comm. § 17 4. ) The juri di tion, in cas of the character of that und r con ideration, ha not been exclu ively v ted
in the fed ral court ; hence the tate court may till xerci e
juri diction in all uch cases.
With the concurrenc of the other judge , the judgment will
be reversed, and the cause remanded.

On Motion to Eemand to State Court. „ ^ -^^ ^'^

Jackson, District Judge: r\\ [J^ { f .'(/^

~
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This cause was removed to this court, by the defendant Samljel l^j^ / v^

~~

A. Crozier, from the circuit court of McDowell county, and the^x ^^^ */

record filed on the 14th day of November, 1895. Upon the 5tlil^'^^^(

ITS BY AND AGALNST INF.ANTS.

day of January, 1898, a motion was made by the plaintiffs tojo'l i- *"

remand the cause to the circuit court of McDowell county, which. ^ ^ ^

Jarvis v. Crozie1-, 98 Fed. Rep. 753.

thereof, overruled. Between the time of filing the record in this^j^i^^-^ ^^^

court and the motion to remand, there seems to have been little ^-^ (i*^

preparation made for the hearing of the cause, except the filing of :\\k'' Xr

the joint answer of Samuel A. Crozier in his own right and of the ''i \h

trustees of the Crozier Land Association, and the answer of the Nor- W^ r ^

folk & Western Eailroad Company. Since the motion to remand ^Jp^ * ^

was overruled, quite a number of depositions have been taken by the^iL-r^ j,

defendants in support of their answers. The plaintiffs, failing to/^^ ^^/^

take any evidence in the case, have at the present term of the court V\ ^.r^

asked leave to renew their motion to remand, which leave was i/y^^ (u. "^

granted, and the court again heard the argument, and this cause/ z^'^'^l^

now comes on to be heard upon that motion. ^-'"'^

It appears from the bill filed in this cause by B. F. Jarvis in hi<

On lliotion te> Remand te> State Court.

2

t,. k

{1899.) /

motion (being argued by counsel) the court, upon consideration^^^V, yj^,^^

'lfrfl'

~
' 11

-~

d/~k
.

JACK ON, Di trict Judge:
{)jt ~).J
Thi cau e wa removed to thi court, by the defendant Sa~~el /
y.)
A. Crozier, from the circuit oourt of McDowell county, and the
· ' ~
record filed on the 14th day of .r ovember, 1 95. Upon the 5tli
ttlif
day of J ainuary, 1 9 ' a motion wa made by the plaintiff to-e,o ...
~
remand the cau e to the circuit court of :McDowell county, whichd _~ ~
motion (b ing argued by coun el) the court, upon consideration~/
thereof, overrul d. Between the time of filing the record in this~ ~
court and the motion to remand, there eem to have been little~
if
preparation made for the hearing of the cau e, exc pt the filing of
,
;.,,-.
the joint an wer of amuel A. rozier in hi own right and of the
U..tru tee of the rozier Lam.d
o iation and th an w r of the or. i.r v-Jfolk & W tern Railroad ompany.
inc the motion to remand .fp! --tyiJ
wa ov rrul d, quit a number of depo ition ha e been taken by thel'l'~
µ,
defendant in upport of their an w . The plaintiff failinrr to /) u- ~-_)
take an
idenc in th a e, ha ait th pr ent term of th court Pi 1 ~ ...,
a ked lea
to ren w th ir motion to r man wbi h 1 a e wa
Q,1- ~
granted and the court again h ard th ar ·um nt and thi au e r ;VV""___now come on to be heard upon that motion.
~
It appear from th bill filed in thi cau b B. F. Jarvi in hi ·

l

r.

?

µ-} .

0

1t
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own right, and as the next friend of Mary Carry Bowen and Bowen

Watts, who are infants, against the defendants, that the plaintiffs

derived title to a certain tract of land some years ago, known as

"Peery Bottoms," containing about 39 acres; that the lands were

conveyed by one Andrew Sarver, one half to William T. Moore, and

the other half to Peery and Bowen, and that William T, Moore

subsequently conveyed his one-half to J. A. Belcher, who afterwards

conveyed that one-half interest acquired from Moore to Samuel A.

Crozier, and that Crozier conveyed a portion of his one-half to

the Norfolk & Western Eailroad Company; and that the remain-

ing portion of his half was conveyed to trustees for the Crozier

Land Association. The bill discloses the fact that both Peery and

Bowen are dead, and that their one-half interest passed to their

heirs, and that all of the heirs except the infant plaintiffs, Mary

Carry Bowen and Bowen Watts, have conveyed their respective

interests in said parcel of land to the plaintiff Jarvis. The only

object and purpose of this bill is a partition of the land described

in the bill between the various owners in severalty, except a prayer

own right, and as the next friend of Mary Ca·rry Bow n and Bowen
\ att , who are infant , again t the defendants, that the plaintiffs
derived title to a certain tract of land ome years ago, known a::i
' Peery Bottoms," containing about 29 acre ; that the land were
conveyed by one Andrew Sarver, one half to illiam T. Moor , and
th other half to Peery and Bowen, and that William T. :Moore
sub equently conveyed hi one-half to J. A. Belcher, who afterwards
conveyed that one-half interest acquired from Moore to Samuel A.
Crozier, and that Crozier convey d a portion of his one-half to
the Norfolk & We tern Railroad Company; and that the remaining portion o:f his half was conveyed to tru tee for the Crozier
Land A..,sociation. The bill disclo es the fact that both P eery and
Bowen are dead, and that their one-half interest passed to their
heirs, a nd that all of the heirs except the infant plaintiffs, Mary
Carry Bowen and Bowen Watts, have conveyed their respective
interests in said parcel of land to the plaintiff Jarvis. The only
object and purpose of this bill is a partition of the land described
in the bill between the various owners in severalty, except a praiyer
for general relief. Upon the face of the bill, there is no controversy between the plaintiffs and defendants a to. the extent of
their respective interests. The bill upon its face shows that the
plaintiff Jarvis is only entitled to one-fourth, and that the two
infant heirs of Bowen a.ire entitled to one-fourth, making one-half,
and that Crozier and those under whom he claims are entitled to
the other half. The question of title is not in controversy; as both
ides claim under Sarver as a common source of title. It is to be
ob erved that there is no allegation in this bill that Jarvis, who
sue as the next friend for the infant plaintiffs, was ever authorized
to do so by a court, or by next o.f kin or by anybody interest ed in
them. It do not app ar that he i in any wi e related to them,
but thait h a urned th right, without any authority what oev r,
of making them plaintiff in tbi cau of a tion. Ordinarily th ·y
wou]d properly be def ndants to the cau e for the pur1 o es o.f partition, a ought in thi bill. Ther i no di put b twe n Jarvi
and the infant plaintiff a to th ir titl or th xtent of it. He
admit upon the fa e of the bill thart th y ar th own r of one
undi vid d on -fourth of th 9 acr . It e m to the ourt that th
draft man of thi bill ha 1 a p ial obj t in a o iatino- th infant a plaintiff with Jarvi an th t th obj t wa to prev nt,
if po ibl , th r moval f thi cau e by rozi r, the Crozier Land
0

for general relief. Upon the face of the bill, there is no con-
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troversy between the plaintiffs and defendants as to the extent of

their respective interests. The bill upon its face shows that the

plaintiff Jarvis is only entitled to one-fourth, and that the two

infant heirs of Bowen are entitled to one-fourth, making one-half,

and that Crozier and those under whom he claims are entitled to

the other half. Tlie question of title is not in controversy, as both

sides claim under Sarver as a common source of title. It is to be

observed that there is no allegation in this bill that Jarvis, who

sues as the next friend for the infant plaintiffs, was ever authorized

to do so by a court, or by next of kin, or by anybody interested in

them. It does not appear that he is in any wise related to them,

but that he assumed the right, without any authority whatsoever,

of making them plaintiffs in this cause of action. Ordinarily they

would properly be defendants to the cause for the purposes of par-

tition, as sought in this bill. There is no dispute between Jarvis

and the infant plaintiffs as to their title or the extent of it. He

admits upon the face of the bill that they are the owners of one

undivided one-fourth of the 29 acres. It seems to the court that the

draftsman of this bill had a special object in associating the in-

fants as plaintiffs with Jarvis, and that the object was to prevent,

if possible, the removal of this cause by Crozier, the Crozier Land

ITS BY A.i:TD AGAINST !NF.A TS

J .ARVI v.
Jaevis v. Crozier 9

Assot-iation, and the Norfolk & Western Railroad Company into

the courts of the United States, all of which defendants are non-

residents of the district of West Virginia. If this be the case, and

the court can properly do so, would it not be a case in which the

court would transpose the parties, and place them on the respective

sides of the case, so as to retain the case for hearing in this court

if it can be done? Tlie only matter in dispute or controversy, if

it can be called a controversy, between the infant plaintiffs and the

plaintiff Jarvis, would be the laying off' of their respective interests

in the said land. It is claimed that by reason of the fact of the

infant plaintiffs being citizens of Virginia, and the Norfolk &

Western Railroad Company being also a citizen of Virginia, this

case is not wholly a case between citizens of different states. This

partition can be had just as well by the infant plaintiffs being

transposed and made infant defendants in the case, and their rights

as fully and amply protected, as if they were plaintiffs to the

action. The whole theory of the case, as presented by the bill,

shows that they would more properly be defendants than plaintiffs ;

and in the absence of an allegation in the bill that Jarvis was
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authorized to bring this suit, and associate these infants as infant

plaintiffs, or the exhibition of any authority sustaining an allega-

tion of that character, it would seem to be right, and properly so,

to transpose these parties, and make them defendants in this cause,

in order that the rights of all parties could be heard and adjudi-

cated in this tribunal, where the defendants Samuel A. Crozier, the

trustees of the Crozier Land Association, and the Norfolk &

Western Railroad Company could be heard, as they desired.

In the Removal Cases, 100 U. S. 457, 25 L. Ed. 593, the court

held:

"For the purposes of a removal the matter in dispute may be

ascertained and, according to the facts, the parties to the suit

arranged on opposite sides of that dispute. If in such an arrange-

ment it appears that those on the one side, being all citizens of

different states from those on the other, desire a removal, the suit

may be removed."

In the case of Barney v. Latham, 103 U. S. 205, 26 L. Ed. 514,

the court held (following the cases just cited) that you may disre-i

gard as inmiaterial the mere form of the pleadings, and place the

parties on the opposite side of the real matter in dispute, accord- 1

ing to the facts.

CR ZIER
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Association, and th Nodolk & Wet rn aHroad ompany into
th ourt of the nited tates, all of which ef ndan ar nonre ident of the di trict of W t Virginia. f tbi b the as , and
the court an propeTly do o, ould it not be a ca e in whi h the
court w uld tran po the parties, and plac th m on the respccti c
sid of th ca , o a to retain the
e for h aring in this ourt
if it n b don ? Th only atter i di put or ontro er y, if
it an b all d a controv rsy, b tw n the i fant plaintiff and th
plaintiff Jarvi would be the laying off o,f their re p ctive intere t ·
in the aid land.
t i laii m d that by rea on of the fact of the
infant plaintiff being citiz n of Virginia, and th
orfolk &
t rn ailroa
ompany being al o a citiz n of Virginia, thi
cas i not wholly a as betw en citizens of different tates. T'b.i
pa:rtition can b had ju t a w 11 by the infant plaintiff being
tran po ed and made infant defendant in the case, and their right
as fully and amply protected, as if they were plaintiffs to the
action. The whol th o.ry of the case, as presented by the bill,
shows that they would more properly be defendants than plaintiffi ;
and in the ab ence of an allegation in the bill that Jarvi was
authorized to bring this suit, and a sociate the e infants as infant
plaintiff , or the exhibition of any authority ustaining an allegation of that chara:oter, it would eem to b right, and properly so,
to tran po e these parties, and make them defendants in thi cau e,
in order that the rights of all parties could be heard and adjudicait ed in thi tribunal, where the defendants Samuel A. Crozier, the
trustees o the Crozier Land Association, and the Norfolk &
Western Railroad Company could be heard, a they desired.
In the R mo;val Ca e , 100 U. S. 457, 25 L. Ed. 593, the court
held:
"For the purpo es of a removal the matter in di pute may be
ascertain d and a ording to the fact.s, th partie to the suit
arranged on oppo ite ide of that di pute. If in uch an arrangem nt it appears that tho e on the one ide, being all citiz n of
diff r nt tate :fro tho e on th oth r, d ire a r moval the sui ·
ma b remov d."
nth a of Barney v. Latham 103 U. S. 05 26 . Ed. 147
th court h Id (followin the a
jut cited) that ou ma di r
gard a immat rial the m r orm of th pl adings and pla the)
arti
n he oppo ite ide of th r al matter in di pute according to the £ t .
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In the case of Hyde v. EulU, 104 U. S. 407, 26 L. Ed. 823, fol-

lowing the decisions in the Eemoval Cases, the court held that

where all the parties to the controversy on one side are citizens of

different states from those on the other side, and there is in the

suit a separable controversy, wholly between the parties who are

citizens of different states, which can be fully determined as be-

tween them, it may be removed.

It may be contended in this case that the infant plaintiffs have

made no application for a removal. They could only make it by a

party who was duly authorized to represent them as their next

friend, either by an order of court, or by a party who was either an

executor or a personal representative who had control erf their es-

tate, or who was next of kin, and so nearly related to them that

the court would recognize the right to act for them. So far as the

present case is concerned, it does not appear that Jarvis was ever

authorized to act for them, or that he was ever authorized to insti-

tute this suit for them; but he has made use of their names, and

subjected them to litigation, and the costs and expenses thereof,

without the slightest authority therefor. Is not such action upon
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the part of Jarvis calculated to awaken the attention of the court

in the case, and is it not a mark of inexcusable inattention to make

infants plaintiffs in an action by a party as a next friend who is

neither next of kin nor has exhibited any authority whatever to

justify his action in arranging them as plaintiffs to an action in

which he had a personal interest ? It is a well-settled principle that

any one must have no personal interest, however remote or indirect,

who either institutes or defends an action for infants as their next

friend. In re Burgess, 25 Ch. Div. 243 ; In re Corsellis, 50 Law T.

(N. S.) 703. "When an infant claims a right or suffers an injury

on account of which it is necessary to resort to a court of chancery

to protect his rights, his nearest relation, not concerned in point of

interest in the matter in question, is supposed to be the person who

will take him under his protection and institute a suit to assert

his rights, or defend an action against him ; and it is for this rea-

son that a person who institutes a suit on behalf of an infant is

termed 'his next friend.' " 1 Daniell, Ch. Prac. 69. Legal proceed-

ings in favor of an infant should in every respect be strictly

guarded, for the reason that an infant on coming of age can re-

pudiate a suit brought in his name, and the court would be com-

pelled to strike out his name as plaintiff and add it as a defendant.

SUITS BY AND AGAINST INF ANTS

In the case of Hyde v. RuMe, 104 U. S. 407, 26 L. Ed. 823, following the deci ions in the Removal Ca e , the court held that
where all the parties to the controversy on one side are citizens of
different states from those on the other ide, and there is in the
suit a eparable contro eTsy, wholly between the parties who are
citizen of different state , which can be fully determined as between them, it may be removed.
It may be contended in this case that the infant plaintiffs have
made no application for a removal. They could only make it by n.
party who wa duly authorized to represent them as their next
friend, either by an order of c~mrt, or by a party who was either an
executor or a personal repr sentative who had control en their estate, or who was n xt of kin, and so nearly related to them that
the court would recognize the right to act for them. So far as the
present case is concerned, it does not appear that Jarvis was ever
authorized to act for them, or that he was ever authorized to in titute this suit for them; but he has made u e of their names, and
ubjected them to litigation, and the costs and expenses thereof,
without the lightest authority therefor. Is not such action upon
the part of Jarvis calculated to awaken the attention of the court
in the case, and is it not a mark of inexcusable inattention to make
infants plaintiffs in an action by a party as a next friend who is
neither next of kin nor has exhibited any authority whatever to
ju tify his action in arranging them as plaintiffs to an action in
which he had a personal interest? It is a well- ettled principle that
a:ny one must have no personal interest, however remote or indirect,
who either institutes or defends an action for infants as their next
friend. In re Burgess, 25 Ch. Div. 2±3; In re Corsellis, 50 Law T.
(N. S.) 703. "When an infant claim a right or suffers an injury
on account of which it is necessary to re ort to a court of chancery
to protect bi right , bis neare t relation not concerned in point of
intere tin the matter in que tion, i uppo d to be the per on who
will take him under bis proteclion and in titute a suit to a ert
his rights, or d fend an action again t him; and it is for thi reason that a per on who institute a uit on b half of an infant is
term d 'hi next fri nd.'" 1 Dani ll, Ch. Prac. 69. L gal pr ceding in favor of an infant hould in every re pect be trictly
gua·r d d, for the reason that an infant on coming f age can repudiate a suit brought in his nam and th court would be compelled to trik out hi name as plaintiff and a ld it a a defendant.

WARL. G

Waring v. Crane 11

Chief Justice Marshall, in the case of Bank v. Ritchie, 8 Pet. 128,

8 L. Ed. 890, discusses at some length the rights of parties to

appear for infants; and, in a case in which there was an attempt

to secure a judgment against infants who were represented by a

guardian ad litem, he remarks that "the guardian ad litem was

appointed on motion of counsel for the plaintiffs, without bringing

the minoi"s into court, or issuing a commission for the purpose of

making the appointment. This is contrary to the most approved

usage, and is certainly a mark of inexcusable inattention," — and

refers to Coop. Eq. PI. 109, for his position. It is the duty of a

court of equity to look after the interests of infant defendants, and

to protect them, in the absence of any one to represent them ; and

it would seem proper in this case that a court of equity should make

the infants defendants, and appoint a guardian ad litem to protect

their interests as infant defendants, instead of allowing them to

remain as plaintiffs to that action, and possibly have their estate

more or less absorbed by the costs and expenses of litigation. An

order will be entered transposing the position of Mary Carr}- Bowen

and Bowen Watts from plaintiffs to defendants, and making them
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defendants in this action : also, directing that a guardian ad litem

be appointed for the infant defendants, to protect their interests.

For the reasons assigned, the motion to remand is overruled.

Waring v. Crane, 2 Paige (N. Y.) 79. (1830.)

The bill in this cause was filed in July, 1824, in the name of

the complainants, who were infants, by A. Brunson, as the next

friend of W. Waring, and by W. Baker, as the next friend of the

other three complainants; charging the defendants, who were

(>xecutors, with mismanagement of the estate of the father of the

complainants; and also alleging that one of the defendants was

irresponsible. An injunction was granted restraining the executors

.

11
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Chief Ju tice Ma hall, in th ·a e of ank v. Ritchie, 8 P t. 128,
8 L. d.
0, di. cu
t ome length the rights of partie to
app ar for infant ; -an , in a ca e in which there was an att mpt
to e ure a judgm nt again t infants who w re repr ented by a
guardian ad litem, he r ark that 'th guardian ad litem wa
appoint d on motion of un 1 for th plaintiff, without bringing
th mino into court, or i 'uing a ommi ion for the purpo e of
making the appointment.
hi i contrar; i.o the mo t approved
u ag , and i c rtainly a mark of inexcu able inattention,' -aind
ref r to Coop. Eq. 1. 109, for hi po ition. It i the duty of a
ourt of equity to look after the inter t of infant defendant , and
to protect them, in the ab ence of any one to repre ent them; and
it woulcl e proper in thi ca e that a court of equity hould make
th infant defendant and appoint a guardian ad litem to protect
their int re t a infant defendants, in t ad of allowing them to
remain a plaintiff to that action, and poo ibly hav their e tate
more or le s ab orbed by the co ts and expen e of litigation. An
order will be entered tran p ing the po ition of M:ary Carry Bowen
and Bowen Watts from plaintiff to d fendant , and making them
defendant in thi, action; al o, directing that a guardian ad litem
be appointed for the infant defendant , to protect their interest .
For the rea on a igned th motion to r mand i overruled.

from selling or disposing of the estate. In October, 1825, upon

the application of the defendants, and with the consent of the

counsel for the complainants, a receiver of the estate was appointed.

On the fourth of ]\rarch, 1827, W. Waring became of age; but

without adverting to that fact the cause was brought to a hearing

Waring v.

rane, ,.,

aig e (-C:. . Y.) 79.

(1830.)

without giving any notice to him or calling upon him to appoint

a solicitor. On the 16th of April, 1827, a decree for an account

Th bill in thi cau e wa :filed in Jul3 1 9-J: in the name of
the complainanL ho w re infant , b3 A. Brun on a the next
fri nd of W. Waring and by W. Baker a the next friend of the
ther three complai ant ; charging the defendant who were
xecutor with l i manag m nt of the e tate of the father of the
omplainant ; and al o an ging that one of the defendant wa
irre..pon ible. An injunction wa granted re training th
ecutor::;
from lling or di po ino- of the tat . In ctober 1 25 upon
th appli ation of h d f ndant and with th con ent of the
oun 1 for th complainant a r ceiver f th e tate wa appoint .
W. Warin · b came of aa · but
n th fourth of l\Iar h 1
with ut adv rting to that fa t the au wa brouaht to a h aring
ithout ITT.i; ing an noti to him or a.Uina upon him to ap int
a oli itor.
n th 1 th of pril 1
a d er e f r an ac ount

12

was made by the con ent of the counsel for the defendants and
of the guardians of the complainants. The cause was afterwairds
brought to a hearing on the master's report, but it being ascertained that one of the complainants was of aige and had no notice
of the hearing, the chancellor ordered the cause to stand over, that
such complainant might have notice to appear and defend his
right . An order wa sub equently made referring it to a master
to enquire and report whether there were any ju t grounds for the
commencement and prosecution of thi suit; and whether the same
had been pro ecuted by the advice of counsel in good faith, and
with the sole object of subserving the interest of the infant complainant ; and to enquire and report whether the complainant
W. Waring, ince he became of age, had adopted the proceedings
in the suit and assumed the agency and management thereof. The
master reported that although there were apparently, yet in fact
there were no just grounds for the commencement of the suit;
that the suit was commenced for the infants by the advice of counsel, and with the sole object of subserving their intere ts; that after
W. Waring became of age, he took po e sion of the papers in the
suit, and procured a master to proceed on the order of reference;
and that since May or June, 1827, he had had the direction and
management of the suit. After this report was made, the cause
wa brought to a final hearing, upon the pleadings, proofs, reports
and the objections of the complainants' counsel to the last report.

12 Suits by and against Infants

was made b}' the consent of the counsel for the defendants and

of the guardians of the complainants. The cause was afterwards

brought to a hearing on the master's report, but it being ascer-

tained that one of the complainants was of age and had no notice

of the hearing, the chancellor ordered the cause to stand over, that

such complainant might have notice to appear and defend his

rights. An order was subsequently made referring it to a master

to enquire and report whether there were any just grounds for the

commencement and prosecution of tliis suit ; and whether the same

had been prosecuted by the advice of counsel in good faith, and

with the sole object of subserving the interest of the infant com-

plainants; and to enquire and report whether the complainant

W. Waring, since he became of age, had adopted the proceedings

in the suit and assumed the agency and management thereof. The

master reported that although there were apparently, yet in fact

there were no just grounds for the commencement of the suit;

that the suit was commenced for the infants by the advice of coun-

sel, and with the sole object of subserving their interests ; that after

W. Waring became of age, he took possession of the papers in the

suit, and procured a master to proceed on the order of reference;
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SUITS BY AND AGAINST INFANTS

and that since May or June, 1827, he had had the direction and

management of the suit. After this report was made, the cause

was brought to a final hearing, upon the pleadings, proofs, reports

and the objections of the complainants' counsel to the last report.

I The Chancellor:

K 5 ^ A ^^ ^ ^^^^ ^^ ^^^^ ^^ behalf of an infant by his next friend, and

fcr ^ \ ii/the bill is dismissed or a decree is made in the cause before the

f jicA infant is of age, he cannot be personally charged with the costs.

y Thcj are to be charged against the next friend, unless there is

y -vvi^ Ir^ fund under the control of the court belonging to the infant, in

'^" 'i^^ ' .which case the court may direct the costs to be paid out of that

(L; fund. {Taner v. Ivie, 2 Yes. sen. 466.) But the costs will not b e

t (L ""V" charged on the infant's estate, unless the co urt_is_satisfied th£_suit

A Q/^ . was brought in good faith, and with a bona fi de intent t ojbenefit

<^^ the infant. (Pearce v. Pearce, 9 A^es. 547. Whitaher v. Marlar,

^^^foyl Cox's Cas. 285.) In Turner v. Turner (2 Peere Wms. 297),

THE CHANCELLOR:

a bill i filed on behalf of an infant by his next friend, and
1U'~theIfbill
is dismis ed or a decree i made in the cause before the

0"^' j> the next friend died before a decree in the cause. After the infant

y^ became of age, he refused to proceed in the suit; and the bill was

dismissed against him with costs. But on a re-hearing in that

^ i"

^v

infant is of ag , he cannot be per onally charged with the cost .
krbey are to be charged against the n xt friend, unless there is
? ai fund und r the control of the court belonging to the infant, in
which ca e the court may direct the co t to be paid out of that
J
fund. ( Taner v. I vie, 2 Ve . en. 66.) But the co ts will not be
~
harged on the infant'
tat , unle th court i sati fiedJhe_suit
~ , wa brou ht in ood faith, and with a bona de intenJ to benefit
~ the infant.
(Pearce v. Pear e, 9 V . 5 7. Whitak er v. Marlar,
~vA ~ 1 Cox' Ca. 2 5.)
n Tu.rn er v. Turn er (2 P re Wm. 9 ),
~
th next fri nd di d b fore a d er in the au e. After the infant
1 came of age he r fu d to pro
in th uit; and the bill wa
~
i mi ed again t him with co ts. But on a re-hearing in that

"v- .

CV

;\p

V
i

r Jo ;.,,-•
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Waring v. Crane 13

case, Lord King reversed his former decree as to the costs, and

decreed that the infant was not liable therefor. (1 Strange, 708.

2 Eq. Ca. Abr. 238, S. C.) If the suit was improperly brought,

and the infant elects to abandon it when he becomes of age, he

may apply to the court for a reference to ascertain the fact, and the

bill will then be dismissed, with costs to be paid by the next friend.

j3ut although the complainant elects to abandon the suit when he

1

RANE

ca e, Lord ing r versed hi form r d ere a to the co
de ·r d that he infant wa not liabl ther for.
2 q. 1a. br.
, 1 • 1. )
and th jnfont
may appl t th
bill will th n l

13

ancl

is of age, he ca nnot, as a mat t er of course, compel the next friend

to ])ay the costs. If the suit was properly brought for^the infant's

benefit, he mu st pay the c osts^ of the next fri end, a nd also th ose

of the adverse party, wh en he app lies to dismiss the bill, (Anon.

4 Madd. Iv. 4G1.) If he elects tojproceedjn jthe cause after he i s of

ago, the ncxtfri end is discharged from hisj i ability, and the infan t_

will be l iable in t lic_s amc manner as if the suit had been comm enced

by an adult. (1 Harrison, -tT-i. Mitford, 26.) The only excep-

tion to this rule must be, the case that sometimes occurs, where a

decree has been made during liis infancy, by which the infant's

rights are bound. There the suit cannot be abandoned, although

it was not brought in good faith, and was against the interest
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of the infant. In such a case, if the infant applied in time, the

court might compel the next friend to remunerate him for the

costs and expenses to which his estate had been improperly sub-

jected, although he was compelled to proceed under the decree.

In this case, W. Waring became of age before the decree was made

against the executors for an account. He afterwards elected to

proceed under the decree, and took the management of the refer-

ence into his own hands. He has therefore affirmed the act of his

right
it a
of th

next friend in bringing the suit, and it is too late for him now to

insist that it was improperly brought. His proportion of the

defendants' costs must be charged on him personally, or be paid

out of his share of the estate.

The situation of the next friend of the two complainants who

have not arrived of age is different. If the suit was now in a

situation to have the bill dismissed without prejudice to the rights

of the infants when they come of age, I should be disposed to

charge the costs upon their next friend, on the ground that the

suit was improperly instituted by him, and without taking ordi-

nary care to inform himself as to the facts. But some embarrass-

ment now arises from the decree of April, 1827, under which the

accounts of the defendants have been taken. Bv the will of the

n xt fri nd in bringing the uit and it i too late for him now to
in i t that it wa improper! brought. Hi proportion of th
def ndant co t mu t be harg d on 1im per onall3 or be paid
out of hi har of the tate.
h ..:ituation of th n xt fri nd of th two complainant who
haY n t arrived of aO' i diff r nt. If th uit a now in a
. ituati n t haY th bill di mi ed without pr ju lice to the riO'ht
of th infant wh n th ' com of ag I hould b cli p --e to
hnra th o t upon h ir next fri nd n th QTOun l that the
. nit wa __ imr rap rl r institut 1 by him. and with ut takinO' or liut om mbarra nary ar t inform him . . lf a t th fa t .
m nt no"· a 'i
fr m th l r
f \.1 ril, 1 · , , un l r whi 11 th
y h will £ th
a count f th d f ndant ha\ e n tak n.

14

SUITS BY AND AG.AI ST INF ANTS

t tator the defendant weTe tru t e , both of the real and per onal
14 Suits by and against Infants

testator the defendants were trustees, both of the real and personal

estate, until the youngest child became of age; and it was their

duty to take care of it until that time, and then sell or divide it

among the complainants. Instead of consenting to a decree for an

account, and asking for the appointment of a receiver, they should

have asked for a dismissal of the bill; to enable them to go on

and execute the trust, and account to the heirs when they became

of age. The report of the master upon that reference having been

confirmed, that accounting, so far as it goes, must be considered

final between the parties. But the defendants cannot take the

legacies, which were evidently intended as a remuneration in part

to them for the execution of their trust under the will, and aban-

don the trust. As they have been guilty of no misconduct or

breach of trust they are entitled to the costs of defending this suit

and of taking the account, to be paid out of the fund. The injunc-

tion must be dissolved and the receiver discharged; and he must

account with and pay over to the defendants the balance, if any

in his hands, and deliver to them all property which has come to

his possession. In case of disagreement, his accounts must be
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passed before a master residing in the county of Jefferson. The

decree must direct the defendants to proceed and execute the trust

according to the directions of the will, and to distribute the prop-

erty among the complainants when they become of age, respec-

tively, retaining out of the share of each one-third of the costs of

this suit. It must reserve to the complainants the right to apply

to the court for further directions as they shall be advised, if they

cannot settle the estate amicably with the executors; but the

account, as far as it has been taken is to be conclusive upon both

parties. The defendants are also to be at liberty to apply to the

court from time to time as they shall be advised, for directions

in relation to the execution of their trust; giving the usual notice

of such application to the complainant who is of age or to his

solicitor, and to the guardian of the infants. The right is also-

to be reserved to each of the complainants who arc infants, at any

time within six months after they come of age, and notwithstand-

ing any acts done by them under the decree in this cause, to apply-

to the court for such order and dirnction in relation to the costs,

as between them and their next friend, as may be just.

e ~ tate,

until the youn 0 e t child b came of age; and it was their
duty to take care of it until that tim , and then ell or divicle it
among the complainant . In t ad of con enting to a lecre for an
a· ount, and a king for the appointment of a receiver, they shoulJ
ha v a keel for a di missal of the bill; to enable them to go on
and execute the trust, and account to the heirs when they became
of age. The report of the ma ter upon that reference having been
onfirmed, that accounting, o far a it goes, must be considered
final between the partie . But the defendants cannot take the
1 gacies, which were evidently inten led as a remuneration in part
to them for the execution of their tru t under the will, and abandon the tru t. As th y have been guilty of no mi oonduct or
breach of tru t they are entitled to the co t of defending thi uit
and of taking the account, to be paid out of the fund. The injunction must be dis olved and the receiver di charged ; aind he must
account with and pay over to the defendants the balance, if any
in his hands, and deliver to them all property which has come to
his po se ion. In case of di agreement, his accounts must be
pa ed before a master residing in the county of J e:fferson. The
decree must direct th defendants to proceed and execute the trust
according to the directions of the will, and to distribute the property among the complainants when they become of age, re pectively, retaining out of the hare of each one-third of the costs of
thi uit. It mu t reserve to the complainants the right to apply
to the court for further directions a they shall be advised, if they
cannot ettle the estate amicably with the executors; but the
account, a far as it ha been taken i to be conclusive upon both
parlie . The clef ndant are al o to be at liberty to appl to the
court from time to time a they hall b ad vi ed, for directions
in r lation to the execution of th ir tru t; giving the u ual notice
of u h application to the complainant who i o·f age or to his
olicitor and to th guardian of the infant . The right i also.
to be r ervcd t a h of the complainants who arc infant at any
tim within ix month aft r th y om of age, and notwith tandin any a t done by them und r the cl re in thi cau , to apply·
to th court for u h od r an 1 dir ction in r lation to the costs,
as between them and their next friend, as may be just.
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KNICKEEBACKEII v. FliEEST 15

KnicTcerhacher v. De Freest, 2 Paige (N. Y.) SOh. (1830.)

Tins was an application on the part of the complainant to ap-

point a guardian for an infant defendant. The infant had

J{nickerba ker

.

e Fre e l 2 Paige (N . Y.) 304.

(18 0.)

neglected to appear, for twenty days after the time for appearing

as prescribed in the 22d rule had expired; and a petition was

thereupon presented to the court agreeably to the last section of

the 144th rule, requesting that a particular person named in such

petition should be appointed guardian.

The Cpiancellor:

The court never selects a guardian ad litem for an infant de-

fendant on the nomination of the adverse party. It is frequently

necessary for the guardian seriously to contest the complainant's

claim. It is his duty in every case to ascertain from the infant

and his friends, or from other proper sources of information, what

Tur wa an appli ation on th part of the complainant to appoint a guardian for aID infant d i ndant. The infant had
n gl cted to apr ear, for twen day alt r th time for app aring
a· pr rib d in th 2 d rule had xpired; and a petition wa
th reup n pre nt d to the court agr eably to the la t ection of
the 1 -±th rul , r qu ting that a particular per on name l in u ·h
p titian h uld b a·pp int d guardian.

are the legal and equitable rights of his ward. And if a special

answer is necessary, or advisable, for the purpose of bringing the

rights of the infant properly before the court, it is his duty to put

in such an answer. If the infant is a mere nominal party, or has

no defence against the complainant, and no equitable rights as
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against his co-defendants which render a special answer necessar}',

the general answer will be sufficient. If the infant has any sub-

stantial rights which may be injuriously affected by the proceed-

ings in the cause, or if the claim against him is of ar doubtful

character, it is also the duty of his guardian ad litem to attend,

before the court on the hearing, on the taking of testimony in the

cause, on references to the master, and on all other proper occa-

sions to bring forward and protect the rights of his ward. And if

the guardian neglects his duty, in consequence of which the rights

of the infant are not properly attended to, or are sacrificed, he

may be punished for his neglect. H e will also in such case be

liabl e to_the inf ant for all da mages he may sustain. Although it

is the duty of the court to protect the rights of infants, when they

are properly before it, so that they may be seen and fairly under-

stood, yet it is the special duty of the guardian ad litem to bring

those riglits directly under the consideration of the chancellor

for his decision thereon. Tliis being the dutv of tlie ornardian, it

TnE Cn CELLOR:
Th court nev r 1 cts a guardiam ad litem for an infant d f n lant on the nomination of the ad ei:rse party. It i fr qu ntly
ne
ary for the guardian eriou ly to cont t the complainant'
claim. It i hi duty in ev ry ca e to a certain from th infant
and hi friend , or from other prop r ource of information what
are the legal and equitable right of hi ward. And if
pecial
an w r i n e ary, or advi able, for the purpo e of bringin the
right of th infant prop rly before the rourt, it i hi duty to put
in uch an an w r. If the infant i a mere nominal party, or ha~
no d £ n again t th complainant, and no quitable right aao-ain t hi co-d ·f ndain ts which r nder a pecial an wer nece ary
th
neral an wer will be ufficient. If the infant ha any ubtantial right whi h may be injuriou 1 aff cted by the proc eling in th cau , or if the claim again t him i of ai doubtful
chara t r it i al o th duty of hi guardian ad litem to att nd,
b for th ourt on th hearino- on th takino- of t timon in th

tho._
f th e ,. ., uardian it

16
16 Suits by and against Infants

would be improper in any case to permit the complaina^nt to name

the person who is to resist his claim against the infant.

The revised statutes have made provision for the appointment

of a o-uardian for an infant defendant in courts of common law,

where he neglects to have one appointed for himself. (3 E. S.

447, § 10, 11.) It is therefore advisable that the proceedings in

this court should conform to the spirit of those provisions. There

a guardian is not to be appointed for an infant, on the application

of the adverse party, until the infant defendant has been duly

notified and required to procure one to be appointed for himself.

When the complainant applies for the appointment of a guardian

for an infant defendant, under the last clause of the 144th rule,

he will be entitled to an order appointing such person as shall

then be designated by the court guardian ad litem, unless the

infant, within ten days after service of a copy of such order, shall

procure a guardian to be appointed for himself; and shall give

notice thereof to the complainant. Such service may be made on

the infant, or at his place of residence, in the usual manner, if he

is of the age of 14 years or upwards. If he is under that age it
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should be served on his general guardian, or on his relative, friend

or other person, with whom he resides. At the expiration of the

ten days, on filing an affidavit of the service of the order, and that

no notice of the appointment of a guardian ad litem has been

received, the complainant may have an order of course that the

former order for the appointment of the guardian named by the

court, be made absolute.

In partition causes, where security is required from the guardian,

the order must require the infant to procure a guardian to be

appointed and to file the requisite security within the ten days,

or the order for the appointment of the person named by the court

will be made absolute, on his filing such security. \YheTe the in-

fant is a non-resident, special directions must be given by the

court as to the manner of serving the order, if any notice thereof

shall be deemed requisite.

In this case James Porter is appointed guardian ad litem, if

the infant defendant sliall not procure one to be appointed for

himself within ten days.

SUITS BY

JD

GA.I ST INF.ANTS

would be improp r in any a e to p rmit the complainant to name
the person who i to re i t hi laim again t the infant.
The revi ed statutes ha e made provi ion for the appointment
of a guardian for an infant defendaint in court of common law,
where he neglect to have one appointed for himself. (2 R. S.
44 , 10, 11.) It i therefore ad vi able that the proceeding in
thi court hould conform to the piri t of tho e provi ion . 'l1here
a guardian i not to be appointed for an infant, on the a:p plication
of th ad1er e party, until the infant defendant ha been duly
notified and required to procure one to be appointed for him elf.
When the complainant applie for the appointment of a guardian
for an infant defendant, under the last lau e of the 1-1-±th rule,
he will be entitled to an order appointing uch person a hall
then be de ignated b the court guarlian ad liteni, unle the
infant, within ten day aft r ervice of a opy of uch order, hall
procure a guardian to be appointed for him elf; and hall give
notice thereof to the complainant.
uch rvice may be made on
the infant, or at hi place of re idence, in the u ual manner, if he
i of the age of 1-1 year or up" ard . If he i under i.hat age it
should be rved on hi general guardian, or on hi relafrvc, friend
or other per on, with whom he re ide .
t the expiration of the
ten day on filing an affidavit of the ervice of the order, and that
no notice of the appointm nt of a guardian ad liteni ha been
rec ived, the complainant may have an order of cour e that the
form r order for the appointment of the guardian named by the
court, be made ab olute.
In partition cau
where ecurity i required from the guardian,
the ord r mu t require th infant to procure a guardian to be
appointed and to file the requi ite ecurity within the ten days,
or i.he order for the appointm nt of the per on named by the ourt
will be made ab olut , on hi filing uch ecurit '. \Vh re the infant i a non-r ident p ial dir ction mu t be gi.v n by the
court a to the mann r of erving th ord r if an ' notic thereof
hall be deemed r qui ite.
In thi ca Jam
orter i appoint c1 gunr linn ad l item iC
th infant d f nclant . h 11 not pro ure one to b ar pointccl for
him elf within ten day .
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Enos v. Capps

Ems V. Cam)s, 12 III. 25

Eno

This was a- bill in chancery filed by Capps against the plaintill'V*'^ ^ A ^

.

app

1

Ill. ;,5 .

in error and others. The bill charges that Capps had an equitablctrl J^v*/

interest in certain lands, which Pascal P. Enos held as trustee for(>^w

one Moore, and of which he died seized. That Moore and the

heirs of Enos, are combining, etc., to deprive Capps of the land.

P. P. Enos, deceased, and left a widow and several children, who

were all made parties.

This writ of error is prosecuted by Susan P. Enos and Julia R.

Enos, who are respectively under the age of twenty-one years, act-

ing by Pascal P. Enos, the younger, as their next friend.

The decree sought to be reversed was rendered by Ford, Judge,

at September, 1836.

Treat, C. J.:

This was a suit in chancery brought in 1834, by Jabez Capps

against John Moore, William S. Hamilton, Salome Enos widow

of Pascal P. Enos, deceased, and P. P. Enos, Z. A. Enos, M. M.

Enos, S. P. Enos, and J. R Enos, his heirs at law. The heirs were
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then all minors. The bill set up an equitable title in the com-

plainant to a tract of land, of which Pascal P. Enos died seized;

and it contained a prayer that the heirs might be required to con-

.. J
~/~,vJ

' e> .v

';t7~r-

.J^

·~ ~

vY

, P

/

1

the defendants except Z. A. Enos, S. P. Enos and J. R. Enos. At

litem for the infant defendants; and at the September term, 1836,

the bill was taken for confessed against all of the defendants, and

a decree entered, requiring Salome Enos to convey to the com-

plainant all of the interest of the heirs in the land. In 18-47, a

writ of error for the reversal of the decree was sued out in the

name of all of the defendants. Tlie complainant pleaded, that

more than five years had elapsed between the entering of the

decree and the suing out of the writ of error; to which the de-

fendants replied, that two of the heirs were still infants, and within

the saving clause of the statute. This court sustained a demurrer

to the replication, and dismissed the writ of error. The decision

was put on the ground that, as any one or more of the defendants

.,/'
jyl:
iV

Thi wa ai bill in ·hancery fil 'U 1y app again t the plaintiff
in rror an th . r h bill ·hara- that 1app had an quitabl ~
hi h a cal I . 1 no h ld a tru te for ·
int r t in •r ain lancl
on l\I r
iz cl. That :\ oore and the
1
app of th land.
Ycral hildren, who
wer all ma partic .
Thi writ of rror i pro ecut d by u an . 1 n and Julia R.
Eno who ar r p tively und r th a e of twenty-one yea
acting b , a ca-1 . Eno the younger a th ir next friend.
Th d r e ought to be re ersed wa rendered b; Ford, Judge,
at eptember, 1 36.

vey the legal estate to the complainant. Process was served on all

the October term, 1835, Salome Enos was appointed guardian ad

e/v'.

(fs~or ~~.::

1
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J.:

Thi wa a uit in chancer brouaht in 1 3-± by Jabez Capp"
amilton alom Eno widow
again t John Moor William
cea ed and
. Eno , Z. . Eno
I. :JI.
of a cal . Eno
Eno
. P. Eno and J. R Eno hi heir at law. Th h ir were
then all minors. The bill et up an quitable titl in the mplainant to a tract of land, of which Pa cal P. Eno died eized ;
ancl i conta1ned a pra er that th heir might b required to con\e) the 1 aal e tat
o th complainant. Proce wa erved on all
th defendant x pt Z. . Eno
. P. Eno and J. . Eno .
t
th
ctob r term 1
alo e Eno wa appoint d 21lardian ad
litem for th infant d f ndant · and at the ptemb r term, 1 36
the bill wa tak n f r onf
d a aain t all of the d f ndant and

nam
mor tha
till infant", and within
ann ·lau
tatut .
hi
tut U"tain d a cl murr r
to th r pli ati n and di 1i " d i.h writ f rr r . Th d i i n
wa I ut n th 0 r un l that, a an~~ on
f th d f ndant
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18 Suits by axd against Infants

might under our statute ha^ve removed tlie case into the Supreme

Court, by appeal or writ of error, and as some of them had lost

their right to do so by lapse of time, they should not be permitted

to avail themselves of the nonage of their co-defendants, to accom-

plish indirectly what the law would not allow them to do directly :

See -i Gilman, 315. This writ of error is prosecuted by S. P. Enos

and J. K. Enos, who are still minors, and within the protection

of the statute.

The decree was unquestionably erroneous. No answer was ever

filed bjjhe_£u ardian ad litem nor was any proof introduced to _siis-

tain the averments of the bill. I^either a defau lt, no r a decree pr o

confesso can bejak en against an inf ant defendant;_Therejnust_be

a^guardian ad Ui £m ap pointedjor him, and the guardia nLJBB§t fije

an_answer ; and^t he complainan t must th en make fu ll proof_of ^is

rightj o the relief c laimed. Even where the answer of_Jh£_^guard-

ian admits the bill to be Jrue^ the^complainant^ must prove the

Fruthofjiis^allegat ions with the same str ictness^asjf the answer

had interposed a direct and positive denial : McCIay v. Norris, 4

Gilman, 370; Hough v. Doyle, 8 Blackford, 300. The decree,
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then, as to the present plaintiffs in error cannot l)e sustained.

Bartlctt V. Batts, IJf Ga. 539. (ISoJ,.)

Trespass, &c., in Lee Superior Court. Decision by Judge Love,

November Term, 1853,

William N. Batts brought his action for trespass &c. vs. William

IST. Bartlett. The infancy of the plaintiff being suggested, counsel

for plaintiff moved the appointment of a guardian ad litem, for

the purpose of prosecuting said suit; which motion was granted,

SUITS BY A D .A.GA.INST INFANTS

might under our statute haive removed the case into the Supreme
ourt, by appeal or writ of error, and a ome of them had lost
their right to do o by lap e of time, they hould not be permitted
to avail them elve of th nonage of their co-defendant , to accompli h indir tly "hat th law would not allow them to do directly:
ee -:!: Gilman 15. Thi writ of error i prosecuted by S. P. Enos
and J. R. Eno who are till minors, and within the protection
of the tatu .
The decre wa unque tionably erroneous. No answer was ever
:filed by the guardian ad litem nor was any proof introduced to sustain the averment of the bill. Neither ai default, nor a decree P!Y
confe so can be taken again t an infant defendant. There must be
~guardian ad litem appointed for him, and the guardia1
n must file
an an wer; and the complainant mu t then make full proof of his
right to the relief claimed. Even where the an wer of the guardiain admit the bill to be true, the complainant must prove the
truth of hi allegation with the ame trictnes as if the an wer
had interpo ed a direct and positive denial: McClay v. Norris, 4
Gilman, · 370; Hough v. Doyle, 8 Blackford, 300. The decree,
then, as to the present plaintiffs in error cannot be ustained.

and the Hon. Lott Warren was so appointed. [The father and

natural guardian of the plaintiff not residing in this State.]

This decision is assigned as error by the defendants below, and

plaintiff in this Court.

By the Court. — Benning, J., delivering the opinion.

Bartlett v. Batts, 14 Ga. 539.

( 18 4.)

As to suits by infants, this seem;? to have been the state of the

Law of England, at the time when that Law was introduced into

Georgia.

Process might ho. sued out by tbe infant alone, l)nt the declara-

Trc pa , & ., in Lee Superior Court. Deci ion by Judge LovE,
November Term, 1853.
William N. Batt brought his action for trespa &c. vs. William
N. Bartlett. The infancy of the plaintiff being ugg ted, coun el
for plaintiff mo ed the appointment of a guardian ad litem, for
the purpo e of pro ecuting aid uit · which motion wa granted,
and the Hon. Lott Warr n wa o appointed. [Th father ancl
natural guardian of the plaintiff not re iding in thi State.]
Thi d ci ion i a igned a error by the def ndant below, and
plaintiff in thi
ourt.
By the ourt.-BEN :rING J., deliv rin the op1mon.
m:) to hav been th tate of the
to uit by infant thi
Law of 1 DO'"land, at the tim when that Law wa introduc d into
oro-rn.
Pr ·() . miaht l
u d out by the infant alon , l nt the a rlara-

Ban.TLETT
Bartlett v. Bates 19

tion could not regularly be filed before a next friend to the infant

had been appointed by the Court, for prasecuting the infant's

suit. If the declaration was filed before such a next friend had

been appointed, the defendant might, at his option, refuse to

plead, or he might go on with his defense. If he chose to go on,i

A and did go on until a verdict had passed against him, he lost alll

right to object to the non-existence of a next friend in the suit.

That after, verdict had become a matter which was cured by the I

Statutes of jeofails.

If not clioosing to go on, the defendant refused to plead to the

declaration, or after pleading, refused to take any other of the

steps to be taken by defendants before verdict, the Court would

not comi)el him to advance ; but neither would it dismis s _the in-

fant's suit. It would j ucrely, at that stage of the case, appoint a^

next friend to__the_ inf ant ; and ha ving appointed one, it would

consider th e case as standing in th e condition_ in whichit would

have stood, h ad a next friend been regularly appointed at the fi igt

momen t, at wh ich one might prope £ly_ha ve been a ppointed.

Tlie suit, although attended by a next friend, was the suit of
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the infant's. The next friend was merely an officer of the Court,

apix>inted by the Court to look after the interests of the infant.

He was not a) party to the suit. (Macpherson on Inf. 353. 1

Tidd Pr. 99. 2 Saund. Eep. 117, f note (i.)— Flight v. Bodand,

4 Russ. R. 298. Sinclair v. Sinclmr, 13 Mees & W. 640.

[1.] Upon the whol e, it seems very s afe to say, that a suit

c^menced_aiid 4)rosecuted- hyL_aii_inianL^alQn£»_is_ji ot absolutely !

void; an d although_de££ati££_nLJganting^ a next friend, the d efe_ct

is one which, before verdict is amendable, and after verdict is

cured.

[2.] The father of the infant is not the only person that is

eligible to the place of next friend. Any other may be appointed

by the Court, in its discretion. And when the father can be a

witness for the infant, or when he neglects the interests of the

infant, if another is appointed, it is done in the exercise of a wise

discretion. (1 Tidd. Pr. 99, 100. 1 Danl. Ch. Pr. 94, 95.)

There does not appear to be any material difference between

a next friend and a guardian, ad litem. (1 Tidd., 99, 100. —

Macpherson on Inf. 352, 353.)

No error is apparent in the record in this case; and there-

fore, the decisions of the Court below ought to be affirmed.

v.

B 'IES

1

tion oould not r gularly be fil cl b f r a xt fri ncl o the infant
1
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Statut of jeofaiil .
H not choo in t go on, the defendant ref eel to plead to th
declarati n, or aft r pleading, r f d to take any other of the
st p t b taken by d fendant b for v rdi t, th
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not c mpel him to advance; but neither would it di mi t_he infant
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~n id r he ca e a tanding in the condition in which it would_
ha e toad, had a n xt friend be n regularly appointed a the :first
mom nt, ait whi h on might properly have been appointed.
The suit, although att nded by a next friend, -;a the uit of
the infant . The next friend wa m rely an officer of the ourt,
appoint d by the ourt to look after the int re
of the infant.
wa" not ai party to the uit. (Macpher on on Inf. 35 . 1
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whi h, b fore
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The father of the infant i not th onl per on that i
to th pla of next fri nd.
ny other ma b appoint d
bv th
ourt in · di cretion.
nd wh
th father an b a
witn
for the infant or when h n glee th int r t of the
infant i anoth r i appoint d it i don in the
di er tion. ( 1 Tidd. r. 99, 100. 1 anl. h. r. ± 9 . )
Ther do not ppear to b an material di:ff r n e b hr n
ardian ad litem.
1 Tidd.
9 100.3.)
rror i appar n i th r r m tbi
and her f the ourt b low ouo-ht to b a ·med.

2~,.

~

::0 /11
'^ n c^ Johnson v. ^Yaterllouse, 152 Mass. 5S5. flSOl.)

)/

. . /^ ctWrit of error to reverse a judgment of the Superior Court,

1

contained a general denial, and alleged that the defendant at the

time of the issuing out of the plaintiff's writ "was and is under

twenty-one years of age." The second paragraph of the plea was

as follows: "And further says that the plaintiff was a minor,

as alleged, at the time of said judgment, and that he had no

probate guardian or legally appointed guardian ad litem; but

that he was in fact represented and defended in said action, in

which judgment was recovered, by his father and mother, and that

said action was twice tried by a jury, and at both trials the father

and mother were present in said Superior Court, and were repre-

sented by counsel, and defended said action on behalf of said

p^itioner."

irkJL f^ At the hearing, before Field, J., the facts contained in the
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' '^'\ second paragraph of the plea were admitted to be true, and the

^ judge reserved the case for the consideration of the full court.

y.

a/^, C. Allen, J.:

~s riy Tl^^ general rule is well established, that a judgment cannot

)t/^ -ilT properlybe rendered against an int anF defe ndan t in a civil s uit,

A p unless he has a guardian who may defend the suit in h isJ jeFalf ;

^ \ tP and if a judgm en t" is so rendered, the infant is entitled t o maintain

i/^ a writ of error to avoid the same. Crockett v. Drew, 5 Gray, 399.

>/< Swan V. Horton, 14 Gray, 179. Farris v. Richardson, 6 Allen,

> ^'^ — 118. Mansur v. Pratt, 101 Mass. 60. Cassier's case, 139 Mass.

^ ^ In the present case, the plea avers that the plaintiff in error

^\( ^^^ ^^ infant at the time of the rendering of the judgment, and

\k/ ^^^ °° probate guardian or legally appointed guardian ad litem,,

j^ but was in fact represented and defended in the action by his

^^ father and mother, who were present in court at the trial, and

■/ir ( » were represented by counsel, and defended the action on his be-

y^ / &. ' half, ^he defendant in error contends that these facts will supply

r

c

·~ ~

.AGAINST INF.ANTS

.

.vr; /'

J

r-Y
John on v. Tfaterhouse, 15

~""' ~RIT

rendered in an action of tort to recover for personal injuries occa-

in error. The record showed that the answer in the original action

v
l l

e .

2^ }J^ «. §^'I'J-'S BY AND AGAINST INFANTS

sioned to the defendant in error by a dog owned by the plaintiff

<( _J\

of

if

,K^./^

?

Mass. 585. {1891.)

to rever e a judgment of the Superior Court,
. /
i rendered in an action of tort to recover for personal injuries occaioned to the defendant in error by a dog owned by the plaintiff
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in rror. The record howed that the an wer in the original action
~\
contained a g neral d nial, and alleg d that the defendant at the
time of the i uing out of the plaintiff writ "was and i under
~
twent -one 3 ear of ag . ' The cond paragraph of the plea was
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a follow : ' And further a
that the plaintiff wa a minor,
e a alleged, at the time of ruid judgment, and that he had no
probate guardian or legally appointed guardian ad litem; but
<r that he wa in fact rep re ented and def nded in aid action, in
,.Y
which judgment was recovered, by his father and mother, and that
I
aid action was twice tried by a jury, and at both trial the father
U
and mother were pre ent in aid Superior Court, and were rnpreV' ,. ~
ented by counsel, and defended said action on behalf of said
pptitioner."
At the hearing, before Field, J ., the facts contained in the
) ~~ /
J "~q second paragraph of the plea were admitted to be true, and the
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judge re erved the ca e for the consideration of the full court.
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properly be r endered agarnst Ml mfant defendant in a civil suit,
unle he ha a guardian who may defend the suit in his behalf;
and if a judgment i o rendered, the infant i entitled to maintain
a writ of rror to avoid the ame. Crockett v. Drew, 5 Gray, 399.
S wan v. Horton, 14 ra;, 179. Farris v. Richardson, 6 Allen,
11
Mansur v. Pratt, 101 M . 60. Oassier's ca e, 139 :Ma .
-!

~?s.

./

ALLEN,

9J The general rule i well established, that a judgment cannot

1 ..

n the pr nt ca e the pl a a e that th plaintiff in error
wa an infant at the tim of th r nd rirw of th judgm~pt, and
b ad no Ir bat
uardian o 1 o-ally app int d uardian ad litem,
ut wru in fa t repr ent d and d f nd d in the a tion by bi·
fath r and mo her who w re pr ent in ourt at th trial, and
wer e r pr nt
by un el, and d f nd d th action on hi behalf~ he d f ndant in rror ontend that th e fact will upply

Jorr . . • _
Johnson v. Wateuiiouse 21

the want of a guardian regularly and formally appointed, and that

under these circumstances the infant is not entitled to maintain

his writ of error.

Such appears to be the rule adopted in Vermont. Priest v.

Hamilton, 2 Tyler, 50. Wrisley v. Kenyan, 28 Vt. 5. Fuller v.

Smith, 49 Vt. 253. The case cited from Mississippi does not

appear to us to go so far, as there a husband was authorized by

statute to appear for his infant wife, so that no guardian ad litem

for her was deemed necessary. Frishy v. Harrisson, 30 Miss. 452.

Xo other decision has been cited by counsel which goes so far as

the Vermont cases, and after some examination we have found

none. The practice of having a regularly appointed guardian rests

on good reasons. It has been said that the duty of watching over

the interests of infants in a litigation devolves in a considerable

degree upon the court. Bank of United States v. Ritchie, 8 Pet.

128, 144. This duty is performed in the first instance by seeing

that an infant is represented by a guardian who is suitable to

protect his interests in the particular case. The father is usually

a proper person to act as such guardian, but not always. There is
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an obvious advantage in having the fitness of the person who is

to act as guardian determined in, the first instance, rather than

after the trial is over. It was held in Brown v. Severson, 12 Heisk.

381, that where an infant's mother, who was named as his guar-

dian, in his father's will, had appeared in a suit as his guardian,

and answered as such, and had been recognizeil by the court as

guardian, the judgment should not be set aside, though no formal

appointment as guardian appeared of record. In the case now

before us, the infant's parents did not file an answer as his guar-

dians, nor assume to act formally as such, and there is nothing

to show that the court recognized them as his actual guardians,

or acted upon the assumption that they were such. They were

simply his parents. It is la jd down in Ma _cpherson on Infant^

353, that no legal right of p arentage or of gulirdianship Avill

enable any one to act for the infant without an appointment a_s

guardiaiL. If there is no guardian of an infant defendant, the

plaintiff must bring the matter to the attention of the court, and

see to it that one is appointed. Sican v. Ilorton, 14 Gray, 179.

Shipman v. Stevens, 2 Wils. 50. Clarke v. Gilmanton, 12 X. H.

515. Mason v. Denison, 15 Wend. 64, 67. In Letcher v. Letcher,

2 Marshall, 153, the mother of infant defendants, who was also

.

WATERUO

E
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22 Suits by and against Infants

herself a defendant, answered for them as their guardian ; but she

did not appear to have been appointed to defend for them, and the

judgment against them was reversed. See also Irons v. Crist, 3

Mai-shall, 143 ; Searccy v. Morgan, 4 Bibb, 96 ; Pond v. Doneghy,

18 B. Mon. (Ky.) 558. In Swain v. Fidelity Ins. Co. 54 Penn.

St. 455, an attorney appeared for an infant at the instance of his

SUITS BY AND AGAINST INF ANTS

her elf a defendant, an wered for them as their guardian; but she
did not appea·r to have been appointed to defend for them, and the
judgment again t them was reversed. See also Irons v. Crist, 3
far hall, 1±3; earcey v. Morgan, 4 Bibb, 96; Pond v. Doneghy,
18 B. 1on. (Ky.) 558. In Swain v. Fidelity Ins. Co . 54 Penn.
St. -±55, an attorney appeared for an infant a t the instance of his
mother; but this was held to be insufficient. In Colman v. Northcote, 2 Hare 1-±7, Vice Chancellor Wigram refused to receive the
an wer in equity of a married woman, who was an infant, either
separately or jointly with her husband, until a guardian should
have been assigned to her. The fact that there are adult defendants joined with an infant defendant, and that all appear
by the same attorney, will not a·vail to prevent the infant from
obtaining a reversal of the judgment. Goodridge v. Ross, 6 Met.
487. Castledine v. Mundy, 4 B. & Ad. 90. 2 Saund. 212a, note -t
The father of an infant soldier is not entitled to his bounty money,
nor to money paid for his enlisting as a substitute in the army.
Banks v. Conant, 14 Allen, 497. Kelly v. Sprout, 97 Mass. 169.
T aylor v. Mechanics' Savings Bank, 97 Mass. 345. Nor has a
father as such a right to demand and receive a legacy to his
infant child. Miles v. Boyden, 3 Pick. 213, 218. Genet v. Tallmadge, 1 Johns. Ch. 3. When an infant sues by prochein ami, in
theory of law the prochein ami is appointed by the court, and his
authority to act may be revoked by the court. Guild v. Cranston,
8 Cush. 506.
It seems to us that it is more in accordance with the general
current of decisions, and with sound principles, to hold that the
facts stated are insufficient to show that the plaintiff in error is
bound by the judgment rendered against him. Certainly he ought
not to be bound by the appearance of his father and mother for
him, unless in point of fact they were suitable per ans to represent him in the particufar case, and to def end his interests; and
the proper time for making the inquiry whether they were so is
past. The original answer disclos d the fact nf infancy, and the
original plaintiff, the pr ent d fendant in rror, might have had
a guardian ad litem appointed by making an application to the
court.
c ording to the practice under the statute of thi Commonwealth, e en wh re a judgment i found to hav be n erroneou by
1

mother; but this was held to be insufficient. In Colman v. North-

cote, 2 Hare 147, Vice Chancellor Wigram refused to receive the

answer in equity of a married woman, who was an infant, either

separately or jointly with her husband, until a guardian should

have been assigned to her. The fact that there are adult de-

fendants joined with an infant defendant, and that all appear

by the same attorney, will not avail to prevent the infant from

obtaining a reversal of the judgment. Goodridge v. Ross, 6 Met.

487. Castledine v. Mundy, 4 B. & Ad. 90. 2 Saund. 212a, note 4.

The father of an infant soldier is not entitled to his bounty money,

nor to money paid for his enlisting as a substitute in the army.

Banks v. Conant, 14 Allen, 497. Kelly v. Sprout, 97 Mass. 169.

Taylor v. Mechanics' Savings Bank, 97 Mass. 345. Nor has a
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father as such a right to demand and receive a legacy to his

infant child. Miles v. Boy den, 3 Pick. 213, 218. Oenet v. Tall-

madge, 1 Johns. Ch. 3. When an infant sues by prochein ami, in

theory of law the prochein ami is appointed by the court, and his

authority to act may be revoked by the court. Guild v. Cranston,

8 Cush. 506.

It seems to us that it is more in accordance with the general

current of decisions, and with sound principles, to hold that the

facts stated are insufficient to show that the plaintiff in error is

bound by the judgment rendered against him. Certainly he ought

not to be bound by the appearance of his father and mother for

him, unless in point of fact they were suitable persons to repre-

sent him in the particular case, and to defend his interests; and

the proper time for making the inquiry whether they were so is

past. The original answer disclosed the fact of infancy, and the

original plaintiff, the present defendant in error, might have had

a guardian ad litem appointed by making an application to the

court.

According to the practice under the statutes of this Common-

wealth, even where a judgment is found to have been erroneous by

23
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reason of an error in fact, the entry must be judgment reversed.

Pub. Sts. c. 187, § 2. Packard v. Matthews, 9 Gray, 311.

Judgment reversed.

rea on of an error in fact, th ntry mu t l e judgment re r ·ed.
Pub. t . c. 187, 2. Packard . Matthews, 9 ray, 311.
Judgment reversed.

McDermott v. Thompson, 29 Fla. 299. (1892.)

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Monroe county.

The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court.

(Judge Malone, of the Second Circuit, sat in the place of Mr.

Chief Justice Eaney, who was disqualified.)

McD ermott v. Thompson,

9 Fla.

99.

{1 892.)

Taylor, J. :

On the 20th day of Januar}^, 1883, John L. McDermott filed

his bill in equity in the Circuit Court of Monroe county, Sixth

Judicial Circuit, against John E. Thompson, as executor of the

will of Olivia Gibbons, deceased, and against George Edward and

Tliomas Eugene Gibbons, minor children of Olivia Gibbons, de-

ceased, praying that the last will of Oliviai McDermott, who was

Appea1 from th
ircuit ourt for n·fonro
unty.
The fact in the
tated in th opinion of h court.
·ond ircuit, at in th place of Mr.
( J udg Ialon , of th
Chi f Ju tic Raney, who wa di qualified.)

formerly, before her marriage with McDermott, called Olivia

Gibbons, made before her marriage with McDermott, be set aside

as illegal and void, and for an accounting by John E. Thompson

as the executor of such will, &c.
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John E. Thompson, as executor, answered. Testimony was

taken and the cause submitted to the chancellor, and a final decree

therein was rendered in the court below on the 24th of April,

1882, setting aside the will and declaring it to have been revoked

because of the fact that it was made by the testatrix prior to her

second marriage, devising all of her property to children by

former marriage, and having had issue of a son by her second

marriage with McDermott who was not provided for by said will.

From this decree the cause was appealed to this court, and this

court at the January Term, 1883, rendered a decision therein (19

Fla., 852) reversing the decree of the court below because of the

failure to make the minor children of Olivia Gibbons by her first

marriage parties to the suit by proper service upon them of process

in the cause, and because of the want of proper answer for such

minoi-s through a guardian ad litem. In the former decision of

this court in the cause it was distinctly decided that the subpoena

in the cause should be served upon the minors in person, and

T LOR J.:
On the Oth day of January, 18 2, John L. McDermott :filed
quity in the ircuit ourt of Monroe county ixth
Judicial ir uit, again t John E . Thomp on a xecutor of the
will of livia ibbon dee a ed, and again t George Edward and
Thoma Eu ene Gibbon , minor children of Olivia Gibbon , deea ed prayin that th la t will of Olivia• fc ermott, who wa"'
form rly, befor her marriag with fcDermott called livia
ibbon , mad b fore h r marriage with 1cDermott, be et asid
a ill gal and void, and for an accounting by John E. Thomp on
a th xecu tor of u h will, &c.
John E. Thomp on, a executor, answered. Te timony wa
taken and the cau e ubmitted to the chancellor, and a final decree
therein wa rend r d in the court below on the 24th of April,
18 2, etting a ide the will and declaring it to have been revoked
because of the fact that it wa made by the te tatrix prior to her
econd marriage, devi .. ing all of her property to children by
former marriage, and ha ing had i ue of a on by her econ<l
marriage with McDermott who was not provided for by aid will.
From thi decree th cau e wa appealed to thi court and thin
court at the J anuar T erm 1 3, r ndered a deci ion therein ( 19
Fla., 52) rev r ing the d cree of the court below b cau e of the
failur to mak the minor children of livia Gibbon b ' h r fir t
marria·a parti to th uit b · proper ervi upon th m of proce "'
in th
and b au of th want of prop r an w r for u h
mmo
iardian ad l item. In the former
ci ion of
thi our in th au it wa di tin tl d id d that th ubpcena
in th au
h uld b
r1 d up n th
minor in p r on and
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u])on a guardian ad litem for them appointed by the court, and

that the service on the minors should be in the presence of their

legal guardian, if they have one, or in the presence of such person

as had for the time being the actual care or custody of such minors.

After the decision of this court subpoena seems to have been issued

to such minors, but the return of service thereof is defective be-

cause it does not show the names of the minors upon whom it was

(served, neither does it show that it was ever served upon any

guardian ad litem for such minors appointed by the court. On

the 2d day of June, 1883, after the service of subpcena on the

minors, of which the imperfect return was made as aforesaid,

G. Bowne Patterson, as guardian ad litem for the minors, George

E. and Thomas E. Gibbons, interposed a demurrer to the bill.

This demurrer was subsequently on September 11th, 1884, sus-

tained by the court below, and the bill dismissed; and from this

order the cause is appealed a second time to this court. How, or

by what authority, G. Bowne Patterson got into the cause as guar-

dian ad litem for these minors, we have been unable to discover
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from anything in the record. Therejsno order of cou rt ap point-

ing and authorizi ng ^ him to act in that capacity, an d_ there_is_no

subpoen a directed too r served upon him, citing him in th at or any

other capac ity_to appear and answer _forL ^nfl nn bphg VP^ of said

minors. We are constrained to conclude from this status of the

record that the requirements of the former decision and mandate

of this court have not been complied with, and that the said minors

are not yet properly before the court. With that decision we are

fully in accord. It pointed out with sufficient particularity what

was necessary to be done in order to get the minors properly before

the court; 1st, that a guardian ad litem should be appointed by

■ ,. . |the court for such minors; 2d, that such minors should be per-

\^J^ sonally served with subpoena in the presence of their legal guar-

,^ (dian, or in the presence of such person who had the care and cus-

tody of them; and 3d, that such guardian ad litem should be

served with subpcena in the cause. None of these requisites have

been complied with. It follows that all the proceedings and orders

had and made in the cause since the former decision of this court

in the premises must be set aside and reversed, with directions to

supjjly tlie omissions in the proceedings therein, and herein jwinted

out, and it is so ordered.
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upon a guardian ad litem for them appointed by the court, and
that the ervice on the minors should be in the presence of their
legal guardian, if they have one, or in the presence of uch person
a had for the tim being the actual care or custo ly of such minors.
Aft r the decitSion of this court ubpama seems to have been issued
to such minor , but th return of service thereof i defective becau e it does not show the names of the minors upon whom it vrns
served, neither does it show that it wa ever erved upon any
guardian ad litem for such minors appointed by the court. On
the 2d day of June, 1883, after the service of subpama on the
' minors, of which the imperfect return was made as aforesaid,
G. Bowne Patterson, as guardian ad litem for the minor , George
E. and Thomas E. Gibbons, interposed a demurrer to the bill.
This d murr r was ub quently on September 11th, 1884, sustained by the court below, and the bill dismi sed ; and from this
order the cause is appealed a second time to this court. How, or
by what authority, G. Bowne Paitterson got into the cause as guardian ad litem fo.r these minors, we have been unable to discover
from anything in the record. There is no order of court appointing and authorizing him to act in that capacit:y, and there is no
sub cena directed to or served u on him citin him in that or any
other capacity to appear and answer for and on behalf of sai
minors. We are constrained to conclude from this status of the
record that the requirements of the former decision and mandate
of this court have not been complied with, and that the said minors
are not yet properly before the court. With that decision we are
fully in accord. It pointed out with sufficient particularity what
wa necessary to be done in order to get the minors properly before
the court; 1 t, that a guardian ad litem hould be appointed by
the court for such minors; 2d, that such minors should be per, onally erved with ubpama in the pres nee of their legal guardian, or in the pre ence of uch person who had the care and custody of them; and 3d, that uch guardian ad litem hould be
ervcd with ubpcena in the cau e. Non of th e r quisites have
be n complied with. It follow that all th proceeding and order
had and mad in th cau e in e the former d ci ion of this court
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Suits by and against Persons ]\Ientally Incompetent.

Dorsheimer v. Roorback, 18 N. J. Eq. 438. (18G7.)

S UITS BY AND AGAINST PERSONS

1ENTALLY INCOMPETENT.

This was a motion on jjart of the defendant to order the bill to

be taken from the llles, on the ground that the complainant was

Dorsheimer v. Roorbaclc, 18 N. J . Eq. 438.

(1867.)

an idiot, and the bill was filed in her name by one Couse, as her

next friend, he not having been appointed her guardian upon

inquisition found, or been authorized by this court in this case

to file the bill as her next friend.

The Chancellor:

The motion is made by the defendant, and not on part of the

idiot, or any one in her behalf. But in this case, where it is alleged

in the bill that complainant is an idiot a nativitate, and unable

to manage her affairs, and sues by a person calling himself her

next friend, without any appointment, if the proceeding is not

This wa a otion on part of the d f ndant to ord r the bill to
be tak n from th file , on th ground that the complainant wab
an idiot, and the bill wa filed in her nam by one ou , a her
n xt fri nd, h not having b en appoint d her guardian upon
inqui ition found, or b en authorized by this court in thi a e
to :file th bill as her next friend.

according to law, and not binding on the idiot, the defendant

must make this motion to protect himself from being obliged to

defend a suit brought without authority.

Idiots and lunatics may sue at law ])y next friend, to be ap-

pointed by the court; but in equity, must sue by the committee
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or guardian of their estates duly appointed. When the idiocy or

lunacy is not partial, and, in all cases, when it has been found on

an inquisition, a court of equity will not allow a suit to be brought

by an idiot or lunatic in his owm name, or that of a next friend,

nominated by himself, or appointed by the court; his guardian

or committee must join in the suit. When a person is only par-

tially incapable, as one merely deaf and dumb, the court will

appoint a next friend to be joined with him in the suit, and to

conduct it for him.

The authorities all agree that idiots and lunatics must sue in

equity, by their committees or guardians. In this state, the per-

sons to whom the estates of idiots and lunatics are committed

upon inquisition found, are styled their guardians; in many of

the other states, and in England, they are called their committees.

Shclford on Lunatics, 415, says: "Idiots and lunatics must sue

in courts of equity by their committees." In Story's Eq. PI., § 64;

1 Daniell's Chan. Pr. (3d ed.) 79; Stock on Non Compotes MenWs,

33 ; Mitford Eq. PI. 29, and 2 Barb. Chan. Pr. 224, the same rule

THE CHANCELLOR :

The motion i made by the defendant, and not on part of the
idiot, or any one in her behalf. But in thi ca e, where it i alleged
in the bill that complainant i an idiot a nativitate, and unable
to manage h r affairs, and u by a person calling him elf h r
next friend, without any appointment, if the proceeding i not
according to law, and not binding on the idiot, the defendant
mu t make thi motion to protect himself from being obliged to
defend a suit brought without authority.
Idiots and lunatics may su at law by next friend, to be appoint d by the court; but in equity, must sue by the committee
or guardian of their estates duly appointed. When the idiocy or
lunacy i not partia1, and, in all ca es, when it ha been found on
an inqui ition, a court of equity will not allow a uit to be brought
by an idiot or lunatic in hi own name, or that of a next friend,
nominated by him elf, or appointed by the court; his guardian
or committee mu t join in the uit. When a person is only paortially incapable, a one merely deaf and dumb, the court will
appoint a next friend to be joined with him in the suit, and to
conduct it for him.
The authoritie all agree that idiots and lunatic must ue in
quity, by th ir committee or guardians. In thi tate the person to whom th e tat of idiots and lunati are committed
upon inqui ition found, ar t led th ir guardian · in man of
th other tat and in Eno-land they are all d their ommittee .
h lford n Lunati
a
Idiot and lunatic mz t ue
6 ;
ourt I quit ' b th ir ommittee . ' n tor
1 ani 11
han. r. ( 3d d.) 9 · tock on on om pot . . en ti ,
3 · Iitford 1 q. 1. 29, and 2 Barb. Chan. Pr. 9 -±, th am rule
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is laid dowu; and it is further stated by some of these authorities,

that a suit ought not to be brought, even by the committee, with-

out the direction of the court, ujjon an inquiry made, whether it

is for the benefit of the idiot or lunatic. I find no case or authority

in which it is held that they may sue by a next friend, either a

volunteer or appointed for the purpose.

The only semblance of authority found, is the passage in Shel-

ford 416, and copied in 1 Daniell's Ch. Pr. 81: "If a person

exhibiting a bill, appear upon the face of it to be either an idiot

or a lunatic, and no next friend or committee is named in the bill,

the defendant may demur." Daniell cites Fuller v. Lance, 1 Ch.

Cas. 19, which has nothing in it on this point. Shelf ord cites

Mitford on PI. 153, which says: "If an infant or a married

woman, an idiot or a lunatic, appear to be such on the face of the

bill, and no next friend or committee is named, the defendant may

demur."

Lord Redesdale evidently intends to refer singula singulis, and

does not mean to imply that a next friend is proper for an idiot

or lunatic, any more than that a committee is necessary for an
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infant or feme covert. This passage has been adopted by the other

two writers, without noticing that the words next friend were

not applicable to the subject of which they were then treating —

idiots and lunatics.

The rule is a wise one. It should not be permitted that any

volunteer should, by styling himself the next friend of an idiot,

bring a suit for him, and lose or jeopard his rights by an action

brought inopportunely, and it may be, prosecuted without skill

or honesty. The idiot would have no security for the amount

recovered by such next friend, and the defendant could not pay

him, or settle with him, safely.

The motion to take the bill from the files must be granted.

Boughan v. Morris, 87 III. App. 642. (1899.)

Statement. — This is an appeal from an interlocutory order

appointing a receiver.

Tlie bill of complaint was exhibited by James L. Morris, by

Arthur Morris, his brother and next friend. Tlie bill alleges that

J^mes L. Morris is an insane person; that he is a widower and

SUITS-PERSONS MENTALLY INCOMPETENT

i laid down; and it is further tated by ome of the e authorities,
that a uit ought not to be brought, even by the committee, without the direction of the court, upon an inquiry ma·de, whether it
i for the b nefit of the idiot or lunatic. I find no case or authority
in which it i held that they may sue by a next friend, either a
volunteer or appointed for the purpose.
The only emblance of authority found, is the pas age in Shelford ·±16, and copied in 1 Daniell Ch. Pr. 81: 'If a person
exhibiting a bill, appear upon the face of it to be either an idiot
or a lunatic, and no next friend or committee is named in the bill,
the defendant may demur." Daniell cites Furler v. Lance, 1 Ch.
Oas. 19, which has nothing in it on this point. Shelford cites
Mitford on Pl. 153, which ay : "If an infant or a married
woman, an idiot or a lunatic, appear to be such on the face of the
bill, and no next friend or committee is named, the defendant may
demur."
Lord Redesdale evidently intend to refer singula singulis, and
does not mean to imply that a next friend i proper for an idiot
or lunatic, any more than that a committee is necessary for an
infant or f eme covert. This passage has been adopted by the other
two writers, without noticing that the words next friend were
not applicable to the subject of which they were then treatingidiots and lunatics.
The rule i a wise one. It should not be permitted that any
volunteer hould, by styling himself the next friend of an idiot,
bring a suit for him, and lose or jeopard his rights by an action
brought inopportunely, a·n d it may be, prosecuted without skill
or honesty. Th idiot would have no ecurity for the amount
recovered by such next friend and the defendant could not pay
him, or ettle with him, afely.
The motion to take the bill from the file mu t be granted.

Roughan v. Morris, 87 Ill. App. 64 .

{1899.)

ST TEME rT.-Thi i an appeal from an interlocutory order
appointing a receiver.
The bill of complaint was exhibited by Jame L. M:orri , by
rthur orri hi broth r and ne. t fri nd. Th bill all ge that
J a.me L. Morri i an in ane per on; that he is a widower and

RouGHAN v.
RoDGiiAN V. Morris 27

had no children, and that Arthur Morris, who appears as his next

friend in the suit, and George Morris, his two brothers, are his

next of kin. The bill also alleges that the defendant, Michael

J. Roughan, procured the signature of James L. Morris to a certain

pretended power of attorney, giving the defendant full control and

dominion over all the property of said Morris, consisting of a

large l)usiness and real estate, improved and rented; that for a

considerable space of time said Iloughan had been in complete

and undisturbed possession of said property; that said Roughan

had made no report of any of his doings in the premises; that

by reason of his management the business was becoming deeply

involved, was likely to be ruined, and the income of Morris de-

stroyed, unless the same was cared for; that the creditors of the

complainant were refusing to grant any more credit to the busi-

ness so long as it was under the control of the defendant; that

the landlord was about to levy a distress warrant for non-payment

of rent, and that if the assets of the complainant were properly

applied this would be wholly unnecessary; that defendant had

collected and disposed of, to his own use, large sums of money
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belonging to complainant; that the defendant fails and neglects

to pay the debts of the estate, and willfully and maliciously per-

mits the estate to become more and more indebted ; that the de-

fendant is insolvent, irresponsible, and not a proper person to

conduct said business ; that about five weeks must necessarily elapse

before the matter of the insanity of Morris can be heard in the

Probate Court of Cook County, where a petition has been filed

by Arthur Morris and George Morris, brothers and next of kin

of complainant, asking for the appointment of a conservator.

The prayer of the bill is inter alia for the appointment of a

receiver to collect the rents of real estate owned by James L.

Morris, and to manage the business of said Morris until a con-

servator can be appointed by the Probate Court of Cook County.

Upon the application for appointment of a receiver, a hearing

was had upon bill of complaint and affidavits, and oral testimony.

An interlocutory order was entered appointing one Frank D.

Kitchner as receiver. This appeal is from that order.

^Ir. Presiding Justice Sears delivered the opinion of the

court.

But one question of controlling importance is prcsontod upon

27
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before th matt r of he in anity of forri can be heard in the
P roba e ourt of Cook ount3 where a petition ha be n filed
by rthur Morri and G orge Morri , brother and next of kin
of complainant, a king for th appointment of a con ervator.
The prayer of th bill i inter alia for the appointment of a
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:Morri , and to mana e th bu in
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pon th application for appointment of a receiver a hearing
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this appeal, viz.: whether the suit may be entertained for the

purpose indicated when commenced by an insane person by his

next friend.

The grounds for the intervention of a court of chancery are

here ample, if the suit were brought by a complainant of sound

mind and in his own name. The relation of the parties, the

insolvency of defendant, the refusal or failure to account, and

the waste alleged, constitute sufficient ground for intervention

of a court of equity, if the suit were brought by John L. Morris

of sound mind. Tlie question then is, he being a lunatic, could

the suit be brought by his brother as his next friend?

The statute, Sec. 13, Chap. 86, R. S., provides as follows in rela-

tion to conservators:

"He shall appear for and represent his ward in all suits and

proceedings unless another person is appointed for that purpose,

as conservator or next friend; but nothing contained in this act

shall impair or affect the power of any court to appoint a con-

servator or next friend to defend the interests of said ward im-

pleaded in such court, or interested in a suit or matter therein
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pending, nor its power to appoint or allow any person as next

friend for such ward to commence, prosecute or defend any suit

in his behalf, subject to the direction of such court."

Could the court then allow Arthur Morris, as next friend, to

maintain this suit for the purpose disclosed by the bill?

It is contended by appellant that the question is determined

adversely to the maintenance of the suit by the decision of our

Supreme Court in Covington v. Neftzger, 140 111. 608. If the

purpose of this suit were merely the termination of the agency

created by the power of attorney to appellant and for an account-

ing, we think it clear that the case would be governed by the

Covington case, and that the bill would not lie for such purpose

when brought by one volunteering as next friend. But here the

purpose of the bill is merely to conserve the estate until a con-

servator might be appointed by the Probate Court.

It would seem upon principle that a court of chancery should

have the power to protect the estate of an insane person until

a conservator could be appointed by the Probate Court, to which

jurisdiction the appointment of conservators of insane persons is

committed l)y the law of this State. The jurisdiction of the

chancellor hero, to thus appoint this receiver, can not be maintained

SUITS-PERSONS l\'.IENTALLY INCOMPETENT

thi appeal, viz.: whether the suit may be entertained for the
purpose indicated when commenced by an insane person by his
next friend.
The grounds for the intervention of a court of chancery are
here ample, if the uit were brought by a complainant of sound
mind and in hi own name. The relation of the partie , the
in olvency of defendant, the refu al or failure to account, and
the waste alleged, constitute sufficient ground for intervention
of a court of equity, if the suit were brought by John L. Morris
of sound mind. The question then is, he being a lunatic, could
the suit be brought by his brother as his next friend?
The statute, Sec. 13, Chap. 86, R. S., provides as follows in relation to conservators:
"He shaU app ar for and represent his ward in all suits and
proceedings unle another person is appointed for that purpose,
as conservator or next friend; but nothing contained in this act
shall impair or affect the power of any court to appoint a conservator or next friend to defend the interests of said ward impleaded in such court, or interested in a suit or matter therein
pending, nor its power to appoint or allow any person as next
friend for such ward to commence, prosecute or defend any suit
in his behalf, subject to the direction of such court."
Could the court then allow Arthur Morris, as next friend, to
maintain this suit for the purpose disclosed by the bill?
It is contended by appellant that the question is determined
adversely to the maintenance of the suit by the decision of our
Supreme Court in Covington v. N eftzger, 140 Ill. 608. If the
purpose of thi uit were merely the termination of the agency
created by the power of attorney to appellant and for an accounting, we think it clear that the ca e would be governed by the
Covington ca e, and that the bill would not lie for uch purpose
when brought by one volunteering a next friend. But here the
purpose of th bill i merely to con rv the e tate until a conservator might b appointed by the Probate Court.
It would em upon principle that a ourt of hancery hould
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han 1lor h r t thu appoint thi recciv r, can not be maintained

0 G IA
Rough AN v. Morris 29

upon the ground alone that the sul)ject-mattor of the suit is a

matter proper for equitable cognizance, that is, the agency, the

waste, and the right to an accounting, for in respect to such relief

as the complainant might be entitled to in these matters, the suit

could not be maintained by one volunteering as next friend, un-

der the decision in the Covington case. But it would seem that

the suit may be maintained under the general chancery power to

protect the estates of lunatics, and for the limited purpose of such

protection oiily as could be shown to be necessary until a con-

servator might be appointed by the Probate Court.

In England the care of lunatics and their estates was vested

in the sovereign, and although the exercise of this care and control

was delegated by the sovereign to the chancellor, yet it was always

treated as a special prerogative of the crown, and not as a matter

within the general chancery powers.

The question of the inherent powers of our courts of chancery

in relation to this subject has been treated differently in different

States. In some States it has been held that the subject had so

far become a matter of chancery jurisdiction in England, that
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when by constitution or statute the powers and jurisdiction of

the Court of Chancery of England were given to our courts of

chancery, this element of jurisdiction was thereby conferred. In

others it has been held that the power which the English chan-

cellor exercised in this behalf was not a judicial power, but a

delegated prerogative right, derived from the crown, and by special

delegation in each instance. But the courts so holding have, at

least in some cases, also held that when there was no special pro-

vision by the commonwealth giving courts of chancery this juris-

diction and power, yet it was to be considered as arising ex

necessitate for the protection of the persons and property of the

commonwealth.

Whether the conclusion that our courts of chancery have this

jurisdictional power is reached by the one process of reasoning

or the other, is of little importance. It may be regarded as well

settled in our State that the power exists in a court of chancery

to conserve the estate of a lunatic, when such action is necessary.

Dod(]c V. Cole, 97 111. 338.

The question then is, whether such protection may be extended

by a court of chancery for the period only which must intervene

before a conservator can be appointed by a court of probate. The

:r
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commonw alth.
\Yhether the conclu ion that our court of hancery ha1 thi
juri dictional pow r i r ach d b th one proc
of rea oning
ell
or the other i of littl importance. It may be r o-arded a
cttl d in our tat tba t th power exi t in a cour of chancery
t
on r tl
tat of a lunatic wh n uch action i ~ nece ary.
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11.
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l y a court of hanc r ' for th period nl ' '\\'"hi h mu ~t int r1 n
before a con r tor an b appoint d b a ourt of pr at . Th
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only contention to the contrary is based upon the decision in the

case of Covington v. Neftzger, supra. The gist of the decision

in that case is expressed in the following language of the court:

"A person suing as next friend has no authority to bind the

lunatic or his estate. * * * It would be a dangerous rule to'

hold that such a person might, at his own will or discretion, come

into court for the purpose of impeaching a transaction in which

he has no interest, as trustee or otherwise, and over which he has

no control. * * * ^Ye think it is a well settled principle that

the person who brings a bill to avoid the deed of an insane person,

must have power to act for such person and bind him and his

estate."

The court also considered whether the rule of the trial court

upon Covington, the next friend, to file a bond for costs, amounted

to an order authorizing him to sue. It seems clear that the court

did not intend to hold that the trial court might not in any case

"'allow'- a suit to be maintained by a next friend, and did not

construe the section of the statute above set forth to that effect.

AVhat the decision does hold is that a volunteer can not thus elect
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to set aside the deed of the lunatic. And there is a distinction

indicated between an attempt to procure equitable relief in chan-

cery by setting aside a deed for a lunatic who appears only by

next friend, and an effort merely to protect the estate of the lunatic

through a suit brought by next friend until a committee or con-

servator can be appointed to represent him.

The case of Jones v. Lloyd, 18 Law Eep. Eq. Cas. 265, which

is cited in the Covington case and quoted from for the express

purpose of illustrating this distinction, would seem to precisely

apply to the conditions here presented. In that case the court

said:

"Can a suit be instituted by a lunatic, not found so by inquisi-

tion, by his next friend ? I have no doubt it can. There is author-

ity upon the subject, and it seems to me so distinct that I have no

occasion, really, to refer to the reason, for I think the cases of

Ligld V. Light (25 Beav. 248), and Bcall v. Smith (Law Rep. 8

Ch. 85), are such authorities; but independently of the unre-

ported case of Fislier v. NelJcs, where I know the point was dis-

cussed, and independently of authority, let us look at the reason

of the thing. If this were not the law, anybody might, at his will

and pleasure, commit waste on a lunatic's property, or do damage

IT -PERSONS MENTALLY INCOMPETENT
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A p r on uing a next fri nd ha no authority to bind the
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upon Covington, the next friend, to file a bond for co t , amounted
to an ord r authorizing him fo ue. It eem clear that the court
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or serious injur}' and ann()\aiic(- to him or his property, without

there being an}' remedy whatever. In the first place, the Lord

Justices or the Lord Ciianeelior are not always sitting for applica-

tions in lunacy. In the next place, if they were, everybody knows

it takes a considerable time to make a man a lunatic by inquisi-

tion, * * * Is it to be tolerated that any person can injure

him or his property without there being any power in any court

of justice to restrain such injury? Is it to l^e said that a man

may cut down trees on the property of a person in this unfortunate

state, and that because no effort of his can be made, no member

of his family can file a bill in his name as next friend, to prevent

that injury? Is it to be allowed that a man may make away with

the share of a lunatic in a partnership business, or take away the

trust property in which he is interested, without this court being

able to extend its protection to him by granting an injunction at

the suit of the lunatic by a next friend, because he is not found

so by inquisition ? I take it those propositions, when stated, really

furnish a complete answ'er to the suggestion that he can not main-

tain such a suit. Of course they do not answer the question as to
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how far he may carry it; but that he can maintain such a suit

^for the purpose of protection, for the purpose of ol)taining, as in

this case, a receiver, I should think there can be no doubt what-

ever."

Other decisions holding to like doctrine are: Beese v. Reese,

89 Ga. 645; Whetstone v. Whetstone, 75 Ala. 495.

We are of opinion, therefore, that while under the decision in

the Covington case this suit brought by next friend might not be

maintained for the ultimate purpose alone of annulling the deed

by which the agency of the defendant was created, nor for the

obtaining of an accounting alone, yet it may be maintained for the

sole purpose of protecting the estate of the lunatic, through a re-

ceivership, until a conservator can be appointed to act for him.

The order is affirmed.
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^* * Chadbourne v. Coe, 10 U. S. App. 78. (1892.)

Eeuben W. Chadbourne, a citizen of the State of Wisconsin,

r;

,/'6:

~~

y,.V

CHAPTER II.

PARTIES TO A SUIT IN EQUITY.

filed his bill in equity in the Circuit Court of the United States

for the District of Minnesota against Orlen P. Whitcomb, a citi-

A~

zen of the State of Colorado, and James N. Coe, a citizen of the

State of Minnesota, alleging that Whitcomb was indebted to the

complainant in a sum exceeding five thousand dollars upon certain

~

..

PARTIE

OLA

Chadbourne v. Coe, 10 U.

IFIED.

. App. 78.

{1892.)

promissory notes set out in the bill ; that Whitcomb was insolvent,

and that to hinder, delay and defraud his creditors he had by

deeds conveyed certain real estate, and by bills of sale transferred

certain personal property, to Coe upon certain secret trusts in

writing, which instruments creating the alleged trusts are made

exhibits to the bill. The last in date of these alleged trust agree-

ments included all the property, real and personal, conveyed and

transferred by Whitcomb to Coe, and the powers conferred and
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trusts imposed on Coe thereby are as follows:

"Now, in consideration of the premises I, the said Orlen P.

Whitcomb, hereby authorize and fully empower the said James

N. Coe to sell, exchange or dispose of any and all of the said

property mentioned in the agreements hereinbefore referred to,

whicli has not been already disposed of, together with all of the

personal property hereby conveyed to said Coe, to such person

or persons, and for such prices and on such terms as said Coe shall

sec fit, hereby granting unto said Coe full and exclusive authority

to manage, dispose of and control said property or any thereof as

he shall see fit, and hereby fully investing him with all the rents,

profits and increase of said property, both real and personal, and

giving him full authority to execute and deliver any and all con-

veyances or instruments necessary or proper to convey or dispose

of, or in the management of, the same without obtaining my_ con-

sent thereto; and the net proceed^;, either cash, securities or other

32

Reuben W. hadbourne a citizen of the State of Wi consin,
filed hi bill in eq ui t in the ircui t ourt of the United State
for the Di trict of 1inne ota again t Orl n P. Whit omb, a citizen of the tat of Colorado, and Jame :N. Coe a citizen of th·3
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pro1 rty m ntioned in the agr em nt h reinbefore r f rr cl t
whi ·h ha not b n alr ady di po eel of tog ther with all of the
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h . hall
fit and h r b fully inv tin him with ·111 the r nt'i
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f, r in th manao- rn nt f th ._ rn with ut
my __oncnt th r to· ancl th n t pr
fl . ith r a h
uriti or other
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property derived from the sale of any of said property, or the

rents, profits or increase thereof, said Coe is hereby authorized and

directed to liold and apply, when reduced to money, on any sura

or sums of money now due or hereafter owing to said Coe from

said Whitcomb, and on any indebtedness incurred in the manage-

ment of said property or taxes paid, and on any and all liabilities

now or at any time hereafter incurred by said Coe for said Whit-

comb, as surety or otherwise, and after the satisfaction and pay-

ment of all such claims and indebtedness whatsoever, the balance

thereafter to be paid to said Whitcomb."

It is alleged that Whitcomb has no other property out of which

the complainant can make his debt. The prayer of the bill is

that the conveyances of Coe be set aside, that the trust agreements

be declared void, and that Coe be required to account; that the

real estate be sold and the complainant's debt paid out of the pro-

ceeds and the moneys received from Coe on the accounting. The

complainant died, and the suit was revived in the name of Cath-

erine E. Chadbourne and Smith W. Chadbourne, his executors.

Whitcomb appeared specially and filed a plea to the jurisdiction
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of the court upon the ground that he was a citizen of Colorado,

which plea was sustained, and the bill was dismissed as to him.

No complaint is made of this ruling, touching which the counsel

for the appellants in their brief say: "\Miitcomb was originally

made a defendant, but he was dismissed upon filing a plea to the

jurisdiction, and, as we think, properly, under the act of August

13, 1888, defining the jurisdiction of Federal courts, and no excep-

tion is taken to the dismissal." After the suit was dismissed as to

Whitcomb, Coe filed a demurrer to the bill for want of proper

parties, which the court sustained and entered a decree dismissing

the bill without prejudice, and the complainants appealed. In

the brief of the counsel for the appellants it is said: "The only

question for the consideration of this court is whether or not the

Circuit Court erred in sustaining the demurrer upon the ground

that Whitcomb is not a party to the action." The opinion of the

Circuit Court dismissing the bill is reported in 45 Fed. Rep. 822.

Caldwell, Circuit Judge, after stating the case as above, de-

livered the opinion of the court.

The Supreme Court of the United States divide parties to suits

in equity into three classes: First, formal parties; Second, neces-

.
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34 Parties Classified

sary parties; Third, indispensable parties. Formal parties are

those who have no interest in the controversy between the imme-

diate litigants, but have an interest in the subject-matter which

may be conveniently settled in the suit and thereby prevent further

litigation. They may be parties or not at the option of the com-

plainant. Necessary parties are those who have an interest in the

controversy, but whose interests are separable from those of the

parties before the court, and will not be directly affected by a

decree which does complete and full justice between them. Such

persons must be made parties, if practicable, in obedience to the

general rule which requires all persons to be made parties who are

interested in the controversy, in order that there may be an end

of litigation; but the rule in the Federal courts is, that if they

are beyond the jurisdiction of the court, or if making them parties

would oust the jurisdiction of the court, the case may proceed to

a final decree between the parties before the court, leaving the

rights of the absent parties untouched, and to be determined in

any competent forum. The reason for this liberal rule in dis-

pensing with necessary parties in the Federal courts will be pres-
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ently stated. Indispensable parties are those who not only have

an interest in the subject-matter of the controversy, but an interest

of such a nature that a final decree cannot be made without either

affecting their interests or leaving the controversy in such a con-

dition that its final determination may be wholly inconsistent

with equity and good conscience. Shields v. Barrow, IT How.

130, 139; Ribon v. Railroad Companies, 16 Wall. 446, 450; Coiron,

V. Millaudon, 19 How. 113; Williams v. Bankliead, 19 Wall. 563;

Eendig v. Dean, 97 U. S. 423; Alexander v. Horner, 1 McCrary,

634. .

I The general rule as to parties in chancery is that persons falling

within the definition of necessary parties must be brought in for

the purpose of putting an end to the whole controversy, or the

bill will be dismissed; and this is still the rule in most of the

state courts. But in the Federal courts this rule has been relaxed.

The relaxation resulted from two causes: First, the limitation

imposed upon the jurisdiction of these courts by the citizenship

of the parties; and Second, by their inability to bring in parties

out of their jurisdiction by publication. The extent of the re-

laxation of the general rule in the Federal courts is expressed in

the forty-seventh equity rule. That rule is simply declaratory of

p ARTIES
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sary partie ; Third, indi pen able parties. Formal parties are
those who have no intere t in the controversy between the immediate litigaints, but have an interest in the subject-matter which
may be conveniently ettled in the suit and thereb3 prevent further
litigation. The may be parties or not at the option of the comec ary partie are those who have an intere t in the
plainant.
controversy, but whose interests are separable from those of the
partie before the court, and will not be directly affected by a
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per ons must be made parties, if practicable, in obedience to the
general rule which requires all persons to be made partie who are
intere ted in the controversy, in order that there may be an end
of litigation; but the rule in the Federal courts is, that if they
are beyond the jurisdiction of the court, or if making them partiea
would ou t the juri diction of the court, the case may proceed to
a :final decree between the parties before the court, leaving the
rights of the absent parties untouched, and to be determined in
any competent forum. The reason for this liberal rule in dispensing with necessary parties in the Federal courts will be presently stated. Indispensable parties are those who not only have
an interest in the subject-matter of the controversy, but an interest
of such a nature tha·t a :final decree cannot be made without either
affecting their interests or leaving the controversy in such a condition that it final determination may be wholly incon i tent
with equity and good conscience. Shields v. Barrow, 1' How.
130, 139; Ribon v. Railroad Companies, 16 Wall. 446, 450; Co iron
v. Millaudon, 19 How. 113; Williams v. Bankhead, 19 Wall. 563;
Kendig v. Dean, 97 U. S. 423; Alexander v. Horner, 1 McCrary,
634. .
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the previous decisions of the Supreme Court on the subject of the

rule. The Supreme Court has said repeatedly, that, notwithstand-

ing this rule, a Circuit Court can make no decree affecting the

rights of an absent person, and that all persons whose interests

will be directly affected by the decree are indispensable parties.

Shields v. Barrow, supra; Rihon v. Railroad Companies, supra;

Coiron v. Millaudon, supra; Alexander v. Horner, supra; The

Cole Silver Mining Company v. The Virginia and Gold Hifl

Water Company, 1 Sawyer, 685.

Can a decree be made in this case without affecting the rights

of Whitcomb? Before the complainants can have the specific

relief sought by the bill, the court must find and decree: First,

that Whitcomb is indebted to the complainants in the sum of

$5,000 more or less as alleged in the bill ; Second, that Whitcomb

is insolvent; Third, that the deeds from Whitcomb to Coe are

fraudulent and void as to Whitcomb's creditors; Fourth, that the

agreement between Whitcomb and Coe relating to the sale of the

property and an accounting for the same, and for the rents and

profits thereof, is fraudulent and void; Fifth, that the lands be
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sold and that the proceeds of the sale be applied to the payment

of Whitcomb's alleged indebtedness to the complainants; and

Sixth, that Coe account for the property and its rents and profits,

and that he pay the amount found due to the complainants on

Whitcomb's alleged indebtedness to them. If the complainants

are not creditors of Whitcomb, as they allege; or if Whitcomb is

not insolvent; or if the deeds Wliitcomb made to Coe are not

fraudulent; or if the contracts set out between Whitcomb and Coe

are valid, the bill cannot be maintained. In the judicial deter-

mination of every one of these issue s Whitcomb is an indis pensable

^rty. As to some of them he is necessarily the only party in

interest; the only party who would be affected by the decree, and

the only party capable of making an intelligent defence.

The contracts or trust agreements between ^^^litcomb and Coe

made part of the bill are not fraudulent on their face. Upon

their face they are valid agreements, under which Whitcomb can

compel Coe to account for the property, and its rents, issues and

profits. If the court in a suit to which Whitcomb was not a party

should compel Coe to account for, and turn over, the property and

money to the complainants, such a decree would be no bar to a suit

by Whitcomb against Coe to compel the latter to account to him

.
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according to the terms of the agreement between them, and for

this reason Coe has a right to insist that Whitcomb shall be made

a party for his protec-tion. Alexander v. Horner, supra.

Formerly the general rule was that a judgment must be obtained

and execution returned 7iulla hona, or its equivalent, before a bill

could be filed to vacate a fraudulent conveyance, and it was held

that the debtor was a necessary party to such a bill. In modern

times this rule has by legislation in some of the States, and by

judicial decisions in others, undergone important modifications not

necessary to be noticed in the decision of this case. The cases on the

subject are collected in 3 Pomeroy's Eq. Jur. § 1-115, note 4;

Story's Eq. PL (10th ed.), § 233, note (h) ; Pomeroy on Remedies

and Remedial Rights, § 347. But the modern cases which go to

the greatest length in modifying the old rule fall far short of sup-

porting the complainants' contention in this case. In this case

there is not only no judgment, but it is contended that the alleged

debtor has no right to be heard on the question as to whether he

owes the complainants anything for which a judgment should be

rendered.
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We do not rest our decision upon the ground that a creditor

cannot file a bill to set aside a fraudulent conveyance of his debtor

and subject the property to the payment of his debt until he has

obtained a judgment at law for his debt and had a return of nulla

hona (as to which see Case v. Beauregard, 101 TJ. S. 688) ; but

upon the ground that a creditor cannot maintain a bill to establish

a debt against his alleged debtor, to annul the debtor's conveyances

and contracts, and appropriate his property and money to the pay-

ment of the creditor's alleged debt, without making the debtor a

party of the bill seeking such relief. It is fundamental in the

jurisprudence of this country that no court, and, least of all, a

Federal court, can adjudicate upon the rights of one not before

it and not subject to its jurisdiction.

The decree of the Circuit Court is

Affirmed.

PARTIES CLASSIFIED

according to the terms of the agreement between them, and for
thi rea on oe has a right to insi t thait Whitcomb shall be made
a part for hi protection. Alexander v. H 01·ner, supra.
Formerly he general rule was that a judgment must be obtained
and ex cution returned nuUa bona, or its equivalent, before a; bill
could be filed to vacate a fraudulent conveyance, and it was held
that the debtoir was a nece ary party to such ai bill. In modern
times this rule has by legislation in some of the States, a·n d by
judicial deci ion in other , undergone important modifications not
nece ary to be noticed in the decision nf this case. The cases on the
ubject are collected in 3 Pomeroy's Eq. Jur. § 1415, note 4;
Story's Eq. Pl. (10th ed.), § 233, note (b); Pomeroy on Remedies
and Remedial Rights, § 347. But the modern cases which go to
the greatest length in modifying the old rule fall far hart of supporting the complainants' contention in this case. In this case
there is not only no judgment, but it is contended that the alleged
debtor has no right to be heard on the question as to whether he
owes the complainants anything for which a judgment should be
rendered.
We do not rest our decision upon the ground that a creditor
cannot file a bill to set aside a; fraudulent conveyance of his debtor
and subject the property to the payment of his debt until he has
obtained a judgment at law for his debt and had a return of nulla
bona (as to which see Case v. Beauregard, 101 U. S. 688) ; but
upon the ground that a creditor cannot maintain a bill to establish
a debt against his alleged debtor, to annul the debtor's conveyances
and contrads, and appropriate his property and money to the payment of the creditor's alleged debt, without making the debtor a
party o·f the bill seeking such relief. It is fundamental in the
juri prudence of this country that no court, and, lea t of all, a
Federal court, can adjudicate upon the rights of one not before
it a-nd not subject to its jurisdiction.
The decree of the Circuit Court is
Affirmed.
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Bill to set aside tax sales and vacate sewer assessment

.

ants appeal. Eeversed; bill dismissed.

Campbell, J.: '^ v /* c i ~

This is a bill filed by a large number of persons whose lots have , jtT » .

been bid in by Bay City under a sewer assessment to have the sales \y ///

set aside as illegal. The ground of illegality is that the sewer itself i ^ ^ (^

from
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was not authorized to be built, nor the assessments authorized ioW Ok

be made in the manner adopted. /, lO- '^

Without going at length into the question presented, we areijj^-,/ ^.

met at the outset by a difficulty which we cannot overlook. We do a ^ (^

not find any warrant for any such joinder of grievances. The citytr ^ ^

now occupies the same position which would be occupied by anylJr

other tax purchaser who might choose to bid off all of these parcels.i

Each complainant would have against him a single separate^' o

grievance, but it would not in law be a common grievance, merely^p
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because it was similar in its nature to the grievances of others

The assertion of his title against one would be by a separate action

and his action of ejectment could not implead any persons

interested in the parcel it involved. Matters in which there is no

common interest on the one side or the other are not allowed to*^ vir^

be litigated jointly; and while there are some classes of cases j^' ^

where the community of interest is not as plain as in others, we

do not think they go far enough to warrant this suit.

The joinder of several parties similarly interested in resisting-|b»

a common aggressor was ordinarily allowed, to save multiplying U

litigation, to settle once and finally the matter in contention. It ^

was at first strictly confined to cases where the act complained of,

if done, or continued, would affect every one in the same way, and

would affect all, if any. It was applied in questions of commons

in pasturage, fisheries, and similar interests, and in questions of

tithes, which were asserted over certain districts. It was extended

on the same grounds to frauds or wrongs by corporate aixents

against the interests of corporators, public and private. It was
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finally applied to restrain taxes and assessments, in which the

inhabitants of localities taxed, or the owners of land in assess-

ment districts, were sought to be charged for a common burden.

There is no doubt that in some of these cases the rule may have

been extended somewhat beyond the line first laid down. But in

all of the cases which have been well considered, there has been

one cause of grievance which at the time of filing the bill involved

some aggressive action in which all of the parties complaining

were involved in precisely the same way. And we have held dis-

tinctly that in such actions, if any person set up grievances not

of the same common nature with those of the rest, the bill could

not be maintained. Kerr v. Lansing, 17 Mich. 34. See also

Miller v. Grandy, 13 Mich. 540 and Scofield v. Lansing, IT Mich.

437; YoungUood v. Sexton, 33 Mich. 406.

In the present case it may be doubted whether the complainants

could have joined in a suit to enjoin the assessment, however

illegal. The chief objection underlying the whole theory of the

bill is that the assessment was not and could not lawfully be made

upon any general and uniform system of apportionment; but that
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each lot should be assessed, not an aliquot part of a general charge,

but so much as it was separately benefited by the work. It is very

evident that each complainant is interested in enlarging the re-

sponsibilities of the rest and in diminishing his own. Instead of

a communty of interest their interests are hostile.

But when the assessment has been enforced by sale, we can see

no reason why one purchaser should differ from another, or why

the purchase of several lots should be regarded as a common wrong

to the several lot-owners. He is not after his purchase capable

of doing any act which can operate as a common grievance. Each

act in the enforcement of his title is an independent and several

injury, if it is a wrong at all, and no lot-owner is hurt by the

wrong done to his neighbor. It would be like the exclusion of a

person from a common or fishery, on personal grounds, and not on

a denial of the general right. No joinder of complaints could be

allowed in such cases.

We think Bay City cannot be sued in this way, and that if any

lot-owner has an equitable grievance against the sale of his lot

actually made, he must sue for it separately.

The decree must be reversed with costs and bill dismissed.

finally applied to re train taxes and a e sments, in which the
inhabitants of localiti taxed, or the owner of land in a essment di trict , w re ought to be charged for a common burden.
Th re i no doubt that in ome of these ca es the rule may ha·rn
been extend d somewhat beyond the line first laid down. But in
all of th ca es which have been well considered, there has been
on cau e of grievance which a·t the time of filing the bill involveLl
ome aggre ive action in which all of the partie complaining
were involved in precisely the same way. And we have held di . . tinctly that in such action , if any per on set up grievance not
f the ame common nature with those of the rest, the bill could
not be maintained. Kerr v. Lansing, 17 Mich. 3-±. See al o
Miller v. Grandy 13 Mich. 5-10 and Scofield v. Lansing, 17 Mich.
-±3'; Youngblood v. Sexton, 32 Mich. 406.
In the pre ent case it may be doubted whether the complainants
could have joined in a suit to enjoin the assessment, however
illegal. The chief objection underlying the whole theory of tho
bill is that the assessment wa not and could not lawfully be made
upon any general and uniform system of apportionment; but that
each lot should be assessed, not an aliquot part of a general charge,
but so much as it was separate!) benefited by the work. It is very
evident that each complainant is interested in enlarging the reponsibilities of the rest and in dimini bing hi own. Instead of
a communty of interest their intere ts are hostile.
But when the assessment has been enforced by sale, we can see
no reason why one purchaser hould differ from another, or why
the purcha e of everal lots should be regarded as a common wrong
to the several lot-owner . He is not a:fter his purchase capable
of doing any act which an operate as a common grievance. Each
act in the enforcement of his title i an independent and several
injury, if it is a wrong at all, and no lot-owner i hurt by the
wrong done to hi neighbor. It would be like the xclu ion of a
per on from a common or fi hery, on per on.al around , and not on
a enial of th eneral right. No joinder of complaint could be
allowed in uch ca e .
We think Bay City cannot b ued in thi way, and that if any
lot-owner ha an quitabl grievance again t the ale of hi lot
actually made, he mu t ue for it eparately.
The decree mu t be reversed with costs and bill dismissed.
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CooLEY and Graves, JJ., concurred.
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Marston, C. J., being a resident tax-payer of Bay City, did not i^P^
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This was an application, on the part of the complainants, to . ^^ Ji
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Murray v. Hay, 1 Barb. Cli. (N. Y.) 59. {ISJto.J'T^'^ ^\J.>^/ ^

open an order entered by the defendant to close the proofs, ancF*"^^ '^\^

rjf,0

(1 4 .) c;.}r~~

to allow farther time for the complainants to take testimony in^^^'''*^

this cause. And a second application was made, for leave to amen

the complainant's bill, by striking out the name of Murray as one

of the complainants therein. V^

The defendant's solicitor, on the 10th of June, 1835, entere|^

an order that the complainants produce witnesses in this cause/,

within forty days after notice of the order, and served a notice jjl/^ ' \^

of such order upon the solicitor for the complainants the samo^*-^^^ *^

day. On the 18th of July, the solicitor for the complainants }^^y^ ^

mailed an affidavit, directed to the chancellor, and obtained his, Jt^ ii)^^-

fiat for an order, founded thereon, extending the time to produce U/J^ '^

proofs until the 1st of October. The fiat was received on Mon-'' jj-^^ ,^

day the 21st of July, the second day after the great fire in Xewf^^Lji'^ ^
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York; and the order was entered the same day, but was not served,' t^ ^

until the afternoon of the 22d, owing to the derangement oi

business produced by the fire. Previous to the receipt of notice oil

the order, the defendant's solicitor had entered an order to closj

the proofs; which, under the instructions of his client, he refused, ^'^ ^t^

to open. The application for leave to amend was made upon th(!- Jp^^ ^ ^

supposition that an objection for a misjoinder of complainants . t^ /j/

could be sustained ; the bill having been filed by two persons, vfh^i'^^'^ltr^ f,

were owners of different dwelling houses in severalty, having no/'^^ v. '*'[

joint interest in either of them, to restrain an alleged nuisanco^A^^l^*^''

which was a common but not a joint injury to both of the com-, ^ ^iJ^

plainants. / ^ ^j^

The Chancellor: J^ ^'-'

The objection that the order to produce witnesses was not

entered in the proper form is not well taken. By the practice

of the English court of chancery, and as it formerly existed here,

eitlier party who wished to close the proofs was obliged to enter

a rule that the adverse party produce his witnesses; and at the
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expiration of the time allowed by that order, he entered the order

nisi to pass publication. By this last order both parties were

precluded from examining farther witnesses, after the expiration

of the eight days, unless an order to enlarge publication had been

obtained in the meantime. (2 Dan. Ch. Pr. 563. 1 Smith's Ch.

Pr. 252.) The rules of this court, however, have altered the prac-

tice so far as to allow either party to enter a forty day order to

produce witnesses, upon which the party entering such order, or

the adverse party, may proceed and obtain an absolute order to close

the proofs after the expiration of the time allowed by the first

order, unless the time shall be enlarged by a special order of the

court. (Eule 68.) But the mere authority to one party to enter

an order to close the proofs, upon an affidavit of the receipt of a

notice from the adverse party of an order to produce witnesses,

did not necessarily require a variance in the form of the first

order. The order to produce witnesses may therefore be in the

form originally used, requiring the adverse party to produce wit-

nesses within forty days. Or it may be in the form contained

in the precedents of Barbour and of Hoffman, requiring the parties
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to produce witnesses, &c. ; which is according to its legal effect,

under the new rule of this court upon the subject. The order to

close the proofs was therefore strictly regular; although the form

of the preliminary order entered by the defendant did not in terms

require the defendant himself, as well as the complainant, to pro-

duce witnesses within forty days. For, upon filing an affidavit of

the receipt of notice of such an order as was entered in this case,

the complainant could himself have entered an order to close the

proofs, at the expiration of the specified time.

But as the complainants had actually obtained the fiat of the

court, and had entered an order thereon, enlarging the time to pro-

duce witnesses, within the time allowed for that purpose by the

practice of the court, the service of which order was delayed by

mere accident, the order to close the proofs should be opened

upon payment of costs. The excitement and confusion neces-

sarily produced among business men in N'ew-York by the great

fire on the previous Saturday, is sufficient of itself to excuse, or

account for, the delay in serving the order immediately after it

was entered. The order to close the proofs must therefore be

vacated, and the time to produce witnesses is extended to the

first of November next, inclusive. And the complainants are to

JOINT PLAINTIFFS

expiration of the time allowed by that order, he entered the order
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order. The order to produce witne se may therefore be in the
form originally used, requiring the adver e party to produce witnesses within forty days. Or it may be in the form contained
in the precedents of Barbour and of Hoffman, requiring the parties
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under the new rule of this court upon the subject. The order to
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pay to the defendant's solicitor $15 for his costs of entering the

order to close the proofs, and noticing the cause for hearing, and

opposing this application to open such order.

The application to amend, by leaving out the name of one of

the complainants, should also be granted, upon such terms as

will eirectually protect the defendant as to costs, &c.; if there

is in fact a misjoinder of the complainants, which may be fatal

to their suit at the hearing. Upon an examination of the ques-

tion, however, I am satisfied there is no misjoinder of complain-

ants, so far as the bill seeks to restrain the continuance of a nui-

sance which was a common though not a joint injury to both

of the parties who have filed this bill. There is no inflexible

rule on the subject of joinder of parties in this court. But, as a

general principle, several complainants, having distinct and inde-

pendent claims to relief against a defendant, cannot join in a suit

for the separate relief of each; nor can a single complainant,

having distinct and independent claims to relief against two or

more defendants severally, join both or all of them in the same

bill. Tliere are, however, many exceptions to this general
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principle; and the court exercises a sound discretion in deter-

mining whether there is a misjoinder of parties, under the par-

ticular circumstances of the case. Thus in the case of Ken-

sington V. White (3 Price's Rep. 164), the court of exchequer

in England overruled a demurrer for multifariousness, which

was put in to a bill, filed by seventy-two different underwriters

upon policies for the defendants, upon which policies the com-

plainants had been sued at law for their respective subscriptions ;

the object of the bill being to enable each complainant to estab-

lish a defence, which was common to all. And this decision

was followed by Lord Abinger in the more recent case of MUh

and others v. Camphell (2 Young & Coll. Exc. Eep. 389),

where the suits against some of the complainants were upon

ordinary policies by simple contract, and against others upon a

policy under seal. Tliis court also sustained a bill filed by dif-

ferent judgment creditors, having a common but not a joint in-

terest in the relief sought by their suit, in the case of Brincl-er-

hoff and others v. Brown and others (6 John. Ch. Rep. 130).

And it is a common practice in this court for two or more judg-

ment creditors, having separate judgments, to join in a suit to

reach the equitable interests and choses in action of their com-
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mon debtor, after they have exhausted their remedies at law, by

executions upon their respective judgments.

The particular question which arises in this suit, whether two

or more persons having separate and distinct tenements which

are injured or rendered uninhabitable by a common nuisance, or

which are rendered less valuable by a private nuisance which is

a common injury to the respective tenements of each of the

complainants, may join in a suit to restrain such nuisance, does

not appear to have been raised in England until recently; and

then in a single case only, wliich was not very fully considered.

In the case of Spencer & V^'ard v. The London and Birming-

ham Railway Company (1 Xicoll, Hare & Car. Railway Cases,

159), which came before the vice chancellor of England in 1836,

the bill was filed by the landlord and his tenant, for a nuisance

which was supposed to be an injury to the interests of each in the

property; and an injunction was granted without raising the

question of misjoinder of parties.

The same thing occurred in the case of Sutton and others v.

Montfort (4 Sim. Eep. 559), which came before the same equity
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judge five years previous; where two tenants of different build-

ings, having no joint interest, joined with the landlord of both

in filing the bill to restrain the nuisance. But in the more re-

cent case of Hudson and others v. Maddison (5 Lond. Jur.

1104), which came before him in December, 1841, where five

different owners of separate houses had joined in a bill to re-

strain a nuisance which was a common injury to all their houses,

he seems to have taken it for granted that the objection of mis-

joinder of complainants would be fatal at the hearing; and he

discharged the injunction upon that ground alone. (See 13 Sim.

Eep. 416, S. C). Even if that case may be considered as finally

settling the question in England, which I presume it does not,

as it does not appear to have received the sanction of the lord

chancellor, upon appeal or otherwise, I do not consider myself at

liberty to follow that decision here; as the question was settled

by this court directly the other way, more than twenty years since.

In the case of Reed and others v. Gifford (Hopk, Rep. 416),

which came before Chancellor Sanford in February, 1825, the

complainants, as the chancellor states in his opinion, were several

proprietors of different lands and mills, and of separate parts of

the natural water-course at the outlet of a lake. The nuisance
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mon debtor, after they have exhausted their remedies at law, by
execution upon their respective judgments.
The parti ular question which arises in this suit, whether two
or more per on having separate and distinct tenements which
are injured or rendered uninhabitable by a common nuisance, or
which are rendered less valuable by a, private nuisance which is
a common injury to the respective tenements of each of the
complainants, may join in a suit to restrain such nuisance, does
not appear to have been raised in England until recently; and
then in a single case only, which was not very fully considered.
In the case of SpencM· & Ward v. The London and Birmingham Railway Company (1 Nicoll, Hare & Ca·r. Railway Cases,
159), which came before the vice chancellor of England in 1836,
the bill was filed by the landlord and his tenant, for a nuisance
which was supposed to be an injury to the interests of each in the
property; and an injunction was granted without raising the
question of misjoinder of parties.
The same thing occurred in the case of Sutton and others v.
Montfort (4 Sim. Rep. 559), which came before the same equity
judge five years previous; where two tenants of different buildings, ha·ving no joint interest, joined with the landlord of both
in filing the bill to restrain the nuisance. But in the more recent case of Hudson and· others v. Maddison (5 Lond. Jur.
1104), which came before him in December, 1841, where five
different owners of separate houses had joined in a bill to restrain a nui ance which was a common injury to all their houses,
he seems to ha,ve taken it for granted that the objection of misjoinder of complainants would be fatal at the hearing; and he
discharged the injunction upon that ground alone. (See 12 Sim.
Rep. 416, S. C.) . Even if that case may be con idered as finally
settling the question in England, which I presume it does not,
a it doe not appear to have received the anction 0£ the lord
chancellor, upon appeal or otherwise, I do not consider myself at
lib rty to follow that deci ion here; as the question was settled
by thi court directly the oth r way, more than twenty years since.
In the ca e of Re ed and others v. Gifford (Hopk. Rep. 416),
which came before Cha llor Sanford in February, 1825, the
complainants, a the chanc llor tate in hi opinion were several
proprietors of different land and mills, and of separat parts of
the natural w t er-cour e at the outlet of a lake. The nuisance

M
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■which they sought to restrain was an artificial channel, cut by

the defendant ujjon his own land, the effect of which would be

to draw off the water of the lake, and thereby to prevent it from

flowing in its natural channel to the several mills of the com-

plainants, respectively. And he decided that as the acts of the

defendant, complained of, were a common injury to all the com-

plainants, there was such a common interest in the subject of the
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suit as to authorize them to join in one bill; although the injury

which each sustained, by the diversion of the water from his

individual mill, was separate and distinct.

It is true each of the complainants, in that case, would have

had the right to file a bill to restrain the nuisance, which was a

special injury to his individual property. But as the relief sought

was the same as to all the complainants, there certainly was no

good reason for compelling them to file several bills to protect

their common right against acts of the defendant, which were

injurious to all of them. A similar opinion was expressed by me

in the case of The Trustees of Watertown v. Cowen (4 Paige's

Eep. 510) ; although from the manner in which the formal ob-
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jection of the misjoinder of complainants was raised in that case,

it was not necessary definitely to decide the question of misjoinder

of parties. For it is well settled that a mere formal objection of

that kind, which is neither raised by demurrer nor by the answer

of the defendant, cannot be set up at the hearing as a bar to

relief which is common to all the complainants.

In the case of MarseUs and others v. The Morris Canal Com--

pany (Saxton's Eep. 31), where the objection was raised, that the vl,^

bill was multifarious, because several persons having distinct am\U<^>^\ ^^^^

independent interests had joined therein as complainants, the acts , JU v^

of the defendants, complained of, were neither a joint nor even a ' ^^-^ -^

common injury to all the complainants. There the entry upon iw-^^ w^/^"^^

the land of each complainant and excavating the same, for th^J^'*\ \p^

purpose of making the canal, without compensating the owner for^^^ji-^

his property, was a distinct and independent cause of complaint.

And it was in nowise injurious to his co-complainants; nor did

it in any way interfere with, or affect, their several rights of

property. That case therefore was rightly decided upon that

ground. In the case under consideration, however, the bill shows

that the erection and continuance of the alleged nuisance, and of

r* /
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every part of it, is a common injury to the separate property and

rights of each of the complainants.

It is said the complainants in this case in addition to their

prayer for a perpetual injunction to restrain the continuance of

the nuisance, have also prayed for an account, and compensation

for the damage which they have respectively sustained by the

alleged nuisance. The insertion of such a prayer might perhaps

render the bill multifarious, if the court, at the hearing, would,

upon the case made by the bill, be required to grant such multi-

farious relief, in addition to the restraining the continuance of

the nuisance, which is a common injury to both complainants.

But where multifarious relief is not prayed for in the bill, it is

not a matter of course to give multifarious relief at the hearing,

under the general prayer, in addition to the relief in which the

complainants have a common interest. That objection to this

bill may therefore be obviated by striking out that part of the

prayer which calls for an account of the damages which the com-

plainants respectively have sustained by reason of the alleged

nuisance.
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The motion to amend by striking out the name of Murray, as

one of the complainants, must be denied with $15 costs. But the

complainants are to be at liberty to amend their bill within twenty

days, by striking out the prayer for an account and payment of the

damages.

Lloyd V. Loaring, G Yes. 773. (1802.)

This bill, filed by Evan Lloyd and two other persons on behalf

of themselves and all other members of the Caledonian Lodge of

Free Masons, except the Defendant Loaring, against Loaring and

another person, stated, that Plaintiifs are members or companions

of a certain ancient fraternity, society, or lodge of Free Masons,

called or known by the name of the Caledonian Chapter, No. 2, and

being No. 2 on the list of the societies of Eoyal Arch Free Masons,

consisting of Plaintiffs and a number of other persons; and Plain-

tiff Lloyd being the chief or principal officer, and the other two

T
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e\ ry part of it i a common injury to the eparate property and
right of each of the complainants.
It i aid the complainants in thi ca e in addition to their
prayer for a perpetual injunction to re train the continuance of
the nui ance, have al o prayed for an account, and compen ation
for the damage which th y have re pecti ely su tained by the
alleged nui ance. The in ertion of such a prayer might perhaps
render the bill multifariou , if the court, at the hearing, would,
upon the ca e made by the bill, be required to grant such multifariou relief, in addition to the re training the continuance of
the nuisance, which is a common injury to both complainants.
But where multifariou relief i not prayed for in the bill, it i ·
not a matter of course to give multifarious relief at the hearing,
under the general prayer, in addition to the relief in which the
romplainant have a common intere t. That objection to thi
l ill may therefore be obviated by triking out that part of the
prayer which call for an account of the damages which the com1 lainants respectively have u tained by rea on of the alleged
nw l:!nce.
The motion to amend by striking out the name of Murray as
ne of the complainant , mu t be denied with $15 co t . But the
complainants are to be at liberty to amend their bill within twenty
clay , b} triking out the prayer for an account and payment of the
lamages.

Plaintiffs secretaries or other officers of the said companion, chap-

ter or society: Plaintiffs as such three officers, as aforesaid, hav-

ing the sole management and direction of the affairs of the said

Lloyd

. Loaring, 6 Ves. 773.

(1802.)
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Caledonian Chapter; which said chapter has been duly certified,

and the names of the members registered according to law.

The bill farther stated, that the said chapter or society held tlieir

meetings at the Horn Tavern; and the dresses and decorations,

and the books and papers, tools and implements, and other goods

and effects, of the said chapter or society were there kept in a chest;

the key of which was kept by Lloyd, as principal officer. A union

with another chapter, called the Prudence Lodge, having been pro-

posed and assented to by the members then present, and that the

future meetings should be held at the Free Masons Tavern, the De-

fendant Loaring and four other members then present authorised

the janitor or servant of the said chapter to remove the said prop-

erty to the Free Masons Tavern ; the master of which was directed

to deliver it to him on producing the written order and in the pres-

ence of Lloyd, and to no other person. The Defendants afterwards

went there ; pretending authority from Lloyd ; and that by mistake

he had sent the wrong key; and they broke open the chest; and

took away all the said dresses, &c.

The bill further stated, that by the rules and condition of the

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 16:36 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t3223129q
Public Domain in the United States / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-us

said society it is necessary, whenever any of the business or cere-

monies are to be transacted or performed, that the Plaintiffs or one

of them should be present; especially Lloyd as the president or

principal officer; to whose care the key to the chest, and the effects,

and the books, containing the laws and constitution and the ac-

counts of the said society or chapter and the original warrant or

charter arc entrusted ; and it is indispensable, that he should have

possession of them; without which the society cannot properly be

convened, or the business transacted; and the Defendant Loaring

is interested in, or has a share in, the property vested in him as a

joint tenant with the other members ; and having got the exclusive

possession of the said effects, is a trustee for the other members,

and bound to restore them uninjured for the use of the society.

The bill charged, that the Plaintiffs took a Bow-street officer

to the house of the other Defendant Hannam ; who acknowledged,

that they had taken the property; and restored part of it, that

was in his possession ; but that Loaring has the greatest part, and

in particular the books of the constitution, laws, and rules, of the

said chapter or society, the books of account, names of the mem-

bers, minutes of the proceedings, and the original warrant or

charter, granted to them by the grand or head chapter of Royal

Lo
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Arch Masons; by which the Caledonian Chapter is constituted or

authorised and continued, and without which original warrant or

charter no meetings of the said chapter or society can be properly

and regularly convened or held, or the business or ceremonies, or

functions, of the said chapter or society performed; that the per-

sons, by or from whom such constitution and warrant or charter

were granted, are all long since dead ; and no constitution or char-

ter can now be had ; and if the said constitution or charter or war-

rant should be lost or destroyed, the said chapter or society would

either be wholly dissolved, and lose its rank and privileges among

the several different lodges or chapters, or be prejudiced or de-

graded; that the Defendant Loaring has threatened and intends

to burn or otherwise destroy the property, and in particular the

books and the original warrant or charter; and that Plaintiffs are

ignorant of the particulars, of which the property consists ; and the

Defendants refuse to discover, &c.; whereby the Plaintiffs cannot

take any effectual steps at law.

The bill prayed a discovery; and that the Defendants may be

decreed to deliver up the said articles uninjured or undefaced;
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and in the meantime be restrained from disposing of, burning, or

otherwise destroying, defacing, or injuring, them.

The Defendants demurred generally to this bill for want of

Equity, and also for want of parties.

Lord Chancellor [Eldon] :

If this is not a corporation, how could these five persons remove

these articles? Loaring himself had a right to object to the pro-

posed junction. If I consider them as individuals, the majority

had no right to bind the minority. One individual has as good a

right to possess the property as any other: unless he can be

affected by some agreement. But how is this Court to take notice

of these persons as a society ? A bill might be filed for a chattel ;

JOI
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Arch Ma on ; by which the Caledonian Chapter is constituted or
authori ed and continued, and without which original warrant or
charter no me ting of the aid chapter or ociety can be properly
and regularly con ened or h ld, or the bu ine or ceremonie , or
function , of the said chapter or so iety performed; that the peron, by or from whom such constitution and warrant or charter
w re granted, are all long ince dead; and no con titution or charter can now be had; and if the said con titution or charter or warrant hould be lo t or de troyed, the aid chapt r or ociety woul<l
either be wholly di olved, and lo e it rank and privileges among
the several different lodges or chapt rs, or be prejudiced or d<~
graded; that the Defendant Loaring ha threatened and intends
to burn or otherwi e de troy the property, and in particular the
book and the original warrant or charter; and that Plaintiffs are
ignorant of the particulars, of which the property consists; and the
Def ndant refu e to di cover, &c.; whereby the Plaintiffs cannot
take any effectual steps at law.
The bill prayed a di covery; and that the Defendant may be
decreed to deliver up the said article uninjur d or undefaced;
and in the meantime be restrainecl from di posing of, burning, or
otherwise destroying, defacing, or injuring, them.
The Defendants demurred generally to this bill for want of
Equity, and also for want of parties.

the Plaintiffs stating themselves to be jointly interested in it with

several other persons : but it would be very dangerous to take notice

of them as a society, having any thing of constitution in it. As

to the Statute referred to, the meaning was only to take them,

provided they gave notice of their meetings, out of the operation

of the Sedition Laws, not to acknowledge them. In this lull there

is a great affectation of a corporate character. They speak of their

laws and constitutions, and the original charter, by which they

Lord CHANCELLOR [ELDON] :
If thi i not a corporation, how could these five persons remove
the e article ? Loaring himself had a right to object to the propo d junction. If I con ider them as individual , the majority
had no right to bind the minority. One individua1 has as good a
right to po e the property a any other: unle he can be
aff ted by om agreement. But how i this Court to take notice
of i.he per on a a oci t ? A bill might b fil d for a chattel;
the laintiff tating them clv to be jointly int r ted in it with
ev ral oth r p r on : 1 ut it would b v ry dang rou to tak notir:e
of them a a o iety, having any thing of on titution in it. A
to th
tatute ref rred to, the meaning was only to take th m
provided th y gave notic of i.h ir m tin
out of the operation
of the edition Law, not to acknowledg them. In thi bill there
i a gr at aff ·tation of a corporate chara ter. They peak of th ir
law. and · n. tj tut ion. uncl th 01·iginal hart r, by which th y

LL YD

Llovd v. Loabing 47

were constituted. In Cul'len v. The Duke of Queensberry, Lord

Thurlow said, ho would convince the parties, that they had no law;,

and constitutions. But tliere was an allegation, that he was indi-

vidually liable. It is the absolute duty of Courts of Justice not to

permit persons, not incorporated, to affect to treat themselves as a

corporation upon the Itecord. If the Plaintiffs had stated simply,

that they and several persons were jointly interested, or even they

on behalf of themselves and others, provided it was manifestly in-

convenient to justice to make them all parties, and stating this case

as individuals, upon the principle of Fells v. Read it might be very

proper. That this Court will hold jurisdiction to have a chatte"l

delivered up, I have no doubt: but I am alarmed at the notion,

that these voluntary societies are to be permitted to state all their

laws, forms, and constitutions, upon the Record, and then to tell

the Court, they are individuals. Then what sort of a partnership

is this; for it is now admitted to be a partnership? The bill

states, that they subsist under a charter, granted l)y persons, who

are now dead; and therefore, if this charter cannot be produced,

tlie society is gone. Upon principles of policy the Courts of this
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country do not sit to determine upon charters granted by persons,

who have not the prerogative to grant charters. I desire my ground

to be understood distinctly. I do not think, the Court ought to

permit persons, who can only sue as partners, to sue in a corporate

character; and that is the effect of this bill.

The Demurrer was allowed.

May 13th. The Lord Chancellor, when the demurrer was

allowed, having thrown out an intimation, that the Plaintiffs might

amend, ]\Ir. Eomilly and Mr. Roupell moved for leave to amend

tlie bill.

ilr. Piggott and Mr. Wooddeson, for the Defendants, opposed

Ihe motion; insisting, that it would not be permitted in the case

of any partnership trade ; that the decision in Lord Coningshy v.

Sir Joseph Jel-yll was not considered regular: at least it is not of

course, where the demurrer is not merely for want of parties-

and that there is not a passage in this bill, in which the objection

taken l)y the Court does not occur.

Lord Chancellor [Eldox] :

If the Plaintiffs strike out their present style as Plaintiffs, and

sue as individuals, they will appear as dilTercnt persons. I give

. LOA.RI

w re con titut d. In 'ut'len . The Duke of Queensuerry,
iu
'.I.1hurlow aid, h w ulcl · nvinc th parti , that th y had no 1 w.
ancl on titutio
ut th 'r · wa.· an all 'Jab n, that h wa: incliviclually liabl .
i th ab olut •duty oi 1 urt J: Ju ~ ti · ot io
permit p r on n L in rp rat cl t aife ·t t tr at th m.·elv ' a :i
·orporation up n th I · rel. Ii th
lainti.O:. had tat cl . imply,
that th y and s ral p I on w r jointly inter t ·d, or e'
they
on b hall of th m lv and oth r , provicl d it wa maniJ> ·tly inon ni nt to ju ti to mak th m all parti , and tatina thi a e
a indiviclual upon th prin ipl of 1 ells . Read it mi ht 1 Yery
prop r. That thi
ourt will hold juri di ti n to hav a ·hattel
c.1 'liv r cl up
have no doubt: but I am alarmecl at the notion,
that th
oluntar o i ti ar to b p rmitt cl to tat all their
and con titution , upon the
ord, and then to tell
urt th y ar in li idual . Then what ort of a partn r hip
i thi · · for it i now admitted to be a partner hip? Th bill
tat ' that th y ub i t und r a harter, grant d by p rson wh:)
ar now d ad; and therefor , if thi harter cannot l produce<l,
th o i ty i on . Upon principl of p lie th
ourt of thi~
ountr do not it to d termine upon harter granted by per on:,
who hav not the prerogative to grant hart r . I d ir my O'rouncl
to b und r tood di tin tly. I do not think the ourt ought to
permit p on who can onl u a partn r to ue in a corporate
hara ter; and that i th ffcct of thi bill.
Th D murr r wa allow 1.
:Jla ' 1 th. Th Lord hancellor when the demurrer wa
allow d ha ing thrown out an intimation, that the Plaintiff might
am nd fr. Romilly and Ir. oup 11 mov d for leave to amend
th bill.
Mr. iggott and Ur. \\ oodde on for th
f n lant oppo ed
th moti n · in i ting, that it would not b p rmitted in th ca e
f an ' partn r hip trad · that th d ci ion in Lord oning by \.
'ir Jo eplz J kyll wa not con id red r gular : at lea t it i" not of
ur
wh r th d murr r i not m r 1 for want £ I arti ;
;md th, t th r
bill in whi h the obj tion
tak n b · th

orcl JI
ELL R [ELD x]:
If th
lainti:ff trik out th ir pr nt hl a
laintiff and
ue a in lividual th
will appear a li r nt p I"SOns. I 1ri\
.l.T

48

48 Joint Plaintiffs

them leave to amend, because I am not sure, I should not contra-

dict some rule ; having had great doubt, whether I should allow the

demurrer. That doubt is founded upon this; that it has been

decided, that individuals forming a voluntary society may as indi-

viduals, not as a voluntary society, have such a joint interest in a

chattel, that this Court would take notice of that interest, and of

agreements upon it, not with reference to them as a voluntary-

society, but as individuals. I allude to the case I argued without

success upon the tobacco-box. With respect to that decision I had

considerable doubt, whether this very case would not arise out of it.

I had great doubt, whether a voluntary association for the best

purpose is to meet without the authority of a corporation, and

make laws and statutes, which have no authority, and then call

upon this Court to administer all the moral justice, that may arise

upon the disputes among these, in a sense unauthorized, bodies.

It is singular, that this Court should sit upon the concerns of an

association, which in law has no existence; and in that case, that

this Court should be ancillary to their agreements as to their toasts,

&c. I was much disappointed with that case upon that part of it;
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though I never had a doubt as to the jurisdiction upon chattels be-

tween man and man. But it is too late to consider that now.

In this case, though I cannot disguise from myself, that the

whole record attributed more of a corporate character than I ought

to permit a voluntary society to put upon the record, yet I could

not devest myself of this notion altogether ; that, though they had

assumed that character, yet upon the whole bill there was a case

represented fairly of individuals with a joint interest, absurdly

representing themselves corporate; and I had doubt enough there-

fore, whether over-ruling the demurrer was absolutely right. By

giving leave to amend I thought I might enable them to reduce

the record to that, which, it is admitted, might be made by a new

bill. Suppose, Mr. Worseley's silver cup was taken away from the

Middle Temple: the society must some way or other be permitted

to sue ; and this is really the same ; for it is not material, what it

is. Upon the whole therefore I thought it fair to let them amend

by striking out all that.

In the manuscript notes I have seen strong passages, as falling

from Lord Ilardwicke, that, where a great many individuals are

jointly interested, there are more cases than those, which are fa-

miliar, of creditors and legatees, where the Court will let a few

JOINT PLAINTIFFS

them leave to amend, because I am not ure, I should not contradict some rule; having had great doubt, whether I should allow the
demurrer. That doubt i founded upon thi ; tha·t it has been
decided, that individual forming a voluntary ociety may a individual , not a a voluntary society, have such a joint interest in a
chaittel, that i.hi Court would take noti of that interest, and of
agreement upon it, not with reference to them a a voluntary
ociety, but a individual . I allude to the ca e I argued without
succe upon the tobacco-box. With re pect to that decision I had
con iderable doubt, whether this very case would not airise out of it.
I had great doubt, wheth r a voluntary as ociation for the best
purpo e i to meet without the authority of a corporation, and
make law and statutes, which have no authority, and then call
upon thi Court to administer all the moral justice, that may arise
upon the disputes among these, in a sense unauthorized, bodies.
It i singular, that thi Court should it upon the oncerns of an
a sociation, which in law has no existence ; and in that case, that
this Court should be ancillary to their agreements as to their toast~,
&c. I was much disappointed with that case upon that part of it;
though I never had a doubt as to the jurisdiction upon chattels between man and man. But it is too late to consider that now.
In this case, though I cannot disguise from myself, that the
whole record attributed more of a corporate cha·r acter than I ought
to permit a voluntary society to put upon the record, yet I could
not deve t myself of this notion altogether; that, though they had
as urned that character, yet upon the whole bill there was a case
repre ented fairly of individuals with a joint int rest, absurdly
repre enting themselves corporate ; and I had doubt enough therefore, whether over-ruling the demurrer wa ab olut ly right. By
giving leave to amend I thought I might nable th m to reduce
the record to that, which, it i admitt d might be made by a new
bill.
uppo e, Mr. Wor ley' silver cup was taken away from the
fiddle T emple: the oci ty mu t ome way or other be permitt d
to u ; and thi i reall} the ame; for it i not mat rial, what it
i . Upon th whol th r fore I thought it fair to 1 t them amend
by triking out all that.
In the manu cript not I have een trong pa ag , a falling
from Lord Hardwick that, wh r a r at many individuals are
joi11tly int r t d th r ar mar ca e than tho
which ar faurt will 1 t a few
mili r f r Jii r and l gat , wh r th

LLO D

Lloyd v. Loaring 49

represent the whole. There is one case very familiar, in which the

Court has allowed a very few to represent the whole world.

. L ARI G

49

repre ent the whole. Th r i one a e v ry familiar) in which th
Court ha allow d a ry few to repr nt th whole world.
a,·' wa ··v n to amend.

Leave was given to amend.

1. Where a number of persons have an interest in the same

subject, if a Court cannot recognize them as a legally associated

body, but is bound to consider them as individuals. Lord Eldon

declared, not only in the principal case, but in Ex parte Lacey,

6 Ves. G28, that the majority have no right to bind the minority.

2. As to the jurisdiction which Courts of Equity exercise, for

the delivery of specific chattels, and the permission granted to

certain individuals to sue, as representing a joint interest, although

they may not be a regularly incorporated society, provided they do

not profess, by their bill, to sue as corporators; see, ante, the note

to Fells V. Eeacl 3 V. 70.

3. A plaintiff, it has been said, is now frequently permitted,

as in the principal case, to amend his bill, in order to avoid the

effect of a demurrer, at any stage of the argument, before judgment

is given thereon (Baker v. Mellisli, 11 Ves. 72) ; and, before the

demurrer is argued, it was long ago agreed, that the plaintiff may
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obtain leave to amend his bill, as of course. Lord Coningsby v.

Sir Joseph Jekyll, 2 P. Wms. 300. Convenience, and the saving

of both expense and time, have dictated a farther relaxation of

practice in modem days; strictly speaking, after a demurrer is

allowed, the bill is out of Court; and Lord Hardwicke said there

was no instance of permission given to amend it {Smith v. Barnes,

1 Dick. 67) ; but Lord Eldon has declared, that he knew many

cases in which, after a demurrer allowed, and the bill dismissed

by order, it had been considered in the discretion of the Court to

set the cause on foot again. And, as this indulgence is granted

to a plaintiff, so, on the other hand, when, during the pendency

of the argument of the demurrer, and before judgment, the Court

sees the demurrer is too general; but that, if more confined, it

would be good ; permission will, for the sake of justice, be given to

the defendant to amend the demurrer, at that stage of the proceed-

ings. Baler v. MclUsh, ubi supra.

4. As to the cases in which the general rule, requiring all par-

ties interested in a suit to be before the Court, may be dispensed

with, see, post, the note to The Attorney General v. Jackson, 11

V. 365.

1. WHERE a numb r of per o s hav an interc t in the ame
ul j ct, if a Court a not recognize them a a legally a ciated
bod , but i bound to on id r them a individual , ord Eldon
c1 clarec1, not only in the principal a e but jn Ex parte Lacey,
6 V . 6 , that th majority have no right to bind the minori y.
to th juri diction which ourts of quity ex rci e, for
th deli ry of pe ific chattel , and the p rmi ion granted to
c rtain individual to u , a representing a joint intere t, although
th y ma not be a r gularly incorporat d oci ty pro ided they do
not prof , by their bill, to ue a corporator ; ee ante,, the note
to Fells v. Read, 3 V. 70.
3. A plaintiff, it ha been said, i now frequently permitted,
a in the principal ca e, to amend hi bill, in order to avoid the
effect of a demurrer, at any tage of the argument, before judgment
i given thereon (Balcer v. Mellish, 11 Ve. ·); and, before the
demurrer i argued, it wa long ago agreed, that the plaintiff may
obtain 1 a e to amend hi bill, as of cour e. Lord oning by v.
Sir Joseph Jekyll 2 P. Wm . 300. Convenience, and the aving
of both expen and time, have dictated a farther r elaxation of
practice in modern da} ; trictly peaking, after a demurrer is
allowed, the bill i out of Court; and Lord Hardwicke aii d there
wa no in tance of permi ion given to amend it ( mith v. Barnes,
1 Dick. 6 ) ; but Lord Eldon ha declared, that h knew man
ca e in which after a demurrer allowed and the bill di mi ed
b order, it had b en con idered in the di cretion of th
ourt to
et the cau e on foot again. And a thi indulgen i granted
to a plaintiff, o on the other hand when during th pend ncy
of the arrrument of the d murrer aind befor judgment, the ourt
e th d murrer i too g neral · ut that if mor confined it
woul 1 b ood; p rmi ion will for the ak of ju ti e b gi n
tl
f ndant t am nd th d murrer at that tag of the proc ding . Baker v. M ll' h ubi supra..
to the ca in whicl th rr n ral rule, r quirinrr all arti
t d in a uit to
f r th
ur . 11r:1y b di:- n e 1
po t th no to Th e Attorn ey eneral . Ja k on 11
4
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'HoyU V. Moore, Jf. Ired. Eq. (N. C.) 175. (lSJf5.)

Cause removed from the Court of Equity of Lincoln County,

at the Spring Term, 1845.

(1845.)

The Bill is filed for the purpose of obtaining from the Court

directions to the plaintiff, how to distribute property in his hands,

which he holds as representing Alexander Moore, deceased. Alex-

ander Moore, by his will, gave to his wife, Elizabeth Moore, con-

siderable property, both real and personal, during her life, and, at

her death, to be disposed of as she might think proper, among her

children. Elizabeth Moore, by her will, gave a certain portion of

the property, so devised to her, to the children of her deceased

son, James Moore, naming them. The plaintiff is the adminis-

trator with the will annexed of Alexander Moore, and he may be

the executor of Elizabeth Moore, though it is not stated in the

Bill, nor is her will exhibited. The Bill then states, that, after

selling a large portion of the personal property, preparatory to

dividing it among those who were entitled, he was '^y some of the

legatees ordered to pay over none of the legacies or bequests, &c.";
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"that some of the negroes are claimed by Margaret Moore, relict

and widow of James Moore, dec'd., who is the guardian of the

children of A. Moore, dec'd. The) other children claim that

the negroes shall be sold and divided among the other children of

Alexander Moore;" "that James Moore and William Moore, sons

of A. Moore, died after the making of the will and before the

testator. William left five children; and John Moore died many

years before, leaving" — with a space, to insert, as we presume,

the names of his children, but setting out none. The Bill then

proceeds: "Eobinson ]\[oore is still living, Alexander is still liv-

ing, John Rhinehardt married Ann, Michael married Polly, since

dead; William Scott married Posanna, both dead; they left issue

William Scott, who died without issue, Alexander Pankin mar-

ried Elizabeth, still living" — not stating the period when any of

the foregoing died. The Bill then prays, that "tlie proper parties

may be made defendants, and if there arc others than those set

forth, they may be made parties, &c." — "that the clerk may be

ordered to issue his State's writ of subpnona to th(^ proper defend-

Cau e removed from the Court of Equity of Lincoln County,
at the Spring Term, 1845.
The Bill i :filed for the purpose of obtaining from the Court
directions to the plaintiff, ho.w to distribute pr9perty in his hands,
which he holds as representing Alexander Moore, deceased. Alexander Moore, by his will, gave to his wife, Elizabeth Moore, coniderable property, both real and per anal, during her life, and, at
her death, to be disposed of as she might think proper, among her
children. Elizabeth Moor , by her will, gave a certain portion of
the property, so devised to her, to the children of her deceased
on, James Moore, naming them. The plaintiff is the administrator with the will annexed of Alexander Moore, and he may be
the executor of Elizabeth Moore, though it is not stated in the
Bill, nor is her will exhibited. The Bill then states, that, after
elling a large portion of the personal property, preparatory to
dividing it among those who were entitled, he was ''by some of the
legatees ordered to pay over none of the legacies or bequest , &c." ;
"that some of the negroes are claimed by Margaret Moore, relict
and widow of James Moore, dec'd., who is the guardian of the
children of A. Moore, dec'd. Thel other children claim that
the negroes shall be sold and divided among the other children of
Alexander Moore;" "that James Moore and William Moore, sons
of A. Moore, died after the making of the will and before the
te tator. William left :five children; and John Moore died many
year before, 1 aving" - with a space, to in ert, a we pre ume,
the names of hi hildren, but setting out none. The Bill then
proceeds: "Robin on Moore i still living, Al xand r i till living John Rhinehardt marri d Ann, Mi hael marri d Polly inc
cl ad; William cott married Ro anna, both dead; they 1 ft i ue
William Scott, who died without i ue, Alexander ankin marri d Elizab th, . till living"-not tating the p riod when any of
th foregoing di d. The ill then pray that "the proper partie.
t
may l e mad cl f ndant and if th r ar other than tho
forth they ma b mad partie , &c."-"that th 1°rk may 1e
tat
writ of . ubp na to tl1 I rop r def ndord r 1 o i u hi

II
HOYLE V. MooKi: • ol

ants, &c." Answers were filed by several persons, Sii^ji replication

YLE

~I

~1

HE

eral per on ,
ant , &c.'
n w
w r fil d by
tak n, and the au e et f r hearing.

a·~

replication

'/

taken, and the cause set for hearing. ' ^

Nash, J. :

.•'
J .:
\\ mu h rcgr t it j n t in our pow r t grant to the plaintiff
th r lief h e k . Th
ill, no doubt from ha te, i o inartifi ially drawn, that we ann t gi e him i.h in ruction required.
t i a g n ral rul in Equity, hat all the p on howev r num rou he ma b , who are int r t d in the ubjec of a uit,
mu t b made parti' , ith r plaintiff or d f ndant , if known ·
and lik a de laration at common law, the ircum tance on tituting the a
u t b
t forth in the Bill at large. :Jfr. 1oopcr,
in hi
quity 1 ading, page 9, tate that the econd part of the
Bill et forth h name of the parti . In order to obtain Lh13
an r upon oatl he Bill mu t pray, that the writ of ubpama
I u
to th d f ndant; and, although pe on may be named in
the ill none ar partie to it, again t whom proce i not prayed.
Coop. Eq. Plead. 16. 1 P . il. 593. 2 Dick. 0 . A defendant
i a ne e ary to the ju t and proper con tru tion of a Bill in
Equit a a plaintiff. I n the case w are now con idering, there i
no d f ndant whatever- proce i pra ed a ain t no one. 'lhe
pra · r i , 'that the clerk be order d to i ue ubpama to th
prop r defendant & . ' But who are they? . . o name or name·
ar iY n.
ow i he to find them out? I it to be left o hi·
di er tion to ay, who ought to be mad defendant ? Thi , in fact,
i what the plaintiff do
a k. It i not, a before remarked,
uffi i nt that th name of individual a·r contained in the Bill.
roe
i no a ked again t them nor again t any one in parut the
ticular. There i th n, no party defendant to the Bill.
ill i liabl to other obje tion equally fatail. It i , among other
tat d, that John "Moore died before th te tator 1 ann.
thin
childr n and a blank i 1 ft in the Bill after the word leaYing.'
appar ntl3 for in rting the nam of hi chilc1r n, and perha1p of
if he had any. It i not tated wh ther th r-'
hi r pr ntativ
i a r pr entati
or not. Th Bill do not tate who ar the
c:hildr n of \1 and r l\Ioor . The nam of certain pe on ar
111 ntion 1 bu
h h r th y ar u h hildren, w are 1 ft to
·onj tur .
om of th
o ention d ar aid t
a ,
hut wh n th · li d w ar not inform d. I would b impo .. ii l

ASH,

We much regret it is not in our power to grant to the plaintiff

the relief he seeks. The Bill, no doubt from haste, is so inarti-

ficially drawn, that we cannot give him the instructions required.

It is a general rule in Equity, that all the persons, however nu-

merous they may be, who are interested in the subject of a suit,

must be made parties, either plaintiffri or defendants, if known;

and like a declaration at common law, the circumstances consti-

tuting the case must be set forth in the Bill at large. Mr. Cooper,

in his Equity Pleading, page 9, states, that the second part of the

Bill sets forth the names of the parties. In order to obtain the

answer upon oath, the Bill must pray, that the writ of subpoena

issue to the defendant; and, although persons may be named in

the Bill, none are parties to it, against whom process is not prayed.

Coop. Eq. Plead. 16. 1 P. Wil. 593. 2 Dick. 707. A defendant

is as necessary to the just and proper construction of a Bill in

Equity as a plaintiff. In the case we are now considering, there is
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no defendant whatever — process is prayed against no one. The

prayer is, "that the clerk be ordered to issue subpoenas to the

proper defendants, &c." But who are they? Xo name or names

are given. How is he to find them out? Is it to be left to his

discretion to say, who ought to be made defendants? This, in fact,

is what the plaintiff does ask. It is not, as before remarked,

sufficient that the names of individuals are contained in the Bill.

Process is not asked against them, nor against any one in par-

ticular. There is, then, no party defendant to the Bill. But the

Bill is liable to other objections, equally fatal. It is, among other

things, stated, that John ]\Ioore died before the testator, leaving

children, and a blank is left in the Bill, after the word "leaving,"

apparently for inserting the names of his children, and perhaps of

his representatives, if he had any. It is not stated whether there

is a representative or not. The Bill does not state who are tlie

children of Alexander Moore. The names of certain persons are

mentioned, but whether they are such children, we are left to

conjecture. Some of those, so mentioned, are said to be dead,

but when they died wo are not informed. It would be impossible

MULTIFARIOUS ESS

52
52 Multifariousness

for the Court, upon this executor's bill, to know to whoiD to

decree the money.

The Court has gone very far, in sustaining Bills defectr, sly

drawn — but we think this so essentially wanting in one of the

points, necessary to the institution of a suit in any Court, that we

cannot sustain it.

for the Court, upon this executor's bill, to know to whom to
decree the money.
The Court ha gone very far, in sustaining Bills defecfr, .ely
hawn-but we think this so es entially wanting in one of the
point , nece ary to the institution of a suit in any Court, that we
cannot sustain it.

Pee Cubiam. Bill dismissed.

Multifariousness.

Bill dismissed.

PER CuRIAM.

Warren v. Warren, 56 Me. 360. (1868.)

Bill in Equity^ heard on demurrer, brought in the name of

George Warren and Lewis P. Warren, of Westbrook, who were

the sole heirs at law of the late John Warren, against John G.

Warren and Charles W. Scott, executors and trustees of the last

MULTIFARIOUSNESS.

will and testament of the late Nathaniel Warren.

The bill alleges substantially that, in 1815, John and Nathaniel

Warren v. Warren, 56 Me. 360.

(1868.)

Warren entered into a co-partnership in the business of lumbering,

farming, trade and navigation, under the firm name of J. & N.

Warren, each uniting his property, real and personal, and they

were in all things to share equally in their partnership affairs;
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that their partnership business continued till Sept. 10, 1845, when

John Warren died intestate, leaving the complainants his sole

heirs and representatives, and that, upon his decease, all his prop-

erty, together with his interests in said partnership business, vested

in them ; that, during John Warren's lifetime, he advanced to the

partnership more than his proportionate part of the funds and

performed more than his share of the services therein; that, at

John Warren's decease, Nathaniel Warren had received the larger

share of the partnership profits, and was indebted to John Warren

therefor and for the surplus advances aforesaid; that the partner-

ship thus continued without any adjustment, until Feb. 11, 183-1,

when Nathaniel Warren was found indebted to the co-partnership

in a certain sum named; that, from Feb. 11, 1824, to the time

of John Warren's death, there was no settlement or exhibit of the

condition of the partnership affairs, although Nathaniel Warren

kept the partnership 1)ooks and papers and was thereto often re-

quested by John Warrou, and that no account thereof has been

BILL IN EQUITY, heard on demurrer, brought in the name Jf
George Warren and Lewis P. Warren, of Westbrook, who were
the sole heirs at law of the late John Warren, against John G.
Warren and Charles W. Scott, executors and trustees of the last
will and testament of the late Nathaniel Warren.
The bill alleges substantially that, in 1815, John and Nathaniel
Warren entered into a co-partnership in the business of lumbering,
farming, trade and navigation, under the firm name of J. & N.
Warren, each uniting his property, real and personal, and they
were in all things to share equally in their pa·rtnership affairs;
that their partnership business continued till Sept. 10, 1845, when
John Warren died intestate, leaving the complainants his sole
heirs and representatives, and that, upon his decease, all his property, together with his interests in sari.d partnership business, vested
in them; that, during John Warren's lifetime, he advanced to the
partnership more than his proportionate part of the funds and
performed more than his share of the services therein; that, at
John Warren's decease, Nathaniel Warren had received the larger
share of the partnership profits, and was indebted to John Warren
th refor and for the surplus advance aforesaid; that the partnership thus continued without any adju tment, until Feb. 11, 182-.1:,
when Na thani 1 Warren was found ind b d to the co-partnership
in a c rtain um named; that from F b. 11, 1824, to the time
of John Warr n' d ath ther wa no ttl ment or exhibit of the
condition of th partn r hip affair although athaniel Warr n
kept the partner fop 1o k and pap r and was th reto oft n r ..
qu ted by John Wan n and that no· a ount th reof ha lwcn
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rendered by Nathaniel Warren or his representatives, to the date

of this bill; that, prior to the death of John Warren, the co-

partnership acquired certain real estate, a part of which was there-

after divided, but a certain part thereof remained undivided at the

decease of John Warren, which, together with a large amount of

personal property, rights and credits, was continued in the part-

nership business; that no administration of John Warren's estate

has ever been granted to any person ; that the complainants became

entitled to all the rights and remedies in equity to which their

father in his lifetime was entitled.

The bill further alleges that, on August 11, 1844, one Walker

united his business of lumbering to that of J. & M". Warren, and

that the lumbering business was carried on by J. Warren, N. War-

ren and Walker, the said J. & N. Warren having one-fourth part

interest each, and Walker one-half part interest therein; that, in

all other respects, the partnership business of J. & X. Warren was

conducted same as before Walker's connection therewith ; that said

lumbering business was carried on by the firm name of Warren &

Walker, separate and distinct from the other partnership business ;
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that, after the death of their father, the complainants succeeded

to his partnership interests, all of which remained in the hands

of Nathaniel Warren, and it vested in them; that, thus repre-

senting their father's interests, the complainants were admitted by

Nathaniel Warren into the partnership before stated; that the

co-partnership business, so far as the lumbering was concerned,

was carried on by Nathaniel Warren, owning one-fourth. Walker

one-half, and the complainants, owning and representing in the

right of their deceased father, the remaining fourth part interest

in the same; that the several parties in the lumbering business

were each to contribute their respective proportion of services and

property and receive a proportionate share of the profits ; that the

former partnership business of J. & N. Warren was continued

after John Warren's death by Nathaniel Warren and the com-

plainants, owning and representing the moiety of their father

deceased, and they so continued in said business till Nov. 1862 ;

that, after the decease of John Warren, Nathaniel Warren received

more than his share of its proceeds and the complainants con-

tributed more than their share to the business.

The bill further alleges that the lumbering business was con-

tinued by Nathaniel Warren, Walker and the complainants until

. \

53

Ilil•N

rend r d by athani 1 \ arr n or hi r pr ntati v , to the elate
of tbi bill; that, prior to the d ath of ohn arren, the copartn r hip a quir cl rtain r al c tat a part of whi h wa thereaft"r di i l tl but ai ertain part th r of r main d unclivid d at the
d c a of ohn \\arr n which, i. o»th r with a large amount of
p r onal pr I rty, ri 0 ht an 1 r lit , wa conti ued in the partn r hip bu. in . ; tha no aclmini 'trati n of John Warren
tate
ha v r b n oTant d to any p I on· that the complainant became
ntitl d to all the rights and r medi in equity to which their
father in hi lif tim wa ntitled.
Th bill furth r all g that, on ugu t 11, 1 -±-!, one Walker
of lumbering to that of J. & . . . Warren, and
unite 1 hi bu in
was carri d on by J. Warren, N. Warthat the lumb ring bu in
ren aind Walker, the aid J. & . Warren having one-fourth part
inter t ea h an
alker on -half part intere t ther in; that, in
all o her r p c , th partn r hip bu ine of J. & N. Warren wa
mnduct d ame a b fore Walker's connection therewith; that aid
lumbering bu ine wa arri d on by th firm nam of Warren &
Walkcr, parate and di tinct from the other partner hip bu ines ;
that, after the death of their father, the complainants succeed d
to hi partn hip inter t , all of which remained in the hand
of .r athaniel Warren, and it ve t d in them; that thu r epreentino- th ir father' inter t , th comr lainant were admitted by
.,.athani 1 Warren into the partner hip befor tated; that the
co-partner hip bu in , o far a the lumbering wa concern d,
wa carried on by athani 1 Warren owning on -fourth Walker
one-half and the omplainants, owning and r pr enting in the
right of th ir dee a d father the r mainin fourth part intere t
in th am ; that the Yeral parti in th lumb rinO' bu ine
r ach to contribute th ir re pectiv proportion of ervice an
propert and r c i a pr portionat har of th profit ; that the
form r partn r hi bu in
of J. & . Warr n wa continued
aft r ohn Warr n d ath b ' athani 1 Warr n and th complainant ownino- and r pre enting th moi t of their fath r
decca 1 and th
o continued in aid bu in
till ov. 1 2 ;
that aft r th d c a of John Warr n
onmor than hi har of it proc ed an 1 t1;
tribut 1 mor than th ir har to the u in . .
Th ill furth r all o· " that th lum rin bn inc wa
nalk r an 1 the r 1111 lainant until
tinu 1 by athani l Wan n
7

"

.i.
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July, 1854, when Walker sold Ms interest to one Brigham, and

received his share of the profits, and fully accounted for his share

of the property; that, in July aforesaid, the complainants pur-

chased Nathaniel ^Yarren's interest in tlie lumbering interest; that

Nathaniel Warren then held a large amount of property, rights

and credits received from Jolin Warren and never accounted for,

and a large amount of interest and profits which arose from the

funds of the co-partnership of J. & N. Warren, in the hands of

X. Warren, before and after Jolin Warren's death ; that Nathaniel

Warren, so holding the funds of J. Wan-en, in his lifetime, and,

since his death, of the complainants, which he ought to have ac-

counted for to the complainants, the complainants, at Nathaniel

Warren's request, made their promissory note, dated July 1, 1854,

and payable to Nathaniel Warren, for the sum of $8930; that said

note was given for convenience, with the full understanding with

Nathaniel Warren that whatever sum of money or other property

Nathaniel Warren held as due John Warren in his lifetime, or,

since his death, to the complainants, should be applied to the pay-

ment of said note, and that the amount so held was more than the
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value of the note.

The bill further alleges that the partnership business, other than

the lumbering business, was continued by Nathaniel Warren and

the complainants, till November, 1862, when Nathaniel Warren

died testate, and the defendants were appointed executors of his

will, duly probated, and trustees of certain trusts therein named,

which they accepted; that, in Nov., 1866, the defendants, as

executors, disregarding the understanding before named and con-

triving to oppress the complainants, sued said note and entered

their action at the January term, 1867, of this Court, where the

same is now pending.

The bill further alleges that, during the partnership of J. & N.

Warren, both before and since the death of John Warren,

Nathaniel Warren applied to his own use, from the profits of

said co-partnership, large sums of money exceeding his propor-

tion, and, up to the time of his death, Nathaniel Warren has

had charge of the partnership books of account between himself

and John Warren and l)etween himself and the complainants; that

the complainants have had no means to ascertain the true state of

their accounts; that the complainants repeatedly applied to

Nathaniel Warren in his lifetime, and, since his death, to the

MuLTIFARIO sNEss

July, 1854, when Walker sold his interest to one Brigham, arn1
received his share of the profits, and fully accounted for his share
of the property; that, in July afore aid, the complainant purcha ed Nathaniel \\ arren' interest in the lumbering intere t; that
athaniel Warren then held a large amount of prop rty, rights
and credits received from John Warren and never accounted for,
and a large amount of interest and profits which arose from the
funds of the co-partnership of J. & N. Warren, in the hand of
N. Warren, before and after John Warren's death; that Nathaniel
Warren, so holding the funds of J. Warr en, in his lifetime, and,
since his death, of the complaiinants, which he ought to have accounted for to the complainants, the complainants, at Nathaniel
Warren's request, made their promissory note, dated July 1, 185-J.,
and payable to N athailliel Warren, for the sum of $8920; that said
note was given for convenience, with the full under tanding with
Nathaniel Warren that whatever sum of money or other property
Nathaniel Warren held as due John Wail'ren in his lifetime, or,
since his death, to the complainants, should be applied to the payment of said note, and that the amount so held was more than the
value of the note.
The bill further alleges that the partnership business, other than
the lumbering business, was continued by Nathaniel ·warren and
the complainants, till November, 1862, when Nathaniel Wairren
died testate, and the defendants were appointed executors of his
will, duly probated, and trustees of certain trusts th rein named,
which they accepted; that, in Nov., 1866, the defendants, as
ex cutors, disrega-rding the understanding before named and contriving to oppress the complainants, sued said note and entered
their action at the January term, 1867, of this Court, where the
same is now pending.
The bill further alleges that, during the partnership of J. & N.
Warren, both before and since the death of John Warren,
Nathaniel Warren appli d to hi own use, from the profits of
said co-partner hip, large um of mon y exceeding hi proportion, and, up to the tim of hi d ath
athani 1 Warrcn ha ..
had charge of the partn r hip book of account between himself
and John Warren and b ween hims lf and the omplainants; that
th complajnan hav ha 1 no m an to a certain th true tate of
th ir ac ount · that the complainants repeatedly applied to
Nathani 1 Warr n in hi lif time and sine hi a ath, to the
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defendants, for au account of all the alfairs of the co-iDartnerbhip

between Nathaniel & John Warren, in his lifetime, and, since his

death, between Nathaniel V^arren and the complainants; that

Nathaniel Warren, in his lifetime, refused and neglected to

answer said account to John Warren or the complainants, as have

the defendants since the death of Nathaniel Warren; that the

defendants pretend that nothing is due the complainants; that

Nathaniel Warren received $5000 more than his proportion of the

partnership profits; that the defendants ought to apply said

moneys to the payment of said note and be enjoined from prosecut-

ing their suit thereon, and render a true account of the partner-

ship transactions.

The prayer of the bill was for an answer and for an account

of all the partnership dealings, and the defendants be decreed to

apply whatever is found due the complainants to the payment of

said note, and the balance to the complainants, offering to pay

whatever may be found due from John Warren or the com-

plainants; that, in the meantime, the defendants be restrained

from prosecuting their suit on the note, and for further relief.
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The defendants demurred, assigning the following causes:

1. That the claims and transactions set out in the bill occurred

more than six years before the filing of the bill ;

2. That the plaintiffs, as heirs of John Warren, have no right

to maintain the bill or to any relief touching the same;

3. That, as to so much of the bill as seeks an answer touchinsr

real estate acquired by the co-partnership prior to the death of

John Warren, the plaintiffs have not made such a case in refer-

ence thereto as entitles them to any discovery or relief;

•1. That as to so much of the bill as seeks an answer touchinsr

the alleged admission of the plaintiffs into the co-partnership after

the death of John Warren, the continuance of the co-partnership

thereafterwards, &c., the plaintiffs have not made such a case as

entitles them to any discovery or relief; and,

5. That the bill is exhibited for several separate and distinct

claims and causes which have no relation to or dependance on

each other, and concern different and distinct persons who have

no common relation to or interest in the same; because the bill

is multifarious, and because it discloses no equity on the part- of

the plaintiffs, nor any right to the assistance of a court of equity.

55

defendants) for n a ount f all th afl'.ai of th co-parln r hip
b tween athani 1 J hn Warr n) in hi lif im ) and, ince hi··
death) betw n
thani 1 ·warr n and th
o plainants; that
athani 1 V arren) in hi lifotim ) r fus d and neglected to
ount t
hn \ arr n or the omplainant ) as ha
an w r aid
the d f ndant inc the death f athani 1 Warren; that the
omplainant ; that
d f ndant pr t nd that nothing i due tl
athaniel \\arr n r c ived $5000 mor than hi proportion of the
partn r hip profit ; that the defenda·n t ought to apply aid
mon y to th paym nt of aid note and be njoined from pro ecuting th ir uit thereon, and render a true account of the partnership tran action .
The pra 'er of the bill was for an an wer and for an account
of all th partnership dealing ) and the defendant be decreed to
apply whatever i found due th complainant to the payment of
said note) aind th balance to the omplainant , offering to pay
whate r may be found due from John Warr n or the complainant · that) in the meantime) the defendant be re trained
from pro uting th ir uit on the not and for further reli f.
Tbe def ndant demurred, a ignin the following cau e :
1. That the claim a·n d tran a tion et out in th bill occurred
more than ix year b fore the filing of the bill;
2. That the plaintiff ) a h ir of John Warren ha e no right
to maintain the bill or to any relief touching the ame;
3. That) a to o much of the bill a eek atll an wer touching
real e tate acquired by the co-partner hip prior to the death of
John ~arr n) th plaintiff have not made uch a a e in reference ther to a entitle them to any di covery or r lief;
-!. Tha a to o much of the bill a eek an an wer touching
the alleged admi ion of the plaintiff into the co-partner hip after
the death of John Warren, the ontinuance of the co-partn r hip
thereafterward , &c. the plaintiff have not made uch a ca e a,
enti 1 th m to any di covery or r lief; and)
5. That the bill i xhibited for everal eparate and di tinct
laim and cau e whi h hav no r lation to or dependance on
ach oth r and n rn diff r nt and di tinct per on who ha1e
no common r la ion t r int r t in th am ; b cau th bill
i multifari u
n b au e it di lo
no quit· on the part o
th plaintiff nor an right to th a i tanc of a ourt of equity.
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MULTIF .ARIOUSNESS

KENT, J.:
5G MULTIFAEIOUSNESS

Kent, J. :

The principal ground, set fortli in the demurrer to this bill, is

that it is multifarious. Before examining the allegations in the

bill, it is important to ascertain what is the true definition of

multifariousness as applied to a bill in equity, and its extent and

limitations. Equity, whilst it is broad and liberal in the applica-

tion of remedies, and avoids the strict technicalities of the common

law, yet forbids the mixing together in one bill of entirely distinct

and independent matters of complaint, or the introduction of par-

ties wdio are not interested in the subject matter or decree sought,

and have but an incidental interest in some question raised by the

statements in the bill. The objection, therefore, is of a two fold

character, one relating to the subject matter and prayer of the bill,

and the other relating to the parties thereto. But "a bill is not

multifarious because it joins two good causes of complaint, growing

out of the same transaction, when all the defendants are interested

in the same claim of right, and when the relief asked for in rela-

tion to each is of the same general character." Foss v. Eayiies,

31 Maine, 81 ; Story's Eq. PI., § 284.
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Where the object of the bill is single, to establish and obtain

relief for one claim, in which all the defendants may be inter-

ested, it is not multifarious. Bughee v. Sargent, 23 Maine, 260.

"A bill is not to be regarded as multifarious when it states a right

to account from A & B against whom it has one remedy which it

seeks to enforce, and also claims a lien against A for what is due.''

Story's Eq. PI., § 284.

A bill is not multifarious when it sets up one substantial ground

of relief and also another on which no relief can be had. VarricJc

V. Smith, 5 Paige, 137.

In the case of Newland v. Rogers, 3 Barb. C. E., 432, Chan-

cellor Walworth, after stating that there did not appear to be

any necessary connection between the different subject matters

stated in the bill, says that, "the counsel is wrong in supposing

that two distinct and independent matters or claims, by the same

complainant against the same defendant, cannot properly be united

in the same bill. Multifariousness in a bill is only where different

matters, having no connection with each other, are joined in the

bill against several defendants, having no interest in or connection

with one or more of the distinct causes of action or claims for

which the 1)111 is ])ronght, so that such defendants are put to the

The principal ground, set forth in the demurrer to this bill, is
that it i multifariou . B fore examining the allegations in the
bill, it i important to a certain what i the true definition of
multifariou ne s a applied to ai bill in equity, and its extent and
limitations. Equity, whil t it is broad and liberal in the application of remedies, and avoid the strict technicalitie of the common
law, yet forbid the mixing together in one bill of entirely distinct
and independent matters of complaint, nr the introduction of parties who are not intere ted in the subject matter or decree sought,
and have but an incidental intere t in ome que tion raised by the
tatements in the bill. The objection, therefore, i of a two foltl
character, one relating to the ubject matter and prayer of the bill,
and the other relating to the parties thereto. But "a bill is not
multifarious because it joins two good causes of complaint, growing
out of the ame tran action, when all the defendants are interested
in the same claim of right, and when the relief asked for in relation to each i of the same general character." Foss v. Haynes,
31 Maine, 81; Story's Eq. Pl., § 284.
Where the object of the bill is single, to esta-blish and obtain
relief for one claim, in which all the defendants may be interested, it is not multifarious. Bugbee v. Sargent, 23 Maine, 26~).
"A bill is not to be regarded as multifarious when it states a right
to account from A & B against whom it has one remedy which it
seeks to enforce, and also claims a lien against A for what is due."
Story's Eq. PL, § 284.
A bill is not multifarious when it sets up one substantial ground
of relief and al o another on which no relief can be had. Varrick
v. Smith, 5 Paige, 137.
In the ca e of Newland v. Rogers, 3 Barb. C. R., 432, Chancellor Walworth, after ta·t ing that there did not appear to be
any necessary connection between the different ubject matters
tat d in the bill, ay that, "the coun el is wrong in uppo ing
that two di tinct and ind pendent matt r or claim by the ame
complainant again t the ame defendant cannot prop rly b unitc<l
in the sam bill. Multifariou ne in a bill i only where di:ff rent
matter , having no connection with ach other ar join d in the
bill again t evera1 def ndant having no inter t in or conn ction
of a· tion or claim for
with one or more of th di tin t cau
whi ·h th bm j hr uaht 0 that u h d f ndant are put to the
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unnecessary trouble and expense of answering and litigating mat-

ters stated in the bill in which they are not interested, and with

which they have no connection. But a simple misjoinder of dif-

ferent causes of complaint, between the same parties, which cannot

conveniently and properly be litigated together, is sometimes called

multifariousness, although the ground of objection, in such cases,

depends upon an entirely different principle, and is a mere matter

of convenience in the administration of justice."

Story also says, — that "the objection of multifariousness and

the circumstances under which it will be allowed to prevail, or not,

is, in many cases, a matter of discretion and no general rule can

be laid down on the subject." Eq. Plead., § 284.

The Supreme Court of the United States takes the same view

in Gaines v. Cheiv, 2 How., 619, and in Oliver v. Piatt, 3 How.,

411. In the latter case, the Court say, — "We are of opinion that

the bill is in no just sense multifarious. It is true that it em-

braces the claims of both companies, but these interests are so

mixed up in all these transactions that entire justice could scarcely

be done, at least, not conveniently be done, without a union of
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the proprietors of both companies. It was well observed, by Lord

Coltenham, in Catnphell v. McKay, 1 Mylne & Craig, 603, and

the same doctrine was affirmed in this Court, in Gaines v. Chew,

2 Howard, 642, that it is impracticable to lay down any rule as to

what constitutes multifariousness as an abstract proposition; that

each case must depend upon its own circumstances, and much

must necessarily be left, where the authorities leave it, to the sound

discretion of the Court."

If we apply the doctrines and principles of these authorities to

the facts in this case, we fail to find sufficient foundation to the

objections made, to require us to dismiss the bill on the ground of

multifariousness.

The case presented in the bill is substantially one between part-

ners, seeking for an adjustment of partnership business. It sets

forth a co-partnership as existing between the complainants and

the deceased, represented by the defendants, from 1845 to 1862.

That such a partnership existed during that time, is distinctly

averred. The bill in fact seeks for an adjustment of that partner-

ship, and the ascertainment of the rights of the different parties

during the existence of that firm. It is true that it sets forth the

existence of a co-partnership between John and Nathaniel Warren

ARilEN
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unneces ary trouble and xp n e of an wering and litigating matter stated in the bill in whi h th y ar not intere ted, and with
which th y hav no onnection.
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The a e pre ented in the bill is ub tantially one between par ner , e king for an adju tment of partner hip bu ine . It et
forth a co-partner hip a xi ting between the complainant~ and
th
ec a d r pr nt d b) th defendant from 1 -!"' to 1 '...
That u h a parln r hip xi t d J.urino- that tim i~ di tinctl 1
aven d. Th bill in fa t e k for an adju tm nt of that partn rhip and th a rtainm nt of the rio-ht of th
iffcr nt I arti ~
durinCT th
·i t n
f that :firm. It i true that it " t f rth h
of a - artn r hip b tw n John an
athaniel Warr n
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for many years before 1845, and that the complainants are the

heirs of John. If the bill had been framed as claiming a right as

heirs alone to have an adjustment of the partnership, without

showing any other connection with the co-partnership, than as

heirs of their father, it might well be questioned whether such a

bill should not be instituted by an administrator and not by the

heirs. But the bill sets forth that the complainants, being heirs,

"were admitted by Nathaniel into the partnership before stated.''

They then became co-partners, and not simply heirs, and came in

as members of the firm, as individuals, and not in their representa-

tive capacity. They now ask that the old co-partnership matters

may be examined, not on the ground that they were members of

the firm before their father's death, but because they were so inti-

mately connected with the business after his death, that it is neces-

sary to investigate and settle these prior matters, in order to deter-

mine the rights of the parties under the firm as it existed after the

complainants came in.

If they came in, assuming simply their father's place by consent

or understanding with the surviving partner, and entitled to all

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 16:36 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t3223129q
Public Domain in the United States / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-us

his interest in the firm property, and liable for all its debts, then

it may be that they should be held entitled or liable, as the case

might be, from the settlement in 1824. In such a case, if it became

necessary to institute a bill in equity to adjust the affairs of the

firm, thus continued, it clearly would not be multifarious to con-

nect the prior with the subsequent transactions and seek for an

adjustment of both, where the parties are the same.

If another view is taken and these complainants are to be re-

garded as having been admitted as members of a new firm, and

independent of the old one, but as contributing the capital be-

longing to their father at his death, in the firm, it would not be

objectionable to ask for an examination and adjustment of the

condition of that firm, in order to ascertain, among other things,

wliat capital was in fact put in by the new partners. At all

events, the transactions referred to in the bill arc not so entirely

disconnected with the main purpose of the suit, as to justify us in

saying that they cannot have any bearing on the case after all the

facts are developed.

The allegations in the bill in reference to the branch partner-

ship, in which one Walker was originally a party, do not appear

to us as improper, or as such distinct and independent and un-

MULTIF .ARIOUSNESS

for many y ar before 1 -±5, and that the complainants a·r e the
h irs of John. If the bill had been framed a claiming a right a.
h eir alone to have an adju tment of the partnership, without
showing any other connection with the co-partnership, than as
heirs of their father, it might well be questioned whether such a
bill hould not be in tituted by an admini trator and not by the
heirs. But the bill sets forth that the complainants, being heirs
"were admitted by Nathaniel into the partnership before stated;''
They then became co-partners, and not simply heirs, and came in
as members of the firm, as individuals, and not in their representative capacity. They now ask that the old co-partnership matter'
may be examined, not on the ground that they were members of
the firm before their father's death, but oocau e they were so intimately connected with the business after his death, that it is necessary to investigate and settle these prior matters, in order to determine the right of the parties under the firm as it existed after the
complainant came in.
If they came in, assuming simply their father's place by consent
or understanding with the surviving partner, and entitled to all
his interest in the firm property, and liable for all its debts, then
it may be that they should be held entitled or liable, as the ca. c
might be, from the settlement in 18 4:. In such a case, if it became
necessary to institute a bill in equity to adjust the a·ffairs of the
firm, thus continued, it clearly would not be multifarious to connect the prior with the ubsequent transactions and seek for an
adjustment of both, where the partie are the same.
If another view is taken and these complainants are to be regarded as having been admitted as members of a new firm, ancl
independent of the old one, but as contributing the capital belonging to their father at hi death in the firm, it would not be
objectionable to a k for an examination and adju tment of the
condition o.r that firm, in order to a c rtain, among other thing ,
what capital wa in fact put in by the n w partners. At all
e ent , th transaction r £erred to in th bill are not o entirely
di connected with th main purpo e of th uit, a to ju tify us in
aying that they annot have any bearing on th ca e after all the
fact are developed.
The all gations in the bill in ref rence to the branch partnership, in whi h one Walker wa ori!rinally a party, do not appear
to us a improp r, or a uch di tinct and ind pendent and un-

W.ARRE
Wabren v. Warren 59

connected matters as bring them within the objection of multi-

fariousness. That partnership was in relation to one branch only

of the business of the general firm, and was confined to that par-

ticular business. It was well likened by the counsel for the com-

plainants to the branches of a co-partnership, so common in

mercantile transactions, existing in different cities or countries.

It is not properly a distinct and independent firm, but a wheel

within a wheel, or a branch from a common trunk.

If Walker had remained as a partner, he, undoubtedly, should

have been made a party. But the bill shows that, in 18o-l, Walker

sold out his interest, and received from the partnership his share

of the profits, and fully accounted for his share of the property.

On the same day, the complainants purchased of Xathaniel War-

ren, the testator, his interest in the lumbering business, which

was the sole business of the branch firm. Thus that particular

union was dissolved, and Walker had no further interest, and no

claim is made upon him, nor any that could affect his interests.

How far the purchase by the complainants of Xathaniel War-

ren's interest was a full and final settlement, so far as that branch
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of the business is concerned, we cannot determine until the whole

case is developed by the proof. All we now say is, that the bill is

not objectionable for this cause on demurrer. The same remark

may apply to the statute of limitations, invoked as one cause of

demurrer. The bill was commenced within six years after the final

dissolution of the partnership, by the death of Xathaniel Warren,

in 1862.

We arc now called upon to consider, on this demurrer, whether

or not the statute of limitations should be applied to any part

of the transactions between the parties, or whether they were in

the nature of merchants' accounts, or open transactions, the in-

vestigation of which would not be precluded by the statute. These

questions may well await the answers and proof. There is nothing

in the bill which on its face shows that the cause of complaint

io necessarily and absolutely barred by the statute of limitations.

Demurrer overruled.

Barrows, Dickerson, Danforth and Tapley, JJ., concurred.

V.
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connected matt r a bring h m within the obj ction of multifariou ne . That partn r hip wa in r la i n to one branch only
f the g n ral firm and w
onfined to that arof the busin
ticular bu in
t wa well lik n d by h ounsel for he complainants to th bran hes of a co-partn r hip, o common in
mer antil tran ac ions, exi ting in different itie or countrie ~ .
t i not pr p rly a di tinct and ind n lent firm, but a wheel
within a wh 1, or a branch from a common trunk.
If v alk r had r mained a a partner, he, undoubtedly, hould
ha e been mad a party. But the bill how that, in 1 54, alker
old out hi in er t, and receiv d from the artnership hi hare
of the profit , and fully accounted for hi hare of the property.
On the sam day, the complainants purcha ed of Nathaniel Warren, the te tator hi intere t in the lumbering busine , which
wa th ole bu in
of the branch firm. Thu that particular
union wa di sol ed, and Walker had no further intere t, and no
claim i made upon him, nor any that could affect his intere ts.
How far the purchase by the complainant of Nathaniel Warr n intere t wa a full and final ettlement o far as that branch
of the busine i concerned, we cannot determine until the whole
ca e i dev loped by the proof. All we now ·ay i , that the bill i
not objectionable for this cau e on demurrer. The ame remark
may apply to the tatute of limitation , invoked a one cau e of
demurrer. Tb bill wa commenced within ix year after the final
di olution of th partner hip, by the death of Nathaniel Warren,
in 1 6 .
W are now called upon to consider, on thi demurrer, whether
or not the statute of limitation hould be applied to any part
of the tran action between the partie , or whether they were in
the nature of mercha·n ts' account , or op n tran actions, the in' tigation of whi h would not be pr clu led b ' the tatute. Th e
que tion ma well await the an wers and proof. Th re i nothing
b th bill which on its face how that the cau e of complaint
i · nece arily and ab olutely barred by the tatut of limitation.. .

Demurrer 01:erruled.
BARROWS DICKERSON, DA FORTH and

TAPLEY,

JJ., concurred.
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Winslow V. Jenness, 64 Mich. S^. (1887.)

MULTIFARIOUSNESS

Winslow v. Jenness, 64 Mich. 84.

(1887.)

Appeal from. Lapeer. (Stickney, J.) Argued October 28, 1886.

Decided January 6, 1887.

Bill to restrain the prosecution of 21 ejectment suits. De-

murrer, for multifariousness in the misjoinder of unconnected

causes of action, sustained, and bill dismissed. Affirmed. The

facts are stated in the opinion.

Campbell, C. J.:

This bill, which was filed in February, 1886, seeks to restrain

defendant Gertrude Smith from prosecuting 21 ejectment suits,

Appeal from Lapeer. (Stickney, J.) Argued October 28, 1886.
Decided January 6, 1887.
Bill to r train the pro ecution of 21 ejectment suits. Demurrer, for multifariousn s in the mi joinder of unconnected
causes of action, sustained, and bill dismissed. Affirmed. The
facts are stated in the opinion.

and to compel her to convey to the several complainants an undi-

vided third interest each to the property involved in the suit in

0. J.:

CAMPBELL,

which he or she is interested. There are no joint interests in

complainants. Each claims title to separate land, in which Mrs.

Smith sets up her own title to an undivided third. Defendant

Gertrude Smith demurred for multifariousness in the misjoinder

of unconnected causes of action, and the demurrer was sustained,

and the bill dismissed. Complainants appeal.

The case contains a recital of several matters, giving the history
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of various partnership matters, which are detailed in a bill for-

merly filed by defendant Isaac N. Jenness against his co-defend-

ant, Gertrude Smith, to obtain the same relief which is sought

here. Jenness v. Smith, 58 Mich. 280. The present record does

not entirely conform to that. But in order to try the sufficiency

of the present bill on the one question of multifariousness, it will

only be necessary to give an outline of the controversy, giving

complainants the advantage of all the ambiguities.

The case, thus abridged, is this: Henry Fish, father of Gert-

rude Smith, died intestate in May, 1876, leaving her his heir at

law, 17 years of age. Before his death, he, and defendant Isaac

N. Jenness, and Allen Fish (since deceased) were ownei*s of con-

siderable tracts of land in Michigan, including the lands here in

controversy, which are in Lapeer county. They were all in part-

nership, under the name of I. N. Jenness & Co., and these lands,

although held by tenancy in common, are claimed to have been

partnership property. After Henry Fish's death, it is claimed it

became necessary to continue the business and manufacture the

pine left, so as to close matters out, and, after using such personal

This bill, which was filed in February, 1886, seeks to restrain
defendant Gertrude Smith from prosecuting 21 ejectment suits,
and to compel her to convey to the several complainants an undivided third interest each to the property involved in the suit in
which he or she is interested. There are no joint interests in
complainants. Each claims title to eparate laJld, in which Mrs.
Smith sets up her own title to an undivided third. Defendant
Gertrude Smith demurred for multifariousness in the misjoinder
of unconnected causes of action, and the demurrer was sustained,
and the bill dismissed. Complainants appeal.
The case contains a recital of several matters, giving the history
of various pa rtnership matters, which are detailed in a bill formerly filed by defendant Isaac N. Jenness against his co-defendant, Gertrude Smith, to obtain the same relief which is sought
here. Jenness v. Smith, 58 Mich. 280. T'he present record does
not entirely conform to that. But in order to try the sufficiency
of the present bill on the one question of multifariousness, it will
only be necessary to give an outline of the controversy, giving
complainants the advantage of all the ambiguities.
The ca , thus abridged, is this: Henry Fi h, father of Gertrude Smith, died inte tate in May, 1 76, leaving her hi heir at
law, 17 years of age. Before hi death, he, and defendant Isaac
. J nn , and Allen Fish ( ince d cea ed) were own r of conid ral 1 tracts of land in Mi higan, including th lands here in
contro er y whi h ar in Lapeer county. They wer all in pa·rtner hip under the name of I. N. J nne & o. and the e land.:,
although held by tenancy in ommon, ar claim d to have beeu
partnership property. After Henry Fi h' d ath, it i claimed it
became nee ary to continue the bu ine amd manufacture the
pine left, so a to clo e matters out, and, after using such personal
1
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assets as could be spared without stopping the business, the debts

could not be paid off without selling lands.

Allen Fish became defendant Gertrude's guardian, and, suppos-

ing salc-s could not be made complete without autliority to act for

her, applied to the circuit court for the county of St. Clair, and

obtained a decree, the sul)stance of which is not set out, but which,

it was assumed, gave him power to act for her. Had the case been

otherwise sufficient, it would have been necessary to show just what

those proceedings were. After that decree, Allen Fish, for himself

and also as guardian, joined in warranty deeds with Isaac N".

Jenness and the widow of Henry Fish, to several parties, of the

various parcels of land involved in this suit, including the com-

plainants or their respective grantors, for prices set forth in the

bill; and the consideration so received was used for partnership

purposes. Tliese conveyances were not made at auction or at

the same time, but at private sale, and from time to time, during

the year 1877. It does not appear when the contracts were made,

and it is not averred that the deeds referred to the lands as part-

nership property, or that they were so considered by the purchasers.
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All that is shown as to the partnership is that the money was used

for its benefit. One of the conveyances is shown to have been

made in carrying out an individual land contract executed by the

three partners during Henry Fish's life-time. This piece of land

is averred to have been conveyed for a valuable consideration, the

amount of which docs not appear, l)y Allen Fish, for himself and

as guardian, with Mrs. Fish, to Jenness, who conveyed the land to

Charles Bashaw, a complainant, and holder of the original con-

tract.

It is assumed, and is no doubt true, that Fish's deeds as guardian

were void, the sales never having been reported or confirmed.

Whether any lands remained unsold does not appear, but is not

important now.

Gertrude Smith has brought ejectment for her interest as heir

at law, each complainant being sued separately for his or her sev-

eral parcels.

The case, then, is that of a person claiming an undivided interest,

wliich, so far as she is concerned, has never been parted with, who

is sued in equity to compel her to surrender and release it to the

several grantees of her co-tenants, on the assumption that they

owned it all and conveyed it all equitably.

61

assets as could be pa1 without topping the busine , the d l> ,
could not be paid off with ut elling land .
Allen i h became def ndant
rtrud guardian, nd, uppo ing sal
ould not be made ompl te without authority to act for
her, applied to the ircuit court for th ounty of t. Clair, and
obtain d a 1 ere , the ub tance of whi ·h is not t out, but whi ·h,
it wa a um d, gav him pow r to act for her. Had the ca e 1 c n
oth rwi e uili i nt, it ould have been ncce sary to how ju what
tho e proc dings were.
ft r that decre , llcn i h, for him lf
and al o a uardian, joined in warranty deed with Isaac
Jenne and the widow of H nry Fi h, to e eral parties, of the
variou par 1 of land involv d in this uit, including the complainant or th ir re p ctive grantors, for price et forth in the
bill; and the on id ration so r ceived wa u ·ed for partnership
purpo e . The e conveyance were not made at auction or at
the ame time, but at private sale, and from time to time, during
the year 18 . It doe not appear when the contract were made,
and it is not averred that the deed referr d to the land a partnership property, or that they were o considered by the purcha er .
All that i hown as to the partner hip i that the money w used
for its benefit. One of the conveyances is shown to have been
made in carrying out an individual land contract executed by the
thre partn r during Henry Fish' life-tim . Thi piece of land
i av rred to have been conveyed for a valuable onsideration, the
amount of which do not app ar, by Allen Fi h for him elf and
as guardian, with Mrs. Fi h, to J ennes , who conveyed the land to
Charle Ba haw, a complainant, and holder of the original con·
tract.
It is a sumed, and i no doubt true, that Fi h' deeds as guardian
were oid, the ale never having been reported or confirmed.
\'\ h th r any land remained un old does not appear, but i not
important now.
G rtrud
mith ha brought ej ctm nt for h r int re t a heir
at law, ea h omplainant b ing ued parately for hi or her evral parcels.
Th a then, i that of a p r on laiming an undivided inter t,
whi h, o far a h i on rn d ha n v r been part d with who
i u d in quity to om 1 h r t urr n · an r 1 a e it t the
umption that they
. cveral grante of h r o-t nant on th
wn d it all and onv d jt all quitably.
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Tlie guardian's transfers are not relied upon, and could not

be relied upon, as having any part in the controversy. ISTo equity

could arise out of them. They were nullities, or else the bill had

no basis.

The legal issue is, therefore, a simple one. Each of these com-

plainants claims under a purchase which was not made under any

legal proceedings, which was separate in time and in consideration

from every other sale. The only alleged common equity is that the

conveyances from Jenness and Allen Fish, which in law conveyed

two-thirds, should be held in equity as conveying the entirety.

The bill does not even show a simultaneous origin, or a common

fraud or contrivance by which these complainants were deceived.

All that can be made out is that they bought of the same parties

independently, and their title has failed in the same way; and no

fraud or conduct of defendant in any way contributed to their

difhculty.

This attempt to obtain relief by joint bill goes beyond the

broadest doctrine which has been formulated anywhere. There is

no common wrong and no privity among them. Their grievances
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are similar, and that is all that can be said in their favor.

The general rule of equity is that every several grievance must

be redressed by a several proceeding. The only recognized excep-

tions to it (and these are considerably qualified) are instances

where there is a single right asserted on one side which affects all

the parties on tlie other side in the same way, or a single wrong

which falls on them all simultaneously and together. The in-

stances which are most familiar are rights in common which are

resisted by the owner of the estate on which it is charged, tax-

rolls assessing all parties on an equal ratio, frauds by trustees

affecting all the cestuis que trustent, and the like. Here the griev-

ances are not separate and similar, but single and uniformly in-

jurious. And it has been held in this Court, as well as elsewhere,

that, if there is any distinction in the proportion or chairacter of

the several grievances, there can be no joinder. Kerr v. Lansing,

17 Mich. 34.

Where the cause of grievance does not arise out of the same

wrong, affecting all at once as well as similarly, there is no founda-

tion for any such joinder. Our own precedents have settled the

doctrine sufficiently.

In the case of ^Valsh v. Varney, 38 Mich. 73, each of several

MULTIFARIOUSNESS

The guardian's tran fers are not relied upon, and could not
be relied upon, as having any part in the controversy. No equity
could arise out of them. T'h y were nullities, or else the bill haJ
no ba is.
The legal issue is, therefore, a simple one. Each of these complainants claims under a purchase which was not made under any
legal proceedings, which wa eparate in time and in consideration
from every other sale. The only aHeged common equity is that the
onveyances from J ennes and Allen Fi h, which in law conveyed
two-thirds, should be held in equity as conveying the entirety.
The bill does not even how a simultaneous origin, or a common
fraud or contrivance by which these complainants were deceived.
All that can be made out is that they bought of the same parties
independently, and their title has failed in the same way; and no
fraud or conduct of defendant in any way contributed to their
difficulty.
Thi attempt to obtain relief by joint bill goes beyond the
broadest doctrine which has been formula.ted anywhere. There i8
no common wrong and no privity among them. Their grievances
are similar, and thait is all that can be said in their favor.
The general rule of equity is that every several grievance must
be redressed by a several proceeding. The only recognized exceptions to it (and these are considerably qualified) are instances
where there is a single right asserted on one side which affects all
the parties on the other side in the same wa,y, or a single wrong
which fall on them all simultaneously and together. The in• tances which are most familiar are right in common which are
resisted by the owner of the estate on which it is charged, taxrolls asses ing all partie on an equal ratio, fraud by trustees
affecting all the cestuis qu.e t1~stent and the like. H re the grievance are not eparate and imilar, but single and uniformly injuriou . And it ha be n h lcl in thi Court, as well a elsewhere,
that, if th re i any di tinction in the proportion or chairacter of
the everal grievance , ther can be no joinder. K err v. Lansing,
17 fich. 34.
·wher the cau of grievance do not ari e out of the ame
wrong affecting all at once as w ll a imilarly, th r i no foundation for any uch joinder. Our own precedent have settled the
doctrine suffici ntly.
In the ca e of Wal h v. Varney, 38 l\fi h. 73 each of ev ral
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complainants had purchased separate parcels under partition pro-

ceedings, which were valid as against all who were before the court,

but which left out some of the tenants in common. These com-

plainants joined in a h\\\ to restrain ejectment suits brought by the

heirs not concluded by the partition, and sought further to have

the partition decree opened and extended so as to bind them. But

it was held complainants had no common grievance entitling them

to join, and also that they had no rights beyond their purchase.

This last point bears on another difficulty in this case which is

distinct from the question of multifariousness. As the bill states

their case, they bought a title in which defendant purported to

have an interest in her own right, and which failed apparently

from a defect in the guardian's power, of which, as that decision

holds, they had notice.^ The bill does not indicate that they bought

in reliance on the right of Fish and Jenness to convey the whole.

In Bigelow v. Booili, 39 Mich. 623, a bill was filed by com-

plainants to redeem, basing their right on a joint interest ac-

quired under execution. It was held that, as this joint title failed,

the bill could not stand to help separate interests derived other-
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wise. That case, however, is not one where the particular point

raised here is veiy clearly presented, although a bill to redeem

usually includes all parties to be affected.

In Woodruff v. Young, 43 Mich. 548, a bill filed against three

defendants for fraud in hindering complainant from getting the

settlement of an estate in which they were all concerned, and also

for frauds committed by them separately in various dealings aris-

ing out of the same family relationship, but not connected with the

estate, was held multifarious, because the frauds were distinct.

In Brunner v. Bay City, 46 Mich. 236, it was held that parties

whose lots had been sold under the same illegal assessment, and

bid in by the city, had no longer any grievance for which they

could join in a bill, and that each lot-owner had merely the several

riglit to pursue the city as he would any other person having a deed

whieh would be a cloud on his title to the separate lot. That case

cannot ho distinguished in principle from this. And this was on

the ground that thenceforward any claim or assertion by the city

against one lot could in no way affect any other lot, but must be

prosecuted and defended separately. It cannot help or hinder any

'"It is a well-settled doctrine that parties purchasincr titles under judi-

cial sales purchase just what can be lawfully sold, neither more nor less,

and have no further rights. U'alsli v. ranicy. ,?8 .Mich. 76.

v.
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complainan had pur ha d parat pare 1 und r partition proce ding , whi h w r valid a again tall wl o were before the court,
but whi h 1 ft ut ome of t1 t nant in ommon. The e complainan j in d in a bill tor train j tm nt ui brought by the
h ir not on lud d by the partition, ancl ought further to have
the pa:rtition clc r op ned and ext nd d o a to bind them. But
it wa h 11 complainant had no ommon gri anc entitling them
yond their purcha e.
to join, and al o that they had no right
Thi la t point b ars on another diffi ulty in thi case whi ·h i
di tinct from the que tion of multifariou n . A the bill tate
their ca e, they bought a title in which d fendant purported to
have an interest in her own right, and which failed apparentl;
from a d f ct in the guardian' pow r, of which, a that deci ion
holcl , they had notic .1 The bill does not indi ate that they bought
in r lian eon th right of Fi hand J nnes to convey the whole.
In Bigelow . Booth, 39 Mich. 622, 3J bill was filed by complainants to red em, basing their right on a joint intere t acquir d under execution. It wa held that, as thi joint title failed,
the bill could not stand to help separate interests derived otherwi c. That case, however, is not one where the particular point
rni ed here i very clearly pre ented although a bill to redeem
usually include all parties to be affected.
In Woodruff v. Young, 43 Mich. 548, a bill filed again t three
def ndant for fraud in hindering complainant from getting the
ttl m nt of an e tate in which they were all concerned, and al o
for fra:uds committed by them separately in variou dealings ari in0 out of the ame family relation hip, but not connected with the
estate, wa held multifariou , becau e the frauds were distinct.
In Brunner v. Bay ity, 46 Mich. 236, it wa held that partie
who e lo had be n sold under the ame illegal a es m nt and
bi 1 in by the city had no longer any grievance for which they
couB jo'n in a bill, and that each lot-owner had erely the everal
ri ht to pur ue the it r a he would any other person ha ing ad ed
whi h would b a loud on hi titl to the eparate lot. That ca c
nd thi wa on
cannot b di tingui h d in prin ipl from thi .
th ground that thenc forward any claim or a ertion b the cit:
n o-ain t on lot could in no way affect any oth r lot, but mu t l e
pro cut 1 and f nd d parat 1 . It cannot help or hind r any
lt'It i a well- ttl d do trine that par ti
pur ha ing title un er j udicial al
pur ha
ju t ' hat can 1 lawfully old. neither more nor les
and ha e no forth r ri ht . n a/sh v. [ ar11 j .
ri h. 76.
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one of these complainants to have defendant's title made out or

defeated against any of the rest. Judgment in one of the eject-

ment suits could not be shown in any of the others, and could not

affect them.

It is hardly necessary to increase citations, but they are not dif-

ficfult to find. In Jones v. Garcia del Rio, 1 Turn. & R. 297, where

several persons had been induced to buy scrip in the same loan by

a fraud affecting them all in the same way, but by separate pur-

chases. Lord Eldon dismissed their bill on this sole ground. He

said that the plaintiffs, if they had any demand at all, had each a

demand at law, and each a several demand in equity; that they

could not file a bill on behalf of themselves and the other holders

of scrip ; and, as they were unable to do that, they could not, hav-

ing three distinct demands, file one bill; and, upon that ground

alone, his lordship, without again adverting to the question of

public policy (which had been raised and discussed), dissolved the

injunction. This decision was in 1823.

In 1834 the United States Supreme Court decided the case of

Yeaton v. Lenox, 8 Pet. 123, on the same principle. There a
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considerable number of underwriters, taking risks on the same

property and voyage, but severally, and not jointly, had paid their

insurances to the same bank as holder, on the understanding that

the money should be refunded if it turned out they were not

liable. Tliis having been ascertained, they joined in a l)ill against

the trustees of the bank, which was in liquidation, its charter hav-

ing expired, to recover back their funds. Chief Justice Marshall

disposed of their claim Yery briefly, refusing to pass on the equities,

which were controverted. He said:

"The plaintiffs who unite in this suit claim the return of money

paid by them severally on distinct promissory notes. They are

several contracts, having no connection with each other. Tliese

parties cannot, we think, join their claims in the same bill."

The principle is also recognized in Story, Eq. PL § 279, and

Daniell, Ch. Pr. 395.

It is by no means clear from the allegations in the Ijill that the

grievances or claims of these complainants are entirely similar in

their equities. But this we do not think it necessary to discuss.

Their claims, good or bad, are entirely separate, and there is no

common grievance.

The decree should be aiTirmed, with costs.

The other Justices concurred.
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one of the e complainant to have defendant's title made out or
defeated again t any of the rest. Judgment in one of the ejectment suits could not be shown in any of the others, a.ind could not
affect them.
It i hardly necessary to increase citations, but they are not difficult to find. In Jones v. Garcia del Rio, 1 T'urn. & R. 297, where
e eral persons had been induced to buy scrip in the same loan by
a fraud affecting them a.U in the same way, but by separate purcha es, Lord Eldon dismi sed their bill on this sole ground. He
said that the plaintiffs, if the3 had any demand at all, had each a
demand at law, and each a several demand in equity; that they
could not file a bill on behalf of themselves and the other holder~
of scrip; and, a they were unable to do that, they could not, having three di tinct demands, file one bill; and, upon that ground
alone, his lord hip, without again adverting to the question of
public policy (which hoo been raised and discussed), dissolved the
injunction. This decision was in 1823.
In 1834 the United States Supreme Court decided the case of
Yeaton v. Lenox, 8 Pet. 123, on the same principle. There a.
considerable number of underwriters, taking risks on the same
propert3 and voyage, but everally, and not jointly, had paid their
in urances to the same bank as holder, on the understanding that
the money should be refunded if it turned out they were not
liable. This having been ascertained, they joined in a bill against
the trru;tees of the bank, which was in liquidation, its charter having expired, to recover back their fund . Chief J ru;tice Marshall
di posed of their r:la:im very briefly, refusing to pass on the equities,
which were controverted. He said:
"The plaintiff who unite in this suit claim the return of money
paid by them everaUy on distinct promissory note . They are
several contract having no connection with each other. These
parties cannot, we think, join their claims in the same bill."
The prin ipl i al o r cognized in Story, Eq. Pl. § 279, and
Daniell, Ch. Pr. 3 95.
It i by no m a•n lear from the allegation in the bill that the
grievan e or laim of the e complaina t are ntir l imilar in
their equities. But thi we do not think it n c ary to discuss.
Their claims, good or bad, are entirely parate, and there is no
common grievance.
The deer f'l ul b affirmed, with . L.
The other J l , ti . ·o ncun d.
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Pointon V. Pohiton, L. B. 12 Eq. Cos. 5^7. (1871.)

Demurueu for multifariousness and for want of parties.

Pointon

George Pointon, who died on the Gth of January, 18G3, leaving

.

Pofriton~

L. R. 1 Eq.

as. 547.

(1871.)

a widow, the Defendant Eliza Pointon, and four children, three of

whom were Plaintiffs, the fourth being out of the jurisdiction, and

not a part}' to the suit, him surviving, and who at the time of his

decease was carrying on, in partncrsliip with his brother, the

Defendant William Pointon, the businesses of lime burner and

corn merchant and miller, by will, dated the 2nd of January, 1863,

after bequeathing all his furniture to his wife, subject to the pay-

ment of certain debts, gave, devised, and bequeathed all his prop-

erty, real and personal, unto his wife and to his brother William

Pointon, whom he appointed executors, upon trust to convert

into money by sale, or by William Pointon taking all or any part

thereof by valuation, which he thereby empowered him to do, and

to invest (as in the will mentioned) for the benefit of his wife for

life, and after her decease or second marriage to divide the same

equally amongst all his children. The bill, filed on the Ifith of

May, 1871, against William Pointon and the testator's widow,
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alleged that the testator's estate included his share and interest in

the assets of the partnership; that the affairs of the partnership

had not been wound up; that William Pointon, on the death of

the testator, possessed himself of such assets; that he had carried

and was carrying on the businesses under the old style; that it

was expedient that the testator's estate should be administered by

the Court; also that the accounts of the partnership should be

taken; that this could not be conveniently done, except in this

suit or in one similarly constituted, William Pointon being both

executor and suriving partner; that William Pointon ought to

account for what he had received, and for what, but for his wilful

default and neglect, he might have received on account of the

testator's estate ; that he had employed the testator's estate in the

businesses, and had thereby occasioned great loss to it; that he

had mismanaged and neglected the businesses, and that thereby

large sums had been lost to the testator's est<ite. There were also

allegations that he was getting in the outstanding partnership debts,

and that he intended to apply them to his own use ; that he had

5

for multifairiou n
ancl for want of parti .
G org ointon who di d on the Gth of January, 1863, leaving
n widow, th
£ nclan 1 liza oint n, ancl four hildren, thr e of
whom wer lain iff th fourth being out of the juri diction, and
not a part} to th uit, him urvi ing and who at the time of hi.
lccec
wa
· rrying on in partnership with hi brother the
Def ndant William ointon, th bu ines e ol'. lime burn r and
corn mer hant and miller, by will, dat d the nd of January, 1 63,
al'.tcr b queathing all his furnitur to hi wif , ubj ect to the payment of ertain debt gave, d vi eel, aIDd b qu athed all hi propert real and personal, unto hi wife and to hi brother William
Pointon whom h appointed x cutor , upon tru t to convert
into money by ale, or by William Pointon taking all or any part
th r of by valuation, which he thereby empow r d him to do, a:nd
to in t (as in th will mention d) for the ben fit of hi wife for
lif , and after h r decea e or econd marriage to divide the ame
quall3 among t all his children. The bill, filed on the 16th of
May, 18 1, again t William Pointon amd th te ta.tor' widow
all ged that the te tator' e ta.te included hi share and intere t in
th a et of the partnership; that the affairs of the partnership
had not been wound up · that William Pointon on the death of
th t ta.tor, po
d him elf of uch a et ; that he had carried
and wa carrying on the bu in e under the old t3 le; that it
wa xp client that th te tator'
tate hould b admini tered by
the ourt; al o that the accoun of the partner hip hould be
taken · hat thi ould not be conv ni ntl done except in thi
uit or in one imilarl con titut d William ointon being both
e cutor and uri ing partn r · that William Pointon ought to
account for what h had r c i ed and for what but for hi wilful
d fa.ult and n 1 c h might hav recei d on acCQunt of the
t ta or
tat · hat h had mploy cl th te tator'
tate in the
bu ine
an had th r b o ca ioned r at lo to it; that h
had mi mana d aud n gl t d th bu in
and that th r by
lar
um ha b n lo t t th t tat r
all crati n tha h wa er ttincr in th ou ~ ta ing partner:~ hip
an 1 that h int nd d to appl ' th m to hi ~·n u e · hat h
EM RRER
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agreed to purchase Forge Mill and the stock-in-trade, part of the

partnership assets, at a valuation, and had obtained a conveyance

of the mill, but had not paid the purchase-money either in respect

of the mill or in respect of the stock-in-trade, and that he had

advertised the mill for sale by auction.

The Plaintiffs, three children of the testator, prayed that his

estate might be administered; for accounts of what William

Pointon had received, or, but for his wilful default and neglect,

might have received; and that he might be charged with what

was due from him in respect of the partnership, both before and

since the death of the testator, and with all losses occasioned by

his mismanagement and neglect in reference to the businesses; for

a receiver of the testatoi^'s estate and of the assets of the partner-

ship and of the businesses carried on by William Pointon since

the death of the testator; and for injunctions to restrain William

Pointon from interfering with the testator's estate and the assets

of the partnership before and since his death, and from selling

the mill; and for the appointment of new trustees; and for all

proper accounts.
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Sir Jonx Wickens, V. C. :

I think that the demurrer to tliis bill is not well founded. It is

a demuiTcr for want of parties, and for what is called multifarious-

ness, but which is really misjoinder of subjects in a suit. As to

the objection for want of parties, the case appears to me to be

clearly within the 9th rule of s. 42 of the 15 & 16 Vict. e. 86, and

I think it is impossible to hold that three out of four cestuis que

1'f
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agr ed to purcha e Forge Mill and the stock-in-trade, part of the.
partner hip a t , at a valuation, and had obtained a con e) ance
of the mill, but had not paid the purcha e-money either in respect
of the mill or in re pect of the tock-in-trade, and that he had
ad verti ed the mill for sale by auction.
The Plaintiff , three children of the t e tator, prayed th&-t his
e tate might b admini tered; for accounts of what William
Pointon had received, or, but for his wilful default and neglect,
might have r ceived ; and that he might be charged with what
wa due from him i_n re pect of the partnership, both before and
ince the death of the te tator, arnd with all los es occa ioned by
his mi. management and neglect in reference to the businesses; for
a receiver of the te tator' e tate and of the as ets of the partnerhip and of the bu ine es carried on by William Pointon since
the death of the te tator; a.ind for injunctions to restrain William
Pointon from interfering with the testator's estate and the as ets
of the partnership before and since hi ~ death and from elling
the mill; and for the appointment of new tru tee ; and for all
proper accounts.

trust — residuary legatees — cannot sue an executor, because tlie

fourth has not been brought before the Court, without doing away

with the operation of this clause of the section. The only authority

which has been relied upon on this point is the case of Payne v.

Parker. That is a case of this sort: A trustee under a settle-

ment was brought before the Court to represent the interests of

the cestuis que trust, and the Plaintiff, having elected to have those

interests represented, was bound to have them represented by

proper persons. The only question was, whether he had done so;

and the Court decided that the trustee, Mr. Heningham, did not

siilFieiently represent the interests of the cestuis que trust, and

required that they should be made parties; and I think that the

Court could not have decided otherwise. But that case, when

SIR JOH WICKENS, v. c.:
I think that the demurrer to this bill is not well founded. It is
a demurrer for want of parties, and for what is called multifariousnes , but which i really mi joinder of ubj ect in a suit. As to
the objection for want of parties, the case appears to me to be
clearly within the 9th rule of s. 42 of the 15 & 16 Viet. c. 86, and
I think it is impo ible to hold that three out of four cestuis que
trusfr-r idua1ry 1 gat e - cannot ue an executor, becau e th
fourth ha not been brought before the Court, without doing away
ction. The only authority
with the operation of thi lau e of th
which ha been reli d upon on thi point i the ca e of Payne i;.
Parker. That i a a of thi art: A tru tee under a ettlement wa brought b f r the ourt to repr nt the intere t of
the cestui.s que tru t, and th Plaintiff having 1 cted to have tho e
int re t repr ent d was bound to hav th m repr ent d by
proper person . The onl} qu tion wa , wheth r h had done o ·
an 1 the ourt d id d that the tru te Mr. eningham, did not
uffi i ntly repre nt th intere t of the cestui.s que frust, ancl
r quir d that they hould be made partie ; and I think that the
Court could nat ha e d cided otherwi e. But that cai:; wh n
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attentively looked at, has, in my opinion, no application to the

present.

Next, as to the question of multifariousness: I think that there

is no more in the objection on that ground than there is in that

for want of parties. There are three analogous vices to which

bills in equity are subject — misjoinder of Plaintiffs, misjoinder of

Defendants, and multifariousness or misjoinder of subjects of suit.

It is the last which is imputed to this bill. Multifariousness, prop-

erly so called, exists when one of the Defendants is not interested

in the whole of the relief sought, as the old fonn of the demurrer

for multifariousness shows. Misjoinder of subjects of suit is where

two subjects distinct in their nature are united in one bill, and

for convenience sake the Court requires them to be put in two

separate records. The case of Salvidge v. Hyde, 5 Madd. 138;

Jac. 151, in which the bill was for the administration of a testa-

tor's estate, and to set aside a sale made of part of it by the execu-

tor, was an instance of this. There the Court refused to allow the

two subjects to be united, although the Plaintiff was interested in

each, and the Defendants were liable in respect of each. In the
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present case the misjoinder is of this nature: the suit is first an

ordinar}' suit against the devisees in trust and executoi"s for the

administration of the real and personal estates of the testator ; and,

secondly, the Plaintiff's claim to have the partnership accounts

taken as between the testator's estate and the Defendant William

Pointon, the testator's partner and one of the executors and trus-

tees; and then the suit is further complicated in this way: it is

alleged that William Pointon has sold to himself or taken posses-

sion of the partnership assets at a valuation under a power in the

will, and that he has not paid for them. It is suggested that not

only is the price of such assets in his hands, but that he having

sold to himself without payment, what was purported to be sold

remains assets of the testator till the price is paid. If a trustee

who is entitled to take property at a valuation has a valuation

made, but does not pay the money, nothing passes; until the

money has been paid he has no interest in the property.

It is not necessarj' to consider whether the Plaintiffs are or are

not entitled to all the relief which they ask; but the question is,

whether the various subjects as to which relief is sought are such

as if fit for discussion can be properly dealt with in one suit.

This is, of course, a matter of discretion. The Court will not allow

INTO
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att ntiv ly look d at, h , in my o inion no application to the
pr nt.
Next, a to th quc tion f mul ifariou ne : I think that th re
i no mor in th obj ion on that ground than there i in that
for want of p rtie . T11er are thr anal gou vice to hich
bill in quit , re ubject-mi joinder f laintiff mi joinder of
Defendant am.1 multifariou n
or mi j ind r of ubjects of uit.
It i th la t whi h i imputed to thi l ill.
ultifariou ne , properly o call d
i t h n one of the efendan i not inter tecl
in the wh le f he reli f ought, a the ol form of th demurr r
how . :Hi joinder of ubj ct of uit i here
for multifariou 11
two ubj t di tinct in th ir natur are united in one bill, and
for com· ni nc ake the ourt 1 quir them to be put in tw-o
eparat r cord . The ca e of alvidge . Hyd e, 5 Iadd. 13 ·
J ac. 151, in whi h the bill wa for the admini tration of a te tator' e tat , and to et a ide a ale made of part of it by the executor, wa an in tanc of thi . Th re th Court refu ed to allow the
two ubject to b united, although the Plaintiff was interested in
each, and the efendants were liable in re pect of each. In the
pre ent ca e the mi joinder i of thi nature: the uit i first an
ordina1; uit again t he de isee in tru t and executors for the
admini traition of the real and personal e tate of the testator; and
second.13, the Plaintiff claim to have the partner hip accounts
taken a between the te tator' e tate and the D f ndant William
Pointon, the te tator' partner and one of the executors aind tru"tee ; and then the uit i further complicated in thi way: it i ,
alleged that William Pointon has sold to him elf or taken pos
ion of the partner hip as et at a valuation und r a power in the
will, and that he ha not paid for them. It i ugg ted that not
onlj i th price of uch a ets in hi hand but that he having
old to him elf without paym nt, what wa purported to be old
remain a et of the te ta or till th price i paid. If a tru tee
who i entitled to take property at a valuation ha a aluation
made, but doe not pay the mone nothino- pa e ; until the
mone ha been paid he ha no int r t in the propert .
It i not nee ar to consider wh ther the Plaintiff are or ar
not entitled to all the relief which th a k; but th que tion i"
whether the variou ubj t a to which r lief · ought ar u h
a if :fi for di cu ion can be pr p rh dealt with in on uit.
Thi i of coure a mat r of di er ti n. Th ourt will 11 allow
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distinct subjects to be mixed up in one suit when it would be

inconvenient to the Court, or unfair to some one or more of the

parties to it; but not one of these considerations, or of those

mentioned in the case of Camphell v. Mackaij, 1 My. & Cr. 603,

applies to the ])resent case. The estate of the testator cannot be

wound up until the partnership accounts have been taken, nor

until it has been ascertained whether William Pointon will pay

the purchase-money or not. It is quite clear that, if there are to

be separate suits, they must be closely intermixed, and the winding-

up of the principal suit must await that of the other or others, and

before it can be found out what the estate of the testator consists

of, or what William Pointon owes to it, the partnership accounts

must be taken. I am wholly unable to discover why they should

not be taken in this suit. If it would result in inconvenience or

unfairness, it would be another matter; but it appears to me to

be impossible to say that any inconvenience can be apprehended,

or that any injustice will be done. My opinion being that the

objection as to misjoinder of subjects has failed as completely as
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that as to misjoinder of parties, the demurrer must be overruled.
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di tinct ubjects to be mixed up in one suit when it would be
inconvenient to the Court, or unfair to some one or more of the
partie to it; but not one of these con iderations, or of those
mentioned in the ca e of Campb ell v. Mackay, 1 My. & Cr. 603,
applie to th pre ent ca e. The e tate of the testator cannot be
wound up until the partner hip accounts have been taken, nor
until it has been ascertained whether William Pointon will pay
the purchase-money or not. It i quite clear that, if there are to
be eparate suit , they mu t be closely intermixed, and the windingup of the principal suit mu t await that of the other or other , and
before it can be found out what the estate of the testator consists
of, or what William Pointon ow to it, the partnership account:;
mu t be taken. I am wholly unable to discover why they should
not be taken in this suit. If it would result in inconvenience or
unfairness, it would be another matter; but it a;ppears to me to
be impossible to say that any inconvenience can be apprehended,
or that any injustice will be done. My opinion being that thH
objection as to misjoinder of subjects has failed as completely as
thait as to misjoinder of parties, flie demurrer must be overruled.

CHAPTER III. .

FORM AND REQUISITES OE A BILL IX EQUITY. > ,«

•

Paets of a Bill ix Equity. n^ ^ y

ComstocTc V. Herron, Ji5 Fed. Rep. GGO. (lS91.)rjy }t^ »^ h^

CHAPTER III.

This cause is before the court upon exceptions to the answer/^ -^^

/-;

of the respondents Herron and Fisher. The bill charges that as^

in productive real estate and mortgages or interest-bearing stocksj^j^ /^

and bonds, and to pay the income therefrom to the complainant. |;|;-^ ^ jy

FORM

E

LI

I

E UITY.

The respondents answer, denying the averments, and stating thai i/^ ^^/J'^

ART

they have never been requested until the present year, by the com- Lp rjlr-

ILL L

~

Q IT .

plainant or any other persons, to make said investments, and that,"^ ^

om tock

on the contrar}^ it was well known to the complainant that they \\ ^1

were proceeding as rapidly as possible to convert the estate into .^ ^ [

. IIerron, 45 Fed. Rep. 660.

rJ

money or productive property, so as to make said investments^ , li^

also that their entire conduct in this matter was fully known toL^ ^

the complainant, and approved by her, and that she has nevero-x^^^^

expressed the least dissatisfaction in reference thereto. To these ^TvA^ o/'f'

averments the complainant excepts. They are directly and prop- ^/^ "^

erly responsive to the charge of the bill. I do not think that the f^ ^'

respondents, w'hen charged with dereliction of duty and violation
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of their trust, ought to be limited to a simple denial, and to be

precluded from setting up that not only was no objection made by

the complainant, but that she approved their entire conduct in

this matter. \Yhile it may be true that that may not affect the

final decree in this case, I think the trustees are entitled to relieve

themselves from the imputations which are at least implied by

the averments of the bill. Moreover, these averments of the answer

are directly responsive to the charge that the respondents refused

to make investments. Tlie same line of remark applies to the

portions of the answer in which the respondents state that they

69

AGE,

{1891.)

•:

//;
v.J. Y ~
v~
,)"
we~ J

Thi au e i b for th court upon exception to the an
of the r pond nt H rron and · h r. The bill charge that ~/ _
und r the will of Margaret Poor, deceased~
x cutor and tru t
th y have d lay d, negl c d, and refu ed, and till delay, neglect,
/
and r f e, to in t the um of $56,6 , a directed by the will,,
· ~->
in productiv real tate and mortgag or intere t-bearing tock
rt _)
and bond , and to pay th in ome therefrom to the complainant:
J"-_
Th responden an w r, denying the averm nt, and tating that.:~/.
th y have never been r que ted until the pre nt year, by the com-~~;}
plainant or any other per on , to make aid inv tments, and that,
on the contrary, it wa well known to the complainant that they
were proceeding as rapidl a po ibl to conv rt the tate into
money or produ ti e property, o a to make aid inve tment ,
al o that th ir ntire condu t in thi matter wa fully known to
the omplainant and approv d b h r, and that h ha ne er
xpre ed th 1 ast di ati fa tion in r f rence thereto. To the e
a rm nt the complainant exc pt . Th y ar directly and proprl re pan ive to the harg of th bill. I do not think that the
r ~pondent wh n harg 1 with d r li tion of dut and violation
f th ir tru t ought to b limit d to a impl d nial an to be
pr lud d from ttin up that not onl ' wa n obj tion made by
th omplainant but that h appro d th ir n ir conduct in
thi matt r. \\fill it a b true tha that ma3 not affect the
final d r in thi a e, thin] th tru t
are nti 1 d to r li Y
th m 1
from th imputation whi h ar at lea t impli d by
th a rm nt of th bill. Ior 01 r the e av rment ~ of th an w r
ar dir tl re p n ~ iv t th har tha th r pon nt~ 1 fu ~
t mak inv tm nt . Th am lin of r mark appli t th
portion of h an w r in whi h the r ~ pon nh• tat hat th y
69

70
70 Parts of a Bill in Equity

were assisted by the complainant in their efforts to sell the Newport

cottage; she being familiar with it, and owning the furniture in

it. Without entering into detail, it is enough to say generally that

the bill charges the trustees with neglecting their duties and re-

fusing to carry out the provisions of the will, and that by their

failure to execute the trusts reposed in them the estate is con-

stantly being depleted, and that there is danger of the destruction

of the distributive share of the complainant, and, further, that

they have mingled the trust moneys of the estate coming into their

hands as trustees and executors with their own money and property,

instead of keeping the same separate and apart, by reason whereof

the money and property of the estate is likely to be confused, so

that it cannot be separated from other funds. The averments of

the answer to which exceptions are taken are in response to these

wholesale charges, with reference to which the respondents have

a right to vindicate themselves. It was said, in substance, upon

the argument that there was no intention to reflect upon the

respondents, and that the bill was drawn in accordance with ap-

proved forms, and it was insisted that the averments of the answer

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 16:36 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t3223129q
Public Domain in the United States / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-us

excepted to did not touch the merits of the cause, which was not

intended to be adversary, but merely for the construction of the

will and the ascertainment of the rights of the complainant.

Nevertheless the averments are in the bill, and, being there, the

respondents have a right to answer them fully. Originally a bill

in equity consisted of nine parts, of which there were five principal

parts, to-wit, the statement, the charges, the interrogatories, the

prayer of relief, and the prayer of process. But all these, according

to more recent authorities, may be dispensed with excepting the

stating part and the prayer for relief; for, as Langdell in his

hand-book on Equity Pleadings states:

"All that was ever essential to a bill was a proper statement

of the facts which the plaintiff intended to prove, a specification

of the relief which he claimed, and an indication of the legal

grounds of such relief." Section 55.

Had the bill been confined to these limits, as it might have been,

there would have been no occasion for the answers to which the

exceptions are directed; but, as it was not so limited, and as the

answers do not go beyond what is responsive to the bill, the excep-

tions will be overruled, without taking into consideration whether

the matters set forth in the portions of the an^^wcr to which the

p ARTS

OF A BILL IN EQUITY

were as isted by the complainant in their efforts to sell the Newport
cottage; he being familiar with it, and owning the furniture in
it. Without nt ring into detail, it i enough to say generally that
the bill charges the tru tee with neglecting their duties and refu ing to carry out the provisions of the will, and that by their
failure to execute the trusts reposed in them the estate is contantly being depleted, and that there i danger of the destruction
of the distributive share of the complainant, and, further, that
they have mingled the trust moneys of the estate coming into their
hands as trustees and executors with their own money and property,
in tead of keeping the arne separate and apart, by reason whereof
th money and property of the estate i likely to be confused, so
that it cannot be separated from other funds. The averments of
the answer to which exceptions are taken are in response to the e
wholesale charges, with reference to which the re pondents have
a right to vindica te themselves. It was said, in substance, upon
the argument that there was no intention to reflect upon the
respondents, and that the bill was drawn in accordance with approved forms, and it was insisted that the averments of the answer
excepted to did not touch the merits of the cause, which was not
intended to be adversary, but merely for the construction of the
will and the a certainment of the rights of the complainant.
Nevertheless the averments are in the bill, and, being there, the
respondents have a right to answer them fully. Originally a bill
in equity consisted of nine parts, of which there were five principal
parts, to-wit, the statement, the charges, the interrogatories, the
prayer of relief, and the prayer of proces . But all these, according
to more recent authorities, may be dispensed with excepting the
stating part and the prayer for relief; for, as Langdell in hi8
hand-book on Equity Pleadings states:
"All that wa ever e ential to a bill was a proper statement
f the facts which the pla·inti:ff intended to prove, a specification
of the relief which he claim d, and an indication of the 1 gal
ground of such relief."
ection 55.
Had the bill been confin d to the e limit as it might have been,
ther would hav been no occasion for the an wer to which the
x ption are dir cted ; but, as it wa not o limited and a the
an wer do not go be and what i re l~on ive to th bill the exception will b oYerruled, without takino- into con id ration whether
t f rth in th porti n of th an . w r to which the
the matt r
1
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exceptions are taken are material to the final disposition of the

71

l:TIRICK V. .r UG LE '

exceptions are taken ar mat rial to the final di position of he
cause.

cause.

Address of the Bill,

Sterrick v. Pugsley, Fed. Cases, No. 13379. (1S7J,.)

A.DDRE

On motion of complainant [Charles V. Sterrick] for a pre-

OF THE BILL.

liminary injunction to restrain defendants [James W. Pugsley

and others] from using a deed of assignment of a patent by com-

plainant to defendant Pugsley, and from claiming or exercising

terrick

. Pug ley, F ed.

ase , L\ o. 13379.

{187 4.)

any rights thereunder.

LoNGYEAR, District Judge:

Some preliminar}' objections will be first noticed. The defend-

ants' counsel objected to the bill of complaint being read on the

grounds: 1st — That the entitling of the court is not "in equity,"

but of the "circuit court," etc., merely. 2d — That it is entitled

in the cause.

The address of the bill is to the "circuit court," etc., "in chan-

On motion of omplainant [ harle
t rrick J for a preliminan injunction to re train d fendants [Jame
. Pug ley
and oth r ] from u ing a de d of a ignment of a patent by complainan to def ndant Pug le ' and from claiming or exerci ing
a·ny right th reunder.

cery sitting." This is sufficient, and if the entitling of the court

were of any consequence the court would direct it to be amended

by adding the words "in equity." The bill is entitled in the cause.
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This is irregular, because until the bill is filed there is no cause

pending. The bill, however, is complete without it, and the en-

titling as to the parties is rejected as surplusage. The objections

to the bill arc, therefore, overruled.

Counsel for defendants also objected to the reception and read-

ing of the affidavits annexed to the bill of complaint in support

of the motion for injunction on the grounds: 1st — That they

have no proper venue. 2d — That they are not entitled in any cause

"in equity."

The affidavits are sworn to before United States circuit court

commissioners, some of them before a commissioner for the Eastern

district, and some before a commissioner for the Western district

of Michigan. The^venue of each is: "State of Michigan, County

of Calhoun," or, "County of Kalamazoo," according, I suppose,

to the county in which the oath happened to be administered. This

was irregular. The proper venue of an affidavit taken before a

United States commissioner is: "United States of America, Dis-

Lo TG E.lR, Di trict Judge :
Som pr liminary objections will be first notic2d. The defendant ' coun el objected to the bill of complaint being read on the
groun 1 : 1 t-That the entitling of the court i not "in equity"
but of the circuit court," etc., m rely.
d-That it i entitled.
in the cau e.
The addre of the bill i to the "circuit court," etc., "in chancery itting." Thi i ufficient, and if the entitling of the court
were of an con quence the court would direct it to be amended
by adding the word 'in equit} ." The bill i entitled in the cau e.
Thi i irregular, becau e until the bill i filed there i no ca1u e
pending. The bill, however, i complete without it, and the entitling a to the partie i rejected a urplu age. The objection ..
to the bill are, therefore, overruled.
Coun el for def ndant al o objected to the reception and reading of the affida,it annexed to the bill of complaint in upport
of th motion for injunction on the ground : 1 t-Tha·t the
haw no proper venue. 2d-That the; are not entitled in any cau~e
in equit3.
Th affidavit are worn to before United tate circuit court
ome of them b for a commi ioner for the Ea tern
commi ione
li trict and om b for a commi ioner for the
tern di trict
The ..' nu of ea h i :
tate of UichiO'an ount ·
or
ount · of alamazoo a ordinO' I "uppo e
ounty in whi h th ath happ n d to b a lmini,.ter d. Thi
wo irr aular.
h pr p r nu of an affida,it tak n befor a
tate commi ion r is :
nit d ate of menca i. -
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trict of /' naming the district and state for wliich the com-

missioner is such. In this case it should have been "Eastern Dis-

trict of Michigan," or "Western District of Michigan," as the case

was. In the view taken by the court, however, upon the merits

of the motion, admitting all the affidavits, it is unnecessary for the

purposes of this case to decide what is the effect of the irregularity

in the venue.

The objection to the entitling of the court is not tenable upon

the ground stated. The affidavits were all made before the suit was

commenced. Such affidavits should in no case be entitled in any

court or cause. When they are so entitled it is a good cause for

their rejection. Beg. v. Jones, 1 Strange, 70-i; Bex v. Pierson,

Andrews, 313; Bex v. Harrison, 6 Term E. 60; King v. Cole, Id.

640; 1 Daniell, Ch. Prac. 891; Humphrey v. Cande, 2 Cow. 509;

Haight v. Turner, 2 Johns. 371; In re Bronson, 12 Johns. 460;

MiUihen v. Sehje, 3 Denio, 54; Haivley v. Donnelly, 8 Paige, 415;

1 Barb. Ch. Prac. 600. See, also, the decision of this court made

in the present term in BlaTce Crusher Co. v. Ward (Case No. 1505).

But it was said at the argument, if there is no entitling how can
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it be known for what purpose the affidavit was made ? This ob-

jection, if it be one, can be very easily obviated by stating the pur-

pose for wliich it is intended in the affidavit itself.

The bill and affidavits having been read, defendants' counsel

offered to read a sworn answer and accompanying affidavits in

opposition to the motion. To this the complainant's counsel ob-

jected, on the ground that he had not been served with copies.

Affidavits to be used in support of, or in opposition to, special

motions, ought always to be served on the opposite counsel a rea-

sonable time before the motion is brought on. Where this is not

done the court may reject the affidavits, or, in its discretion, allow

the same to be read, giving the opposite party the option to pro-

ceed with the hearing or to take time for the perusal and examina-

tion of the affidavits, and production of affidavits in reply, where

that is competent. The latter course was pursued in the present

case.

ADDRESS OF THE BILL

trict of---," naming the district and state for which the com.
. .
m1 10ner I uch. In this case it should have been "Eastern District of 1ichigan," or "Western District of Michigan," as the case
wa . In the iew taken by the court, however, upon the merits
of the motion, admitting all the affidavit , it i unnecessary for the
purpo e of thi case to decide what i the effect of the irregularity
in the venue.
The objection to the entitling of the court i not tenable upon
the ground stated. The affidavits were all made before the suit was
commenced. Such affidavit should in no case be entitled in any
court or cau e. When they are so entitled it is a good cause for
their rejection. Reg. v. Jones, 1 Strange, 704; Rex v. Pierso11,,
Andrews, 313; Rex v. Harrison, 6 Term R. 60; King v. Cole, Id.
640; 1 Daniell, Ch. Prac. 891; Humphrey v. Cande, 2 Cow. 509;
Haight v. T urner, 2 Johns. 371; In re Bronson, 12 Johns. 460;
~Milliken v. Selye, 3 Denio, 54; Hawley v. Donnelly, 8 Paige, 415;
1 Barb. Ch. Prac. 600. See, al o, the decision of this court made
in the present term in Blake Crusher Co. v. Ward (Case No. 1505).
But it was said at the argument, if there is no entitling how can
it be known for what purpose the affidavit was made? This objection, if it be one, can be very easily obviated by stating the purpose for which it is intended in the affida-vit itself.
The bill and affidavits having been read, defendants' counsel
offered to read a sworn answer and accompanying affidavits in
opposition to the motion. To this the complainant's counsel objected, on the ground that he had not been served with copies.
Affidavits to be used in support of, or in opposition to, special
motions, ought always to be served on the opposite counsel a reasonable time before the motion is brought on. Where this is not
done the court may reject the affidavits, or in its di cretion, allow
the same to be read, giving the opposite party the option to proce d with the hearing or to take time for the perusal and examination of the affi lavi ts, and production of affidavit in reply, where
that is competent. The latter course wa pursued in the present
case.

GOVE

.

ETTIS

.~zrl

Gove v. Pettis

Introduction.

1

Gove V. Pettis, Jf Sandf. (N. Y.) JfOJf. (18J,6.) < ^ ^^

Demurrer by the defendant, Pettis, to a bill filed against him/-

together with W. Austin and B. Dyckman. Several causes of de

ove

murrer were expressed, and at the hcarin<,f, other objections to the-W/*' \J

.

ett

4 ,.:::. ;

.' . .)

404 . {1 46)

;~~

bill were taken, ore tenus; all of which will be found stated in the*^ A'^ r^

opinion of the court. t^ . „ . ^

The Vice-Ciiaxcellor: ,^^ n ^' r'

It is no longer a ground of demurrer that the complainant onuts, V^ '^ e.

to state in the bill, his occupation or addition. V - J^ ^J^^*'^

The omission of the signature of solicitor or counsel is a caui^"" \/^

for moving to take the bill from the files of the court. It is a mat-C/

ter of practice, not of pleading; and is not a proper subject for

E r nn n b ' th
ti , to a l i11 fil d again t hi m / - 0
tog th r with W. \.u tin an
) ·kma·n. f Y ral cau
of cl - /
murr r w r
pr
cl ancl at th h arin
1.h r ol j tion t the~
/
ill w r tak n ore lenu .; all of whi ·h will be found tat d in th '
15""
urt.
. !'

tJ

a demurrer.

I think otherwise of the omission to verify the bill, or to waive

an answer on oath. The bill as served, is one not verified by the

oath of the complainant, and yet it requires an answer on the oath

of the defendant. By the 17th rule, if the bill do not waive the

defendant's oath to the answer, it must he verified by the complain-
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ant or his agent, attorney or solicitor.

This is a substantial part of the pleading, having a vital influ-

ence on the cause; and the omission to comply with the positive

requirement of the standing rule, is a defect in the bill for which

a demurrer may be interposed. The chancellor has so decided in

respect of the averments in creditor's bills, prescribed by the 189th

rule. (McEIwain v. Willis, 3 Paige, 505.)

As this defect is obviously a slip or clerical er/or, which might

be amended, I have looked into the demurrer for want of equity,

which was raised ore tenus, at the hearing. No relief is praj^ed

against Pettis, nor is it stated that the discovery from him is

essential or material. It does not appear by the bill, that Abbott

has not a perfect remedy at law. The facts stated are available

at the trial in his defence, and there is no apparent reason for his

coming into this court.

On these grounds the bill must be dismissed as to Pettis, but

without eoet^. It is dismissed finally, on the demurrer ore tenus.

IE

I E- II

ELLOR :

W.

v

y"'

It i no long r a ground of demurrer that the complainant o t
·
y
to tat in th bill hi
upation or addition.
.
Th omi ion of th ignatur of olicitor or oun 'el i a ca:u ~ v
for mo ing to tak the bill from th :fil of the court. It i a mat
ter of practice not of pl ading; and i not a prop r ubj ct for
ad murr r.
I think otherwi e of th omi ion to verify th bill or to waive
an an wer on oath. Th bill a erv d, i one not verified b the
oath of the complainant, and ;et it r quire an a wer on the oath
of the 1 fendant. By th 1 th rule, if th bill do not waive th
defendant oath to th an wer, it must be ri:fi d by the complainant or hi agent, attorney or olicitor.
Thi i a ub tantial part of th pl ading having a vital influnc on th au e; and th omi ion to omply with the positive
requir m nt of the tandin rule, i a d fe t in the bill for which
a d murrer may b int rpo d. Th hancellor ha o d ided in
r pect of th av rm nt in redito1 bill pre cribed by th 1 9th
rule. (JI cElwain v. 1 illi 3 aige
.)
thi cl fe t i bviou ly a lip or leri al rJ.·or which might
be amend d I have look into th demurrer for want of equit ,
which w, rai ed ore tenu , at the h aring.
ro reli f i pra ·ed
again t
tti n r i it tat d that th di cover .fr m him i
ntial or ma t rial. It do not app ar b th bill that bbott
ha not a p rf t r m d at law.
h fa t tat d ar arnila le
at th trial in hi 1 f n
nd th r
no appar nt r a on for hi·
omin into thi ourt.
th
gr und th
ill ml t
i m1
a t P tti.:- but
with ut
. I i di mis ' d :finally n th d murr r ore ten u ,
1
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which, if it wer the only valid one, would be allowed upon the
payment of co . On the other hand the demurrer for form, being
well taken, would, standing alone, entitle the defendant to a bill
of co ts on the compla·i nant' amending. It will be equitable, there~ to give no
to either party.

74 Introduction

v.liich, if it were the only valid one, would be allowed upon the

payment of costs. On the other hand the demurrer for form, being

07

well taken, would, standing alone, entitle the defendant to a bill

of costs on the complainant's amending. It will be equitable, there-

fore, to give no costs to either party.

arvey v. Richmond, 6 J/. Fed. Rep. 19. (189Jf.)

wo Demurrers to the Bill of Complaint.

Hughes, District Judge:

This case is before me at present solely on the pleadings filed.

The bill was first presented to one of the judges of the court on

otion for an injunction and the appointment of a receiver.

After a hearing on this motion and two other hearings of motions

jy the court, the bill went back to rules. Under the practice ob-

aining in the circuit courts of the United States, it became incum-

bent upon the defendants in the cause to plead at the September

rule^jia^past ; that is to say, on Monday, the 3d of September,

happened that that day was a national holiday, and dies non,

the clerk's office being closed. TliSs circumstance constituted

Tuesday, the 4tli of September, which was the next succeeding
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^P> " ^^y>i ^^^® September rule day for the purposes of this case. Ac-

^/jj}^ cp^mngly one of the defendants, viz., the Eichmond Eailway &

"^^ xcX'^l^ctric Company, appeared and filed a demurrer to the bill on

'pr^^Q 4th. Afterwards, to wit, on the 6th of September, the Eich-

ond & Manchester Eailway Company entered its appearance by

8unsel, and tendered a demurrer, on its part, to the bill of com-

plaint.

The two demurrers are substantially the same. The disposal of

one of them by the court will virtually dispose of the other. As the

demurrer of the Eichmond defendant is regularly in, and permis-

sion to file that of the Manchester defendant cannot materially

affect the proceedings in the case, and as, moreover, it is within

the discretion of the court to permit the filing of the demurrer of

the Manchester defendant, the court permits that demurrer to bo

filed.

The principal ground of demurrer insisted upon l)y defendants

is the failure of the bill to set out the places of residence of the

INTRODUCTION

~*::Richmond,
~ V ya6'~wo
~ eAi'uGHES,

64 Fed. Rep. 19.

(1894.)

Demurrers to the Bill of Complaint.

Di trict Judge :
)~ /
O This case is before me at present solely on the pleadings filed.
~
The bill was first presented to one of the judges of the court on
' otion for an injunction and the appointment of a receiver.
er a hearing on this motion and two other hearings of motions
y the court, the bill went back to rules. Under the practice ob;v _ytaining jn the circuit courts of the United States, it became incum(1"' bent upon the defendants in the cau e to plead at the September
rule
past; that is to say, on Monday, the 3d of September.
~_:Al
o happened that that day was a national holiday, and dies non,
~ the clerk's office being closed. Thiis ciricu1mstance constituteu
.
_.> Tuesday, the 4th of September, which wa the next succeeding
~ (""' day, the September rule day for the purposes of this case. Ac~;_;} 1 ~ngly one of the defendants, viz., the Richmond Railway &
~~c;ric Company, appeared and filed a demurrer to the bill on
~
~he 4th. Afterwards, to wit, on the 6th of September, the Richond & Manchester Railway Company entered its appearance b.r
~ el, and tendered a demurrer, on its part, to the bill of comlaint.
The two demurrer are substantially the ame. The dispo al of
/
one of them by the court will virtually di po e of the other. A the
d murrer of the Richmond defendant is r gularly in, and permi ion to file that of the Manch ter defendant cannot mat rially
affect the pro dings in th ca e, and a , moreover it i within
the di er tion of the court to permit th filin · of th d murrer oi
the Manch ter defendant, the court permit that d murrer to be
filed.
The principal ground of d murr r insi t d upon by d f ndants
i the failure of th bill to et out th pla
of re id nee of the

,J...I

Y._
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plaintiffs in the cause, and also the places of residence of defend-

ants. The hill alleges the plaintiffs to he citizens of Maryland, and

the defendants to be citizens of Virginia, but disregards rule 20 in

equity which requires the residence of all parties to be set out in

the bill. As rule 20 does not define the method by which the dis-

regard of this requirement by the pleader shall be taken advantage

of, I infer that its intention is to leave that matter in each instance

to the discretion of the court. My own opinion, in the absence

bill to give merely the places of residence of the plaintiffs and

defendants is not of sufficient gravity to require resort to a de-

murrer. I think it would be competent for the court to require

the residences to be stated in the bill by amendment on the spot,

without delay, on motion.

But the defect of the bill in this case is graver than the mere

failure to give residences. There is a jurisdictional omission, more

serious than the mere failure to conform to rule 20 in equity.

It would not be sufficient for a bill to set out that John Doe, a

citizen and resident of Maryland, complains of Richard Roe, a cit-
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izen and resident of Virginia. If there were but one judicial dis-

trict in Virginia, the omission to state Richard Roe's place of

residence might not be demurraljle, and might be amended on mere

motion. But there arc two districts in Virginia, and the bill must

give jurisdiction in the district in which the suit is brought. It

is of jurisdictional essence that the bill shall allege that Richard

Roe is a citizen of Virginia, resident at some place, alleged to

be in the eastern district of Virginia. The bill at bar uses no other

language in describing the defendants than to say that the suit

is against "the Richmond & Manchester Railway Compan}', and the

Richmond Railway & Electric Company, corporations duly incor-

porated under the laws of the state of Virginia, and as such citi-

zens of A^irginia." Tliat is all. There is no allegation that the

defendant companies are residents, respectively, of Richmond and

of Manchester, in the eastern district of Virginia; having their

offices for the transaction of all their business (Code Va. § 11 04)

in Richmond and Manchester, respectively, in the eastern district

of Virginia. The omission is jurisdictional, and is demurrable.

The fact that a corporation is resident in Richmond, and has its

ofiBce for the transaction of all its business in Richmond, cannot be

implied from the mere circumstance that 'T?ichmond'' is a word

RI IIMOND

p1ainti:O: jn th ·au
and al: th i la · . f r id nee 0£ d f n 1a•n . Th l ill , 11 er th plaintiff: t h itiz n f :Jiarylancl and
the d f nd· nt t l itiz n. of \ irginia ut di r gard rul
in
th r .'i] ·n
f all parii t he et out in
1 . n t d •fin • th m »lho l y which h di r gar 1 f thi,' r ' JUir •rn nt by 1.h 1 l ·ad r hall l tak n ad vantage
of I inf r tha it int ntion i t 1 a,· that matt r in ai ·h in tan
to th di ·r ti n C th ourt. My own pinion) in th ah n ·
of on ·] u i \' auLh riti on th ul j t) i that th failure of th
bill t giv m r 1 ' h pla
f r id n of th plain iff an
d . f ndan ' i n t of uffi ient gra ity to r quir r · rt to a d murr r. I think it w uld be mp t nt for th ourt to requir
b tat cl in th bill by am ndment on th p t
withou d la,' on motion.
ut th def t of the bill in thi a c i gra r than th mer.,
£ailur t giv r id n . Th r i a juri dictional omi ion) more
eriou than th m r failure to onform to rul
0 in equi '·
It w uld not b uffi i nt for a bill to t out that J obn oe) a
itiz n a d r id nt f far rland) complain 0£ ichard Roe a· it1z n an r id nt of Vircinia. If th re w r but one judi ial di ' trict in \ irginia th omi ion to tate Ri bard o
pla e of
re id n might not be demurral 1 and might be amen 1 d on m r
motion.
ut th r ar two 1i trict in \ irginia and th bill mu
gi j uri li ti on in th di tri t in whi h th ui t i brou ht. It
i 0£ juri di tional '~ nc that th bill hall all
that i hard
Roe i a citizen f \ irginia) r id nt at om plac all g d to
b in the a tern di ri t 0£ Vir inia. The bill at bar u e no other
1

of conclusive authorities on the subject, is that the failure of the

v.
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used in its corporate name. It is a fundamental rule of pleading

that implications cannot supply allegations. Certainty and pre-

cision are of the essence of pleading, and all material averments

must be positive and express. Implications, even necessary impli-

cations, can never dispense with material allegations. The bill

here is demurrable and defective in not containing all averments

giving jurisdiction of the cause to the circuit court of the United

States for the eastern district.

I have not time at present to consider the remaining grounds of

demurrer set out by the two defendants in the cause. I will say,

however, that, whether these grounds be valid or not, the bill is

amendable in the respects enumerated, on motion of complainants.

I do not think that the paper called the "answer of defendants"

is yet in the cause, except as an affidavit. The defendants are not

bound to file an answer in the present stage of the cause.

V (fA r. ^ Stating Part.

^\A^*^ y-* Seals v. Robinson, 75 Ala. 363. (1883.)

Appeal from Pike Chancery Court.

Heard before Hon. John A. Foster.
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This was a bill in equity by J. M. Eobinson & Co., a mercantile

u ed in its corporate name. It is a fundamental rule of pleading
that implication cannot upply allegations. Certainty and preci ion are of the e ence of pleading, and all material averments
mu t be po itive and xpre s. Implication , even necessary implic tion , can never di pense with mat rial allegations. The bill
here is demurrabl and defective in not containing all averments
giving jurisdiction of the cau e to the circuit court of the United
State for th ea tern district.
I have not time at present to consider the remaining ground of
demurrer set out by the two def ndants in the cause. I will say,
however, that, whether the ground be valid or not, the bill is
amendable in the re p cts enumerated, on motion of complainants.
I do not think that the paper called the "answer of defendants"
i yet in the cause, except as an affidavit. The defendants are not
bound to file an an wer in the pre ent stage of the cause.

partnership, carrying on business in Louisville, Kentucky, simple

contract creditors of S. J. Seals, against the said Seals, R. C.

Seals, his wife, and W. A. Wei don, seeking to have vacated and

set aside, as fraudulent and void, a deed executed by S. J. Seals to

]iis wife, bearing date 17th June, 1881, and conveying to her sev-

( ral lots of land, situated in the city of Troy, in this State ; and

to have the property conveyed by the deed sold for the payment of

~~o,

complainants' demand; and it was filed on 20th February, 1882.

0'b

STATING PART.

-(". ?-- Seals v. Robinson, 75 Ala. 363.

.\s appears from the averments of the l)ill, and from the proof, the

~PPEAL from Pike Chancery Court.

complainants sold S. J. Seals, on 29th and 30th days of September,

1881, goods, wares and merchandise, amounting in price to nearly

one thousand dollars, on credit, and without security, the debt

(1883.)

maturing at two and four months; on which was paid, on 24th

November, 1881, the sum of two hundred dollars. The bill alleges:

"That at the time said purchases were made, the said S. J. Seals

Heard before Hon. JOHN A. FOSTER.
Thi was a bill in equity by J. M. Robinson & Co., a mercantile
11artnership, carrying on bu iness in Louisville, Kentucky, simple
c ntract creditors of S. J. Seal , against the said Seals, R. C.
als, his wife, and W. A. Weldon, eeking to ha·ve vacated and
et a id , a fraudulent and void, a deed executed by S. J. Seals to
hi wif , bearing dat 17th June, 1881, and conveying to her sevral lo of land, ituated in the city of Troy, in thi State; aml
t ha·v th property onveyed by the deed old for the payment of
· mplainant ' d mand; and it wa filed on 20th F bruary 1882 .
.\ app ars from th averment of the bill and from the proof the
r· mplainants old
. J. al , on 29th and 0th day of ptember,
1, good , war a d m rchandi amounting in pri e to nearly
on thou and dollar on credit, and without curity th debt
maturing at two and four month ; on whi h wa paid, n 24th
vember, 1881, th um of two hundr d d llar . Th bill allege :
id pur ha
w 1 mad th ai 1 . J.
al:-;
' hat at tb tim
, i

"1
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Seals v. Robinson ""

held and owned in his own name and right a large amount of real

citate and personal property, of great value, to-wit, eight or ttn

thousand dollars, consisting of valuable brick storehouses in the

city of Troy, and dwellings and lots in said city, and stock in

trade and choscs in action, as represented by him, of the value

of four thousand dollars; and that upon the faith of said real

and personal property, so owned by him and held and standing

in the name of said S. J. Seals, in his own right as aforesaid, your

orators were induced to sell and credit and trust said S. J. Seals,

and sell and deliver to him goods, wares and merchandise upon

the credit aforesaid. Orators further aver that, at the time the

.

...,

BINS N

I'

lield and own cl in hi own nam and right a larg amount of r al
c ·~iaie and p r anal pr p rty) of gr at alu ) t -wit, eight or
n
tl au and dollar ) on i ting of aluable brick tor hou e in the
city of Tr y) and d lling and lot · in aicl ·i y and tock in
trade antl h
in action) a r 'Ir ni.
hy him, of th value
of four th u and d llar ; and i.hat upon th faith of aid real
and p r nal pr I rty o own 1 1y him ancl h lcl and tanding
in th nam I ai l 1 • J.
al ) in hi own ri 0 ht a. f re aid your
orator w r inlu cl t
11 anl r lit and i.ru t aid f J. f al..,
and 11 and 1 ·liv r to him good. 'varc an l rn rchandi up n
th r <lit f r aid.
rato further a r that) at th tim tl
al ma 1 the pur ·ha
al' r aid he had him lf
r port 1 in ornrn rnjal ircl a b ing worth, av r and al ave all
liabiliti ) in hi own right, tw lv thou and dollar ; and throuo-h
th e r pr enta·t ion , and hi property afore aid, he wa nal 1
to obtain r dit and to be tru t d.' It j th n averred that on
9th January, 1
, th aid . J. eal :fil d in the office of the
judg of probate of aid county, for r cord, the ,. d. e d in que tion,
whi h i made an hibit to the bill. Th con id ration 'expre d
in th d d i th natural love and adfoction which~the grantor
had and bore toward hi wife, the grant
and the property i
conv y d to her in f e imple, to hav and to hold "as her epadte
property und r the tatutes of th
tate governing the e tate of
marri d women."
fter averring th execution by . J. eal on
l 1th ; bruary, 1
, of an a ignment of all hi property, then
own 1 by him, to W. . W ldon, bi father-in-law, as as ignee or
tn t f r th b n fit of hi r dit
the bill proceed : ' our
ou1 ~or further r pr
nt to } our Honor, and av r th fact o to be,
that th aid d d ma 1 b: ai 1 cal to hi aid wif R.
eaL,
'ra not .x cuted on th 1 th da of Jun 1 1 but wa e ecut
om tim aft r that date to-wit about th 9th day of J anuar ,
18
ut rat r av r that if th r are mi tak n in thi th n
the a\ r that ai 1 d wa not 1 li er d on aid da
n v r in fat d liY rd until th th da· of Januar
th am b am f r th :fir~t tim a matt r of r cord.
t i al av IT d that aid c1 c1 wa without valuabl consid raii n · ihat ai th tim of it . cuti n th ai 1 . J. eal wa~
:finan iall. mbarra ~ 1 and in failin
ir um tan . . , whi h wa,
known to hi wif · that it wa x ut d an 1 ] liY r 1 h.Y him '1ith
th int nti n and f r th puq o of hind rincr, 1 layincr an
1

•

said S. J. Seals made the purchases aforesaid, he had himself

reported in commercial circles as being worth, over and above all

liabilities, in his own right, twelve thousand dollars; and through

these representations, and his property aforesaid, he was enabled

to obtain credit and to be trusted." It is then averred that on

9th January, 1882, the said S. J. Seals filed in the office of the

judge of probate of said county, for record, thejieed in question,

which is made an exhibit to the bill. Tlie consideration 'expressed
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in the deed is the natural love and affection which^'the grantor

had and bore towards his ^dfe, the grantee, and the property is

conveyed to her in fee simple, to have and to hold "as her separslte

property under the statutes of the State governing the estates of

married women." After averring the execution by S. J. Seals, on

17th Februar}', 1882, of an assignment of all his property, then

owned by him, to W. A. Weldon, his father-in-law, as assignee or

trustee for the benefit of his creditors, the bill proceeds: 'TTour

orators further represent to your Honor, and aver the fact so to be,

that tlie said deed made by said Seals to his said wife, R. C. Seals,

was not executed on the 17th day of June, 1881, but was executed

some time after that date, to-wit, about the 9th day of January,

1882. But orators aver that if they are mistaken in this, then

they aver that said deed was not delivered on said day, and was

never in fact delivered until the 9th day of Januar}-, 1882, when

the same became, for the first time, a matter of record."

It is also averred that said deed was without valuable considera-

tion; that at the time of its execution, the said S. J. Seals was

financially emliarrassed and in failing circumstances, which was

known to his wife; that it was executed and delivered by him with

the intention, and for the purpose of hindering, delaying and de-

78
78 Stating Part

frauding the complainants and his other creditors; and that such

fraudulent intention and purpose were known to his wife, and the

deed was accepted hy her in furtherance thereof. The bill then

contains this averment: "And plaintiffs aver that if said deed

[was executed and delivered] at the time it purports to have been

executed and delivered, there was a secret understanding and

agreement between the said Seals and his wife, that the same

should not become a matter of record at said time; and so far

as the existence of the said deed was concerned, the whole com-

mercial world was kept in blissful ignorance thereof, until the said

Seals had purchased all the goods he wanted, amounting to several

thousand dollars [in value], and had disposed of the same; and

then, for the first time, it came to light, after the same had been

concealed from your orators, and all persons, for the period of

nearly seven whole months; and all this time the said Seals, his

STATING
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fraucling the complainants and hi other creditors; and that such
fraudulent intention and purpo e were known to his wife, and the
deed wa accepted by her in furtherance thereof. The bill then
contains thi averment: "And plaintiffs aver that if said deecl
[ wa executed and delivered] at the tim it purport to have been
executed and delivered, there wa a cret under tanding and
agr ement betwe n the aid S al and his wife, that the same
hould not become a matter of recor l at aid time; and o far
a the exi tence of the aid deed wa concerned, the whole commercial world wa kept in blis ful ignorance thereof, until the said
Seal had pur ha ed all the good he wanted, amounting to several
thou and dollar [in value], and had di posed of th ame; and
then for the :fir t time, it came to light, after the same had been
concealed from your orators, and all person , for the period of
nearly even whole month ; and all thi time the said Seals, hi·
wife con enting thereto, wa holding him elf out to the world as
the owner in hi own right of said property, for the purpose of
defrauding hi creditor, and tho e with whom he might afterward deal on credit a:nd tru t." It is also charged that the deecl
i fraudulent, a to prior and ubsequent creditors in that said
eal "had a r ervation therein in favor of hims lf, being the
tru tee of hi aid wife, to control and enjoy the rents of said
property, without accounting to any one for the same." The bill
wa ubsequently amended, averring the death of S. J. Seal after
the :filing of the original bill, and making his admini trator a party
defenaant.
To the bill a amended Mrs. Seal and W. A. Weldon :filed a
demurrer, the character of which i tated in the opinion. The
demurrer wa overruled, and the defendant an wered. l\1r. Seal ~ ,
in her answer which wa not under oath averr d, and t timony
introduced on her behalf t nded to how, that the d d in que tion
wa ex cuted and deliv r d at or about th time it bore date, for
th bona fide purpo e on the part of her elf and hu band of
making a provi ion for her and three children, minor of tender
· ar her hu band being indu d th r t by bad health, and an
appr hen ion of an arly d ath from a hroni di a with which
h wa th n affiicted an 1 al o a 1e ir to a aid an admini tration
upon hi
tat ; and that h did not hav th d d r cord d at
an arli r dat b cau
he wa not a vi ed of the n ce ity of
re i tration nd wa. :fi all indu c1 to h v it r ord l 1y a ug0

wife consenting thereto, was holding liimself out to the world as

the owner, in his own right, of said property, for the purpose of

defrauding his creditors, and those with whom he might after-

wards deal on credit and trust." It is also charged that the deed
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is fraudulent, as to prior and subsequent creditoi's, in that said

Seals 'Tiad a reservation therein in favor of himself, being the

trustee of his said wife, to control and enjoy the rents of said

property, without accounting to any one for the same." The bill

was subsequently amended, averring the death of S. J. Seals after

the filing of the original bill, and making his administrator a party

defendant.

To the bill as amended Mrs. Seals and W. A. Weldon filed a

demurrer, the character of which is stated in the opinion. The

demurrer was overruled, and the defendants answered. Mrs. Seals,

in her answer, which was not under oath, averred, and testimony

introduced on her behalf tended to show, that the deed in question

was executed and delivered at or about the time it bore date, for

the hona fide purpose, on the part of herself and husband, of

making a provision for her and three children, minors of tender

years, her husband being induced thereto by ba-d health, and an

apprehension of an early death from a chronic disease with which

he was then afflicted, and also a desire to avoid an administration

upon his estate; and that she did not have the deed recorded at

an earlier date, because she was not advised of the necessity of

registration, and was finally induced to have it recorded by a sug-

~E
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gestion from a third party, tliat the record would be proof of its

contents in the event of a loss. She admitted that her husband

owed debts at the time of the execution of the deed, but denied

that he was then financially embarrassed, and also the averments

of the bill charging fraud.

The material facts and circumstances disclosed by the evidence

for the comi)hnnant,^, on whicli they relied to sustain the averments

of fraud contained in the bill, are sufficiently indicated in the

opinion. There was no direct or positive evidence introduced by

them, that the wife had any knowledge of the huslDand's finan-

cially embarrassed condition when the deed was executed, or of his

intention to hinder, delay and defraud his creditors, or of any

other fraudulent intention or purpose on his part; or that she

combined and conspired with him for the purpose of perpetrating

any fraud; or that she withheld the deed from record for any

fraudulent purpose.

On the hearing, had on pleadings and proof, and on a motion

to dismiss the bill for want of equity, the chancellor caused a

decree to be entered, overruling the motion, declaring the deed
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fraudulent and void, and granting relief to the complainants. The

decree also overrules "the exceptions to the testimony"; but the

record fails to disclose these exceptions, or their nature or extent.

Tlie rulings of the court, in overruling the demurrer, the motion

to dismiss, and the exceptions to tcstimon)-, and in granting relief

to the complainants, are here assigned as error.

Brickell, C. J. :

The rules of pleading in a court of equity, as to matters of

form, are not so strict as the rules originally prevailing in courts

of common law. The statutory requirement in reference to bills

in equity is, that they "must contain a clear and orderly statement

of the facts on which the suit is founded, without prolixity or

repetition, and conclude with a prayer for the appropriate relief."

A bill conforming to this requirement, under the practice and the

decisions of this court, would have been deemed unobjectionable

before the enactment of the statute. The statute has not, hovr-

L
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ge tion from a third party, that the r cord would l e proof of it
contents in th e nt of a lo .
h admitt d that her hu band
ow d d b at t1 tim of th
eed, but enied
that he wa th n £.nan jally emb rr c<l an
1 o the aYerments
of the bill hargin .fraud.
The mat rial Ia t an l circum tan e cli clo ed by th vidence
for the complainan on which th y r li d to u tain the averment
of fraud contain
in th bill ar u ci ntly indicate in the
opinion. Th r
a no dir ct or po iti e vid nee intr luced by
them, th t th wife had any knowl dg of th hu l and financially
barra d condition wh n th d d wa execut d or of hi
int ntion to hinder d lay and defraud hi
reditor. , or of any
other fraudulent intention or purpo e on bi part· or that he
combin cl and on pired with him for th purpo e of perpetrating
any fraud; or that he withh ld the deed from record for any
fraudulent purpo e.
On th h aring, had on pleading and proof, and on a motion
to di mi the bill for want of equity, the chancellor cau ed a
de r e to be ent r d overruling the motion, d clarin th deed
fraudulent and void, and granting relief to the complainant . The
de r e al o ov nule "th xc ption to the te timon ; but the
r cord fail to di clo e th e x eption , or their nature or .rlent.
The ruling of th court, in o erruling th demurrer th motion
to di mi and the exception to t e timon and in granting relief
to the omplainant , are here a igned a error.

ever, been construed as in derogation of the cardinal rule, as it

has been frequently termed, that the bill must show with accuracv

and clearness all matters essential to the complainant's right to

relief. These matters must not lie made to depend upon inference.

BRICKELL

0. J.:

he rul of pl ading in a court of equit3 a to matter of
form, ar not o trict a the rule originally pre ailing in ourt
f common law. The tatutory requirement in r f r nee to bill
in quit ' i that th 'mu t ontain a lear and rderl tat ment
f the fa t on whi h the uit i found d without prohs:iiY or
r p titi i1 and on lud with a pra ·er for th appropriat relief.'
bill onf rmin 0 to thi r guir m nt und r th pra ti and the
d ci ion of thi court would ha
en d em d un bj tionable
b f r th na tm nt of th tatute.
h tatut ha ~ not ho~,,. r b n on tru d a in d r cration f th cardinal rule a it
ha · b n fr qu ntl t rm d, that th ill mu t how with accuracy
an l 1 arn
all matt r
ntial to th omplainanf rirrht to
reli f.
h
matt r mu t n t l ma l t l pen up n inf r n
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nor will amljiguoiis averments of them be accepted as siifiicient.

The averments must be direct and positive, not uncertain and in-

conclusive. — Spcnce V. Duren, 3 Ala. 251; CochreU v. Gurley,

26 Ala. 405; Duclwortli v.. Duclworth, 35 Ala. 70. A bill may

be framed in a double aspect; alternative averments may be in-

troduced; but each alternative must present a case entitling the

complainant to the same relief. The bill is demurrable, if in either

alternative the complainant is not entitled to any relief, or is en-

titled to relief essentially differing in character. — Andrews v. Mc-

Coy, 8 Ala. 920; Lucas v. Oliver, 34 Ala. 626; Elves v. Walthall,

38 Ala. 329; David v. Shepard, 40 Ala. 587; Micoii v. Ashurst,

55 Ala. 607.

If the original bill contains alternative averments, and either

averment is insufficient to support the right of the complainant

to the relief prayed, the objection was not presented in the chancer}'-

court by demurrer. Advantage of it was claimed only by motion

to dismiss for want of equity. A motion to dismiss for want of

equity is not the equivalent of a demurrer; nor is it appropriate

to reach mere defects or insufficiencies of pleading curable by
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amendment, which is matter of right at any time before final

decree. It should be entertained only when, admitting the facts

apparent on the face of the bill, whether well or illy pleaded, the

complainant is without right to equitable relief. When it is ap-

parent, if the facts were well pleaded, a case of relief would exist,

the defendant should be put to a demurrer, specifying the grounds

of objection, affording the complainant the opportunity of removing

them by amendment.— iZoo^^er v. 8. & M. R. R. Co., 69 Ala. 529.

The demurrer interposed was general ; it fails, in the words of the

statute, "to set forth the grounds," and the statute prohibits the

hearing of it. — Hart v. Clark, 54 Ala. 490.

Objections to the admissibility of evidence, in chancery, ought

to bo reduced to writing, and a reference to them should be incor-

porated in the note of submission, or they should be otherwise called

directly to the attention of the chancellor. If the fact that they

have been made is not noted in the submission, or it is not otherwise

shown that they were called to the attention of the chancellor, and

he does not notice them, on appeal, the presumption is that they

were waived.

It is settled by a long line of decisions in this court, that a volun-

tary conveyance, a convcyauce not resting upon a vahialtlc consider-
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nor will ambiguou averments of them be accepted as sufficient.
The averment mu t be direct and positive, not uncertain and inconclu ive.-Spence v. Duren, 3 Ala. 251; Cockreill v. Gurley,
26 Ala. 405; Duckworth v.. Duckworth, 35 Ala. 70. A bill may
be framed in a double a pect; alternative averments may be introduced; but each alternative must present a case entitling the
complainant to the same relief. The bill is demurrable, if in either
alternative the complainant is not entitled to any relief, or is entitled to relief essentially differing in character.-Andrews v. McCoy, 8 Ala. 920; Lucas v. Oliver, 34 Ala. 626; Rives v. Walthall,
38 Ala. 329; David v. Shepard, 40 Ala. 587; 111icou v. Ashurst,
55 Ala. 607.
If the original bill contains alternative averments, and either
averment is in ufficient to support the right of the complainant
to the relief prayed, the objection was not presented in the chancery
court by demurrer. Advantage of it was claimed only by motion
to dismiss for want of equity. A motion to dismiss for want of
equity is not the equivalent of a demurrer; nor is it appropriate
to reach mere defects or insufficiencies of pleading curable by
amendment, which is matter of right at any time before final
decree. It should be entertained only when, admitting the facts
apparent on the face of the bill, whether well or illy pleaded, the
complainant is without right to equitable relief. When it is apparent, if the facts were well pleaded, a case of relief would exist,
the defendant hould be put to a demurrer, specifying the grounds
of objection, affording the complainant the opportunity of removing
th m by amendment.-Hooper v. S. & M. R. R . Co., 69 Ala. 529.
The demurrer interposed was general; it fails, in the words of the
statut , "to et forth the grounds," and the statute prohibits the
h aring of it.-Hart v. Clark, 54 Ala. 490.
Obj ction to th admissibility of evidence, in chancery, ought
to b reduced to writing and a reference to them houll be incorporat d in th note of ubmi ion, or they hould be otherwise called
dir ctly to th attention of th chancellor. If the fact that they
have b en made i not noted in the ubmi ion, or it i not otherwise
shown that they w r call d to the attention of th hancellor, and
he do not notice them, on appeal, the pre umption i that they
were waived.
ti cttl d by a long line of d cj ion in thi ourt that a voluntary om' yan r a nv ran not r ting u on a rnlu 11 c n. . id r-
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ation, is void per se, without any regard to the intention of the

parties, however free from covin or guile they may have been, as to

the existing creditors of the donor, without regard to his circum-

stances, or the amount of his indebtedness, or of the kind, value or

extent of the property conveyed, if it be not exempt from liability

for the payment of debts. As to subsequent creditors, if it be not

shown that there was mala fides, or fraud in fact in the transaction,

the conveyance is valid and operative. But if actual fraud is shown,

it is not of importance whether it was directed against existing

or subsequent creditors ; either can successfully impeach and defeat

the conveyance, so far as it breaks in upon the right to satisfaction

of their debts. The distinction between existing and subsequent

creditors is, that, as to the former, the conveyance is void ;;er se,

for the want of a valuable consideration; as to the latter, because

it is infected with actual fraud. — Miller v. Thompson, 3 Port. 196;

Cato V. Easletj, 2 Stew. 214; Moore v. Spence, 6 Ala. 506; Costilla

V. Thompson, 9 Ala. 937; Thomas v. DeGraffenreid, 17 Ala. 602;

Foote V. Cohb, 18 Ala. 585; Stolces v. Jones, lb. 734; s. c. 21 Ala,

731; Gannard v. Eslava, 20 Ala. 732; Randall v. Lang, 23 Ala.
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751; Stiles v. Lightfoot, 26 Ala. 443; Iluggins v. Perrine, 30

Ala. 396; Cole v. Varner, 31 Ala. 244; Pinksion v. McLemore,

lb. 308 ; Williams v. Avery, 38 Ala. 115. The right of the subse-

quent creditor depends upon the existence of actual fraud in the

transaction; the burden of proving it rests upon him. — Bump on

Fraud. Con. 308. The general rule applies, that fraud must be

proved; it will not be presumed, if the facts and circumstances

shown in the evidence may consist with honesty and purity of in-

tention. But it must not be supposed that fraud must be proved

by direct and positive evidence, or that it is incapable of proof by

circumstances leading to a rational, well grounded conviction of its

existence. There is no fact which may be the subject of controversy

in a judicial proceeding, civil or criminal, that is not the subject

of proof by circumstantial, as distinguished from positive or direct

evidence. As the fraud visiting a transaction at the instance of

creditors lies in the intention of the parties to it, %dcious intent

is not generally susceptible of proof otherwise than by evidence of

circumstances indicative of it. The intention is a mental emotion,

of which the external signs are the acts and declarations of the par-

ties, taken in connection with the concomitant circumstances. —

Hubbard v. Allen. 59 Ala. 283; Harrell v. Mitchell 61 Ala. 270;
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Thames v. Eembert, 63 Ala. 561; Pickett v. PipMn, 64 Ala. 520.

The conveyance now assailed by subsequent creditors of the

grantor is of real estate, is purely voluntary, founded upon no other

consideration than love and affection, and the controlling pui'pose

of its execution was a provision for the wife of the donor. It is

made directly to the wife, without the interposition of a trustee,

and at law is a mere nullity. All contracts and conveyances made

between husband and wife directly, at common law, are invalid, for

the reason that husband and wife are regarded as but one person,

and the legal existence of the wife is merged in that of the husband.

— Gamble v. Gamble, 11 Ala. 966 ; Puryear v. Puryear, 12 Ala. 13 ;

Bradford v. Goldsborougli, 15 Ala. 311; Frierson v. Frierson, 21

Ala. 5-19. The statutes creating and defining the separate estates

of married women are not in abrogation of this doctrine of the

common law; they are not intended to sever the unity of the hus-

band and wife, so far as to confer on them capacity to contract with,

or to convey directly to each other. — Short v. Battle^ 52 Ala. 456;

McMillan v. Peacocl-, 57 Ala. 127. Although this is the recognized

doctrine of the common law, a court of equity, when the contract or
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conveyance is fair and just, will give to it full effect and validity. —

Williams v. Maull, 20 Ala. 721; Williams v. Avery, 38 Ala. 115;

McWilliams v. Ramsey, 23 Ala. 813; Andreivs v. Andrews, 28 Ala.

432; Spencer v. Godwin, 30 Ala. 355. As a gift or conveyance

by the husband to the wife directly is invalid at law, and is valid

only in a court of equity, it is regarded as creating in the wife an

equitable separate estate, though it may not contain words denoting

that it is for her sole and separate use, or words in exclusion of the

marital rights of the liusband; and that the estate is not conse-

quently within the influence or operation of the statutes enabling

the wife to take and hold the property owned by her at the time

of the marriage, or to which she may become entitled subsequently.

— McMillan v. Peacock, supra; EatcUffe v. Dovgherty, 24 Miss.

181; Warren v. Brown, 25 Miss. 66; Short v. Battle, supra.

Tlie conveyance is of all the visible, tangible property of the

donor, subject to execution at law. All that he retained, consisted

of choses in action, of uncertain, doubtful value. It is said by

Judge Stor\^ that, "if a husband should by deed grant all his estate

or property to his wife, the deed would be held inoperative in equity,

as it would be in law ; for it could, in no just sense, be deemed a

reasonable provision for her (which is all that courts of equity hold

ST..iTI~G
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Thames v. Rembert, 63 Ala. 561; Pickett v. Pipkin, 64 Ala. 520.
The conv 'ance now a ailed by subsequent creditors of the
grantor i of real e tate, i purely voluntary, founded upon no other
con icleration than love and affection, and the controlling purpose
of it execution wa a pro i ion for the wife of the donor. It is
made directly to the wif , without the interposition of a tru tee,
and at law i a mere nullity. All contract and conve3 ances made
between Im band and wife directl3 at ommon law, are invalid, for
the rea on that hu band and wife are regarded as but one per on,
and the legal eri tence of the wife is merged in that of the husband.
-Gamble v. Gamble, 11 Ala. 966; Puryear v. Puryear, 12 Ala. 13;
Bradford v. Goldsborough 15 Ala. 311; Frierson v. Frierson, 21
Ala. 549. The tatute creating and defining the eparate e tate
of married women are not in abrogation of thi doctrine of the
common law; they are not intended to sever the unity of the husband and wife o far a to confer on them capacity to contract with,
or to convey directly to each other. - hart v. Battle, 52 Ala. 456 ;
McMillan v. Peacock, 57 Ala. 127. Although this is the recognized
doctrine of the common law, a court of equity, when the contract or
conve ranee i fair and just, will give to it full effect and validity. TVilliams v. Maitll, 20 Ala. 721; Williams v. Avery, 38 Ala. 115;
]Jc Williams v. Ramsey, 23 Ala. 813; Andrews v. Andrews, 28 Ala.
432; Sp encer v. Godwin, 30 Ala. 355. As a gift or conveyance
by the husband to the wife directly i invalid at law, and i alid
only in a court of equity, it is regarded as creating in the wife an
equitable separate e tate, though it may not contain words denoting
that it i for her ole and separate use or words in exclusion of the
marital right of the hu band; and that the e tate i not consequently within the influence or operation of the tatute enabling
the wife to take and hold the property owned b her at the time
of th marriage, or to which he may become entitled sub, equently.
- :McMillan v. Peacock, supra; Ratcliffe v. Dougherty -1 Mi ~.
181; Warren v. Brown, 25 Uiss. 66; hart v. Battle supra.
The conveyanc i of all the vi ible tangible propert of the
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the wife entitled to) ; and, in giving her the whole, he would sur-

render all his own interests." 2 Story's Eq. § 1374. In Coates v.

Gerlach, 44 Pcnn. St. 4G, tlie court said : "A conveyance that de-

nudes a husband of all, or the greater part of his property, is much

more than a reasonaljle provision for a wife; for in considering

what is, and what is not a reasonable provision, the circumstances

of the husband are to l)e regarded, his probable necessities as well as

his debts. Equity will not assist a wife to impoverish her hus-

band." Whether a court of equity would refuse to enforce this

conveyance upon the ground that the provision for the wife is

unreasonable, and that giving to it effect would work injustice to

the husband, it is not necessary to consider. The circumstances

of each case must be considered as determining the reasonableness

of a provision for wife or children, and a conveyance may be valid

inter partes, which the court would not hesitate to pronounce fraud-

ulent as to creditors. — Jones v. Ohencliain, 10 Graft. 259; 1 Bish.

on Mar. Women, § 755. When the rights of creditors are in-

volved, the extent and value of the property conveyed, its kind and

character, are all facts to be considered in determining whether
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the transaction is infected with a covinous intent. The fact that a

donor strips himself of all visible, tangible property w^hich is sub-

ject to execution at law, retaining only choses in action of uncertain,

doubtful value, may not be conclusive proof of fraud ; taken alone

it may be weak and inconclusive; but it will awaken suspicion

and add strength to other circumstances which may in themselves

be also insufficient to prove that his intent was fraudulent. And

it is his intent, not the intent of the donee, which is material ; the

fraud of the donor is visited upon the donee, though he mav be

doli incapax, or though his intentions may be fair and honest, for

he comes in as a volunteer, and has no equity which will protect

him against the rights of creditors. — Pickett v. Pipkin, 64 Ala.

520.

The conveyance is not only of all visible property of the donor

subject to execution at law, the value of which far exceeds the

highest estimate of the value of the choses in action he retained

but it contains the unusual, if not remarkable provision, that the

donee shall hold the property conveyed "as her separate property

under the statutes of the State governing the estates of married

women." The effect which would be given this clause of the con-

veyance, or whether it is capable of being construed as limitino-
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and qualifying tlie estate, narrowing its incidents, lessening the

dominion of the donee, as the estate is created by the general words

which precede it, is not now of importance. Whether it is, or is

not valid and qualifying as a limitation, subjecting the estate and

the wife's dominion to the properties of a statutory estate, which

is, in but a limited sense, a separate estate, it is indicative of the

intention of the donor; and that intention is, in one aspect, now

of the highest importance. Subjecting the estate to the statute

would vest it in the donor as husband and trustee for the donee,

entitling him to his rents and profits, so long as he continues in

that relation, freed from liability to account to the donee, and

exempt from liability for his debts. In other words, he does not

part with the property absolutely, but reserves to himself a specific

benefit which it is to yield, though the ownership is vested in the

donee.

Another circumstance it is of importance to consider. More

than six months passed after the execution of the conveyance be-

fore its registration. AMiatever may have been the general circum-

stances of the donor at the time of the execution of the conveyance,
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and upon this point the evidence is not so clear and satisfactory

as it could probably have been made, the fact is, that when the

conveyance was delivered to the judge of probate for registration,

he was insolvent, and, in but little more than a month thereafter,

made a general assignment for the benefit of creditors. During

the interval between the execution and registration of the con-

veyance, he continued in possession, claiming ownership of the

property, vouching the ownership as entitling him to credit, and

upon the faith of it obtained credit. The omission to register the

conveyance is but a fact or circumstance indicative of fraud, and

is open to explanation, which, if just and reasonable, would neutral-

ize all unfavorable inferences that may be drawn from it. The

only explanation now offered is, that the donee was ignorant of the

necessity for registration; ignorant that the law required regis-

tration to protect her from the claims of subsequent purchasers

from the husband, or from the claims of judgment creditors. This

is ignorance of law, which can not be accepted as explanatory of

the omission. But she was not ignorant that the husband, after

the execution of the conveyance, and before its registration, em-

barked in a new mercantile enterprise, contracting debts to a large

amount. Xor is ignorance of the necessity of registration, or of

STATING PART

and qualifying the e tate, narrowing it incidents, les ening the
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part with the property a:bsolutely, but reserves to him elf a specific
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the duty of giving public-it}- to the fact that he was not the owner

of the property, imputed to him. The evidence is conclusive that he

concealed the fact of the conveyance, and represented himself as

having title.

The omission to register the conveyance, the want of notoriety

of its existence, the magnitude of the property conveyed, when

compared with the value of that which was retained, the attempted

reservation of a specific benefit to the donor, which he could hold

free from liability for debts, his engagement in business very soon

after the execution of the conveyance, obtaining a false credit be-

cause of his possession and representations that he was the owner

of the property, to which, to say the least, the donee by her supine-

ness contributed, are all badges of fraud, or circumstances indicative

that the intent of the donor was the hinderance, delay, and fraud

of creditors. Bump on Fraud. Con. 308. It is not of importance,

whether the intent was directed against present or subsequent

creditors ; in either event, the conveyance may be successfully ira- [/

peached by a subsequent creditor. We concur in the conclusion ; (/-

of the chancellor, that the conveyance must be deemed fraudulent Jf^ y
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as to creditors, prior or subsequent, and the decree is of consequenjB^^ » b w^'

affirmed. ,^- '-^ ^^

Born V. GeuAer, 111 III. 363. (1898.) {f^ J^ '^cT' J" ^

Appeal from the AppeUate Court for the First Distinct ;-^ear^'^ OV^ y

in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County ; /jT y^

the Hon. 0. H. Horton, Judge, presiding. v^^ , t^

This was a bill in chancery filed on the 30th day of April, ISO-'lf^ e/^M

by the appellee Philip Geuder, as executor of the last will and testal; ^
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ment of Johann Geuder, deceased, and Edward S. Dreyer, truste1rV\jj/^

against Gay Dorn, the appellant, and his wife and others, for th^^ ^ l^

foreclosure of a certain trust deed. The bill alleged "that on MarchV^'^^C^ . <^

~

affirmed.

~

,,//

3, 1890, Gay Dorn, for value received, made his one principal ^^ vA"

1

promissory note of that date, and thereby promised to pay to the J^^lm^

order of Emil Dickmann the suin of six thousand dollars ($6000) ^ J:^^ '

Dorn v. Gewler, 171 Ill. 36B.

in three years after said date, with interest at the rate of six^ ^^

/

\..

'/

..,.r

per cent per annum, payable semi-annually, said several install-i^^;;;^i^<

ments of interest being evidenced and secured by six interest note?/ ^ "^

or coupons executed by said Gay Dorn to the order of said Emib ^^ /^^^
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Dickmann, each for the sum of one hundred and eighty dollars

($180), which were due, respectively, in six, twelve, eighteen,

twenty-four, thirty and thirty-six months after the date thereof,

both i^rincipal and interest to bear interest at the rate of eight per

cent per annum after maturity, and payable at the banking office

of E. S. Dreyer & Co., Chicago, Illinois ; that said notes were after-

wards endorsed by said payee, Emil Dickmann, and delivered to

Johann Gender, who became the legal holder and owner thereof,

and so remained up to the day of his death, to-wit, August 11,

189-1; that to secure the payment of the said notes the said Gay

Dorn executed and delivered to complainant Edward S. Dreyer,

trustee, a deed of trust of even date with said notes, thereby con-

veying to said trustee, in fee simple, the following described real

estate, with all the buildings and improvements thereon, to-wit:

(Here follows description of mortgaged premises;) that said prin-

cipal note was given to evidence, and said trust deed to secure, the

balance of the purchase money for the property above described,

together with interest thereon for said period of three years; that

it is provided in said trust deed that if default be made in the
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payment of the said notes or the interest thereon, or any part

thereof, or in case of waste or non-payment of taxes or assessments,

or neglect to procure or renew insurance, or in case of the breach

of any of the covenants therein contained, then the whole of the

principal of said notes shall thereupon, at the option of the legal

holder thereof, become immediately due; that default has been

made in the payment of the principal sum of said note, together

with a large amount of interest thereon ; that there is now due the

whole of the principal of said notes, being the sum of six thousand

dollars ($6000), with interest thereon from March 3, 1890." The

bill also alleged the trust deed contained an agreement to pay

solicitor's fees of the complainants' solicitor in case of a foreclosure,

and that the other parties defendant claim some interest in the

mortgaged premises, and concluded with a prayer that a decree be

entered foreclosing the trust deed and for sale of the property, and

for a decree in personam for any deficiency, and for such other and

further relief as the nature of the case might require.

The appellant filed an answer to the bill, alleging payment of

each of the said six interest notes or coupons mentioned in the bill,

and that by agreement between the parties the time of the payment

of the principal indebtedness was extended for the term of one year.

STATING

p ART

Dickmann, each for the sum of one hundr d and eighty dollars
($1 0), which were due, respectively, in six, twelve, eighteen,
twenty-four, thirty and thirty-six months after the dafo thereof,
both principal and intere t to bear inter st at the rate of eight per
cent per annum after maturity, and payable at the banking office
of E. S. Dreyer & Co., Chicago, Illinois; that said notes were afterwards endorsed by said payee, Emil Dickmann, and delivered to
Johann Geuder, who became the legal holder and owner thereof,
and so remained up to the day of hi death, to-wit, August 11,
1 9-±; that to secure the payment of the said notes the said Gay
Dorn executed and delivered to complainant Edward S. Dreyer,
trustee, a deed of trust of even date with said notes, thereby conyeying to said tru tee, in fee simple, the following described re~l
estate, with all the buildings and improvements thereon, to-wit:
(Here follows description of mortgaged premises;) that said principal note was given to evidence, and aid tru t deed to secure, the
balance of the purchase money for the property above described,
together with interest thereon for said period of three years; that
it is provided in said trust deed that if default be made in the
payment of the said notes or the interest thereon, or any part
thereof, or in case of waste or non-payment of taxes or assessments,
or neglect to procure or renew insurance, or in case of the breach
of any of the covenants therein contained, then the whole of the
principal of said notes shall thereupon, at the option of the legal
holder thereof, become immediately due; that default has been
made in the payment of the principal sum of said note, together
with a large amount of interest thereon; that there is now due the
whole of the principal of said notes, being the sum of six thousand
dollars ($6000), with interest thereon from March 3, 1890." The
bill al o alleged the tru t deed contained an agreement to pay
olicitor's fees of the complainants' solicitor in ca e of a foreclosure,
and that the other parties defendant claim ome intere t in the
mortgaged premi e , and concluded with a prayer that a decree be
ntered foreclo ing the tru t deed and for sale of the property and
for a ecree in per onam for any deficiency, and for uch other and
further reli f a the natur of the ca might require.
The appellant :fil d an an wer to th bill, all ing payment of
each of th aid ix int r t note or oupon mentioned in th bill,
and that by agr m nt b tw n the p rti the tim of th payment
of th principal in 1 btedne s was ext nded for th term of one year,
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to-wit, to the 3d day of March, 1894, in consideration of the pay-

ment by appellant of the sum of $G0 as a bonus for said extension,

and the execution by the appellant of two interest notes for the

payment of the interest semi-annually upon the said principal sum

for the period of time to which payment of the said principal note

was so extended; that appellant paid both of said last mentioned

two interest notes or coupons, and that on or about the said 3d

day of March, 1894, — the date to which the said principal note

was extended by the said agreement, — the parties again agreed that,

in consideration of the sum of $120 paid by the said appellant, the

time of the maturity of the said principal debt should be and was

extended for the further term of three years, until, to-wit, March

3, 1897; that the appellant executed and delivered to the com-

plainants his certain six notes or interest coupons for the semi-

annual interest to accrue upon the said principal sum for and dur-

ing the time to which, by the said agreement, the maturity of the

principal sum was extended; that said appellant paid the interest

for the said period of six months evidenced by the first of said

interest or coupon notes, and said first note was delivered to him;
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that the second of said last mentioned interest notes fell due under

said agreement on the said 3d day of March, 1895, and that by a

further agreement between the parties, based upon a sufficient con-

sideration, it was agreed that for the convenience and accoimnoda-

tion of the complainants the appellant would endeavor to negotiate

a loan from other parties of a sufficient amount to discharge the

principal sum (which, aside from the said last mentioned agree-

ment, would not mature until March 3, 1897), and the interest

coupon which fell due March 3, 1895, and that while he was in

good faith endeavoring to negotiate said loan, complainants, in

violation of the agreement, filed the bill for foreclosure. The

answer contained other averments, which, in the view we take of

the case, need not be adverted to.

To this answer the complainants filed a general replication,

averring that the allegations of their bill of complaint were true,

and that they would aver, maintain and prove the same to be true,

and that the answer of the appellant was uncertain, untrue and

insufficient.

The issue thus raised l)y the bill, answer and replication was

referred to the master to take proof, and report his conclusions

of both law and fact. The proofs were taken and the report of

v.
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to-wit, to the 3d day of Mar h, 1
, in con ideration of th paym nt by app llant of th ·um of $ ·o a a bonu · for aid xtcn ion,
and th x ution by th app llant of two int r t ote for the
payment of th int r ·t ' 11U-annuaJly ur on th aid principal um
for the period of time to whi h payment of the aid prin ·ipal not
wa o xt n<l.ed; that app llant paid both of aid la t m nti nec.l
two int r L note or oupo , and that on or about th aid d
day o.f arch, 1 94,-the dat to whi h the aid principal note
wa xt nd d by the aid agr em nt,-th parti again agre d that,
in on ideration of the um of $120 paid by the aid app llant the
time of th maturity of the aid principal debt hould be and wa
xtcnded for th further term of three y ar ' until to-wit, niarch
3 1 97; that the appellant executed and deliver d to, th complaina·n t hi certain i:x note or intere t coupon for the emiannual intere t to accrue upon the aid principal um for and during the tim to which by the aid agreement the maturity of the
principal um wa extend d; that aid appellant paid the intere t
for th aid period of ix month videnced by the :fir t of aid
int r t or coupon note and aid :fir t note wa delivered to him;
that the cond of aid la t mentioned interest note f 11 due under
ail agreement on the aid 3d day of March, 1 95 and that by a
further agre m nt between the parties ba ed upon a uffici nt conideration, it wa agr ed that for th convenience and accommodation of th complainant the aiJpellant would endeavor to neaotiate
a loan from other partie of a ufficient amount to di charg the
principal um (which, a id from the aid la t mentioned agreement would not mature until Mar h 3 1 97), and the inter t
coupon whi h fell due March 3 1 95, and that while he wa in
good faith nd avoring to n o-otiat aid loan complainants in
violation of the a!ITe ment :fil d th bill for for lo ur . The
an w r contain d other a rm nt which in the i w w tak of
th ca e ne d not b ad rt d to.
T'o thi answer th complainant :filed a g neral replication
a erring that the all o-ation of th ir bill of omplaint wer true
and that they would av r maintain and prov th am to be true
and that the an w r o.f the a1 p llant wa unc rtain untrue and
in uffi i nt.
Th i u thu rai
by th bill an w r and r plication wa ·
r f rr d t the ma ter to tak proof an r p rt hi on lu ion:;
of both la and fact. The proof wer _ tak n and th r p r of
1

1
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the master filed. The substance of the report of the master wa^*,

that the allegations of the appellant that the time of the maturity

of the principal note had been extended to March 3, 1897, were

sustained by the proofs, and that the appellant had paid the interest

coupons mentioned in the bill, and also each of the interest notes

or coupons afterwards executed by and in pursuance of the agree-

ments extending the time of the payments of the principal sum,

except the interest note or coupon due on the 3d day of March,

1895. As to the allegations of the answer as to an extension of the

time of the payment of the interest note which fell due March 3,

1895, the report of the master is as follows: "I find from this

evidence that no agreement for an. extension on the said March

3, 1895, coupon was made; that the language testified to by Dorn

is too indefinite to constitute an agreement for an extension; that

Dorn fails to show that at any time he had any substantial negotia-

tions pending for the procurement of the principal, and as no

definite time is stated by Dorn to which said note was extended,

it was an assumption on his part, which was not justified by the

language, that the time of payment of the interest was extended.
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I therefore conclude that complainants had a right to declare the

principal due for non-payment of the interest due March 3, 1895."

The master found and reported that said interest coupon falling due

March 3, 1895, was paid by the appellant to the appellee executor

on the 25th day of May, 1895, which was a little over a month after

the filing of the bill herein.

Appellant filed exceptions to the findings of the master as to the

facts relative to the alleged agreement for the extension of the

payment of the interest coupon which fell due March 3, 1895, and

to the legal conclusions of the master as to the right of the

appellees, under the allegations of the bill, to foreclose the trust

deed. The exceptions were overruled and a decree of foreclosure and

sale entered, and the decree was affirmed by the Appellate Court

on appeal. This is a further appeal of the said mortgagor, Dorn,

to reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.

Mr. Justice Boggs delivered the opinion of the court:

The case made by the allegations of the bill is, that the appellant

had made default in the payment of the principal note according

t",o its tenor and effect, and also in the payment of the six coupon

notes given at the time the principal note was executed to evidence

ST.A.Tl.!: G
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the master filed. The substance of the report of the master watl,
that the allegations of the appellant that the time of the m&turity
of the principal note had been extended to March 3, 1897, were
sustained by the proofs, and that the appellant had pa·id the interest
coupon mentioned in the bill, and also each of th interest notes
or coupons afterwards executed by and in pursuance of the agreements extending the time of the payments of the principaJ. sum,
except the interest note or coupon due on the 3d day of March,
1895. As to the allegations of the answer as fo an extension of the
time of the payment of the int rest note which fell due March 3,
1895, the report of the master is as follows: "I find from this
evidence that no agreement for an extension on the sa·id March
3, 1895, coupon was made; that the language testified to by Dorn
is too indefinite to constitute an agreement for an extension; that
Dorn fails to show that at any time he had any substantial negotiations pending for the procurement of the principal, and as no
definite time is stated by Dorn to which said note was extended,
it was an assumption on his part, which was not justified by the
languaige, that the time of payment of the interest was extended.
I therefore conclude that complainants had a right to declare the
principal due for non-payment of the interest due March 3, 1895."
The master found and reported that said interest coupon falling due
Ma·r ch 3, 1895, was paid by the appellant to the appellee executor
on the 25th day of May, 1895, which was a little over a month after
the filing of the bill herein.
Appellant filed exceptions to the findings of the master as to the
facts relative to the alleged agreement for the extension of the
payment of the interest coupon which fell due March 3, 1895, and
to the legal conclu ions of the master as to th right of the
appellees, under the allegations of the bill, to foreclo e the trust
deed. The exceptions were overruled and a decree of foreclosure and
ale entered, and the decree was affirmed by the Appellate Court
on appeal. Thi is a further appeal of the said mortgagor, Dorn,
to reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.
Mr. JUSTICE BOGGS delivered the opinion of the court:
The ca made by the all gation of th bill i that th appellant
had made d fault in th payment of th prjn ipal not ac ording
ro it t nor and ff ct, and al o in th paym nt of th ix oupon
note · given at the time the principal not wa x cut d to evidence
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the liability of the appellant to pay interest semi-annually on the

principal note from the date thereof to the 3(1 day of March, 1893,

the date of its maturity.

It appeared from the report of the master, which, in this respect,

it is conceded is fully supported by uncontroverted testimony, that

appellant had paid each of said intercut notes mentioned in the bill,

and was not, in respect of any of them, in default. It also appeared

from the master's report and from like uncontroverted testimony,

that the payment of the principal note had been extended, by an

agreement based upon a good and sufficient consideration, for the

term of one year, to-wit, to the 3d day of March, 1894, and again

extended by a like binding agreement for the further period of

three years, to-wit, to the 3d day of March, 1897, and way not due

when the bill was filed, to-wit, on the 20th day of April, 1895. The

case made by the bill was fully met and overcome by the proofs.

The master found that the maturity of the mortgage debt had been

extended to March 3, 1897, but that it was proven appellant had not

paid the interest coupon which, under the terms of the contract

of extension, fell due on the 3d day of March, 1895, promptly at

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 16:36 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t3223129q
Public Domain in the United States / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-us

maturity, and that the appellees had the right to declare the mort-

gage debt due and payable because of such default, and on this

finding decree was entered against the appellant. The case, then,

upon which the appellees succeeded, was, that the principal of the

indebtedness to them did not fall due until March 3, 1897, but that

by reason of the failure of appellant to pay the semi-annual in-

stallment of interest promptly on the 3d day of March, 1895, the

right accrued to them, under the terms of the agreement extending

the maturity of the note to March 3, 1897, to declare the principal

sum due and payable, and to proceed at once to foreclose the mort-

gage. But the appellees made no such case by the pleading. They

were not entitled to a decree of foreclosure upon the case alleged

in their bill, for it was disproved. It is not sufficient, if true, that

the evidence disclosed a state of case upon which a bill could have

been framed which would have entitled them to a decree, for the

reason such evidence is not applicable to the allegations of the bill.

If the allegations of a bill are overcome by the proof, the com-

plainant cannot have a decree because it may appear that issues

might have been made by other pleading upon which he would have

been entitled to relief. Appellees might, upon the coming in of the

master's report, or at any time before the rendition of the decree.

.

EUDER

9

t.he liability of th app llant to I ay int r t semi-annually on the
principal not fr m ih dat ther of to the cl day of March, 1 93,
the date of i · matarity.
It app ar d from th report of the ma t r, which, in thi respe -t,
it i con ded i full upported by uncon rov rtecl t timony, that
app llant had paid a h of aicl int re t note mentioned in th bill,
and wa not, in r ·p ct of any of h m, in d fault. It al o app ar d
t r r p rt an fr m like uncontrov rted testimony,
.from th
that th p ym t of the principal not had b en xt nded, b an
agreem nt ba d upon a good and ufficient con ideration, for the
term of on y ar, to-wit, to the 3d day of farch, 1 4, and again
ext na d by a like binding agr ment for the further p riod of
three y ar , to-wit, to the 3d fay of March, 1 9 , and wa not due
when th bill wa :fil d, to-wit, on th 20th day of pril, 1895. The
ca. mad by the bill wa fully met and overcom by th pr f .
The ma t r found that the maturity of the mortgag d bt ha lb en
extend d to Mar h 3, 1 97, but that it wa proven appellant had not
paiJ th inter t coupon which, under the t erm of the contract
of exten ion, fell du on the 3d day of March, 1 95, promptly at
maturity, and that the appellee had the right to declare the mortgage debt due and payable becau e of uch default, and on thi
:finding d cree wa entered again t the appellant. The ca e, then,
upon whi h the appellee ucceeded, wa , that the principal of the
indebtedne to them did not fall due until March 3, 1 97, but that
by rea on of th failure of app llant to pay the emi-annual intallment of int re t promptly on th 3d day of March, 189 , the
right a ru d to th m, under th t rm of th agr ement extending
th maturity of th note to March 1897, to declare the principal
um du and payabl and to proc ed at once to for lo e the mortut th app lle made no u h ca b th pleading. They
gage.
wer not ntitl d to a decree of for lo ure upon the ca e all g d
in their bill, for it wa di pro ed. t i not u:ffi ient if true that
the e id e di clo ed a tat of a upon which a bill could have
been framed wbi h would ha e entitled them to a d cree for the
rea on u h idenc i not applicable to th all ation of the bill.
r om by th proof, th co f th all cration of a bill ar
plainant ann t ha
a d r e b au it ma app ar that i u
might ]rnv b n ma 1 b · th r pl a Jing up n whi h he would lHwe
b n ntitl d to r li f.
pp 11 " mi ht upon fo coming in f th
ma t r r p rt or at any time before th r n ition of th
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have applied for and obtained leave, u^wn such terms as the court

should deem just, to make such amendments to their bill as might

be found necessary to state a case entitling them to a decree under

the evidence produced upon the hearing. But no such course was

taken, and the question presented by the record is, whether the

appellees were entitled to a decree under the allegations of their bill.

It is a fundamental rule of equity pleading, that the allegations

of a bill, the proof and the decree must correspond, and that the

decree cannot give relief that facts disclosed by the evidence would

warrant where there are no averments in the bill to which the

evidence can apply, and that if the evidence disproves the case made

by the bill the complainant cannot be given a decree upon other

grounds disclosed by the proofs, unless the court permits the com-

plainant to amend his bill so as to present the case disclosed by the

evidence. McKay v. Bissett, 5 Gilm. 499 j Morgan v. Smith, 11

111. 194; White v. Morrison, id. 361; Roivan v. Bowles, 21 id. 17;

Chaffin v. Heirs of Kimhall, 23 id. 36; Bremer v. Canal Co., 123

id. 104; Russell v. Conners, 140 id. 660; Ohling v. Luitjens, 32

id. 23 ; Burger v. Potter, id. 66.
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We make no ruling on the contention of appellant that under

the agreement between the parties with reference to the interest

note which fell due March 3, 1895, it was necessary to the right of

appellees to institute the suit, they should have first given appellant

notice and an opportunity to pay the coupon. If the bill is

amended, and the right to declare the mortgage debt due because

of the alleged default in the payment of that interest coupon be

made the basis of the right to institute the suit to foreclose the

mortgage, the appellant may answer the amended bill and raise an

issue on the point upon which both parties can be fully heard and

the right of the matter properly determined.

Tlie decree of the circuit court and the judgment of the Appellate

Court are reversed and the cause will be remanded to the circuit

court, where appellees may proceed further, as they may be advised.

Reversed and remanded.

ST.A.TI TG
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ha e applied for and obtained leave, upon such terms as the court
hould deem ju t, to make uch amendments to their bill a might
be found nece ary to tate a ca e entitling them to a decree under
the e idence produced upon the h arin0 . But no uch course was
taken, and the qu tion pre ~ ent c1 by the record i , whether the
appellee were entitled to a decree under the allegations of their bill.
It i a fundam ntal rule of equity pleading, that the allegation::;
of a bill, the proof and the decree mu t corre pond, and that the
decree cannot give relief that facts di clo ed by the evidence would
warrant where there are no averments in the bill to which the
evidence can apply, and that if the evidence di prove the ca e made
by the bill the complainant cannot be given a decree upon other
ground di clo ed by the proofs, unle the court permit the complainant to amend hi bill o a to present the ca e di closed by the
evidence. McKay v. Bissett, 5 ilm. 499; Morgan v. mith, 11
Ill. 194; White v. Morrison, id. 361; Rowan v. Bowles, 21id.17;
Chaffin v. Heirs of Kimball, 23 id. 36; Bremer v. Canal Go., 193
id. 104; Russell v. Conners, 1±0 id. 660; Ohling v. Luitjens, 32
id. 23; Burger v. Potter, id. 66.
We make no ruling on the contention of appellant that under
the agreement between the partie with reference to the interest
note which fell due March 3, 1895, it wa nece sary to the right of
appellees to in titute the uH, they hould have fir t given appellant
notice and an opportunity to pay the coupon. If the bill i.,
amended, and the right to declare the mortgage debt due becau e
of the alleged default in the pa·y ment of that inter t coupon be
made the basi of the right to in titute the uit to for clo e the
mortgage, the appellant may answer the amended bill and rai e an
is ue on the point upon which both partie can be fully heard and
the right of the matt r properly determin d.
Th de r of the ircuit court and the judgment of the Appellate
Court are rev r d and th cau e will be remanded to th circuit
court, where appellee may proce d furth r, a they may be advised.
Reversed and remanded.
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Pehuy v. Carr

w

Perry v. Carr, U N. II. 371. (1860.) ^Aa^ ^11)^

The facts in this case suiliciently appear Uom [iM o])'imon W ^

P rry

the court. , ^^JJ ^ j^ ^f \ y fi

arrJ

41

. II. 3 1.

(1 800. )

c

Bellows, J.: \j - r j^ /n>

This is a bill in equity to redeem a tract of \md in Hopkinton,,.

from a sale on execution of the equity of redemption, to the de- \y

fendant, in May, 1859, and to compel the release to the plaintiff ^^ O^

Tu · I

t

l

thi

ulli ·i ntly ap

the ourt.

of the interest acquired by such sale. The bill alleges that th^ji ^ »

plaintiff, having acquired by deed the title of Bowers, the execu- J^j

tion debtor, tendered to the defendant, November 29, 1859, the ^ v

amount of the purchase money and interest and reasonable charges, A/

Thi

l ' .

..
bill in qui y to r d

and demanded a release of his interest; to which the defendanv^ - l)

demurs for want of equity, and in his argument assigns for cause y^A

that the bill docs not allege that the plaintiff has always lieen ready

and is still ready to pay the money tendered; and makes no offei

Upon examination, it appears that the bill contains no sucli^ ^/^

allegations, and we are therefore of the opinion that the demurrerji/ y\ .

is well taken. In general, the plaintiff must state in his bill a case V) 0^ ^ V

upon which, if admitted by the answer, or proved at the hearing,'^ 1 ^
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this court can make a decree. 1 Dan. Ch. Pr. 412. The right, title, LvV o

or claim of the plaintiff should be stated with accuracy and clear- i)\^ i

ness, so that the defendant shall be informed what he is to meet. -^

Story, Eq. PI., sees. 240, 255, 257. Where the plaintiff, in a bill

to redeem, claimed under a levy of execution, but failed to state a ,

return of the execution and record, on demurrer the bill was held ~)^

to be defective. Ilohart v. Frishe, 5 Conn. 592; and see Crocker v. , A'

Iliggins, 7 Conn. 342. On a bill to enforce a reconveyance of land, '^ \]

it was held that the plaintiff should aver a readiness to pay the

money. Buffum v. Buffiim, 11 X. H. 459. In Frost v. Flanders,

37 N. H. 547, Perley, C. J., holds that a bill to enforce a contract

po
xamination it app ar that th bill ontain no ucb'.
all ·ation , and we ar ther fore of the opinion that the demurr r

for the conveyance of land, when the plaintiff relies upon a tender

of the price, should contain an offer to pay; and so in a bill or

other proceeding to obtain a release, after tender of the appraised

value of land set off on execution. In that case it is held that when

an execution is extended upon land, and the debtor, in a writ of

cntn", relic? on a tender to dischars[e the land from the extent, he

a. ontra ·t

apprni- 1
on _ uti n. n that a
tha wh n
n i xt nd 1 upon land and th d btor, i a writ f
on a l ncl r to li . harcr th 1nnd f1 m th r .· t nt , 1
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must bring the amount tendered into court. For auglit we can see,

the case of a sale of the equity of redemption stands upon the same

footing, the provisions for the redemption and release being sub-

stantially the same. The offer to pay the money tendered should

therefore have been made in the bill, and the money brought into

court, without which the plaintifE would not be entitled to a decree.

The bill, therefore.

Must be dismissed.

^

^(4^*C^

CHARGING

p ART

mu t bring the amount tendered into court. For aught we can see,
the ca e of a ale of the equity of redemption stand upon the same
footing, the provisions for the redemption and relea e being substantially the ame. The offer to pay the money tender d should
therefore have been made in the bill, and the money brought into
court, without which the plaintiff would not be entitled to a d cree.
The bill, therefore,
Must be dismissed.

/:

JJ" ^J^JT Charging PART.

nF. 0^ ^^ K^/^nith V. Clarh, ^ Paige (N. Y.) 368. (1831^.)

f P * This case came before the chancellor on appeal. The facts Ol

CHARGING

^^ f. the case, so far as they are necessary to the understanding of the

p ART.

decision, are stated in the former report of the case referred to in

the opinion of the chancellor.

Smith v. ClarkJ 4 Paige (N. Y.) 368.

{1834.)

The Chancellor :

This is an appeal from the final decree of the vice chancellor of
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the eighth circuit, in the same cause which was formerly before me,

on appeal from the equity court of that circuit, to reverse an order

in relation to the injunction. (1 Paige's Rep. 391.) The case is

substantially the same as it then appeared on the bill and answer.

y^rid upon a careful examination of the case, and the voluminous

THIS case came before the chancellor on app al. The facts o-f
the cas , o far as they are necessary to the understanding of the
decision, are stated in the former report of the case referred to in
the opinion of the chaincellor.

» ' ' Tjriefs of the counsel for the respective parties, I see no reason to

' "^ change the opinion I then entertained. The error into which the

^ plaintiff's counsel appears to have fallen, is in supposing that an

answer responsive to the charging part of the bill is not evidence,

' in favor of the defendants. The charging part of a bill is as

* necessary to be answered as the stating part. So far as the charges

are material to anticipate and defeat a defence which may be set

up by the defendant, they may be considered in the nature of a

©^ special replication. But the complainant has the same right to

\^ the defendant's answer to the charging part of the bill, to prove

-^ the truth of his special replication, as he has to an answer to the

A P' stating part, to prove the truth of that. If he does not waive an

answer on oath from the defendant, he makes him a witness in

favor of the complainant, against himself, and interrogates him

as to every statement and charge in the bill. His answer, therefore.

THE CHANCELLOR:

T'his is an appeal from the final decree of the vice chancellor of
the eighth circuit, in the same cause which was formerly before me,
on appeal from the equity court of that circuit, to reverse an order
in relation to the injunction. (1 Paige's Rep. 391.) The case is
sub tantially the same as it then appeared on the bill and answer.
And upon a careful examination of the case, and the voluminous
brief of the counsel for the respective parties, I see no rea on to
change the opinion I then entertained. The error into which the
plaintiff's coun el appears to have fallen, is in suppo ing thait an
an wer respon i ve to the charging part of the bill is not evidence,
in favor of the def ndants. The charging part of a bill is as
nece ary to be answered as the stating part. So far as the charges
are material to anticipate and defeat a defence which may be set
up by the def ndant, they may b con idered in the nature of a
f\P cial r plication. But the omplainant ha th amc right to
th d f ndant' an w r to the char ing part of th bill to prove
th truth of hi p ial r plication, a he ha to an an w r to the
, tating part t pr v th trutl of that. :f h do not waiv an
an w r on oath fr m the d f ndant h mak him a witne in
favor of th omplainant, again t him lf an int rrogat s him
as to ev rv tat ment and charge in th bill. Hi an w r th r fore,

l'IIITII V.

Smith v. Claek 93

which is responsive to an)' such statement, or charge, in whatever

part of the hill it is contained, is evidence in his own favor as

well as in favor of tlie complainant. I know it has been supposed

by many that the charging part of a bill is mere form; and that

they might therefore put any thing they pleased in that part, by way

of charge, even in a sworn bill. It is frequently, however, as ma-

terial a part of the bill as the stating part ; and the decision of the

cause frequently turns upon the issue formed by the denial of some

averment in the charging part of the bill. It is therefore perjury

for a complainant to make a false charge, or averment, in the

charging part of a sworn bill, in the same manner as it would be for

him to make a false statement in the stating part.

The answer, as to the assignment and the consideration thereof,

being evidence in favor of the defendants, the prior equity of

Clark, to the extent of his debt, is undoubted; and as the com-

plainant claims a mere equitable right of set-off, which accrued after

the defendant Clark had an equitable right to the assignment, it is

perfectly immaterial whether the complainant ever had notice of

the assignment, or of Clark's equity or not. If he had paid the
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bond and mortgage, to the original holder, or had discharged any

security which he held against him, under an actual agreement for

a set-otf, and without notice, it would have been a very different

case from that which is now presented. I have no doubt as to the

correctness of the vice chancellor's decision upon the equity of this

case. He was also right as to the costs. If the complainant wished

to exempt himself from costs, and to put the defendants in the

wrong, he should have offered to pay the amount justly due to

Clark, and have requested him to re-assign the mortgage to Am-

brose Smith, so that a set-off between him and the complainant

could be made. It is a general rule that a mortgagor who comes

into this court and is permitted to redeem, must pay the costs of

the adverse party.

The decree of the vice chancellor must be affirmed, with costs;

and the proceedings arc to be remitted.

LARK

93

which i r pon i t any ·nc:h tat m nt or charg , in whatever
part 0£ the bill it i · contained, i , vid nc in hi own favor a.
well a in :fa or f th· · mplainant.
know it ha. b en uppo ed
by many that th ·barging part f a Lill i m r form ; ancl that
th y might th r f r put any thing they I l · din that part, by way
of cbarg , v n in a w rn bill. It i , frcqu ntl} howe er, as matcrjal a part f th bill a th . ta ting part; and the deci ion of the
a i fr' u ntly turn ipon th i ue form d by the denial of ome
av rm ni in th harging part of the bill. It i th refore perjury
for a omplainant t make a fal
harg , or a erment, in th
chargin part of a worn bill, in th am mann r a it would be for
him to mak a fal e tatcm nt in th tating part.
Th
a to th a i nm nt and the con ideration thereof
in fa or of th d f ndant , the prior equity of
t nt of hi d bt, i undoubted ; and as the complainant laim am re quitable right of et-off, which accrued after
th def ndant Clark had an quitabl right to th as ignm nt, it i
perf ctl r immat rial whether the complainant v r had notice of
th a ignm nt, or of Clark' equity or not. If he had paid the
bond and mortgag , to the original holder, or had di charged any
ecurity which he h Id again t him, under an actual agreement for
a t-o:ff, and without notic , it would have been a very different
ca from that which i now pre ented. I hav no doubt a to the
corr ctn
of the ic hancellor' deci ·ion upon the equity of thi
ca e. H wa al o right a to the co ts. If the complainant wi hed
to xempt him If from co t , and to put the defendant in the
wrong, he hould have offered to pa·y the amount ju tly due to
lark, and have reque t d him to re-a ign th mortgage to mbro
mith o that a et-off betw n him and the complainant
could b made. It i a general rule that a mort acror who ome,
into thi ourt and i p rmitted to redeem mu pa} the co t of
party.
hancellor mu t b affirmed, with o t ;
re f th v1
and th proc ding r to be remi t d.

94

CLAUSE OF JURISDICTION

94 Clause of Jukisdiction

/

/

CL USE OF JURISDICTION.

Clause of Jurisdiction.

I

Goodwin v. Smith, 89 Me. 506. (1S97.)

Walton, J. :

Goodwin v.

This is a suit in equity. The plaintiff says that, being a shipper

mith, 89 Me. 506.

{1897.)

A of granite, he bargained with the defendant for a parcel of land,

\\" LTON, J.:

consisting of about five-eighths of an acre, over which he was

ij- desirous of constructing a road for the transportation of his granite

to the Saco Eiver; that for said parcel of laud he agreed to pay

p4ier and she agreed to accept three hundred dollars; that in pur-

X y^ suance of said agreement, and in part performance of the same,

V\, he paid the defendant one hundred dollars, and entered upon and

{x J. took possession of the land and expended a large sum of money

y ^y^ (about one hundred and seventy-five dollars) in building a culvert

(} and making a passable road over the same, and has at all times

been ready to pay the balance due for the land, and has several

times offered so to do, if the defendant would give him a deed of

it ; but that the defendant, although she accepted and still retains
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the one hundred dollars advanced to her, has hitherto refused, and

still refuses to give the plaintiff a deed of the land, falsely giving

as an excuse for such refusal, that the contract was for a lease and

not for a sale of the land ; and the prayer of the plaintiff's bill is

that the defendant may be compelled to specifically perform her

said agreement, and give the plaintiff a good and sufficient deed of

said land.

It is insisted in defense that the plaintiff's bill is fatally defect-

ive because it does not contain an allegation that the plaintiff has

not a "plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law." If such an

allegation was ever necessary, it is not so now. It is known as

the jurisdiction clause, and to avoid unnecessary prolixity, has

been abolished by a rule of this court. (Rule IV.) It has also

been abolished by the United States Supreme Court. (Piulc XXI.)

And Judge Story says it was never necessary; that if the other

facts stated in the bill do not show jurisdiction, this clause will

not give it; and if the other facts stated in the bill do show

jurisdiction, and are sustained by the proof, the bill will be sus-

tained though this clause is omitted. Story's Equity Pleadings,

Thi i a uit in equity. The plaintiff ay that, being a hipper
of granite, he bargained with th defendant for a parcel of land,
con i ting of about :five-eighth of an acre, over which he was
V de irou of con tructing a road for the tran portation of his granite
t1
to the Saco River; that for aid parcel of land he agreed to pay
,plier and h agre d to accept thr e hundr d dollar ; that in pur../ /
suance of aid agreement, and in part performan e of th same,
. ./\ , ,, he paid the defendant one hundred dollar , and enter d upon and
y/ ~
1 • • ; . took po., e ion of the land and expended a large sum of money
Y . p (about one hundred and eventy-:five dollars) in building a culv rt
J
and making a pa able road over the same, and ha at all time '
been ready to pay the balance due for the land and ha several
time offered o to do, if the def ndant would give him a deed of
it; but that th defendant, although he ace pted and ·till retain'
the one hundred dollar advanced to her, ha hitherto refu ed, and
till refu e to give the plaintiff a de d of the land, fal ely giving
a an excu e for uch r fusal, that the contract wa for a lease and
not for a ale of the land; and the prayer of the plaintiff bill i
that the d fendant may be compelled to peci:fically perform her
aid agreement, and give the plaintiff a good and ufficient deed of
aid land.
It i insi t d in defense that the plaintiff bill is fatally defecti e becau it doe not ontain an all gation that the laintiff ha
not a "plain ad quat and ompl te rem dy at law." If uch an
all gation wa v r n ce ary, it i not o now. It i known as
th juri di tion lau
and to avoid unn e ary prolixity ha.
It ha al o
b n aboli h d by a rule of thi court. (Rul V.)
upr m ourt. ( ul
een aboli hed by the nit d tat
nd ud
tory a it wa n er nece arr; that if the other
fa t tate in th bill do not how juri di tion thi clau e will
not giv i · and if the oth r fa t tat d in the bill do how
juri. di tion and ar u tain by th I ro f th bill will be u tain c1 thouah thi lau e i omitt d.
tory 1 quit
1 adino- ,
w (

.LT.LT

.)

1
Miles v. Miles 95

§ 3-4; and note 2, citing the rule of tlie United States Supreme

Court.

It is further insisted in defense that the contract was oral, and

that tlie evidence is insullicient to take it out of the operation of

the statute of frauds. Wc think the evidence is sufficient. It is

true that to take an oral contract for the sale of land out of the

operation of the statute of frauds, the proof of a part performance

of the contract, and the proof of the contract itself, must be clear

and convincing. Or, as the rule is stated in Bennett v. Dyer,

ante, 17, "the party making the attempt to take the case out of

the statute of frauds must establish the existence of the oral con-

tract by clear and satisfactory evidence." But we think the evi-

dence in this case is clear and satisfactory. Viewed in the light

of the undisputed acts of the parties, we think the oral proof shows

beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did make such a

contract as is set out in the plaintiff's bill, and that she accepted

a hundred dollars in part performance of the contract, and per-

mitted the plaintiff to take possession of the land and expend a

large sum of money in constructing a road over it. And we think
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she must now be required to complete the performance of her con-

tract, and give the plaintiff a good and sufficient deed of the land,

as prayed for in his bill.

Decree accordingly, with costs.

Interrogatixg Part.

Miles V. Miles, 21 N. H. UO. (1S53.)

In Equity. The bill alleges that on the •?6th day of March,

18-il, Eeuben Miles of Madbury, father of the orator, Abraham

Miles, made and published his last will and testament ; and on the

7th of August, 1841, made and published a codicil to his will. That

Eeuben died in Madbury, on the 23d day of June, 1845, and on the

1st day of July, 1845, the will and codicil were duly proved and

allowed. That Reuben, by his will, among other things, devised to

95

ILES V. nfILES

§ 34 ; and note , citing he rule of the nitcd
ates upreme
Court.
It i furth r in i t
ontract wa oral, and
that th
id n e i in uff i L to tak it out of th operation of
the statute of :fraud . v c think th
idence i ufficient. It is
true that to take an oral oniract for th al of land ou of the
operation of th tatut of fraud , the proof of a part performance
of .t h ontra t, an l th proof of the ontract it elf, mu t be lear
and con incing.
r, a th rule is tated in Bennett v. Dyer,
ante, 1 , th party making the attempt to take the ·a out of
th tatut of fraud mu t c tabli h th exi tence of the oral conBut we think the evitract by lear and ati factory viden e.
denc i thi ca e i cl ar and ati factory. Viewed in the light
of the undi puted act of the parti , w think the oral proof how
beyond a r a onable doubt that the defendant did mak uch a
contract a i
t out in th plaintiff bill, and that he accepted
a hundr d dollar in part performance of the contract, and permitted the plaintiff to take po e ion of the land and exp nd alarge um of money in constructing a road over it. And we think
she mu t now be requi1~ed to complete the performance of h r contract, and give the plaintiff a good and ufficient deed of the land,
as pray d for in his bill.
Decree accordingly, with costs.

his daughter, Betsey Meserve, wife of Joseph Meserve, now of

Wilson's Village, in the county of Niagara and State of New York,

one-half in common and undivided of his homestead fann in ]\[ad-

bury, including all the land which Reuben then occupied, with

INTERROGATI NG

p .A.RT.

Miles v. Miles,, 7 N . H. 440.

{1853.)

The bill all ge that on th 9 6th da of larch,
1841 Reuben Mile of Madbury, father of the orator Abraham
Mile. . , mad and publi h d hi la twill and te tament; and on the
th of uITTl t 1 -±1 mad and publi h d a codicil to hi will. That
Reub n di d in Iadbur r on th 3d ia. of June 1 -±5 and on the
1 t day of Jul 1 -±5 the will and odicil were dul pro ed and
de i ed to
allowed. That R ub n b hi will amo g other thin
bi dau ht r Bet e 1 rv wife of Jo eph f er
now of
\ il on Villag in the count of Niacrara and ta t f _._ w ork
one-half in mmon and undivid d of hi home . . t ad fan11 in :.Hadbur including all th land wbi h R ub n th n oc upi
with
I N EQUITY.

INTERROGATING PART

V6 Interrogating Part

one-half of all the buildings thereon, and one-half in common and

undivided of his wood lot, in Barrington, called the Waldron Hill

lot, to have and to hold the same to her and her assigns, for and

during the term of her natural life, and from and immediately after

her decease, to such child or children of said Betsey, if any she

should ever have, as might be living at the time of her decease, to

have and to hold the same to such child or children, and its or

their heirs and assigns forever; but in case Betsey should die with-

out leaving any child of hers alive at the time of her decease, then

and in that case, from and immediately after the decease of Betsey,

to Abraham Miles, the orator, and Tichenor Miles of Madbury, one

of the defendants, sons of the testator, in equal shares, to have and

to hold the same to Abraham and Tichenor, their respective heirs

and assigns forever.

That Reuben, also, among other things, devised to his daughter,

Nancy Miles, another of the defendants, the other half in common

and undivided of said farm, including all the land which Eeuben

then occupied, with one-half of the buildings thereon, and one-half

in common and undivided of the Waldron Hill lot, to have and
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to hold the same to her and her assigns, during her natural life,

and from and immediately after her decease, to such child or

children as she might at that time have living, and to its or their

heirs and assigns forever; but in case Nancy should die without

leaving any child alive at the time of her decease, then and in that

case, from and immediately after her decease, to Abraham Miles

and Tichenor Miles, in equal shares, to have and to hold the same

to them and their respective heirs and assigns forever.

That it was ordered by the will that the devises to Betsey and

Nancy, and their heirs, should be subject to and charged with am''

devise that the testator might thereinafter make to his wife, Lydia

Miles, another of the defendants, and to any incumbrance that he

might order in her favor.

That Eeuben gave to his wife one-third part of his homestead

and the Waldron Hill lot, in common and undivided, so long as

she should remain his widow.

The bill then charges that Betsey and Joseph Meserve, on the

14th of July, 184G, by their deed of that date, for a valual)le con-

sideration, conveyed to the orator all their right in the premises.

That Nancy and Lydia Miles applied to the judge of probate

for partition of the premises, and the same were duly divided and

one-hall of all the buildings thereon, and one-half in common aind
undivided of his wood lot, in Barrington, called the Waldron Hill
lot, to have and to hold the same to her and her assigns, for and
during the term of her natural life, and from and immediately after
her decease, to such child or children of said Betsey, if any she
should ever have, as might be living at the time of her decease, to
have and to hold the arne to such child or children, and its or
their heirs and a igns forever; but in case Betsey should die without leaving any child of hers alive at the time of her decease, then
and in that case, from and immediately after the decease of Betsey,
to Abraham Miles, the orator, and Tichenor Miles of Madbury, one
of the defendants, sons of the testator, in equal shares, to have and
to hold the ame to Abraham and Tichenor, their respective heirs
and assigns forever.
That Reuben, al o, among other things, devised to his daughter,
Nancy Miles, another of the defendants, the other half in common
and undivided of said farm, including all the land which Reuben
then occupied, with one-half of the buildings thereon, and one-half
in common and undivided of the ·waldron Hill lot, to have and
to hold the same to her and her assigns, during her natural life,
and from and immediately after her decease, to such child or
children as she might at that time have living, and to its or their
heirs and assigns forever; but in case Nancy should die without
leaving any child alive at the time of her decease, then and in that
case, from and immediately after her decease, to Abraham Mile5
and Tichenor Miles, in equal shares, to have and to hold the same
to them and their respective heirs and assigns forever.
That it was ordered by the will that the devises to Betsey and
Nancy, and their heirs, should be subject to and charged with any
devi e that the testator might thereinafter make to his wife, Lydia
Mile , another of the defendants, and to any incumbrance that he
might order in her favor.
·
That Reuben gav to his wif one-third part of hi home teaJ
and the Waldron Hill lot, in common and undivided, so long as
she should remain his widow.
The bill then charg that Betsey and Jo eph M erve on the
14th of July, 1846, by their d d of that date, for a valuable consideration, conveyed to the oraitor all their right in the premise .
That Nancy and Lydia Mil applie to the ju e of probate
for partiti n of the premi s, an th am w r duly divided and

MILES

Miles v. Miles ^'^

set off to the parties by a comniittee, and the decree of the judge

of probate made thereon, the 4th of April, 1848. The particular

parts assigned to the several parties interested are set forth in

the bill.

That on the ITth of April, 1811, the complainant released to

Betsey Meserve and her husband all his interest in the premises;

and that John Kingman of Durham, another of the defendants,

claims to hold that part of the premises set off to Betsey Meserve

and Joseph, by a lease from them.

That Lydia Miles is about eighty years of age, and is still the

widow of Keuben; that Betsey Meserve is fifty-six years of age,

and never had any child; that Nancy Miles is forty-seven years old,

and was never married, and never had any child.

That the complainant has reason to believe, and does believe,

that the defendants intend to commit strip and waste on the prem-

ises so devised and divided, and that there is an understanding,

if not an express agreement among them for that purpose; and

that when the premises were divided, there was standing thereon

a large amount of pine and oak wood and timber, and that there
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is still standing on some parts a large amount of pine and oak wood

and timber.

That John Kingman has, as the orator has been informed and

believes to be true, for about two years last past, cut and drawn

away wood and timber to a large amount from that part of the

premises devised and set off to Betsey Meserve ; and that Kingman,

during that time, has cut and drawn from the premises full twenty

cords of pine wood, and sold the same ; also pine logs, sufficient to

make from five to ten thousand feet of boards, and converted the

same to his own use, but not on said premises, and that the wood

and timber were worth from $100 to $150; and that Kingman

told tlio complainant, in the month of January before the filing of

the l)ill, that he intended to cut wood on the premises that winter

sufficient to last his fire two winters, and that Kingman never lived

on any part of the premises.

The bill also charges Nancy Miles with having committed waste

upon the premises to a considerable amount, and sets forth the

particulars of the same. It also makes the same charges against

Tichenor j\[iles, and states that tho defendants pretend that thev

have a right to cut, as set forth in the bill.

Tlie bill then states that "to the end, therefore, that the de-

7

v.

MILES
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et off to the partic by a committ , and the decree of the judge
of probate mad thereon, th 4th of pril,
. The particular
parts a ign d io the cv ral parti int r e t cl are , et forth in
the bill.
That on th 1 th of pril, 1 .J- , h ·om plainant relea ed to
Bet ey M r and h r hu band all b.i ir i ,r · ·t in the premi e. ;
ancl that ohn Kingma:n of Durham, anoU r of the defendant ,
claim to hold that part of th pr mi
et off to Bet;sey M erve
and Jo ph, by a lea e from them.
That Lydia Miles is about ighty years of age, and i still the
wiclow of Reub n ; that Bet ey Me erve is fifty- ix year of age,
and nev r had any child ; that an y Mil s i forty-seven years old,
and wa n ver married, and nev r had any child.
T hat the complainant has rea on to believe, and doe believe,
that the defendant;s intend to commit trip and waste on the premises o devised and divided, and that there is an under tanding,
if not an express agreement among them for that purpo e; and
that wh n th premises were divided, there was standing thereon
a lare;e amount of pine and oak wood and timber, and that there
is still tanding on some part;s a large amount of pine and oak wood
and timber.
T ha.t John Kingman has, as the orator has been informed and
believ to be true, for about two years last pa t, cut and drawn
away wood and timber to a large amount from that part of the
premi e devi ed and et off to Bet ey Me erve; and hat Kingman,
during that time, ha cut and drawn from th premi e full twenty
·cords of pin wood, and sold th ame; al o pine log , sufficient to
make from fi.ve to ten thousand f et of boards, and conv rted the
same to hi own u e, but not on said premi e , and tha·t the wood
and timber w r worth from $100 to $1 0; and that Kingman
told th complainant in the month of January b fore th :fl.lino- of
th bill that h int nded to cut wood on the premi es that winter
suffi i nt to la t hi fir two wint r and that ingman never li"red
an
with having committ d wa te
pr mi
on i rabl amount, a·n d et forth th
of tl1
t a1
mak th ame harg a ·ain t
Iil
and tat that tl1 1 f ndant pr t end that th ::
hay a ri crht t ut, a
t forth in th bill.
Th bill h n tate that to the en 1 thcr "'for . that th d
'1

98
98 Interrogating Part

fendants may, upon their several and respective corporal oaths, to

the best and utmost of their several and respective knowledge,

remembrance, information and belief, full, true, direct and perfect

answer make to all and singular the matters aforesaid, and that

as fully and particularly as if the same were here repeated, and

they and every of them distinctly interrogated thereto, and that

more especially said confederates may, in manner aforesaid, answer

and set forth" —

Whether Eeuben Miles made his will and codicil, and the devises

therein set forth, and whether the will was proved, as in the bill is

alleged.

When Eeuben Miles died, and whether the real estate was divided,

as set forth in the bill.

Whether deeds were given, as in the bill of complaint is alleged,

and what deeds were given, and where.

What is the age of Lydia Miles, and Nancy Miles and Betsey

Meserve, and whether Betsey and Nancy ever had any child.

Whether Kingman has any right to any part of the premises

so divided ; and what right and to what part and from whom, and
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when and on what terms and conditions.

Whether the defendants, or either of them, and which, have cut

and hauled, or permitted to be cut and hauled, or caused to be cut

and hauled, any wood and timber from the premises, and where

and how much by each, and the value of the same, and what disposi-

tion each has made of the wood and timber so cut and hauled, or

permitted or caused to be cut and hauled.

Whether the defendants, jointly or severally, have not sold the

wood and timber, by them and each of them taken from the prem-

ises, and how much each has sold, and the value of the same, and

where the same was sold, and whether there is not now a large

amount of oak and pine wood and timber on the premises.

The bill then prays an injunction against the defendants and

their agents from committing any further strip and waste on the

premises, and from cutting and hauling wood and timber there-

from, beyond what tenants for life have a right to cut; and that

the defendants be compelled to account for all the illegal cutting

done by them, and to pay to the orator his just proportion of the

value of the same. There is also a prayer for general relief.

To the answers of Betsey Meserve and Joseph Meserve and John

Kingman, replications were filed, and to the answers of tlio other

lNTERROGATI G PART

fendant may, upon their everal and respective corporal oaths, to
the best and utmost of their several and respective knowledge,
remembrance, information and belief, full, true, direct and perfect
an wer make to all and ingular the matters aforesaid, and that
a fully and particularly as if the ame were here repeated, and
they and every of them di tinctly interrogated thereto, and that
more e pecially said confederates may, in manner aforesaid, answer
and et forth"Whether Reuben Miles made his will and codicil, and the devises
therein set forth, and whether the will was proved, as in the bill is
alleged.
When Reuben Miles died, and whether the real estate was divided,
as set forth in the bill.
Whether deed were given, as in the bill of complaint is alleged,
and what deeds were given, and where.
What is the age of Lydia Miles, and Nancy Miles and Betsey
Meserve, and whether Betsey and Nancy ever had any child.
Whether Kingman has any right to any part of the premi es
so divided ; and what right and to what part and from whom, and
when and on what terms and conditions.
Wh ther the defendants, or either of them, and which, have cut
and hauled, or permitted to be cut and hauled, or caused to be cut
and hauled, any wood and timber from the premises, and where
and how much by each, and the value of the same, and what dispo ition each has made of the wood and timber so cut and hauled, or
permitted or caused to be cut and hauled.
Whether the ddendants, jointly or severally, have not sold the
wood and timber, by them and each of them taken from the premi ., and how much each ha sold, and the value of the same, a:nd
wh r the ame was sold, and whether there is not now a large
amount of oak and pine wood and timber on the premi es.
he bill then pray an injunction again t th defendant and
th ir agents from committing any forth r strip and wa te on the
pr mi e , and from cutting and hauling wood and timb r therefrom b yond what tenant for life hav a right to cut; and that
th d f ndant b omp 11 d to account for all the illegal cutting
don by th m, and to pay to the orator hi ju t proportion of the
valu of th am . Ther i al o a prayer for g n ral r li f.
T th an w r of B t y M rv and Jo ph M er an 1 John
ingi a:n replication w r :fil d, an t th an w r of t11 oth r
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defendants, Nancy Miles, Lydia Miles and Tichenor Miles, excep-

tions were filed.

The defendants not submittinfr to the exceptions, the questions

arising upon the same are for the determination of the court.

v.

1ILE

cl l ,uclant ·, an y Mile , Lydia 1il
ti n w r fi.l

an

Tichenor

~files,

xcep-

'l'he d fend nt"' not ul miLting to the . ption , the que tions
ari. ing up n the ame ar for the cl termination of the court.

Eastman, J. :

To the answer of Lydia Miles, the exception is taken that she has

not answered and set forth whether the orator has reason to Ije-

1 . \. ' T~I

)

..

lieve, and does believe, that the several defendants, naming them,

intend to commit strip and waste on the premises devised by Keubeu

Miles, and whether there is not an understanding, if not an express

agreement among them for that purpose.

Upon looking into the bill, we do not find any particular inter-

rogatory specihcally interrogating the defendants upon this point-

But in the general allegations of the bill, the charge is made as

set forth in the exception. There is also in the bill the general

interrogatory or requisition that the defendants may severally and

respectively, full, true, direct and perfect answers make to all and

singular the premises, as fully and particularly as if the same were

repeated, and they and every of them distinctly interrogated thereto.

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 16:36 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t3223129q
Public Domain in the United States / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-us

There is nothing in the answer particularly denying this charge

in the bill — nothing except the general and usual denial of all

unlawful combination and confederacy; and the question is raised

whether a defendant is obliged to answer the statements and charges

in a bill, unless specifically interrogated thereto.

According to the present English practice, the general inter-

rogatory is not sufficient. By the 16th of the orders of August,

1841, it is provided that a defendant shall not be bound to answer

any statement or charge in the bill, unless specially and particu-

larly interrogated thereto. 2 Danl. Ch. PI. & Prac. 820. But such

was not formerly the practice.

Tlie same rule has been adopted by the supreme court of the

United States. Rules in Equity, 40 January term, 1842.

*\Yith us no rule of the kind has been adopted, and we adhere to

the gener al pra ctice ofcourts oif chancery, which have no particular

rules upon the subject, and require a defendant to answer all the

allegations and charges in the bill which may be material to the

plainliff's case; and although, to prevent evasion on the part of the

defendant, it may be well, and is usual, to add interrogatories con-

cerning the matters considered to be most essential, yet. under the

ydia Iil , th ex ption i. taken that she has
not n wer cl an
t forth wh th r th orator ha rea on to believ and oe beli ve that th ev ral d fondant , naming them,
int nd to ommit trip and wa t on the pr mi e devi eel by euben
Mil and wh h r th r i not an uncl r tanding if not an expre ,
agr m nt amonb th m for that purpo e.
I n 1 okino' into the bill, we do not find any particular interrogat r.r p ifi ·all r interrogating the cl fendant upon thi point.
But in th gen ral allegation of the bill, the charge i made a.·
et forth in th
ception. There i al o in the bill the g neral
interr gatory or r qui ition that the defendant may everally and
re p ti v 1 ' full, true, direct and perfect an wer make to all and
singular the pr mi
a full3r and particularly a if the ame w re
repeat d and th and every of them di tinctly int rrogated thereto.
Ther i nothing in the an wer particularly denying thi charge
in th bill-nothing except th general and u ual denial of all
unlawful combination and confederac ; and th qu tion i rai ed
wh th r a defendant i oblig d to an wer the tatement and charges
in a bill, unle
p i:fically interrogat d th reto.
cording to the pre ent Engli h practice, the general interroo-atory i not uffici nt.
y th 16th of the order of Augu t,
1 -±1, it i provid that a def ndant hall not b bound to an wer
any ta ment or barge in the bill unle
pecially and particularl int rrogated th reto.
Danl. Ch. Pl. & Prac. 820. But uch
wa n t form rl3 th practice.
Th am rul ha b en adopted by the upreme court of the
nit d tate . Rule in 1 quity, 40 January term, 1 4 .
"\\ith u no rule of the kind ha b n adopted and we adh r to
h CT 11 ral racti Of 0Urt Of Chan r ' Wll h ha nO particular
rule u n th ul>j t and require a d fendant to a w r all the
all aati n and harg in th bill which may be material to th
plain iff' a · and althouah to pr v nt a ion on the part of the
lefon laut, it ma: b w 11, and i u ual to add interroo-atori
o 1c ming h matt rs on ~ id r d to
mo t ., ~ n ial yet un er b
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eneral interrogatory an an wer i open to exception, if it omita
to notice mat rial charg and tatem nt in the bill, concerning
whi h no :IJe ifi interrogatorie are introduceu. 1 Danl. Ch. Pl.
r Prac. 43
; Story Eq. PL § 38; Methodist Episcopal Church
v. Jaqu es, 1 John. Ch. Rep. 65; Hagthorp v. Hook, 1 Gill. &
John.
0; almon v. Clagg ett, 3 Bland. 125 ;· Bank of Utica v.
Messereau, 7 Paige 517; Parkinson v. Trousdale, 3 Scam. 380;
uyler v. Bogert, 3 Paige 186.
That matter ha b en ttled in the ame way in Ma achu etts,
by rule of court. 1\Ia . Rules for the Regulation of Practice in
Chancery, rule 5.
According to these uggestions, the defendant should have made
an wer to this charge in the bill. It is a material allegation of an
intent to commit wa te, and the exception mu t be su tained.
To the answer of Nancy Miles, two exception are taken. The
:fir ti , that she ha not, to the best of her knowledge, remembrance,
information and belief, an wered and set forth whether John Kingman, during the time stated in the bill, cut a·n d hauled from the
pr mises full twenty cords of pine wood, and sold the ame, and
cut and drew from the premises pine logs sufficient to make from
:five to ten thousand feet of boards, and converted the same to hi··
own use, but not on the premises; and whether the wood and timber
were worth from one hundred to one hundred and :fifty dollars,
and that Kingman told the orator, in the month of January then
la t, that he intended to cut wood on said premises, the present
winter, sufficient to last his :fire two winters, and that Kingman
never lived on any part of the premises.
The bill contains the allegation set forth in the exception, the
an w r to which i a follows: that Kingman held the premises,
by 1 a e from the Me erve, for two years, and that during aid two
year he had ome pine trees cut fo1• fencing, and awed the ame
into board ; and during the latter part of the winter of 1 50, or in
the pring of that year, he cau d ome of the board to b hauled
and 1 ft at or near the diff rent bar on the pr mi
and the ame
w re afterward u din r pairing aid bar . That Kingman u d
whil h o occupie 1 th am and thi
no fu 1 on the premi
d f ndant cloe not know that he took any from th pla to be u ed
L wh re.
Th an w rt thi all at.ion f th bill i far from b ina explicit.
m an might hav ut th ti b r all g d in th bill and th de0

lUO Interrogating Part

general interrogatory, .an answer is ojjen to exception, if it omits

to notice material charges and statements in the bill, concerning

which no specific interrogatories are introduced. 1 Danl. Ch. PL

& Prac. 432; Story's Eq. PI. § 38; Methodist Episcopal Church

V. Jaques, 1 Johns. Ch. Eep. 65; Hagthorp v. FIoolc, 1 Gill. &

Johns. 270; Salmon v. Claggett, 3 Bland. 125;" Banh of Utica v.

Messereau, 7 Paige 517; Parkinson v. Trousdale, 3 Scam. 380;

Ciiijler V. Bogert, 3 Paige 186.

That matter has been settled in the same way in Massachusetts,

by rule of court. Mass. Kules for the Eegulation of Practice in

Chancery, rule 5.

According to these suggestions, the defendant should have made

answer to this charge in the bill. It is a material allegation of an

intent to commit waste, and the exception must be sustained.

To the answ^er of Nancy Miles, two exceptions are taken. The

first is, that she has not, to the best of her knowledge, remembrance,

information and belief, answered and set forth whether John King-

man, during the time stated in the bill, cut and hauled from the

premises full twenty cords of pine wood, and sold the same, and
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cut and drew from the premises pine logs sufficient to make from

five to ten thousand feet of boards, and converted the same to his

own use, but not on the premises ; and whether the wood and timber

were worth from one hundred to one hundred and fifty dollars,

and that Kingman told the orator, in the month of January then

last, that he intended to cut wood on said premises, the present

winter, sufficient to last his fire two winters, and that Kingman

never lived on any part of the premises.

The bill contains the allegation set forth in the exception, the

answer to which is as follows : that Kingman held the premises,

by lease from the Meserves, for two years, and that during said two

years he had some pine trees cut for fencing, and sawed the same

into boards; and during the latter part of the winter of 1850, or in

the spring of that year, he caused some of the boards to be hauled

and left at or near the different bars on the premises, and the same

were afterwards used in repairing said bars. That Kingman used

no fuel on the premises while he so occupied the same, and this

defendant does not know that he took any from the place to be used

elsewhere.

The answer to this allegation of the bill is far fi-om being explicit.

Kingman might have cut the timber alleged in the bill, and the de-

INTERROGATING PART
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fendant, jSTancy Miles, have known the fact, and still the answer be

true ; for he might have cut timber to be sawed for bars in addition

to that specified in the bill.

She says, also, that she does not know that Kingman took any

fuel from the premises to be used elsewhere. But if she had no

knowledge upon the subject, she may have had information.

The answer to the part of the bill contained in this exception

is entirely insufficient, and the exception must be sustained.

A defendant must answer as to his knowledge, remembrance,

information and belief. If a fact is charged as within liis personal

knowledge, he must answer positively, and not as to his remem-

brance or belief. If facts are charged as having happened, but they

are not within his own knowledge, he must answer as to his informa-

tion and belief. And he must answer directly and without evasion.

He must answer the substance of each charge, as well as literally

the several matters charged. A general denial, also, is not sufficient,

but there must be an answer to all the special circumstances and

particular inquiries. Hall v. ^Yood, 1 Paige 404; Devereaux v.

Cooper, 11 Vt. Rep. 103; Utica Ins. Co. v. Lynch, 3 Paige 210;
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Coop. Eq. PI. 314; Smith v. Lasher, 5 Johns. Ch. Eep. 247; Tay-

lor V. Luther, 2 Sumner 228; Woods v. Morrell, 1 Johns. Ch. Eep.

103; Petit v. Candler, 3 Wendell 618; Story's Eq. PI. 852;

Mountford v. Taylor, 6 Vesey, 792 ; 2 Dan'l Ch. PI. & Prac. 830 ;

Morris v. Barker, 3 Johns. Ch. Eep. 297; Bank v. Lewis, 8 Pick.

119.

Tlie other exception to the answer of Nancy Miles is the same

as that taken to the answer of Lydia Miles, and must be sustained

accordingly.

To the answer of Tichenor JVIiles six exceptions are filed. The

fifth and sixth are the same as those filed to the anwser of Nancy

Miles, and they must be sustained for the reasons already given.

The disposition of the other four involves the same question as that

stated in deciding the first exception to the answer of Nancy Miles,

and it is unnecessary to state here anything further than to say that

upon the principles there laid down, we think, the first and second

exceptions should be overruled, and the third and fourth should be

sustained. Tlie answer to the allegations embraced in the first and

second exceptions is sufficient, while the answer to the allegations

contained in the third and fourth exceptions is evasive and insuffi-

cient.

V.

fILES

101

fendant, an y Mil hav known th fa t, and till the an wer be
tru ; f r l mi0 ht hav ut timber to be sawed for bars in addition
to that p i.fi in the bill.
h ay, al o that h do not know that Kingman took any
fu l from th prcmi
to b u
l wh r .
ut if h had no
knowl clg upon th ubj t, he may hav had information.
The an w r t th part of th ill ontain d in till xception
i
ntir ly in uffi i nt, and the x ption mu t be u tained.
!\.. 1 .f ndant mu t an w r a to bi knowl dge, rem mbrance,
inf rmati n and b li f. If a fact i charged
within hi p r onal
knowl dg , h mu t an wer po itiv ly, and not a to bi r membrane orb li £. If fact are charg d as having happened, but th y
arc not within hi wn knowl dg h mu tan w r a to hi inf rmand he mu t an wer directly and without ev ion.
tion and b lief.
He mu t an w r the ub tance of ach charge, a well a literally
the several matt r harg d. Ag neral denial, al o, i not suffici nt,
but th re mu t be an answer to all the p cial circum tance and
particular inquirie . H atl v. Wood, 1 Paige 40± ; Devereaux .
Ooop e1·, 11 Vt. Rep. 103 ; Utica Ins. Go . v. Lynch, 3 Paig 10;
Coop. Eq. PL 31±; mith v. Lasher, 5 John . h. Rep. 24 ; Taylor v. Luther, 2 umner 228 ; Woods v. Morrell, 1 John . Ch. Rep.
103; P etit v. Candler, 3 Wend 11 618;
tory' Eq. PL 5 ;
Mountford v. Taylor, 6 Vesey, 79 ;
Dan 1 h. PL & Prac. 830;
Morris . Barker, 3 Johns. Ch. Rep. 29 ; Bank v. Lewis,
ick.
119.
Th other xc ption to the an wer of Nancy Mile i the ame
as that tak n to the an wer of Lydia Miles, and mu t be u tained
accordingly.
ix exception are filed. The
To th an wer of Tichenor ..Uil
fifth and ixth ar the ame a tho fil d to th anw er of an y
Mil
and they mu t b u tain d for th r a on alr ady oi1 n.
Th di p ition .f th other four in ol
th am qu tion a ~ thai
tat cl in d idinc; lh fir t e pti n to th an w r of _._ an y :Jiil
and it i unn e ar t tate h r an 'thing forth r than to ay that
up n th prin ipl th r laid d
w hink, th fir"t and .. c nd
hould b o rrul d and th third and fourth houh1 b
1 an w r to th all
ation mbra d in th fir t anc.1
ption i u ci nt whil th an w r to the all cration
ntain ll in th thir and fourth xc ption i 1a iv and in~uffii nt.

~

~
r^^ J^'fj^ 5anJk V. Levy, 3 Paige (N. Y.) 606^ (1832.)^

\V"^A V* ' Tnis cause came before the chancellor on appeal by the defend-

■^ . p^ ants from the de^on of the vice chancellor of the first circuit,

overruling thdifexceptions to the master's report on exceptions to

their ^se^j^'^Ll answers. The bill was filed by judgment creditors of

the^eiendant Levy, after the return of their execution at law

tff ainst him unsatisfied. The bill alleged, among other things, that

the defendant Levy obtained moneys from the complainants' bank

fraudulently, and by collusion between him and the defendant

\Yolfe, who was his son-in-law, by overdrawing his account; and

charged that Wolfe received the money thus obtained from the bank,

and still had the same, or a very large amount thereof, in his pos-

session. The bill also charged that after Levy had so overdrawn his

account with the complainants he petitioned for the benefit of the

insolvent law. That the granting of his discharge was opposed;

and upon that occasion both of the defendants in this suit were

sworn and examined. That from such examination it appeared

Levy had knowingly and fraudulently overdrawn his account with

the complainants, for the purpose of placing the moneys thus ob-
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tained in the hands of Wolfe; that the moneys were placed in his

hands accordingly, and he knew at the time that they had been

obtained by such overdrawing; and that those moneys, or the

greater part thereof, were in the hands of Wolfe at the time of

uch examination. The exceptions which were sustained by the

vice chancellor, related principally to the neglect of the defendants

^^ to answer interrogatories founded upon the specific allegations in

^ • the bill as to what appeared from the examination of the defendants

on that occasion.

A \ ^y '" ■

V ' T^ Chancellor :

A ^[i' Before going into the examination of the several exceptions par-

r**/' ^ ^ticularly, it may be proper to notice a general objection, by the

'^ t^^A^ Mefendants' counsel, which is supposed by him to apply to the

whole. It is said there are no charges in the l)ill to sustain the

\ "■^ interrogatories upon which the exceptions are based ; and therefore

that the defendants were not bound to answer the matters enquired

CS fe > °^ ^y ^^^^ interrogatories. The counsel is undoubtedly correct in

y.

- (}._,J

~~J,.;?

~-i)_/

~ .Y\' _V.,~OGATING PART

¥'
^ ' flW*^ VyV ' V^ I^f^ROGATING PaRT '^ 1\V / ^

AY\ /

~"~yr

Yric/?

Bank v. Levy 3 Paige (N. Y.) 606.

{183fJ.)

., ., f) , Trrr cau e came before the hancellor on app al by the defendr- ant from the de~on of the vice chancellor of the first circuit,

V~

overrul~ingth~xceptions

to the ma ter report on exceptions to
their e
an wer . The bill wa filed by judgment creditors of
the~e ndant Levy after the return of their execution at law
--"\
1
,.,,A ~ain t him un ati :fied. The bill alleged, among other things, that
~/
the defendant L€vy obtained money from the complainants' bank
/ _ / fraudulently, and by collusion between him and the defendant
~
\\olfe, who wa his son-in-law, by ov rdrawing his account; and
~
charged that Wolfe received the money thu obtained from the bank,
~
and till had the same or a v ry lar e amount thereof in his po ; ~ esc::ion. The bill al o charged that after Levy had so overdrawn hi ,
,.) ~ account with the complainants he petitioned for the benefit of the
~ .
in olvent law. That the granting of hi di charge wa opposed;
·· ~ and upon that occa ion both of the defendant in thi suit were
~,)
worn and examined. That from such examination it appeared
~V
Levy had knowingly and fraudulently overdrawn hi account with
~. ~.
the complainant, for the purpo of placing the money thus ob~ I tained in the hands of Wolf ; that the man y were placed in hi·
' ~
hand accordingly, and he knew at the tim that they had been
.
obtained by uch overdrawing; and that tho e money , or the
~p~grea.ter part thereof, were in th hand of Wolfe at the time of
ysuch examination. The exception which were su tained by the
vice chanc llor, related principally to the neglect of the def ndant
to an wer int rrogatorie founded upon the peci:fic all gations in
the bill a to what app ared from. the examination of the defendant.
f .
on that occasion.

r/'

HE CHANCELLOR :

efor going into the examination of th everal xception particularl) jt may b pr p r to noti a g n ral obj ction by the
1 f ndan
oun 1, whi h i uppo d by him to apr ly to the
whol . It i aid th r ar no hara in th bill to u tain the
interr gatorie up n whi h the xc ption are ba ed · and th r for'
that th d f ndant w r not boun to an w r th matt r nquired
of by uch int rro atorie . The oun 1 i undoubt dly correct in

B
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the principle that a defendant cannot be called upon to answer any

interrogatory which is not founded upon some allegation or charge ,

in the bill. (Miti'ord, 1th Lond. ed. 45. 1 Xowl. Prac. 3d Lond. '

ed. 255.) But it is not necessary that the interrogatory should arise

directly out of one of those material averments in the bill upon

which the complainants' right to relief essentially depends. It is

sufficient to entitle him to an answe r to_ thc interrogatory, if IF is

foundedjjjjojj: ^ statement in the bil l which is set upjnerely ^s

evidence in support of the main charges therein . In framing an

ordinary bill in chancery the pleader has a two-fold object, dis covery

and relief. The allegations in the bill, so far as the question of the

complainants' right to relief is concerned are substantially in the

same form as the averments in a declaration at law. And the

pleader must state his clients' cause of action in such a manner that

the main facts upon which his right to relief depends may be put

in issue and tried. But the complainant, jn additioii to this, has

aj2Sh^io_cxanij^e_thc^defe^ oath, in support of the mam

charges upon which his claim to the in tej:pi)gition_of_tlic_court in liis

favor is based, and also as to any collateral f acts, which m ay be
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material in determining th e extent, or ki nd of rehef to which he i s

e ntitled, Tf the main cEargesTn the bill are admitted or^ proved.

He may, therefore, state any matters of evidence in his biUwhich

may be material in establishing the main charge, or in ascertaining

the nature or kind of relief proper to be administered; and may

interrogate the defendant as to those matters. In tliis case some

of the main facts, upon which the complainants seek relief against

the defendant Wolfe, are, that the money was fraudulently obtained

from the bank, and was placed in his hands without consideration,

where it remained at the time of the examination before the recorder,

when the circumstances of the fraud appeared upon the examination

of these defendants on oath. And there can be no doubt, in this

case, that if the fact is established that the money was improperly

and fraudulently obtained from the complainants' clerks, and that

Wolfe had notice of that fact before he parted with the money or

paid a valuable consideration therefor, he cannot in equity be per-

mitted to retain the same as against the just claims of the complain-

ants thereon. (Tradesmen Bank v. Merritt, 1 Paige's Rep. 302.)

The allegations in the bill as to what took place before the recorder

are therefore material, not only to show that Wolfe then had notice

of the fraud, while the money was still in his hands, but also as
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the principle that ad fondant canno b called upon to answer any
interrogatory which i not found d upon o
all gation r harg~
in th bill. (Mitford, h
nd. d. . 1 -wl. ra . d Lond.
ed. 255.) But it i not n ·' ·ary that th int nogatory houlcl ari e
directly out f on oi th
mat rial a rm nt in l bill upon
tially d p nd . It is
whi h th omplainant right to r li i
uffi.ci nt to ntitl him to n an w r to th , in rro ator if~
foUfill d upon a tatcment in th bill which i et up m rel a
, vid n in upport of th main charge th r in. n framing an
ordinary bill in chancery th pleader ha a two-fold obj ct, di covery
and rcli f. Th allegations in the bill, o far a th que ti.on of the
omplainan right to r lief i cone rn d are ub tantially in the
ame form a the av rm nts in a d claration at law. And the
pleader mu t tat hi cli nt ' cause of action in uch a manner that
the main fa t upon which hi right to relief d pend may be put
in i ue and tri d. But the complainant, in
i
to thi ha
a ri ht to examine the defendant, on oath in u ort of th main
charg upon which his claim to the interposition of the court in ·
fa or i ba 1, and al o a to any collateral fact , which may be
material in det rmining th xtent, or kind of relief to whic. he i
entit e , i
e main c arg m the bill are admitted or roved.
e may, th r fore, state any matter of evidence in hi bill which
may be material in e tabli bing the main charge or in a certaining
the natur or kind of relief proper to be admini tered; and may
interrogate th d fendant a to tho e matters. In thi ca e ome
of the main fact , upon whi h the complainants e.k relief again t
the def ndant Wolfe, are that th money wa fraudulently obtained
from the bank and wa placed in hi hand without con ideration
where it r main d at th tim of the examination b fore the recorder
when th ir um tanc of the fraud app ared upon the xaminaition
of the e d f ndants on oath. And th r can b no doubt, in thi"
ca
hat if th fact i
tabli h d that the money wa improperly
and fraudul ntly obtain d from the complainant clerk and that
Wolf had notic of that fa t b fore h part d with the money or
perpaid a rnluabl on id ratio th refor h cannot in equit '
mitt d tor tain th am a o-a·i n t th ju t clai
of h omplainp. 02.)
ant th r on. (Trade nien Bank . Merritt 1
Th all ation in th bill a to what t k place b for th r cord r
ar th r f r mat rial n t nl r t h w that olf th n ha notic
of th fraud, whil th mon y wa till in hi" hand but al"o a~
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evidence in support of the main charge of fraud and collusion, upon

which the complainants' claim as against Wolfe mainly rests.

Tlie fourth exception to the answer of Levy, which is the first

allowed hy the vice chancellor, relates to the amount due the com-

plainants on their judgment. In a case of this kind the 189th

rule requires the complainant to state the true sum due on his judg-

ment, over and above all just claims of the defendant by way of

set-off or otherwise. This allegation in the bill was therefore ma-

terial; and the defendant probably intended to admit the whole

amount of the judgment and the interest thereon to be due, as stated

in the bill. But by a slip in the phraseology of the answer the

proper admission is not made. I must therefore, though with some

hesitation, affirm the decision of the master and the vice chancellor

as to this exception.

The fifth exception is for not answering an interrogatory which

calls upon Levy to disclose whether the overdrawing at the bank

was not voluntary and premeditated. The charges in the bill are

that the moneys were obtained by overdrawing, and by fraud and

collusion between him and Wolfe, his son-in-law; and that it ap-
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peared on the examination before the recorder that the overdrawing

was voluntary and premeditated. The discovery called for by this

exception is material in the establishment of a fraud in obtaining

the money from the bank. A wilful and intentional overdrawing,

by a person who knew he had not the means of making good his

account, might be a gross fraud, considering the manner in which

business is done in the banks of our large commercial cities ; espe-

cially if it should appear that several checks were drawn at the same

time and presented separately, or by different individuals, so as to

elude the vigilance of the officers of the institution, by giving to

such checks the appearance of ordinary business drafts. Whereas

if the drawer overdrew by mistake, or under the supposition that he

would have funds there to meet the drafts at the time they were

presented, or before the bank closed, the transaction would be per-

fectly fair and honest, if no means were resorted to for the purpose

of preventing the officers of the bank from noticing the fact that

he had not funds in the bank at the time. This exception was there-

fore properly allowed.

The sixth exception is founded upon an interrogatory, in the bill,

calling upon Levy to disclose whether he delivered the checks, on

which the money was obtained, to Wolfe, or to any other person for
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evidence in support of the main charge of fraud and collusion, upon
which the complainants' claim as a:gainst Wolfe mainly rests.
The fourth exception to the answer of Levy, which is the first
allowed by the vice chancellor, relates to the amount due the complainants on their judgment. In a case of this kind the 189th
rule requir the complainant to state the true sum due on his judgment, over and above all just claims of the defendant by way of
set-off or otherwise. This allegation in the bill was therefore material; and the defendant probably intended to admit the whole
amount of the judgment and the interest thereon to be due, as stated
in the bill. But by a slip in the phra eology of the answer the
proper admission is not made. I must therefore, though with some
hesi ta ti on, affirm the decision of the master and the vice chancellor
as to this exception.
The fifth exception is for not answering an interrogatory which
calls upon Levy to disclose whether the overdrawing at the bank
was not voluntary and premeditated. The charges in the bill are
that the moneys were obtained by overdrawing, and by fraud and
collusion between him and Wolfe, his son-in-law; and that it appeared on the examination before the recorder that the overdrawing
was voluntary and premeditated. The discovery called for by tills
exception is material in the establishment of a fraud in obtaining
the money from the bank. A wilful and intentional overdrawing,
by a person who 1.'"Ilew he had not the means of making good his
account, might be a gross fraud, considering the manner in which
business is done in the banks of our large commercial cities; especially if it should appear that several checks were drawn at the same
time and presented separately, or by different individuals, so as to
elude the vigilance of the officers of the institution by giving to
such checks the appearance of ordinary business drafts. Whereas
if the drawer overdrew by mistake, or under the uppo ition that he
would have fund there to meet the drafts at the time they were
presented, or before the bank closed, the transaction would be perfectly fair and hone t, if no mean were re orted to for the purpo e
of preventing the officers of the bank from noticing the fact that
he had not fund in the bank at the time. This exception was therefore properly allowed.
The ixth exception is founded upon an interrogatory, in the bill,
calling upon Levy to di clo e whether he delivered the checks, on
which th money was obtained, to Wolf or to any other per"on for
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his use; and to whom in particular. He says lie delivered two of

the cheeks to the clerk of Wolfe, hut does not disclose who that clerk

was. It may be material to ascertain who that clerk was, not only

for the purpose of showing that the complainant's money went

directly into the hands of Wolfe, but also to ascertain how much

went there. Even if the separate answer of Wolfe could be referred

to as an admission that the money came to his hands, it does not

remove the difficulty ; as he only admits the receipt of two thousand

dollars, and there are no two of the checks corresponding in amount

with such admission. The discovery of the particular individual

to whom the checks were given may also be very material on other

grounds, which it is not necessary here to state. The complainants

having distinctly called for a discovery as to the person to whom the

checks were given, there is no good reason assigned for withholding

his name.

The eighth exception is founded upon an interrogatory calling

upon Levy to state whether Wolfe is not now indebted to him;

and if so, in what amount. I have not been able to find any allega-

tion in the bill on which to sustain this interrogatory, to the extent
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claimed by this exception. Except from the allegation that it ap-

peared on the examination before the recorder that Wolfe was then

indebted to Levy, there is nothing on wliich to found a presumption

that he was indebted to him at the time of filing the complainant's

bill, or at any time since. And a defect in the charging part of

the bill cannot be supplied by a subsequent interrogatory; which

is to be construed by the charging part, and is not to be considered

more extensive. The fact of the indebtedness at the time of the ex-

amination before the recorder, is admitted by the answer of Levy.

But he further states, that subsequently, and before the filing of

this bill, he compounded with Wolfe at the rate of twenty-five cents

on a dollar, and received the amount thus agreed upon, in full

satisfaction and discharge of his debt. As there is no suggestion of

any subsequent indebtedness by Wolfe to him, I must consider this

a perfect answer to every thing that could properly be inquired of,

or which he was bound to answer under this interrogatory. This

exception cannot therefore be sustained.

The tenth exception is evidently well taken; as the defendant

Levy admits, by implication at least, that he has still in his posses-

sion a part of the moneys received from Wolfe on the compromise

with him. The complainants are entitled to a discovery of the
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his use; and to whom in particular. He ays he delivered two of
the check to the clerk of Wolfe, but doe not disclo e who that clerk
was. It may be material to ascertain who that clerk wa , not only
for the purpo e of hawing that the complainant' money went
directly into the hands of Wolfe, but al o to a certain how much
w nt there. Even if th eparat answer of Wolfe could be referred
to as an admi sion. that the money came to hi hand , it does not
remove the difficulty; a he only admits the receipt of two thou and
dollar , and there are no two of the checks corresponding in amount
with such admi sion. The discovery of the particular individual
to whom the checks were given may al o be very material on other
grounds, which it is not necessary here to state. The complain.ants
having distinctly called for a di covery as to the person to whom the
checks were given, there is no good reason assigned for withholding
hi name.
The eighth exception is founded upon an interrogatory calling
upon Levy to state whether Wolfe is not now indebted to him;
and if so, in what amount. I have not been able to find any allegation in the bill on which to sustain this interrogatory, to the extent
claimed by this exception. Except from the allegation that it appeared on the exaanination before the recorder that Wolfe was then
indebted to Levy, there is nothing on which to found a presumption
that he was indebted to him at the time of filing the complainant's
bill, or at any time since. And a defect in the charging part of
the bill cannot be supplied by a subsequent interrogatory; which
i to be con trued by the charging part, and is not to be considered
more exten ive. The fact of the indebtedne sat the time of the examination. before the recorder, is admitted by the answer of Levy.
But he further tate , that ubsequently, and before the :filing of
thi bill, he compounded with Wolfe at the rate of twenty-five cents
on a dollar, and received the aanount thu agreed upon, in full
ati faction. and di charge of hi debt. A there i no suggestion of
an , ub equent in.debtednes by Wolfe to him, I must con ider this
a p rf ect an wer to every thing that could properl be inquired of,
or which he wa bound to an wer under thi interrogator}. Thi
ex eption. cannot therefore be u tained.
The tenth xception. i evidently well taken; a the d f n.dant
L vy admit , by implication at 1 a t that he ha till in hi po e~ 
ion a part of the mone3 recei ed from Wolfe on the compromi e
ith him. The complainants are en.titled to a di co'\'er r of the
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nature and amount of all the property and effects of their judgment

debtor, as well to sustain and prove the allegation in the bill that

he had property to the value of $100 or more, so as to give this court

jurisdiction to make a decree in their favor, as to have such property

applied to the satisfaction of their debt.

The eleventh exception is not well taken. As there is no allega-

tion or suggestion in the complainants' bill that the purchasers of

the notes, or the other Carolina property, did not purchase that

property fairly and bona fide, it would not benefit the complainants

if Levy should admit that he sold the notes, and his interest in the

other property, for less than half their value. Although the court

might b€ satisfied that he parted with the property in that manner

for the purpose of defrauding his creditors, yet, if the vendees pur-

chased it in good faith, their title cannot be disturbed. And the

establishment of the fraud against Levy would not make him liable

to the complainants beyond the amount of their debt, for which

he is liable in any event. If there had been any allegation in the

bill, suggesting a fraudulent agreement between him and Wolfe

to overdraw the bank, and then to sell off his property and to put
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the proceeds in the hands of the latter to keep it out of the reach of

legal process, it might have presented a different question.

The permission to the complainants to amend their bill was a

matter of course, under the -ISth and 190th rules, upon the allow-

ance of any of the exceptions for insufficiency. A majority of the

exceptions to the answer of Levy not having been finally allowed,

the complainants are only entitled to the costs of the original ex-

ceptions which were allowed. And neither party is to have any costs

upon the reference, or upon the hearing before the vice chancellor,

or upon this appeal. The order of the vice chancellor is to be modi-

fied accordingly.

The second exception to the answer of Wolfe is founded upon the

neo-lect of this defendant to state in his answer whether he was the

son-in-law of his co-defendant Levy. The fact of relationship is

not material to the relief sought by this bill against either of the

defendants. But I agree with the vice chancellor that, in connec-

tion with the facts charged, it might not be unimportant as a cir-

cumstance to sustain the charge of fraud. The difficulty, however,

in sustaining this exception is, that the relationship is stated in the

bill by way of recital merely, and not as a positive allegation. And

there is no interrogatory calling upon the defendant to answer as to
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nature and amount of all the property and effects of their judgment
debtor a well to ustain and prove the allegation in the bill that
he had property to the value of $100 or more, o a to give this court
juri diction to make a decree in their favor, as to have such property
applied to the atisfaction of their debt.
The eleventh exception is not well taken. As there is no allegation or sugge tion in the complainant ' bill that the purchasers of
the notes, or the other Carolina property, did not purchase that
property fairly and bona :fide, it would not benefit the complainants
if Lev3 hould admit that he old the notes, and his interest in the
other property, for less than half their value. Although the court
might be atis:fied that he parted with the property in that manner
for the purpo e of defrauding his creditors, yet, if the vendees purchased it in good faith, their title cannot be disturbed. And the
establishment of the fraud again t Levy would not make him liable
to the complainants beyond the amount of their debt, for which
he i liable in any event. If there had been any allegation in the
bill, ugge ·ting a fraudulent agreement between him and Wolfe
to overdraw the bank, and then to ell off hi property and to put
the proceeds in the hand of the latter to keep it out of the reach of
legal proce s, it might have pre ented a different question.
· The permission to the complainants to amend their bill was a
matter of course, under the 45th and 190th rules, upon the allowance of any of the exceptions for insufficiency. A majority of the
exception to the answer of Levy not having been :finally allowed,
the complainants are only entitled to the co t of the original exceptions which were allowed. And neither party is to have any costs
upon the reference, or upon the hearing before the vice chancellor,
or upon thi appeal. The order of the vice chancellor is to be modified accordingly.
The econcl xception to the answer of Wolfe is founded upon the
n gl ct of thi def ndant to tate in his an wer whether he wa the
on-in-law of hi co-d fendant Levy. The fact of relationship i
not material to the relief ought by thi bill again t ither of the
defendant . But agree with the vice chan llor that in connection with the facts charged, it might not be unimportant a a circum tance to u tain the charg of fraud. Th diffi ulty how ver,
in u taining thi exception i , that the r lation hip i tated in the
bill by way of recital mer ly, ancl not a a p. itiv all gation. And
there i no int rrogatory alling up n ih d f ndant to a wer a to
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his relationship to Levy. Altliough a mere recital of a fact may

perhaps be sufficient to justify an interrogatory calling upon the

defendant to answer as to that fact, so that it may be used as evi-

dence, yet I do not tliink he was called upon in this case without

such an interrogatory, to admit or deny the fact recited. This ex-

ception should therefore have been disallowed. (See Alhretcht v.

Sussmanii, 2 Ves. & Bea. 323.)

The matters of the third and fourth exceptions, to the answer

of this defendant, appear to be very material to the establishment

of the complainants' claims against him, for the moneys alleged

to have been obtained from their bank by fraud and collusion. The

defendant is particularly interrogated as to the matters of these ex-

ceptions; and the particular sums of money received by him from

Levy, and the precise time at which each particular sum was re-

ceived by him, appear to be material when taken in connection with

other facts in the case. He must also answer, not only as to his

knowledge of the fact of the money having been overdrawn from

the bank, but as to his understanding, belief and reasons for sup-

posing that the money had bc^n thus obtained, and as to the time
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when that information was first received by him. These two excep-

tions were therefore properly allowed.

The fifth exception calls upon this defendant to answer whether

he admitted, when under oath before the recorder, that he had re-

ceived the sum of $4,300 of Levy, with a knowledge that the same

had been overdrawn from the complainants' bank. By the pre-

ceding exception, the defendant was called upon to answer as to the

fact of his knowledge of the overdrawing at the time he received

the money from Levy. If, in answering that exception, he admits

he had such knowledge, it cannot be material for the complainants

to show that he made a similar admission on his examination before

the recorder. On the contrary, if he denies that he had such knowl-

edge, the complainants cannot compel him to answer whether he

swore differently on the occasion alluded to : as that might subject

him to a prosecution for perjury. The complainants must therefore

confine themselves to the answer to the main fact ; and this excep-

tion must be overruled, as one which the defendant may not answer

with safety to himself. As the money was still in his hands at the

time of his examination before the recorder, if he was then informed

that it had been obtained from the bank, by Levy, illegally and

improperly, it is perhaps not very material to inquire whether he

hi r lation hip t L vy. Although a m r r cital of a fact may
perhap b uili i nt to ju tify an interrogatory calling upon the
idefendant to an wer a to that fa t, o that it may be u ed a
dence, y t I do not think he wa call d upon in thi ca e without
uch an interrogator , to admit or deny th fact recited. Thi exc ption hould h r fore ha e been di allow d. ( ee Albretcht .
us'mann~ ·
. &
a.
.)
Th matt r of the third and fourth x · ption , to th an wer
of thi def ndant, appear to be ry mat rial to the tal li hm nt
of the complainant claim again t him, for th man y alleged
to hav been obtained from their bank by fraud and collu ion. The
d f ndant i parti ularly interrogated a to the matt r of the e exception ; and th particular um of man y r cei ed by him from
Levy and the pr ci time at whi h each particular um wa recei ed by him, appear to be material when taken in connec ion with
oth r fact in the ca e. He mu t al o an w r, not only a to hi
knowledge of the fact of the man y having b en o erdrawn from
the bank, but a to hi understanding, belief and rea on for uppo ing that the money had been thu obtain d, and a to the time
wh n that information wa fir t received by him. The e two exception w re therefore properly allowed.
Tbe fifth exc ption call upon thi defendant to an wer whether
he admitt d, when under oath b fore the recorder that he had received th um of $-± 300 of Le , with a knowledge thait the ame
had b en overdrawn from the complainant ' bank. By the precedin exception the defendant wa called upon to an wer a to the
fact of hi knowl dge of the o erdrawing at the time he received
th money from Le y. If, in an wering that exc ption, he admit,
he had uch knowl dge it cannot be material for the complainant,
t how hat he mad a imilar admi ion on hi examination before
th record r.
n th contrary, if he deni that he had uch knowlth omplainant cannot amp 1 him to an wer wheth r he
d
w re di:ff r ntl on the occa ion alluded to : a that micrht ubject
him to a pro ecution for perjury. The complainant mu t therefore
onfin them l v t th an wer to the main fact · and thi excepti n mu t be overrul d a one which the d f ndant ma not an wer
th man wa till in hi hand at th
with af t to him elf.
tirn of hi :xamination before th r order if he wa then inform
that it had b
obtain d from the bank b L \ illeo-all and
i pr p rl it i p rhap not r mat rial
inquir wh th r he
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had any previous know ledge of the fact: as he could not afterwards
pay it over to Levy, so as to deprive the complainants of their rights
as against himself.
The sixth exception calls upon Wolfe to disclose what disposition
was made of the money received by him from Levy, and what has
become of that part of it which remained in his hands at the time
of his examination before the recorder. This exception is evidently
well taken; as the complainants are entitled to follow their money,
o long as it can be traced and identified, into the hands of any person who has not actually received it for a valuable consideration
without notice of their rights.
The order of the vice chancellor, which is appealed from by this
defendant, must therefore be modified so as to conform to this decision. And as a majority of the exceptions to this answer are not
allowed, the complainants are not entitled to the costs of the reference. And neither party is to have costs as against the other upon
the exceptions taken to the master's report, or upon the hearing
before the vice chancellor, or upon this appeal.

108 Prayer for Belief

had any previous knowledge of the fact : as he could not afterwards

pay it over to Levy, so as to deprive the complainants of their rights

as against himself.

The sixth exception calls upon Wolfe to disclose what disposition

was made of the money received by him from Levy, and what has

become of that part of it which remained in his hands at the time

of his examination before the recorder. This exception is evidently

well taken; as the complainants are entitled to follow their money,

so long as it can be traced and identified, into the hands of any per-

son who has not actually received it for a valuable consideration

without notice of their rights.

The order of the vice chancellor, which is appealed from by this

defendant, must therefore be modified so as to conform to this de-

cision. And as a majority of the exceptions to this answer are not

allowed, the complainants are not entitled to the costs of the refer-

ence. And neither party is to have costs as against the other upon

the exceptions taken to the master's report, or upon the hearing

before the vice chancellor, or upon this appeal.

Prayer for Eelief.

"j> ^ holden V. Holden, 2h HI App. 106. (1881.)
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PRAYER FOR RELIEF

tJ^f' y^MoRAN, P. J.:

m , ^ The question is whether, under the facts stated in the bill, a case

1 jK is made for equitable cognizance. It is contended that a court of

^ 'yf equity has no jurisdiction to quiet title or remove a cloud upon the

V +Ulo \(\ rpal psfflfp nnlpss tbp cnmnlainant is in nossession. or the

^ title to real estate, unless the complainant is in possession, or the

cr- -Japd is unimproved or unoccupied. Such is no doubt the general

y\ Jy\xi\!d, but there are well recognized exceptions.

A Where a complainant is seeking to remove a cloud which is in the

nature of a legal title, which is being or may be asserted adversely

to the title which he desires to protect, then he must show that he

is in possession and therefore can not bring ejectment, or must

allege and prove that the real estate whose title is clouded, is vacant

or unimproved and unoccupied land. But when the facts stated in

the bill show that the legal title claimed by the complainant is not

disputed by the defendant in possession, but that such defendant

sets up some equity not affecting the legal right of possession, but

/
'1~ ¥;-~ ,/
'

~

1

-

PRAYER FOR RELIEF.

ii v" t:lden v. Holden, 24 Ill. App. 106. (1887.)

jYMoRAN, P. J.:
The question is whether, under the facts stated in the bill, a case
'tJ.-Y.
is made for equitable cognizance. It is contended that a court of
~ equity has no jurisdiction to quiet title or remove a cloud upon the
I\,
title to real estate, unless the complainant is in pos ession, or the
v- . ·.Jaµd is unimproved or unoccupied. Such is no doubt the general
/! /J-'\Y ~ule, but there are well recognized exceptions.
~
Where a complainant i eeking to remove a cloud which is in the
nature of a legal title, which is being or may be as erled adversely
to the title which he de ir to protect, then he mu t how that he
is in po e sion and therefore can no,t bring ej ctment, or must
allege and prov that the real e tate who titl i clouded, i vacant
tated in
or unimprov d and uno cupi d land. But when the fa
the bill how that th legal title claimed by the complainant i not
disputed by th defendant in po e ion, but that uch defendant
sets up some equity not affecting the legal right of po e ion, but
I' ~ ~
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which operates as a cloud on the legal title and prevents a sale of

the property, or renders the title unmarketable, then equity has

jurisdiction, because an action at law would not afford an adequate

remedy, and in such case the possession by the defendant, in subor-

dination to complainant's legal title, will not defeat the jurisdiction.

Taking the facts as alleged in the bill as true, it is very plain

that complainant could maintain forcible detainer or ejectment

upon the contract, and that defendant could not set up in such

suit at law in bar of plaintiffs right of possession, that the contract

in fact constituted a mortgage. But a judgment at law would not

silence defendant's claim that the contract was but a security for

money and that he had a right of redemption, and thus after a suc-

cessful action at law defendant's claim of an equitable right in the

land would be as complete a cloud upon complainant's title as it is

now with defendant in possession.

The chancery court has jurisdiction in such a case under the

ancient head of equity, that the action at law furnished no adequate

remedy, and such jurisdiction has been sustained by the Supreme

Court in a case not distinguishable in principle from this case.
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Shays v. Norton, 48 111. 100.

And in cases where there is fraud as a ground of equitable juris-

diction, and removing the fraudulent instrument as a cloud is inci-

dental to the general relief, even though the fraudulent title is in

its nature a legal title, and the holder of such title is in possession,

a court of chancery will have jurisdiction to remove the cloud.

Booth V. Wiley, 102 111. 84.

It is well settled that when equity has jurisdiction for one pur-

pose, it will go on and do complete justice between the parties, and

will not send them to a court of law because part of the relief may

be purely legal relief. So here the court would be authorized to

put complainant in possession if upon a hearing he maintained the

allegation of his bill as to the nature of the contract Green v.

Spring, 43 111. 280.

But there is also another ground of plain chancery jurisdiction.

Tlie contract set out is claimed by complainant in his bill to be,

and on its face is, a contract for the sale of real estate, and defend-

ant is shown to be in possession under the contract, and to be in

default.

In such case the vendor may go in the first instance into a court

of equity, and call on the purchaser to come forward and pay the

v.

HOLDEN

109

which operates a a cloud on the legal title and prevents a sale of
the property, or renders the title unmarketal le, then equity ha'
juri di tion, becau an action at law w uld not afford an adequate
rem dy, and in uch ca the po e ion by the defendant, in ubordination to complainant' legal titl , will not d f at the juri diction.
Taking the fa t a all g d in the bill a true, it i very plain
that complainant could maintain for ible detainer or ejectm nt
upon the ontract, and that defendant could not et up in uch
uit at law in bar of plaintiff' right 0£ po
ion, that the contract
in fact con titut d a mortgage. But a judgment at law would not
ilence defendant claim hat the contract wa but a ecurity for
mon y and that he had a right of redemption, and thus after a succe ..,ful action at law defendant' claim of an equitable right in the
land would b a complete a cloud upon complainant' title a it is
now with def ndant in posse ion.
The chanc ry court has jurisdiction in such a case under the
ancient head of equity, that the action at law furnished no adequate
remedy, and such jurisdiction ha been sustained by the Supreme
Court in a case not distinguishable in principle from thi case.
Shays v. Norton, 48 Ill. 100.
And in cases where there is fraud as a ground of equitable jurisdiction, and removing the fraudulent instrument as a cloud is incidental to the general relief, even though the fraudulent title i in
its nature a legal title, and the holder of such title is in possession,
a court of chancery will have juri diction to remove the cloud.
Booth v. Wiley, 102 Ill. 84.
It i well ettled that when equity has juri diction for one purpo e, it will go on and do complete justice between the parties, and
will not end them to a court of law because part of the relief may
be purely legal relief.
o here the court would be authorized to
put omplainant in po e ion if upon ah aring he maintained the
allegation of hi bill as to the nature of the contract. Green v.
pring 43 Ill. 280.
Bu there i al o another ground of plain chancery juri diction.
The contract t out i claim d by complainant in hi bill to be,
and on it face i a contract for the al of real e tate, and d fendant i hown to be in po
ion under the contract and to be in
d fault.
In uch ca e the endor may go in the first in tanc into a ourt
of quity and call on the purcha er to come forward and pa the

110
IIQ Prayer for Eeliep

money due, or be forever thereafter foreclosed from setting up any

claim against the land; and under some circumstances such is his

only safe remedy. Hanshroiigh v. Peclc, 5 Wall. -197; Derickson

V. Chicago South Branch Doch Co., 18 111. App. 531.

It is true complainant has specially prayed for entirely different

relief, but it is for the court to determine from the material allega-

tions 'of the bill and the proofs on the hearing, what relief he is

entitled to, and to decree him the appropriate relief and thus ter-

minate the suit, unless, to avoid taking the relief which he is found

by the court to be entitled to, he voluntarily dismisses his bill.

There was in this bill the prayer for general relief, as follows:

"That your orator may have such other and further relief in the

premises as equity may require, and this court may deem Just."

Under this general prayer the court could grant the relief appro-

priate to the facts, although the bill was not framed with a view

to getting such relief. If the facts stated entitled the complainant

to a certain relief, it matters not that such statement of facts may

have been made with the purpose and belief, on the part of the

solicitor who drafted the bill, that the relief sought might flow
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from a different source of equitable jurisdiction. McNairy v. East-

land, 10 Yerg. 309; Vansant v. Allmon, 23 111. 30.

The dismissing of the bill in this case on motion was, in effect,

sustaining a demurrer to the bill, and a demurrer can not be sus-

tained on the ground that a party has prayed for the wrong relief

where there is also a prayer for general relief, because at the hearing

the complainant may ask at the bar for the proper specific relief.

Wilhinson v. Beal, 4 Mod. 408; HopTcins v. Snedaker, 71 111. 449;

Curyea v. Berry, 84 111. 600; Stanley v. Valentine, 79 111. 544;

Westcott V. ^Vicls, 72 111. 524 ; Crane v. Hutchinson, 3 111. App. 30.

There was error, therefore, in dismissing the bill on the motion

of the defendant for want of equity, or for want of jurisdiction,

and the decree must therefore be reversed and the case remanded.

Reversed and remanded.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

money due, or be forever thereafter foreclosed from setting up any
claim again t the land; and under some circumstances such is his
only safe remedy. Hansbrough v. Peck, 5 Wall. 497; DM-ickson
v. Chicago South Branch Dock Co ., 18 Ill. App. 531.
It i true complainant has specially prayed for entirely different
relief, but it is for the court to determine from the material allegation of the bill and the proofs on the hearing, what relief he is
entitled to, and to decree him the appropriate relief and thus terminate the uit, unless, to avoid taking the relief which he is found
by the court to be entitled to, he voluntarily dismisses his bill.
There was in this bill the prayer for general relief, as follows :
"That your orator may have such other and further relief in the
premises as equity may require, and this court may deem just."
Under this general prayer the court could grant the relief appropriate to the facts, although the bill was not framed with a view
to getting such relief. If the facts stated entitled the complainant
to a certain relief, it matters not that such statement of facts may
have been made with the purpose and belief, on the part of the
solicitor who drafted the bill, that the relief sought might flow
from a different ource of equitable jurisdiction. McNairy v. Eastland, 10 Yerg. 309; Vansant v. Allmon, 23 Ill. 30.
The dismissing of the bill in this case on motion was, in e:ffect,
sustaini!:l.g a demurrer to the bill, and a demurrer can not be sustained on the ground that a party has prayed for the wrong relief
where there is al o a prayer for general relief, because at the hearing
the complainant may ask at the bar for the proper specific relief.
Wilkinson v. Beal, 4 Mod. 408; Hopkins v. Snedaker, 71 Ill. 449;
Curyea v. Berry, 84 Ill. 600; Stanley v. Valentine, 79 Ill. 544;
Westcott v. Wicks, 72 Ill. 524; Crane v. Hutchinson, 3 Ill. App. 30.
There was error, therefore, in dismissing the bill on the motion
of the defendant for want of equity, or for want of jurisdiction,
and the decree must therefore be rever ed and the ca e remanded.
Reversed and remanded.

HOWE V.

111

OBINS

Howe v. Robins 111

Prater for Process,

Wright V. Wright, 8 N. J. Eq. U3. (18Jt9.)

PR YER

OR

RO E

.

The Chancellor:

It is a bill for dower: this is the substantial relief prayed. The

Wright . Wright, 8

bill anticipates that a decree for divorce, obtained by the husband,

. J. Eq. 143.

(1849.)

in his lifetime, will be set up as a defence; and asks dower

notwithstanding that decree; alleging that it was fraudulently

procured, and setting out the facts on which the allegation of fraud

is founded. The complainant might have filed her bill for dower

saying nothing of the decree for divorce, and left that to come up

in defence. But I see no objection to framing a bill as this is

framed; and I think the defence should be by plea and answer,

and not by demurrer. The grounds of demurrer, therefore, which

go to the matter of the bill are not well taken. As to these, the

demurrer will be overruled.

The want of prayer for process, and of signature of counsel, are

defects which require amendment. As to these the demurrer is

allowed.

Order accordingly.
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Eowe V. BoUns, 36 N. J. Eq. 19. (1882.)

The Chancellor:

The bill is filed to follow trust funds which, it alleges, were

invested by a trustee by malversation in property, the title to

which he took in his own name, and which he, at his death,

claimed to own as his individual estate. It prays for a decree

establishing the rights of the cestiiis que trustent in the premises,

and incidentally for a discovery; also for a distribution of the

fund and an injunction to protect it pendente lite. Various ob-

jections are made to the bill under the notice, some in the nature

of a general and others of a special demurrer. The former are

not well taken : the latter are. The prayer for process is fatally

0 A ELLOR :
It i a bill for dower: thi i th ub tantial relief pray d. The
bill anti ipate that a decree for divorc , obtained by th hu bancl,
in hi lif time, will be t up a a def nee; and a k dower
notwith tanding that d cree; all ging that it wa fraudul ntly
procur d, and tting out th fact on whi h th allegation of fraud
i faun 1 d. Th complainant might have :fil d her bill for dower
ayin nothing of the decree for divorce, and left that to come up
in d fence. But I ee no obj ction to framing a bill a thi is
fram d; and I think the d fen e hould be by plea and an wer,
and not by demurrer. The ground of demurrer, ther fore, which
go to the matter of the bill are not well taken. A to the e, the
demurrer will b overruled.
Th want of pray r for proc s and of i!!Il.ature of coun 1, are
d f t which require amendment. A to th e the demurr r i
allow d.
Ord r a cordingly.
TIIE

defective. While the bill prays for process against "the said de-

fendants," without naming any person, it does not appear from

Howe v. Robins, 36 N. J. Eq. 19.
Trrn

H

{1882.)

NCELLOR:

Th bill i :fil d to follow tru t funds which it alleO'e were
inve t d b a tru t e by malversation in prop rty, the titl to
whi h he took in hi own name and which h , at hi d ath,
claim a to own a hi individual e tate. It pra for a a cree
tabli bing th ri ht of the ce tui que frusten t in the premi e
and in id ntall for a di cover · al o for a di tribution of the
fund and an injunction to prate t it pendente lite. \ ariou obj tion ar mad to the bill und r the notice om in th nature
of a n ral and otb r of a p cial d murr r. The form r are
n t w 11 tak n ; th latt r ar . Th pra r for proce i fatally
a f ti . \\1 il the bill pra for proc a crain t th ai
i ndant
without namin an. per on it do not app ar from

112

112 Prayer for Process

the other parts of the bill, with reasonable certainty, who arc

referred to as "the said defendants." The persons mentioned in

the preceding part of the bill as the defendants, are the heirs of the

trustee alone — his children. His executrix and his widow have

both been subpoenaed to answer, but there is no prayer for process

against either of them. They are necessary parties, and so are

the other persons interested with the complainant as distributees

of the fund which the suit is brought to recover, and of which

the bill prays distribution. The complainant will have leave to

amend on payment of costs.

>joTE.— Defendants must be specially named in the bill, and process

prayed against them. None are parties against whom process is not

PRAYER FOR PROCESS

the other parts of the bill, with reasonable certainty, who are
referred to a "the said defendants." The persons mentioned in
the preceding part of the bill as the defendants, are the heirs of the
tru tee alone--hi children. Hi executrix and hi widow have
both been subpamaed to answer, but there is no prayer for process
again t either of them. They are necessary parties, and so are
the other persons intere ted with the complainant a distributees
of the fund which the uit i brought to recover, and of which
the bill prays di tribution. The complainant will have leave to
amend on payment of costs.

prayed, Windsor v. Windsor, 2 Dick. 707; Fawkes v. Pratt, i P. Wms.

592; Elmendorf v. Delancey, Hopk. 555; Talmage v. Pell, 9 Paige, 413;

Bondurant v. Sibley, 37 Ala. 565; Bond v. Hendricks, i A. K. Marsh.

592; Huston V. McClarty, 3 Litt. 274; see Ferguson v. Hass, Phil. (N. C.)

Eq. 113; unless out of the jurisdiction, Haddock v. Tomlinson, 2 S. & S.

219; Erwin v. Ferguson, 5 Ala. 158; see Brooks v. Burt, i Beav. 109;

Lttc'as V. Bank, i Stew. (Ala.) 280; or an infant heir whose name is
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unknown, Preston v. Dunn, 25 Ala. 507; Botsford v. O'Conner, 57 111.

72; Kirkham v. Justice, 17 111. 107.

A prayer that, in a certain contingency, which has not happened, another

person be made a defendant, does not make him a party, Doherty v. Ste-

venson, I Tenn. Ch. 518; see Valentine v. Fish, 45 111. 462. _

The character in which defendant is sued must also appear m the prayer,

Carter v. Ingraham, 43 Ala. 78; Brasher v. Van Cortlandt, 2 Johns. Ch.

242; Laii'son v. Kolbenson, 61 111. 405. _ ,

The following cases show what has been held a sufficient designation of

the defendant in the prayer for process : Where several stockholders, in-

cluding the objecting defendant, were mentioned by name, and that the

subpoena be directed "to the aforesaid stockholders hereinbefore meri-

tioned and stated," Carey v. Hillhouse, 5 Ga. 251; where a grantor left

many children, all of whom are dead but the defendants A, B and C, and

process prayed against the defendants, Williams v. Burnett, Busb. Eq. 209.

The following were deemed insufficient : "That the clerk be ordered to

issue subpoenas to the proper defendants," Hoyle v. Moore, 4 Ired. Eq.

17s; where a corporation was defendairt, and the process was prayed

against its president and directors, Verplanck v. Mercantile Ins. Co., 2

Paige 438, I Edw. Ch. 84; Walker v. Hallett, i Ala. 379- tt , r-u

Objection may be raised by demurrer, Wright v. Wnght, 4 Hal. Lh.

143: Archibald v. Means, 5 Ired. Eq. 230; Palmer v. ^/^z^fji^ 100 Mass.

461 ; see Boon v. Picrpont, i Stew. Eq. 7; Ferguson v. Hass, Phil. (N. C.)

Eq 113; but is waived by the defendant appearing and answering, Seger

v. Thomas. 3 Blatchf. 11; Airs v. Billops, 4 Jones Eq. 17; Belknap v.

Stone, I Allen, 572; or appearing and allowing a decree pro confesso to

be taken, Brasher v. Van Cortlandt, 2 Johns. Ch. 242.— Rep.

NoTE.-Defendants must be specially named in the bill, and process
prayed again t them. None are parties against whom proce s is not
prayed, Windsor v. Windsor, 2 Dick. 707; Fawkes v. Pratt, l P. Wms.
592; Elmendorf v. Delancey, Hopk. 555; Talmage v. Pell, 9 Paige, 413;
Bondurant v. Sibley, 37 Ala. 565; Bond v. Hendricks, l A. K. Marsh.
592; Huston v. McClarty, 3 Litt. 274; see Ferguson v. Hass, Phil. (N. C.)
Eq. II3; unless out of the jurisdiction, Haddock v. Tomlinson, 2 S. & S.
219; Erwin v. Ferguson, 5 Ala. 158; see Brooks v. Burt, l Beav. 109;
Liicas v. Bank, 1 Stew. (Ala.) 280; or an infant heir whose name is
unknown, Preston v. Dimn, 25 Ala. 507; Botsford v. O'C onner, 57 Ill.
72; Kirkham v. Justice, 17 Ill. 107.
A prayer that, in a certain contingency, which has not happened, another
person be made a defendant, does not make him a party, Doherty v. Stevenson, 1 Tenn. Ch. 518; see Valentine v. Fish, 45 Ill. 462.
The character in which defendant is sued must also appear in the prayer,
Carter v. Ingraham, 43 Ala. 78; Brasher v. Van Cortlandt, 2 Johns. Ch.
242; Lawson v. Kolbenson, 61 Ill. 405.
The following cases show what has heen held a sufficient designation of
the defendant in the prayer for process: Where several stockholders, including the objecting defendant, were mentioned by name, and that the
subpcena be directed "to the aforesaid stockholders hereinbefore mentioned and stated," Carey v. Hillhouse, 5 Ga. 251; where a grantor left
many children, all of whom are dead but the defendants A, B and C, and
process prayed against the defendants, Williams v. Burnett, Bush. Eq. 209.
The following were deemed insufficient: "That the clerk be ordered to
issue subpcenas to the proper defendants," Hoyle v. Moore, 4 Ired. Eq.
175; where a corporation wa defendant, and the process was prayed
again t its president and director , Verplanck v. Mercantile Ins. Co., 2
Paige 438, 1 Edw. Ch. 84; Walker v. Hallett, 1 Ala. 379.
Objection may be raised by demurrer, Wright v. Wright, 4 Hal. Ch.
143; Archibald v. Means, 5 Ired. Eq. 230; Palmer v. Stevens, 100 Mass.
461; ee Boon v. Pierpont 1 Stew. Eq. 7; Ferguson v. Hass, Phil. (N. C.)
Eq. 113; but i waived by the defendant appearing and answering, Seger
v. Tltonias, 3 Blatchf. II; Airs v. Billops, 4 Jones Eq. 17; Belknap v.
Ston e, l Allen, 572; or appearing and allowing a decree pro confesso to
be taken, Brasher v. Van Cortlandt, 2 Johns. Ch. 242.-REP.

CARTER

,t^

rj

Cakter v. Ixgraham 113

'\y

Carter v. Ingraham, 43 Ala. 78. (1869.)

Peck, C. J. :

/'Ir

r.

Tljrcase appears ta have been conducted, in that court, with great

carelessness anq^tfregularity, from the beginning to the end; and

the transcrji^f is miserably made up, with little or no regard as to

oi3ieT of time when the different parts of the proceedings in the

cafcwere had.

1^ ^ The bill was filed by the appellee, Moses Ingraham, against the

f \ appellants, as the heirs at law of Joel W. J. Carter, deceased, the

'^ ^y children and grand children of the said Joel W. J. Carter, ten in

^*^ number, four of whom are infants under the age of twenty-one

{J^ years, two under, and two over fourteen years.

j:^ The bill states that complainant, in the year 1860, recovered a

(^ judgment in the circuit court of said county, against the said Joel

^ k- W,^. Carter, and one Malachi A. Carter, for the sum of fourteen
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'^ ^r^undred and fifty dollars, debt, and eighty-six dollars, damages,

^ I ^ and costs of suit; that in 18G4, the said Malachi A. Carter de-

^y^^ parted this life, wholly insolvent; that the said Joel W. J. Carter,

1^ in the year 1862, departed this life, at his residence, in said county

■^ of, Lawrence, leaving his last will and testament, which was ad-

^ A^^mltPpd to record in the office of the probate court of said county,

O'^ v^but it does not state the said last will and testament was proved.

y^^)^ The bill further states, that by said will, the said Ichabod "W.

^jZy /Carter, and one L. H. Carter were appointed executors; that

yk> shortly afterwards, the said L. H. Carter died, leaving the said

-^ ,.-+r Ichabod TV. Carter the sole surviving executor ; that both of said

iy\ ^ executors qualified as such. It further states, that the said Joel

/^ cW. J. Carter, was the owner, and was seized and possessed at the

^^Jh^^ iuwe the said judgment was rendered, of certain lands, and died

J^"^ seized and possessed of the same, lying and being in the said county

' i>f Lawrence; the lands are described. The bill then states the

^ "names of the heirs-at-law, the said Ichabod "W. Carter being one.

Tlie bill also states that an execution was duly issued upon said

judgment, and afterwards alias and pluries executions were issued,

but it does not state when they were issued ; that neither of them

were satisfied, cither in whole or part, and that said judgment

r^

I

113

RAHAM

1'r1
Garter . Ingraham, 48 Ala. 78.

(1869.)

• J. =
i ca e originat d in the chancery court of Lawrence county.
T
a e appears ~.9 have be n onducted, in that court, with great
arn,lAfregularity, from the beginning to the end; and
arel n
the tran c~{ i mi erably made up, with littl or no regard a to
\ ~<?~of time when the different parts of the proceeding in the
, ci'CaW'Were had.
tr' The bill wa filed by the appellee, Moses Ingraham, against the
~ appellant , a the heir at law of Joel W. J . arter, decea d, the
/ / children and grand children of the aid Joel W. J. Carter, ten in
v~ number, four of whom are infant under the age of twenty-one
(...V.
ear , two under, and two over fourteen year .
~
The bill tate that complainant, in the year 1860, recovered a
~ judgment in the circuit court of said county, again t the aid Joel
. Carter, and one Malachi A. Carter, for the um of fourteen
-"'
red and fifty dollar , debt, and eighty- ix dollars, damage ,
co t of uit; that in 1 64, the said Malachi A. Carter de. parted thi life, wholly insolvent; that the aid Joel W. J . Carter,
~ in the year 1862, departed this life, at his re idence, in aid county
of :\iawrence, leaving hi la t will and te tament, which wa adrnit~d to record in the office of the probate court of aid county,
~ /hut it doe not tate the aid la t will and te tament was proved.
/
~The bill further tate, that by aid will, the aid Ichabod W.
~er, and one L. H. Carter were appointed executors; that
_ ;t.. hortly afterward , the aid L. H . Carter died, leaving the aid
-· ~ Ichabod W. Cart r the ole urviving executor; that both of aid
/
' ex cutors qualifi d a uch. It further tat , that the aid Joel
tif/
. J. Carter wa the owner, and wa eized and po e ed at the
'~-~ tim th aid judgm nt wa r ndered, of certain land , and died
~
.. ' """ iz d and po e d of th am 1 ing and being in the aid county
~
£ Lawrence; th land are de crib d. The bill then tat the
,-v-1'"' nam of the heir -at-law the aid I ha.bod W. arter b inO' one.
, ,.,-11
Th bill al o ta te that an ex cution wa ul ' i ued upon ai
_,..,,.- ju Q"1Il nt and afterward alia and plurie :s: ution wer is u
that n ither of them
but it do not tate when th · w re i u
ith r in whole or part an that aid ju gm nt
w r ati fi
A,

his case originated in the chancery court of Lawrence county.

?

.

.

PECK,

·

,;:;.J

8
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114 Peayer for Process

remains wholly unpaid. He makes a transcript of said Judgment

and execution, an exhibit to his bill, by which it appears that the

first execution was issued the 20th of March, 1866, but the exhibit

does not show that it ever went into the sheriff's hands, nor does

it show that any other execution was issued. The object of the

bill is to set up and enforce an alleged lien, under this judgment,

against said lands, for the purpose of satisfying the same ; although

the bill indirectly states that said Ichabod W. Carter is executor,

&c., and also one of the heirs-at-law, it only prays process against

him as an individual. Process is prayed against the other heirs-at-

law, and they are all made defendants; the bill prays that

guardians ad litem may be appointed for the infants; that the

judgment may be decreed to be a lien on said lands, and that they

may be sold for the payment of the same. The bill is not sworn

to. A guardian ad litem was appointed for the said infants, but

without an affidavit as to the fact of infancy, or that the infants

were believed to be under, or over fourteen years of age.

It appears, in the proceedings, that two summons were issued,

one to the defendants, who are of age, and the other to the infant
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defendants, and they are both returned by the sheriff, "executed in

full, November 13th, 1866," without stating, in any manner, how

they were executed. The 20th rule of chancery practice prescribes

how summons issued against infants may be served. By this rule

they may be served upon their parents, or either of them, if in

life, or in case they are dead, upon the general guardian of such

infants. When there is no parent or guardian, or the interest of

the parent, or parents, or the guardian, is adverse to the infants,

if they are over fourteen years of age, then the service must be

upon said infants personally; and if the infants are under the

age of fourteen, then the service must be upon such person or per-

sons as may have the maintenance and charge of such infants,

unless opposed in interest; and if there is any case not provided

for by statute, or by said rule, or some other rule, and proof be

made before the chancellor or register, he may direct the mode of

service, or appoint a guardian ad litem for such infants, Avithout

service. It may be stated here that the bill docs not say whether

there were any parents, or general guardian, nor does it state who,

if any person, had the maintenance or charge of the said infants.

The summons against the defendants of age, is against the said

Ichabod W. Carter, as executor, and as heir-at-law. The bill, how-

PRAYER FOR PROCESS

remains wholly unpaid. He makes a transcript of said judgment
and execution, an exhibit to his bill, by which it appears that the
:first execution was issued the 20th of March, 1866, but the exhibit
does not how that it ever went into the sheriff's hands, nor does
it show that any other execution was i sued. The object of the
bill i to set up and enforce an alleged lien, under this judgment,
against said lands, for the purpose of satisfying the same; although
the bill indirectly states that said Ichabod W. Carter is executor,
&c., and also one of the heirs-at-law, it only pra ys process against
him as an individual. Process is prnyed against the other heirs-atlaw, and they are all made defendants; the bill prays that
guardians ad litem may be appointed for the infants; that the
judgment may be decreed to be a lien on said lands, a.nd that they
may be sold for the payment of the same. The bill is not sworn
to. A guardian ad litem was appointed for the said infants, but
without an affidavit as to the fact of infancy, or that the infants
were believed to be under, or over fourteen years of age.
It appears, in the proceedings, that two summons were issued,
one to the defendants, who are of age, and the other to the infant
defendants, and they are both returned by the sheriff, "executed in
full, November 13th, 1866," without stating, in any manner, how
they were executed. The 20th rule of chancery practice prescribes
how summons issued against infants may be served. By this rule
they may be served upon their parents, or either of them, if in
life, or in case they are dead, upon the general guardian of such
infants. When there is no parent or guardian, or the interest of
the parent, or parents, or the guardian, is adverse to the infants,
if they are over fourteen years of age, then the service must be
upon said infants personally; and if the infants are under the
age of fourteen, then the service must be upon such per on or peron a may have the maintenance and charge of such infants,
unle · oppo ed in intere t; and if th re is any ca e not provided
for by tatute, or by aid rul , or ome other rule, and proof be
mad before the chanc llor or regi ter, he may dir ct the mode of
ervi e, or appoint a guardian ad litem for uch infants, without
service. It may be tat d here that the bill do not ay whether
there were any parents, or g neral guardian, nor do it state who,
if any person, had the maintenanc or charge of the aid infants.
Th summons against the defendant of age, is agaiin t the aid
Ichabod W. arter, a executor, and a heir-at-law. The bill, how1

CARTER
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ever, gave the register no authority to issue it against him as

executor, because no process is prayed against him in that char-

acter, and besides, he answered the bill as heir-at-law, or as Ichabod

W. Carter merely, and not as executor. In his answer this de-

fendant admits substantially all the statements in the bill, but

denies the lien, and says there is no equity in the bill, and states

that he demurs to the bill, but does not show any reasons why he

demurred. Section 3350, Revised Code, says, "a defendant to a

bill must set forth the ground of demurrer specially, or otherwise

must not be heard." A decree pro confesso was taken against the

other defendants of age. The guardian ad litem, so irregularly

appointed, answered the bill, and says he knows nothing of the

truth of the allegations of the bill.

There was no evidence by depositions taken in the case, and it

was submitted (the demurrer of the said Ichabod W. Carter to

the bill of complaint having been overruled), upon the bill, answer

of said Ichabod W. Carter, answer of the guardian ad litem,

exhibit to the bill, and the decree pro confesso entered against the

defendants of age, who had not answered the bill. A decree was
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rendered by which it is declared, that the said judgment is a lien

on the lands described in the bill, and unless the amount due on the

said judgment be paid in thirty days after the adjournment of the

court, the register should proceed to sell the said lands, and report

to the next term of the court.

The money not being paid, the register sold the lands, and they

were bought by the appellee, and one Crittenden ; the master made

his report to the court at the next term ; the report was confirmed,

and it was ordered, adjudged and decreed, that the register make

deeds to the purchasers and put them in possession of the lands.

Tlie defendants have appealed to this court, and assigned several

errors in the decree of the court below. It is, for the purpose of

this opinion, only necessary to notice the assignment, that brings

to the attention of this court, the appointment of the guardian

ad litem for the infant defendants. The appointment of the

guardian ad litem, without complying with the said 23d rule of

chancery practice, is an error, for which the decree must be re-

versed, on the authority of Bliett and Wife et al. v. Mastin, Trustee,

decided at this term. The appellee's counsel insists that the

executor, the said Ichabod W. Carter only, is a necessary party

defendant in this case, and as he admits all the important allega-

.

I
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ever, gave the r gi t r no authority to i ue it against him al:l
executor, becau no proce i pr y d again t him in that character, and besicl , he an w r d the bill a h ir-at-law, or as Ichabod
W. art r mer ly, and not a exe utor. In hi an wer this defendant admit ub tantially all the tatement in the bill, but
deni th lie , and ay th r i no quity in the bill, and tates
that h demur to the bill, but do s not how any reasons why he
demurr d.
cction 3350, R vi ed Code, ay , "a defendant to a
bill mu t t forth the ground of demurrer pecially, or otherwi e
mu t not be heard." A decree pro confesso wa taken again t the
other d .fendant of age. The guardiaID ad Zitem, so irregularly
appoint d, an w r d the bill, and says he knows nothing of the
truth of the allegation of the bill.
There wa no vidence by depo itions taken in the ca e, and it
wa ubmitted (the demurrer of the said Ichabod W. Carter to
the bill of complaint having be n overruled), upon the bill, an wer
of said Ichabod W. Carter, answer of the guardian ad Zitem,
exhibit to the bill, and the decree pro confesso entered against the
defendant of ag , who had not an wered the bill. A decree wa
rend red by which it is declared, that the aid judgment i a lien
on the land de cribed in the bill, and unless the amount due on the
said judgment b paid in thirty days after the adjournment of the
court, the regi t r hould proceed to sell the said lands, and report
to the next term of the court.
The mon y not b ing paid, the regi ter sold the lands, and they
were bought by the appellee, and one Crittenden; the master made
hi r port to the court at the next term ; the report was confirmed,
and it wa order d, adjudged and decreed, that the register make
ion of the land .
deed to the pur ha ers and put them in po
The d fendant ha e appeal d to this court, and assigned everal
error in the d cree of the court below. It is, for the purpo e of
thi opinion, only ne s ary to notice the as ignment, that bringto th attention of thi court, the appointm nt of the guardian
ad litem for th infant def ndant . Th appointment of the
guardian ad litem, without compl ing with the aid 3d rule of
i an error, for which th d er e mu t b r chanc r pra ti
r d on th authority of Rhett and Wife et al. v. Ma tin Tru tee,
d ci 1 at thi t rm. The app 11
coun 1 in i t" that the
.· ut r, th ail.d I habod W. art r onl i a nee ary party
d f ndant in thi a , and a he admit all the important ullega-
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tions of the bill, the decree should be permitted to stand, as to

him, in his character as executor. He says, "the only error in the

decree was in not dismissing the bill as to all the defendants

except the executor," and that this court should correct this error,

by dismissing the bill as to the other defendants, and affirming

the decree, thus corrected, against the executor. This can not be

done, for the reason that the bill is not sufficient to authorize any

decree against the said lehabod W. Carter as executor. The bill

does not state that the will was proved, but only, that it was

recorded in the probate court. This is not sufficient; it should

have stated that the will was proved. Stating that the will was

recorded, is not equivalent to stating that it was proved ; besides,

no process is prayed against him as executor ; true, the summons,

in the nature of a subpoena, was issued against him as heir-at-law,

and as executor, but this does not help the matter, as the register

had no authority to issue such a summons ; he should have followed

the prayer of the bill. Nor does the answer filed by him, cure this

defect, for he does not answer as executor, but as Ichabod W.

Carter merely. He is, therefore, not a party defendant to the bill
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in such manner as to authorize any decree against him in that

character.

The bill is full of defects and infirmities, and the subsequent

proceedings are full of irregularities, but under our liberal laws

on the subject of amendments, it is possible the bill may be so

amended as to make out a good case for the complainant; and

that he may do so, if it can be done, the case will be remanded for

that purpose.

The demurrer to the bill of complaint was rightly overruled,

because no grounds of demurrer are stated, as required by said

section 3350 of the Revised Code; but if proper grounds of de-

murrer had been stated in the answer, then the demurrer should

have been sustained; for the bill, as it is, is clearly insufficient.

The decree is clearly erroneous, not merely because of the error

in the appointment of the guardian ad litem for the infant de-

fendants, but because there is no evidence to sustain it, especially

as to them. The admissions in the answer of the said Ichabod W.

Carter, is no evidence against the infants, nor is the decree pro

confcsso against the other defendants ; in fact, there is no evidence

whatever against them.

It is deemed unnecessary to pursue this investigation further;

PRAYER FOR PROCESS

tions of the bill, the decree should be permitted to stand, as to
him, in hi character a executor. He a} "the only error in the
decree, wa in not di mi ing the bill a to all the d f endants
except the executor, ' and that thi court hould correct thi error,
by di mi ing the bill a to the other defendants and affirming
the d er e thu corr cted, against the executor. Thi can not be
done for the rea on that the bill i not sufficient to authorize any
decree again t the aid Ichabod W. Carter as executor. The bill
doe not tate that the will was proved, but only that it wa~
recorded in the probate court. Thi i not ufficient; it hould
have tated that the will was proved. Stating that the will was
recorded, i not equivalent to ta.t ing that it wa proved; be ide ,
no proce i prayed again t him a executor; true, the ummon ,
in the nature of a ubpama, was i u d again t him a heir-at-law,
and as executor, but this does not help the matter, as the register
had no authority to i sue uch a summons; he should have followed
the prayer of the bill. Nor does the answer filed by him, cure thi ~
defect, for he does not an wer as executor, but a Ichabod \\.
Carter merely. He is, therefore, not a party defendant to the bill
in uch ma,n ner as to authorize any decree against him in that
character.
The bill is full of defects and infirmities, and the subsequent
proceedings are full of irregularities, but under our liberal laws
on the ubject of amendments, it is pos ible the bill may be so
amended as to make out a good case for the complainant; and
that he may do so, if it can be done, the case will be remanded for
that purpose.
The demurrer to the bill of complaint wa rightly overruled,
becau e no grounds of demurrer are tated, a required by aid
section 3350 of the Revised Code; but if proper grounds of demurrer had be n tat d in the answer, then the demurrer hould
hav been u ta.in d; for th bill, a it i i clearly in ufficient.
The deer e is clearly erroneous, not merely becau e of th error
in th appointm nt of th guardian ad litem for the infant defendamt
ut b cau ther i no e id nee to u ta.in it e p cially
a to th m. Th admi ion in the an wer of th aid I habod W.
Carl r i no vid n again t the infant nor i the decree pro
conf e o a ain t th other d fendant · in fact th r i no vid nee
what ver acrain t th m.
It i d m d unn ce ary to pur u thi in e tigation further;
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the decree of the court below is reversed, with all the proceedings

back to the bill of complaint, at the costs of the appellee, with

leave to the complainant to amend his said bill as he may be

11

AL:MER

:JIARTI

the d er of the court low i r v r ed, with all the proc eding
back to the bill of omplaint, at th o t of the app llee, with
1 av t the
mplainant to amend hi aid bill a he may he
ad i d.

advised.

Peters^ J., not sitting in this case, having been of counsel.

PET •n

J

•

not it ing in thi

a.

ha i g b en f oun el.

te

Signing the Bill. 'XiJ^\

lit/~

Martin v. Palmer, 72 Vt. 409. (1900.)^^^'' J^ '

Chancery. Heard on bill and motion to dismiss. Orange vt^

if,~ ~' J!~

County, December Term, 1899, Munson, Chancellor. Decree ren- i -O. r

dered dismissing the bill. The orator appealed. The appeal was ,^

IG I.i:

TIIE

ILL.

filed as of course. ^r^ ^

Watson, J. :

The bill of complaint was brought to foreclose a mortgage, and

it was signed by the orators' solicitor, but not by the orators.

The defendant moved to dismiss the bill for that there was no

signature of the orators thereto. The motion w^as granted, and

the cause is here upon appeal therefrom.

The bill is usually drawn by the orators' solicitor, and he is
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responsible for its contents. If it contains matter criminal, im-

Martin . Palmer, 7 Vt. 409.

{1900.)

>4 "'Y~Qf.

C - A CERY.
ard on bill and motion to di mi , Oranierl . Y
County D cemb r T rm, 1 99, Mun on, hancellor. Decree r en- ~
vdered di mi ing the bill. The orator appealed. The appeal was V' .'cl
filed a of cour e.
~ /

rY
/

pertinent, or scandalous, such matter may be expunged, and the

solicitor ordered to pay costs; and, from an early time, the gen-

eral rule of practice has been imperative that the signature of

counsel must be subscribed thereto.

It was declared by Lord Eldon that such signature of counsel

is to be regarded as a security'' that, judging from written instruc-

tions laid before him of the case of the defendant as well as of

the plaintiff, there appeared to him, at the time of framing the

bill good ground of suit. Mit. & Ty. Eq. PI. & Pr. 145 ; 1 Dan.

Ch. PI. & Pr. 357. And so it is regarded under the chancery

practice in this State (Chancer}' Eule 8), and in the Federal

Courts. Equity Rule 24.

A party may sue in person and so bo his own solicitor, in

which event only, the practice requires that his signature be sub-

scribed to the bill. 1 Hoff. Ch. Pr. 97.

The decree was not for the foreclosure of a mortgage, and,

W TON J.:
Th bill of complaint wa brought to foreclo._ a mortgage and
it wa igned by th orator ' olicitor, but not by the orator .
Th d f ndant moved to di mi the bill for that ther wa no
ignature of the orators thereto. The motion wa granted, and
the cau e i here upon appeal therefrom.
The bill i u ually drawn by the orator ' olicitor, and he i,
r pon ible for it contents. If it contain matter criminal impertin nt or candalou , uch matter may be expunged, and the
olicitor ordered to pay co · and, from an arl time, the er. neral rul of practice ha b n imperati e that the ignature of
coun 1 mu t be ub cribed thereto.
It wa declar d b Lord Eldon that uch irnature of coun el
i to
r o-arded a a curity that judging fro written in truction laid b for him of th ca e of the d f ndant a well a f
th plaintiff th r app ared to him at the tim of framino- th
bill, o-ood Q"TOund of uit. l\lit. & T . Eq. I. & Pr. 1-± ~ · 1 Dan.
Ch. 1. ., Pr. 3
nd o it i r o-ard d under the chan ery
practi
in thi
tate ( hancery Rule ) an m the Fed ral
ourt .
quit Rul 2-±.
\. party ma
u in p rson and o b hi own olicitor in
whi h
nt onl ·.. h
ra ti reguir that hi ignature
ubcrib d t th ill. 1 off. h. r .
Th d er
wa not f r th for 1 ur of a mortcrage, a
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therefore, the orators could take an appeal without permission of

the court therefor. V. S. 981.

Decree reversed, and cause remanded with mandate that the

motion to dismiss he overruled, and hill adjudged sufficiejit.

CERTAINTY IN PLEADING

therefore, the orator could take an appeal without permission of
the court ther for. V. S. 98l.
D ecree rever ed, and cause remanded with mandate that the
motion to dismiss be ov erruled, and bill adjudged sufficient.

Certainty in Pleading.

Dovaston v. Payne, 2 H. Blaclcstone 527. (1795.)

Eeplevin for taking the cattle of the plaintiff. Avowry, that

the defendant was seised in fee of the locus in quo, and took the

cattle damage feasant. Plea, that the locus in quo "lay contiguous

CERTAINTY IN PLEADING.

and next adjoining to a certain common and publick king's high-

way, and that the defendant and all other owners, tenants and

Dovaston v. Payne, 2 H. Blackstone 527.

{1 795.)

occupiers of the said place in which &c. with the appurtenances,

for the time being, from time whereof the memory of man is not

to the contrary, have repaired and amended, and have been used

and accustomed to repair and amend, and of right ought to have

repaired and amended, and the said defendant still of right ought

to repair and amend the hedges and fences between the said place

in which &c. and the said highway, when and so often as need

or occasion hath been or required, or shall or may be required
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to prevent cattle heing in the said highway from erring and escap-

ing thereout into the said place in which &c. through the defects

and defaults of the said hedges and fences, and doing damage

there. And because the said hedges and fences between the said

place in which &c. and the said highway, before and at the time

when &c. were ruinous, broken down prostrated and in great decay

for want of needful and necessary repairing and amending thereof,

the said cattle in the said declaration mentioned just before the

said time when &c. heing in the said highway erred and escaped

thereout, into the said place in which &c. through the defects and

defaults &c. &c." To this plea there was a special demurrer. For

that it is not shewn in or by the said plea, that the said cattle

before the said time when &c. when they escaped out of the said

highway into the said place in which &c. were passing through and

along the said highway, nor that they had any right to he there

at all, &c."

The support of the demurrer Williams, Scr jt. argued as follows :

REPLEVI r for taking the cattle of the plaintiff. Avowry, that
the defendant was eised in fee of the locus in quo, and took the
cattle damage feasant. Plea, that the locus in quo "lay contiguous
and next adjoining to a certain common and publick king's highway, and that the defendant and all other owners, tenant and
occupiers of the said place in which &c. with the appurtenances,
for the time being from time whereof the memory of man is not
to the contrary, have repaired and amended, and have been used
and accustomed to repair and amend, and of right ought to haive
repair d and amended, and the said defendant still of right ought
to repair and amend the hedges and fences between the said place
in which &c. and the aid highway, when and o often as need
or occasion hath been or required, or shall or may be required
to prevent cattle being in the said highway from erring aind escaping thereout into the aid place in which &c. through the defect.
and default of the said hedges and fences, and doing damage
th re. And b cause the said hedges and fence between t he said
place in which &c. and the said highway, before and at the time
when &c. were ruinou , broken down prostrated and in great decay
for want of n edful and necessary repairing and amending thereof,
th aid cattle in the aid declaration mentione just before the
ajd time wh n &c. being in the aid highway rred and escaped
th rcout, into the aid place in whi h &c. throu h the defect and
d faults & . & ." To thi pl a ther wa a pe ial d murrer, For
that it i not h wn in or by th aid pl a, that th aid cattle
b for th aid tirn when &c. when th y e ap d out of th aid
highway into the aid place in which &c. were pa ing through and
along the said highway, nor that th y had any right to be there
at all &c."
'I'h . upport of th demurrer William S rjt. argu d a follows:

Dov

DovASTON V. Payne 119

It is a rule in pleading, that if the defendant admits the fact

complained of ho must shew some good reason for or justification

of it. If the cattle in this case had escaped from an adjoining

close through the default of the plaintiff's fences, the defendant

must have shewn that he had an interest in that close, or a licence

from the owner to put his cattle there; Dyer, 3G5. a. Sir F. Leke's

case, recognized Hob. 104. Digby v. Fitzherhert; for a man is

bound to repair against those who have right, but not against

those who have no right. So if cattle escape from a highway,

the party justifying a trespass must shew they were lawfvdly

along the highway, that is, were passing and repassing on it,

which is material and traversable. It is not sufficient that they

were simply in it, the being there is equivocal and not traversable.

The owner of the soil may have trespass, if the cattle do any

thing but merely pass and repass, Bro. Abr. Tresp. pi. 321, and

according to this principle the entries state in pleas of this kind,

that the cattle were super viam prcedictam transseuntes. Thomp.

Entr. 296, 397, and in Heme's Plead. 822 that they were "driven

along the highway."
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Hey wood, Serjt, contra. The same strictness is not required in

a plea in bar to an avowry in replevin, as in a justification in

trespass. Here the plaintiff pleads the plea, and it is sufficient

for him to shew that his cattle were wrongfully taken. The

fassing on the highway is as uncertain as the being there, and as

little traversable. But the material issues on the record would be,

■whether the fences were out of repair, and whether the defend-

ant was bound to repair them. If he were, it is immaterial whether

the cattle were passing on the highway or not. In a plea in bar

certainty to a common intent is sufficient. It may therefore be

intended that the cattle were lawfully in the highway.

Lord Ch. J. Eyre:

I agree with my brother Williams as to the general law, that'

the party who would take advantage of fences being out of repair,

as an excuse for his cattle escaping from a way into the land of

another, must shew that he was lawfully using the easoment when

the cattle so escaped. This therefore reduces the case to a single

point, namely, Wliother it does not apjx^ar on the plea, to a

common intent, that tlio cattle were on the highway using it in

such a manner as the owner had a right to do, from the words

STO

v.

AYNE

119

It i a rule in pl ading, that if the defendant admit th fact
complain d of h mu t hew om g d r a on for or ju tifi tion
of it.
f tl
ttl in thi c:a ha
·ap d from an adjoining
clo e thr ugh the d fault of tl plaintiff f n ·e the d fondant
h wn that h ha 1 an int r t in that lo e, or a lie nee
must ha
from th own r o put hi cattl ther ; y r, 365. a. ir F. J_,cke
case, r gniz d lob. 104. Digby . Fitzherbert.; for a man i:,
bound to r pair again t tho e who hav right but not again t
tho who ha
no right.
o if cattl
cape from a highwa ,
t he party ju tifying a tre pa mu t hew th y were lawfully
along tl highway that i , w re pa ing and repa ing on it,
which i material and trav r able. It i not ufficient hat they
were imply in it, the being there i equivocal and not traver able.
The own r of th oil may have tr pa , if the cattle do any
t hing but merely pa and repa , Bro. Abr. Tre p. pl. 3 1 and
according to thi principle the entrie state in pl a of thi kind,
that th attle were super viam prwdictam transseunte . Thomp.
E ntr. 2 6, 397, and in Herne' Plead. 822 thait th y were 'driven
along the highway.n
H ywood, Serjt, contra. The ame trictne i not required in
a pl a in bar to an avowry in r plevin, as in a ju tification in
t respa . Here the plaintiff plead the plea, and it is suffici nt
for him to h w that hi cattle were wrongfully taken. The
passing on the highway i as uncertain as the being there, and as
little traver able. But the material i ue on the r cord would be,
wheth r th f nc w re out of r pair, and whether the def ndant wa bound tor pair th m. If he were, it i immaterial wh ther
the attl were pa ing on the highway or not. In a plea in bar
certainty to a common intent i ufficient. It may therefore be
intend d that the cattle were lawfully in the highway.
Lord h. J. E RE:
I a r with m brother Williams a to the g neral law that I
the part who would ake advantag of fenc b in out of r pair \
a an e u for hi attle e ca ping from a wa3 into the lan 1 of
anoth r, mu t h w that he wa lawfull u ing th ea em nt when
th attl o
ap d. rnhi th r for r duce th a to a ino'le
th r it d
not ap ar on the pl a. t a
p int, nam 13,
conimon int nt that th attlc w r on th hio-hway usin ... it in
u h a mann r a h own r ha 1 a right to do from th w rd~
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"being in the said highway?" Tliis is a different case from cattle

escaping from a close, where it is necessary to shew that the owner

had a right to put them there, because a highway being for the

use of the public, cattle may be in the highway of common right ;

I doubt therefore whether it requires a more particular statement.

It would certainly have been more formal, to have said that the

cattle were passing and repassing, and if the evidence had proved

that they were grazing on the way, though the issue would have

been literally, it would not have been substantially proved. But

I doubt whether the being in the highway might not have been

traversed, and if the being in tlie highway can be construed to be

certain to a common intent, the plea may be supported, notwith-

standing there is a special demurrer, for a special demurrer does

not reach a mere literal expression. The precedents indeed seem

to make it necessary to state that the cattle were passing and re-

passing, but they are but few; yet upon the whole, I rather

think the objection a good one, because those forms of pleading

are as cited by my brother Williams.

BULLER, J. :
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This is so plain a case, that it is difficult to make it a ground

of argument. But my brother Heywood says, there is a difference

between trespass and replevin in the rules of pleading. In some

cases there is certainly a material difference in the pleading in

the two actions, though in others they are the same. One of the

cases in which they differ, is that if trespass be brought for taking

CER'r.AINTY IN PLEADING

'being in the said highway?" This is a different ca e from cattle
e caping from a clo e, where it is nece ary to h w that the owner
had a right to put them there, becau e a highway being for the
u e of th public, cattle may be in the highway of common right;
I doubt therefore wh ther it requires a more particular statement.
It would certainly have been more formal, to have aid that the
cattle were pa ing and repa ing, and if the evid nc had proved
that they w re grazing on the wa3, though the i ue would have
been literally, it would not have been ub tantially proved. But
I doubt whether the being in the highway might not ha1e been
traver ed, and if the being in the highway can be construed to be
certain to a common intent, the plea may be supported, nohvithstanding there is a -special demurrer, for a special demurrer does
not reach a mere literal expres ion. The precedents indeed seem
to make it necessary to state that the cattle were passing and repas ing, but they are but few; yet upon the whole, I rather
think the objection a good one, because those forms of pleading
are as cited by my brother Williams.

cattle which were distrained damage feasant, it is sufficient for

the defendant to say that he was possessed of the close, and the

cattle were doing damage : but in replevin the avowant must deduce

a title to the close. Wherever there is a difference, it is in favour

of trespass and against replevin : for in trespass an excuse in a plea

is sufficient, but in an avowry a title must be shewn. This brings

me to the question, Whether the plea on this record be good to a

common intent? Now I think that the doctrine of certainty to

a common intent will not support it. Certainty in pleading has

been stated by Lord Coke (Co. Litt. 303) to be of three sorts, viz.

certainty to a common intent, to a certain intent in general, and to

a certain intent in every particular. I remember to have heard

Mr. Justice Afton treat these distinctions as a jargon of words,

without meaning. They have however long been made, and ought

J.:
This is so plain a case, that it is difficult to make it a ground
of argument. But my brother Heywood says, there is a difference
between trespas and replevin in the rules of pleading. In some
case there is certainly a material difference in the pleading in
the two actions, though in others they are the same. One of the
ca es in whicli they differ, i that if trespass be brought for taking
cattle whh~h were di trained damage feasant, it is sufficient for
the defendant to ay that he wa possessed of the clo e, and the
·attle w re doing damage: but in replevin the avowant must deduce
a title to the clo e. Wherever there is a difference, it i in favour
of tr pa and again t repl vin : for in tre pas an excu e in a plea
I
uffici nt but in an avowry a title mu t be hewn. Thi bring
me to the qu tion Wh ther the plea on thi record b good to a
ow I think that the do trine of c rtaint. to
common int nt?
a common int nt will not support it. Certainty in pl a<lina ha
b en tated by Lord oke (Co. Litt. 303) to be of thr
ort , viz.
tainty to a ommon intent to a rtain intent in a n ral and to
a rtain int nt in every particular. I r meml er to hav h arcl
Mr . .Ju. ti
fton tr at th e di tin tion a a jar on of word
without m aning.
h ha how ver Ion een made, and ought
BULLER,
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not altogether to be departed from. Concerning the two last kinds

of certainty it is not necessary to say any thing at present. But

it should be remembered, that the certain intent in every particular

applies only to the case of estoppels (Co. Litt. ibid.). By a com-

mon intent I understand that when words are used, which will bear

a natural sense, and also an artificial one^ or one to be made out by

argument or inference, the natural sense shall prevail: it is simply

a rule of construction and not of addition: common intent cannot

add to a sentence words which are omitted. There is also another

rule in pleading, which is, that if the meaning of words be equivo-

cal, they shall be taken most strongly against the party pleading

them. There can be no doubt that the passing and repassing on

the highway was traversable; for the question. Whether the plain-

tiff was a trespasser or not? depends on the fact whether he was

passing and repassing and using the road as a highway, or

whether his cattle were in the road as trespassers; and that which

is tJie gist of the defence must necessarily be traversable. A

most material point therefore is omitted, and I think the plea
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would 1)0 bad on a general demurrer. But here there is a special

demurrer, and as the words are equivocal they are informal.

Heath, J. :

The law is as my brother Williams stated, that if cattle of one

man escape into the land of another, it is no excuse that the fences

were out of repair, if they were trespassers in the place from whence

they came. If it be a close, the owner of the cattle must shew an

interest or a right to put them there. If it be a way, he must shew

YNE

121

not altogether to b
part d from. 10n rning th two la t kind
of rtainty it i n t n c ary t ay any hing at pr ent. But
it hould b re mb r <l, that th
rtain int nt in very particular
appli
nly to h ·a of top 1 ( io. Litt. ibid.). By a com11ion intent I uncl 'I tand that v h n word a:re u d, which will bear
a natural en eJ an<l. al ·o an artificial oneJ or on· to be made out by
argum nt or inf r ne; , the natural sense shaU pre ail: it i imply
a rule of consflruciion and not of addition: common intent ·annot
add to a ent nc word which are omitted. There i al o an th r
rul in pl ading, which i , that if the meani g of word be qui ocal, th y hall
tak n mo t strongly again t the party pl ading
them. Th r an b no doubt that the pa ing and repas ing on
th highway wa trav rnable; for the que tion, \Vhether th plaintiff wa a tre pa er or not? depend on the fact whether he wa
p ing and r ep ing and u ing .the road a a highway, or
wh th r hi cattle w re in the road a tre pa rs; and that which
i the gi t of the defence mu t n ce arily be traver able. A
mo t mat rial point therefore i omitted, and
think the plea
would b bad on a general demurrer. But here there i a p€Cial
demurrer, and a th words aire quivocal they are informal.

that he was lawfully using the way; for the property is in the

owner of the soil, subject to an easement for the benefit of the

public. On this plea it does not appear whether the cattle were

passing and repassing, or whether they were trespassing on the

highway; the words used are entirely equivocal.

EooKE, J. of the same opinion.

Judgment for the defendant.

'i:i

J.:
The law is as my brother Williams stated, that if cattle of one
mane cape into the land of another, it i no excu e that the fences
were out of repair, if they were tre pa er in th place from whence
they came. If it b a clo e, the owner of the cattle mu t hew an \
int re t or a right to put them there. If it be a way he mu t hew
that h wa lawfull u ing the wa ; for the prop rty i in the
owner of the oil, ubject to an ea em nt for the benefit of the
public. On thi plea it doe not app ar wheth r the cattle were
pa in and repa ing or wheth r they w re tre pas ing on the
highway- the word u ed ar entirely quivocal.
HEATH,

RooKE J . of the ame opinion.
Judgment for the defendant.
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^y

Eartwell v. Blocker, 6 Ala. 581. (18U-)

Hartwell v.

-Hrli.

Blocker~

6 Ala. 581.

(1844.)

RiT of error to the Court of Chancery sitting at Mobile.

~ ,.tt .

. ^Jf(y^n the 27th of February, 1843, the defendant in error filed his

P'^'^''^ bill, setting forth that on the eighteenth of August, 1836, Eleazer

iy^ /) Hartwell and John Hartwell were indebted to Abner S. Lips-

~

^ y^^ comb and George W. Owen, since deceased, in the sum of sixteen

^ j£>hundred and five dollars, by six promissory notes (particularly

jACi described), for different sums, payable at different times at the

'^ ^ Planters' and Merchants' Bank of Mobile. In order to secure

^/-^^^ the payment of these several notes, Eleazar and John Hartwell

/ v*^ / conveyed five tracts of land situate in Mobile county, containing

a^ IT ten acres each; conditioned that the same should be void if the

^y^^^^ mJi' notes should be paid according to their tenor and effect. The

[(4^j^ bill alleges, that the notes are due and unpaid; and recites, that

' -^ ^ t]£e complainant is the assignee of Abner S. Lipscomb and Louisa

^^ rA-^. Owen, the administratrix of George W. Owen, deceased; and

^ O^ that Eleazar Hartwell, by deed bearing date the 26th of July,

1.
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1838, conveyed his interest in the lands in question to John

^1^ ' /A/Uohn Hartwell and Josiah Wilkins, who, it is alleged, holds

Af rounder him, are made defendants. The bill concludes with a prayer

9^^^ than an account may be taken, the equity of redemption in the

A mortgaged premises foreclosed, and the lands sold, &c. Fur-

j£^ . ther, that process of subpoena may issue, &c.

"^^^'^ \ v"*^ Subpoena issued on the 1st March, 1843, was executed on Wil-

J<y^' o kins on the 2d, and on Hartwell on the 3d of the same month;

''Ar^ and on 4th of April thereafter, a decree iwo confesso was entered

/ij'*' ^ against the defendants. Thereupon, the notes and mortgage,

^^ being produced and proved to the court, were, with the bill, re-

/y^ -ijt ferred to the master to ascertain the amount due and owing to

\ « A^ the complainants ; and report accordingly at the then term of the

'\. ■jiAm' court. The master reported, "that on examination of the mort-

em gage, bill and notes, he finds due as follows, to wit : on the 18th

J^ August, 1837, a note for $356 34; on the 18th February, 1838, a

C> note for $368 34; with interest on the said notes from the times

<?-A when they respectively fell due."

^1 On the 11th of April, 1843, during the same term, a motion

V
_,,.,.

v

.WRIT

of error to the Court of Chancery itting at Mobile.

V/ tV"Dn the 27th of February, 18±3, the defendant in error filed his

fJV/1 bill, etting forth that on the eighteenth of August, 1836, Eleazer

.\'lt Hartwell and John Hartwell were indebted to Abner S. Lips~

comb and George W. Owen, since deceased, in the um of sixteen
;}-hundred and five dollar , by six promi ory notes (particularly
-It C1 {;V~
de ~ribed), for different sum , payable at different times at the
rt.
~ Planters' and Merchants' Bank of Mobile. In order to secure
the payment of these everal note , Eleazar and John Ha-dwell
conveyed five tracts of land situate in Mobile county, containing
, ....,JV
ten acres each; conditioned that the same hould be void if the
~ ~. ,t,- notes should be paid according to their tenor and effect.
T'he
~ t,J{..r-v bill aUege , that the notes are due and unpaid; and recites, that
• ~te complainant is the a signee of Abner S. Lip comb and Louisa
P
S. Owen, the administratrix of George W. Owen, d ceased; and
that Eleazar Hartwell, by deed bearing date the 26th of July,
/
, ~ .~838, conveyed his interest in the lands in question to John
vr . ~ar
r.
~
ohn Hartwell and Josiah Wil~ins, who, it is alleged, holds
/,,_ _~J under him, are made defendants. The bill concludes with a prayer
yJVthan an account may be taken, the equity of redemption in the
~
mortgaged premises foreclosed, and the lands sold, &c. Further, that proce s of subpama may is ue, &c.
~ ,.i) ~ Subpama issued on the 1 t March, 1843, was executed on Wil~- ~ kin on the 2d, and on Hartwell on the 3d of the same month;
~
and on 4th of April thereafter, a decree pro confesso was entered
~ .,,<.. against the d f ndants. Thereupon, the notes and mortgage,
,
being produced and proved to the court, were, with the bill, re!J f tJ f rr d to the ma ter to a certain the amount due and owing to
~ th omplainants; and r port accordingly at the then t rm of the
f
court. T'h ma ter report d, "that on examination of the mort~ gag bill and note, h find due a follow to wit: on the 18th
_...,.._,,
Augu t 1 7 a note for $ <>6 3-±; on th 1 th F bruary 1 3 , a
_,..vCYnot f r $ G 34; with inter t on the aid not from the times
wh n they re p tively fell due."
n th 11th of pril 1 3, during the ame term, a moti.on
~

Y,d .,,

/ ttY1

A

G

o/

H
Hartwell v. Blocker 133

was made for the confirmation ol' the report and a decree for the

sale of the mortgaged premises. Thereupon, reciting that it was

shown to the court, that the parties have had two days' notice of

the contents of the report; that no exceptions were filed, and no

objection made, it was decreed that the report be in all things

confirmed ; that the defendants pay into the hands of the register,

within sixty days, the amount rei^orted due, with interest and

costs of suit : in default thereof, the master proceed to sell the prop-

erty described in complainant's bill and mortgage, or so much

thereof as may be necessary to satisfy the decree, in separate par-

cels or entire, as may best promote the defendant's interest, at

public auction, in front of the couiijiouse of Mobile county, under

the same rules and regulations that govern sheriffs in making

sales of like property under execution. Further, that he give

public notice once a week for thirty days previous thereto, by

publication in some newspaper printed in the city of Mobile; and

also, by posting notice on the door of the courthouse of the county.

The master was directed to report his proceedings to the next

term of the court.
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At a further day of the same term, the defendants moved to set

aside the report and order of reference, on the ground that Eleazar

Hartwell had not been made party to the suit. But the chancellor

was of opinion, that as he had made an absolute assignment of

his interest in the mortgaged property, there was no necessity for

making him a party; and accordingly he overruled the motion.

Collier, C. J. :

It was said by Lord Hardwicke, that in pleading, "there must

be the same strictness in equity as at law." (2 Atk. Eep. 632.)

But Mr. Justice Story says, "however true this may be as to a plea

in equity, technically so called, it can hardly be affirmed to be true

in the framing of bills or answers, in respect to which more liber-

ality prevails. And it may, perhaps, be correctly affirmed, that

certainty to a common intent is the most that the rules of equity

ordinarily require in pleadings for any purpose." (Eq. Plead.

206.)

RT
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was made for th onfirmation of the r port ancl ai decree for the
al of the mortg g d pr mi e . Th r upon, re ·iting that it wa
hown to the court, that the partie hav, had two day ' notice of
th cont nt of th report; that no x eption w re filed, and no
obje tion mad , it wa d er d that the report be in all things
confirm d; that the def ndant pay into th hand of the regi ter,
within ixty day , the amount r ported due, with intere t and
cost of uit: ind fault th reof, the ma ter proc d to ell the proprty d cribed in omplainant bill and mortgage, or o much
thereof a may b n c a·ry to ati fy the d er , in eparate parcel or entire, a may be t promote the def ndant' int.ere t, at
public auction, in front of the courthou e of Mobile county, under
the ame rule and regulation that govern heriff in making
sale of like property under ex ution. Further that he give
public notice one a week for thirty day previou thereto, by
publication in ome new pap r printed in the ity of Mobile; and
also, by po ting notice on the door of the courthou e of the county.
The mast€r wa directed to report his proceedings to the next
t erm of the court.
At a further day of the same term, the defendants moved to et
aside the report aiild order of r ference, on the ground that Eleazar
H artwell had not been made party to the uit. But the chancellor
was of pinion, that a he had mad an ab olute a ignment of
hi intere t in th mortgaged property, there wa no nece ity for
making him a party; and accordingly he overruled the motion.

Uncertainty in a bill, it is said, may arise in various ways : 1.

In the case intended to be made by the bill. 2. Though the case

intended to be made be certain, yet the allegations of the bill may

be vague and general. 3. Some of the material facts mav be

COLLIER,

c. J . :

It wa aid b Lord Hardwicke, that in pl ading, "there mu t
in equity a at law." (2 Atk. Rep. 632.)
be the ame tri tn
But Mr. Ju tice tory ay , ''however true thi may be a to a plea
in equity, te hni ally o called, it can hardly be affirmed to be true
in th framing of bill or an wer in re pect to which more libernd it may, p rhap , be corr ctly affirmed, that
alit pr ail .
ertaint to a common intent i the mo t that the rule of quity
ordinaril requir in pleadings for any purpo e." (Eq. Plea .
2 G.)
n rtainty in a bill, it i aid may ari e in ariou wa · : 1.
In th ca intend d to be made b th bill.
. Thouah the ca e
int nd d to be ma be certain, yet th all gation of th bill may
b -rao-u and a n ral. 3.
oru of th mat rial fa t rua be
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stated with sufficient certainty, and others again with so much

indistinctness or incompleteness as to their nature, extent, date,

or other essential requisites, as to render inefficient those with

which they are connected, or upon which they depend. (Story's

Eq. Plead. 207, et post, and cases there cited.) In Cresset v.

Milton (1 Ves. jr. Eep. 449), the bill was brought to perpetuate

a right of common and way; the allegation was, that the tenants,

owners and occupiers of certain lands of a manor, "in right

thereof or otherwise" from, &c., had and of right ought to have

common of pasture, &c. The bill was held bad on demurrer;

for "it was not set forth as common appendant, or as common

appurtenant, but as that, "or otherwise," which was no specifica-

tion at all, and left any sort of right open to proof. So, in Jones

V. Jones (3 Meriv. Eep. 160), which was a bill by an heir at law

to restrain the defendant from setting up an outstanding term,

&c.; but as there was no averment of any outstanding terms, it

was held bad on demurrer. And where a bill sought a general

account upon a charge of fraud, it is not sufficient to make such

charge in general terms; but it should point out particular acts
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of fraud. {Palmer v. Mure, 2 Dick. Eep. 489.) But the com-

plainant is not bound to state all the minute facts; the general

statement of a precise fact is usually sufficient. The circum-

stances which confirm or establish it, more properly constitute

matters of proof than of allegation. (Story's Eq. Plead. 213.)

In the present case, the complainant describes himself as the

assignee of A. S. Lipscomb and the administratrix of G. W.

Owen, deceased; and after describing the date, and amount in-

tended to be secured by a mortgage to L. and the intestate, the

bill continues, "whose interest has been legally transferred and

assigned over unto your orator, that certain part or parcel, situ-

ate," &c. (here follows a description of the mortgaged premises).

The notes are described as bearing even date with the mortgage,

payable some of them to the order of the defendant Wilkins, the

others to the order of the makers; and all of them for unequal

sums, payable and negotiable at the Planters' and Merchants'

Bank of Mobile. It is charged, that although the notes have since

been due and payable, yet the mortgagors have failed and re-

fused to pay the same, "whereby the legal estate to the said prem-

ises has become absolute in your orator." In all this, there is

no allegation that the complainant is the assignee of the notes, or

CERTAINTY IN PLEADING

stated with sufficient certainty, and others again with so much
indistinctnes or incompleteness as to their nature, extent, daite,
or other es ential requisites, as to render inefficient those with
which they are connected, or upon which they depend. (Story's
Eq. Plead. 207, et post, and cases there cited.) In Cresset v.
Milton (1 Ves. jr. Rep. 449), the bill was brought to perpetuate
a right of common and way; the allegation was, tha,t the tenants,
owners and occupiers of certain lands of a manor, "in right
thereof 01· otherwise," from, &c., had and of right ought to have
common of pasture, &c. The bill was held bad on demurrer;
for "it was not set forth as common appendant, or as common
appurtenant, but as that, "or otherwise," which was no specification at all, and left any sort of right open to proof. So, in Jones
v. Jones (3 Meriv. Rep. 160), which was a bill by an heir at law
to restrain the defendant from setting up an outstanding term,
&c.; but as there was no averment of any outstanding terms, it
was held bad on demurrer. And where a bill sought a general
account upon a charge of fraud, it is no.t sufficient to make such
charge in general terms; but it should point out pairticular acts
of fraud. (Palm er v. Mure, 2 Dick. Rep. 489.) But the complainant is not bound to state ())ll the minute facts; the general
statement of a precise fact is usually sufficient. The circumstances which confirm or establish it, more properly constitute
maitters of proof than of allegation. (Story's Eq. Plead. 212.)
In the present case, the complainant describes himself as the
assignee of A. S. Lipscomb and the administratrix of G. W.
Owen, deceased; and after describing the date, and amount intended to be secured by a mortgage to L. and the intestate, the
bill continues, "whose interest has been legally transferred and
assigned over unto your orator, that certain part or parcel, situate," &c. (here follows a description of the mortgaged premise ) .
The notes are de cribed as bearing even date with the mortgage,
payable ome of them to the order of the defendant Wilkins, the
others to the order of the maker ; and all of them for unequal
um , payable and n gotiable at the Planters' and Merchants'
Bank of Mobile. It i charg d, that although the notes have since
been ue and payable, y t the mortgagors have failed and refused to pay the ame, "wher by the 1 gal e tate to the said pr mi es ha becom ab olute in your orator." In all thi there is
no allegation that the omplainant i the a i n of th note , or
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either of them ; the inference that such is the fact, is not necessary

and direct. It may or may not be so. If the terms in which the

case is attempted to be stated, are to be understood as having

been employed according to their appropriate use, and with their

usual meaning, they raUier show that the complainant is the as-

signee of the mortgage than the notes. And it is not only not

alleged that the complainant was the assignee of all the notes, but

it is not stated that if either or any of them was assigned to him,

which it is.

It may be true, that tlie mortgage may have been assigned to

the complainant by the mortgagees, yet this would not authorize

him to file a bill for a foreclosure. In Doe ex dem. Duval's heirs

V. McLosley (1 Ala. Eep. X. S. 708), it was determined, that a

mortgagee cannot assign the right to the mortgaged property

without also assigning the debt to which it is an incident, yet it

seems he may relinquish, hy contract, the possession of the mort-

gaged premises to a third person until the debt is paid.

Without amplifying the point, it sufficiently appears from what

has been said, that the bill is obnoxious to the objection of uncer-
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tainty. That even if the case intended to be made by the bill is

certain, the allegations are too vague and general to authorize a

court of equity to entertain it.

Although some of the notes are payable to the order of the

makers, and do not, upon their face, import a promise to pay any

one, yet the mortgage is an acknowledgment that they were the

property of the mortgagees — that the mortgagors were bound to

pay them; and in order to their security, conveys the land de-

scribed in it. This is quite sufficient to show, that the notes have

been transferred by the maker, whether by writing, or mere de-

livery is wholly immaterial in the present case. True, in order

to maintain an action at law upon them, the plaintiff should show

a regular transfer; but it is competent for the holder to entertain

a suit in equity, thougji they were transferred by delivery only.

The bill should state of which of tlie notes the complainant is

the proprietor; if any one of them maturing before those he holds

is paid, or outstanding, unpaid, the fact should be stated, and the

holder made a party. In respect to subsequent incumbrancers,

although they are proper, 3'et they are not indispensable parties.

(Judson V. Emaiutc'l, ct al 1 Ala. Eep. X. S. 598; CuIJum, et ah

V. Batrc's ex'rs, 2 Ala. Eep. 415.)
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either of them; th inf r nc that uch i the fact, i not nece ary
and dir ct. It may or m y not be o. If the term in which the
case i att mpt d to b tat d, are to b und r too as having
been employed a ording to their appropriate u e, and with their
usual m aning th y rath r how that the complainant i the a:,sign e of the mortgag than th not .
nd it i not only not
alleg d that the co plainant wa th a ignee of all the note , but
it i not tat d that if ither or any of them wa a igned to him,
which it i .
It may be tru , that the mortgage may have been a igned to
the complainant by the mortgagee , yet thi would not authorize
him to file a bill for a foreclosure. In Doe ex dem. Duval s heirs
v. 111cLo key (1 la. ep. N. . 08), it wa determined, that a
mortgag
cannot a ign the right to the mortgaged property
without al o a igning the debt to which it i an incident, yet it
seem he may relinqui h, by contract, the po e sion of the mortgaged pr mi e to a third per on until the debt i paid.
Without amplifying the point, it sufficiently appears from what
has been aid, that the bill is obnoxious to the objection of uncertainty. That ven if the case intended to be made by the bill is
certain, the allegation are too vague and general to authorize a
court of quity to entertain it.
Although om of the note are payable to the order of the
maker , and do not, upon their face, import a promise to pay any
one, yet the mortgage is an acknowledgment that they were the
property of the mortgagee -that the mortgagor were bound to
pay them; and in order to their ecurity, con ey the land decribed in it. Thi i quite ufficient to how, that the notes have
b en tran f rred by the maker, wh ther by writing or mere deliv ry i wholly immaterial in th pre ent case. True, in order
to maintain an action at law upon them, the plaintiff hould how
ai regular tran fer; but it i comp t nt for the hold r to entertain
a uit in equit thougp. the were transferred by deli ery only.
Th bill hould tate of which of the not the complainant is
the propri tor; if any on of th m maturing before tho h hold
i paid or out tanding unpaid the fact houl be tated and be
h 11 r made a I art . In r p ct to ub qu nt incumbrancer
althou h the ar prop r yet th y are not indi p n~ abl parti .
(Jud on . Emanzl q t al. 1 la.
p. K. . 9 ; ullu.m, t al.
at re e~t r
... la.
p. -±1 . )
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In re ~ pect to the other que~tions made by the plaintiffs in error,
it i unn c ary now to con icler them. They are mere que tions
of practice about which it i not probable that any controversy
will ari in the ult rior progre of the cau e; especially if the
cl i ion we ha e heretofore made touching the interest of stuvi ing pay e , the powers of executors and administrator , partie.s
in quity the regi tration of de cl , and the duties of ma ters in
hancery, are con ulted.
It follow from what ha been said, that the decree of the court
of chancery mu t be reversed, and the cau e remanded. But inasmuch as no objection to the frame of the bill was taken in the
primary court, the defendant in error will not be taxed with the

136 Certainty in Pleading

In respect to the other questions made by the plaintiffs in error,

it is unnecessary now to consider them. They are mere questions

of practice, about which it is not probable that any controversy

will arise in the ulterior progress of the cause; especially if the

decisions we have heretofore made touching the interest of sur-

viving payees, the powers of executors and administrators, parties

in equity, the registration of deeds, and the duties of masters in

chancery, are consulted.

It follows from what has been said, that the decree of the court

of chancery must be reversed, and the cause remanded. But inas-

much as no objection to the frame of the bill was taken in the

primary court, the defendant in error will not be taxed with the

tire^feosts ; each party will pay their own costs in this court.

y^^ —

i V. Inman, Jf Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) W- (1820.)

Exceptions to the defendant's answer: 1. That the answer

sets forth, in hcec verba, a copy of the power of attorney from the

plaintiff to the defendant and William Lang, mentioned in the

ERTAINTY IN PLEADING

1-

~ ~7., 0 h arty will pay their own co t in this court.

bill, though the defendant was not requested so to do, and though
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^he substance of the power was fully stated in the bill, and when,

-~ ~oj

by setting it forth in hcec verba, the sense and legal effect of it

ara not, in the least, qualified or varied from the same instrument

a& set forth in the bill.

j.

-v^ 2. Because the defendant has, in his answer, from a part of the

17th page thereof, to a part of the 19th page thereof, beginning,

^ &c. stated matters not necessary to answer any allegations in the

,y^ bill, to which he is not interrogated, and upon which no pertinent

^ ^interrogatories can be framed, or depositions given, and wliich are

' /^^ totally irrelevant, immaterial, and highly scandalous.

-^ i^^i^ 'T3a€ exceptions, having been referred to a master, were allowed

y him, and the defendant excepted to liis report. And the ques-

(/- ^ ition now came upon the exceptions to the report.

ffJ^ The Chancellor:

/^/^^ t _, 'i- It was not necessary to set forth the power of attorney in

^ , V"^ 7i(Ec t;er?ja, in the answer. The substance of it was accurately stated

^ i^ in the bill, and to give it at length in the answer, was impertinent.

o"-^ Impertinence consists (1 Ilarr. Pr. 101. 303) in setting forth what

A

r

<)/

v. Inman, 4 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 437.

(1820.)

J- ~ {fa~cE~TIONS to the defendant' an wer: 1. That the answer

set forth, in hwc verba, a copy of the power of attorney from the
~ plaintiff to the defendant and William Lang, mentioned in the
c/bill, though the defendant was not reque ted o to do, and though
/ , fihe ubstance of the power was fully tated in the bill, and when,
~ , _./ by etting it forth in hwc verba, the en e and legal effect of it
~.J .J~ not, in the lea t, qualified or varied from the same instrument
y
-~a~ i et forth in the bill.
~
. -vP ·2. Because the defendant has, in his an wer, from a part of the
" n~
1 th page thereof, to a part of the 19th page thereof, b ginning,
~~
& . tated matter not necessary to an wer any allegation in the
~
bill, to which he i not interrogated, and upon which no pertinent
~ ~~nt rrogatorie can be framed, or cl po ition given and which are
1
1
~ totally irr 1 vant immat rial, and highly candalou.s .
.rj . l-p
exc ption having been referred to a ma ter, were allowed
~._,.µ y him, and the cl fendant exc pted to hi report. And the que ion now came upon the exceptions to the report.
/
/

c:,_

f

T':rrn CHA CELLoR :
1. It wa not n c ary to s t forth th power of attorney in
hwc verba in th an w r. Th ub tanc of it w accurately fated
in the bill and to Qiv it at 1 ngth in the an wer wa impertinent.
mp rtin n
on. i t. (1 Harr. r. 101. 30 ) in etting forth what
.L

(

Y /
r>

u rVv1G
IV-

0
/

~
A./ '

OOD
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is not necessary to be set forth, as where the pleadings are stuffed

with long recitals, or with long digressions of matters of iax:i which

are totally immaterial. An answer, or a bill, ought not, ordinarily,

to set forth deeds in hcec verba; and if the pleader sets forth only

so much thereof as is material to the point in question, it is suf-

ficient. They are matter of evidence to be shown at large at the

hearing. In Alsager v. Johnson (4 Ves. 217) a bill of costs was

given at large in the schedule to the answer, when a reference to

the bill of costs delivered would have fully answered the purpose,

and it was dcH^med impertinent. The present is not an instance of

gross abuse of this rule of pleading ; but I am glad to see the excep-

tion taken, and the point brought up, for the opportunity it affords

of laying down the rule. I have frequently perceived the pleadings,

and particularly the bill, encumbered with a recital, in hcec verba,

of deeds, mortgages, and ot^er documents, which, unless checked,

will lead to great oppression of the suitor, and to the reproach of

the Court, Whenever a proper case arises, I shall certainly mark

it with animadversion; and shall endeavor to enforce, by all suit-

able means, precision and brevity in pleading. The objection to
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unnecessary folia, may be taken on the taxation of costs.

The ancient rules and orders of the English Court of Chancery,

are very explicit, and powerfully monitory on this subject.

If any pleading should be found of an immoderate length, Lord

Bacon declared, that both the party and the counsel, under whose

hand it passed, should be fined. And Lord Keeper Coventry, with

the advice of Sir Julius Caesar, the master of the rolls, in 1635,

ordained, that bills, answers, &c., "should not be stuffed ^\^th the

repetitions of deeds or writings in hcec verba, but the effect and sub-

stance of so much of them only as was pertinent and material to

be set down, and that in brief and effectual terms, &<?., and upon

any default therein, the party and counsel, under whose hand it

passed, should pay the charge of the copy, and be further punished

as the case should merit."

The same rule was, afterwards, adopted, or re-enacted, by the

lords commissioners in 1649, and in Lord Clarendon's Digest or

System of Eulcs (Beame's Orders, 25, 69, 1G5).

But we have a domestic precedent on this point, which is too

interesting to be unnoticed.

In 1727, Governor Burnet, of the colony of Xew York, exercis-

ing, in council, the powers of a Court of chancer}-, appointed five

•

MN

12

is not n c ary i. b et forth, a wh r th pleading are tuffed
with long r cital , or with 1 ng digr i n of m tte of fact which
ar totally immaterial. An an w r, r bill ought not, ordinarily,
to et forth d d in hmc verba.; ncl if th pl ad r e forth only
i material to th point in que tion, it i uffici nt. They ar ma ter of id nee to b hown at large at the
h aring. In lager . John on (4
. 1 ) a bill of co
w:L
gi en at large in th chedul o the an w r, when a refer nc to
the bill of o
cl li ered would hav fully an wered the purpose,
and it wa d m d impertinent. The pre ent i not an in tance f
gro abu of thi rul of pleading; but I am glad to see the x eption tak n, an the point brought up, for the opportunity it affords
of laying down the rule. I have frequently perceived the pleadings,
and parti ularly the bill, encumbered with a r cital, in hmc verba,
of deed , mortgag , and otper document , which, unles checked,
ill 1 ad to gr at oppres ion of the suitor, and to the reproacli of
the Court. Whenever a proper case ari e , I hall certainly mark
it with animadver ion ; and hall ndeavor to enforce, by all uitable mean , preci ion and bre ity in pleading. The objection to
unnec ary folia, may be taken on the taxation of co t .
The ancient rul and orders of the Engli h ourt of Chancery,
are very xpli it, and powerfully monitory on thi ubject.
f any pleading hould be found of an immoderate length, Lord
Bacon declared, that both the part and the coun el, under whose
h and it pa ed, hould be fined. And Lord Keeper Coventry, with
th ad ice of ir J uliu Cre ar, the ma ter of the roll, in 1635,
or dained, that bill , an wers, &c., 'hould not be tuffed with the
repetition of de d 00' writings in hmc verba_, but the effect and ubtan e of o much of them only a wa pertin nt and material to
be et down, and that in brief and effectual term , &c., and upon
any d fault th rein the party and coun el, und r who e hand it
pa ed, hould pay the harge of the copy, and b f urther puni hed
hould merit."
a th ca
The am rul wa afterward , adopted or re-enacted b the
in 16-±9 and in Lord la.rendon Dige t or
( am
2 69 16 ).
ut we ha
a dom tic preced nt on thi point, which i too
int r ting
b unnoticed.
r i 1 2
o rnor urnet of th colon r of ~ ew York
ing in c01oicil the pow
of a ourt of bane IJ" appointed :fi e
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of the most distinguished counsel of tlie Court, as a committee,

*'to consider and report on the fees and dilatory proceedings in the

Court of Chancery, as true and great grievances." This commit-

tee, consisting of Archibald Kennedy, Eip Van Dam, Cadwallader

Colden, James Alexander, and Abraham A'^an Horn, reported to

the counsel a number of abuses in the practice of the Court of

Chancery, and the remedy. This report, which is inserted at the

end of Bradford's edition of the Colony Laws, is a curious and in-

structive document ; but my concern, at present, is only with what

is termed the first abuse and remedy. It declares, "as an abuse, the

inserting, at too much length, in bills, matters of inducement only.

Thus, if A. has been entitled to the thing in question, who con-

veyed it to B., who conveyed it to C, who conveyed it to the plaint-

iff; after tlie thing is certainly set forth in A., it is enough to say,

he conveyed it to B,, and he to C, and he to the plaintiff, as, by

the deeds ready to be produced, will appear." No counsel, say they,

ought to set their hands to any hill that is unduly long, and if he

does, he ought to pay all the charges arising from such needless

length.
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The exception to the master's report, allowing this first excep-

tion, is overruled.

2. The same objection applies to the matter forming the ground

of the second exception. It was matter argumentative, rhetorical,

irrelative, and, consequently, impertinent. Pleadings should con-

sist of averment, or allegations of fact, and not of inference and

airgument.

The exception to the report is, also, overruled; and as the fault

of the pleader was of a venial character, I am content that the costs

of the exceptions, in this particular case, should abide the event of

the suit.

Order accordingly.

CERTAINTY IN PLEADING

of the mo t distinguished counsel of the Court, as a committee,
"to con ider and report on the fees and dilatory p.roceedings in the
Court of Chancery, as true and great grievances." This committee, con i ting of Archibald Kennedy, Rip Van Dam, Cadwallader
Colden, J a.me Alexander, and Abraham Van Horn, reported to
the coun el a number of abu es in the practice of the Court of
Chancery, and the remedy. This report, which is in erted at the
end of Bradford's edition of the Colony Laws, is a curious and instructive document; but my concern, at pre ent, is only with what
is termed the first abuse and remedy. It declares, "as an abuse, the
inserting, at too much length, in bill , matters of inducement only.
Thu , if A. has been entitled to the thing in que tion, who conveyed it to B., who conveyed it to C., who conveyed it to the plaintiff; after the thing is certainly set forth in A., it is enough to say,
he conveyed it to B., and he to C., and he to the plaintiff, as, by
the deeds ready to be produced, will appear." No cownsel, say they,
ought to set their hands to any bill that is unduly long, and if he
does, he ought to pay all the charges arising from such needlei:;s
length.
The exception to the master's report, allowing this :first exception, is overruled.
2. The same objection applies to the maitter forming the ground
of the second exception. It was matter argumentative, rhetorical,
irrelative, and, consequently, impertinent. Pleadings should consi t of averment, or allegations of fact, and not of inference and
ai:rgument.
The exception to the report is, also, overruled; and as the fault
of the pleader was of a venial character, I am content that the costs
of the exceptions, in this particular case, should abide the event of
the suit.
Order accordingly.

CHAPTER IV.

PROCEEDINGS ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF

CHAPTER IV.

Filing the Bill.

Bank v. Iloyt, 7Jf Miss. 221. (189G.) ^"^ j^

r

ir

E

From the chancery court of Lauerdale county, /ff

IN

1

1

'

IL!

The opinion states the case. v ^ i j^

~

L INTIFF.

~~

Hon. N. C. Hill, Chancellor. A/^ c^

THE

ILL.

1/

Whitfield, J., delivered the opinion of the court. ^

anlc . Iloyt

The question which lies at the threshold in the decisio

case is whether the bill of appellant was filed, within the contempla- \ /

4 Mi . 2 1.

tion of law, on May 5, 1893. Tlie facts are these: On May 5,1^^-^

~:om th

Th

1892, appellant's counsel took the bill and the exhibits in one cover

to the chancery clerk, and had him indorse on the bill the word^

''filed," etc., and the clerk made a corresponding entry in the gen-

eral docket, and prepared a regular court wrapper, and put it

around the papers. But counsel immediately took the bill and j > , 'J^

exhibits back to his office, telling the clerk that he did not wish a"/

process issued then, but not giving him any reason for not issuing /^ \

process. The clerk charged the counsel with the papers in his at- ,^^ ^h
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torney's docket. The bill was kept by counsel in his office until ■^ .a

tlie ninth of JMay, when he returned the bill, and process was issued V- ^

and served on the tenth. In the meantime, on May 7, 1892, counsel (r ^>^

for appellees took their bill to the clerk of the chancery court, and ,L/ "y

it was filed on that day, and process issued and served that day.^/v"

Said counsel had, on the fifth of May, gone to the clerk's office, ,y^ \iJ

to see what bill, if any, had been filed, and was told a bill had been i *<' ^

filed by counsel for appellant, and was shown the entry on the" ;/^

general docket, and informed that the papers were at the office r^ J^ .

of appellant's counsel. These are all the facts bearing on this iJ^ /

question. aA

The code of 1892, § 4G3, provides that the clerk "shall not sufferj^ V

11 ny paper so filed to be withdrawn but by leave of the chancellor, t

and then only by retaining a copv, to be made at the costs of the

party obtaining the leave. All the papers and pleadings filed in

9 129
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eral do k t, and prepared a r gular court wrapper, and put it
V.
around th paper .
ut coun el immediatd took the bill and
exhibits back to hi office, telling the clerk that he did not wi h ~
proce i ued then, but not giving him any r a on for not i uing · ,./// ;
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a cause shall be kept in the same file, and all the files kept in

numerical order." In Cooper v. Frierson, 48 Miss. 310, in con-

struing the clause under the agricultural lien law of 1867, 'Tie

must file the contract, or a copy thereof, in the clerk's oflace," the

court said : "The statute is not satisfied by the indorsement on the

contract that it was filed, if the creditor withdraws it, and keeps

it. . . . The term 'filing' imports that the paper shall remain

with the clerk as a record, subject to be inspected by those who

have an interest in it, and to be certified by him as any other paper

properly lodged in his office and committed to his custody. It is

admitted that Frierson's contract was not, in this sense, 'filed' in

the clerk's office. It follows, then, that he has no lien."

Anderson's Law Dictionary defines the noun "file" as follows:

"At common law, a thread, string, or wire upon which writs or

other exhibits are fastened for safe-keeping and ready reference."

And the definitions of Webster's International Dictionary and the

Century Dictionary are to the same effect. The verb Anderson

thus defines: "To leave a paper with an officer for action or

preservation"; and he adds: "In modem practice, the file is the
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manner adopted for preserving papers. The mode is immaterial.

Such papers as are not for transcription into records are folded

similarly, indorsed with a note or index of their contents, and tied

up in a"^ bundle— a file." Webster quotes Burrill, as follows : "To

file a paper on the part of a party is to place it in the official cus-

tody of the clerk. To file on the part of the clerk is to indorse upon

the paper the date of its reception, and retain it in his office, subject

to inspection by whomsoever it may concern." Mr. Freeman, in a

learned note to Beehe v. Morrell (Mich.), 15 Am. St. Eep. 295 (42

N. W. 1119), thus sums up: "Filing consists simply in placing

the paper in the hands of the clerk, to be preserved and kept by him

in his official custody as an archive or record, of which his office

becomes thenceforward the only proper repository; and it is his

duty, when the paper is thus placed in his custody, or filed with

him, to indorse upon it the date of its reception, and retain it in

his office, subject to inspection by whomsoever it may concern;

and that is what is meant by filing the paper. But, when the law

requires a party to file it, it simply means that he shall place it in

the official custody of the clerk. This is all that is required of

him; and, if the officer omits the duty of indorsing upon it the

date of the filing, that will not prejudice the rights of tbe party.

FILING THE BILL

a cause hall be kept in the same file, and all the file kept in
numerical order." In Cooper v. Frierson, 48 Mis . 310, in contruing the clause under the agricultural lien law of 1867, ''he
mu t file the contract, or a copy thereof, in the clerk' office," the
court aid : "The statute i not sati fied by the indorsement on the
contract that it was filed, if the creditor withdraws it, and keeps
it.
The term 'filing' imports that the paper hall remain
with the clerk as a record, subject to be inspected by those who
have an interest in it, and to be certified by him as any other paper
properly lodged in his office and committed to his cu tody. It is
admitted that Frierson's contract was not, in this sen e, 'filed' in
the clerk's office. It follows, then, that he has no lien."
Ander on' Law Dictionary defines the noun "file" as fallows :
"At common law, a thread, string, or wire upon which writs or
other exhibit are fa tened for safe-keeping and ready reference."
And the definitions of Webster's International Dictionary and the
Century Dictionary are to the same effect. The verb Anderson
thus defines: "To leave a paper with an officer for action or
preservation"; and he adds: "In modern practice, the file is the
manner adopted for pre erving pa1per . The mode is immaterial.
Such paper as are not for transcription into records are folded
imilarly, indorsed with a note or index of their contents, and tied
up in a bundle-a file." Webster quotes Burrill, as follows: "To
file a paper on the part of ai party is to place it in the official custody of the clerk. To file on the part of the clerk is to indorse upon
the paper the date of its reception, and retain it in his office, subject
to inspection by whomsoever it may concern." Mr. Freeman, in a
learned note to Beebe v. Morrell (Mich.), 15 Am. St. Rep. 295 (-!2
N. W. 1119) , thus sums up: "Filing consists simply in placing
the paper in the hand of the clerk, to be preserved and kept by him
in hi officia1 cu tody a an archive or record, of which his office
become thenceforward the only proper r po itory; and it i hi~
duty, when the paper is thus placed in hi cu tody, or filed with
him, to indorse upon it the date of it reception, and retain it in
bi office, ubject to in pection by whomsoever it may concern;
and that is what is meant by filing the paper. But, when the law
require a party to file it, it imply mean that he hall plac H in
the official cu tody of the clerk. Thi i all that i required or
him; and, if the officer omits the duty of indor ing upon it the
date of the filing, that will not prejudice the right of the part . .

BANK

Bank v. Hoyt 131

This seems to be universal in its application to all documents, of

whatever nature, which the law requires to be filed," citing many

authorities, to the following among which we especially refer:

Ilolman v. Chevallier, 14 Tex. 339; Bishop v. Cooh, 13 Barb. 329;

Phillips V. Beencs Admr. 38 Ala. 251.

In Ffirmann v. Ilenlel, 1 111. App. 145, cited in 7 Am. & Eng.

Enc. L. (1st series), 962, the case was this: "A certificate and

affidavit required to be filed under a limited partnership act, were

sent by a messenger to the clerk's office, and there presented for the

purpose of being filed. The deputy clerk, to whom they were pre-

sented, instead of retaining them, by mistake added a certificate

of the official character of the notary before whom they were

acknowledged, and returned them to the messenger, by whom they

were carried away. Several months afterwards they were returned

to the county clerk's office and properly filed. As against a creditor

whose debt accrued before tlie papers were returned to the clerk's

office, it was held that the first presentation of them did not con-

stitute a filing. "Filing a paper," said the court, "ex vi termini,

means placing and leaving it among the files. The memorandum

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 16:37 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t3223129q
Public Domain in the United States / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-us

indorsed by the officer in whose custody it is placed is merely evi-

dence of the filing, and not the filing itself."

We close the citation of authorities with the result in modem

practice, as stated by Mr. Freeman in the note above referred to

(page 294, vol. 15, Am. St. Eep.) : "The word 'file' is derived

from the Latin 'filum' signifying a thread, and its present appli-

cation is evidently drawn from the ancient practice of placing

papers upon a thread or wire for safe-keeping. The origin of the

term clearly indicates that the filing of a paper can only be effected

by bringing it to the notice of the officer, who anciently put it

upon the thread or wire; and accordingly, under the modem

practice, the filing of a document is now generally understood

to consist in placing it in the proper official custody by the party

charged with the duty of filing it, and the receiving of it by the

officer, to be kept on file. The most accurate definition of filing

a paper is that it is its delivery to the proper officer, to be kept on

file."

In Christian v. O'Neal, 46 Miss. 672 (a case of an attempt to

enforce a mechanic's lien, in which, as in a chancery suit, the

filing of the petition is the commencement of the suit), it was

v.

HOYT

1 1

Thi
em to be un·versal in it application to all documents, of
whatever natur , wh.i h the law re uire to be :fil d/' citing matny
authorities, to th following among which we e pecially refer :
Holman . Chevallier, 1 Tex.
ishop . Coale, 13 Barb. 3 9;
Phillips . Beene s Aclmr. 38 Ala.
1.
In Pfirmann . Henkel, 1 Ill. pp. 1-1 , cited in 7 Am. & Eng.
Enc. L. ( 1 t erie ) , 9 6 , the cas
a thi : " certificate and
affidavit requir d to be £.1 d under a limited partnership act, were
sent by a me eng r to the clerk' office, and there pre ented for the
purpo e of bein0 £.1 d. The deputy clerk, to whom the were presented, in tead of retaining them, by mi take added a certi£.cate
of the official haracter of the notary before whom they were
acknowledged, and returned them to the me enger, by whorn they
were carried away. Se eral month afterward they were returned
to the county clerk's office and prop rly £.led. A against a creditor
who e debt accrued before the papers were return d to the clerk's
office, it was held that the :fir t presentation of them did not constitute a :filing. "Filing a paper," aid the court, "ex vi termini,
mean placing and leaving it among the :file . The memorandum
indorsed by the officer in whose cu tody it is placed i merely evidence of the filing, and not the filing itself."
We close the citation of authorities willi the result in modern
practice, as stated by Mr. Freemam. in the note above referred to
(page 294, vol. 15, Am. St. Rep.) : "The word '£.le' i derived
from the Latin 'fifom,' signifying a thread, and its present application is evidently drawn from the ancient practice of placing
papers upon a thread or wire for safe-keeping. The origin of the
term clearly indicates that the £.ling of a paper can only be effected
b bringing it to the notice of the officer, who anciently put it
upon the threaid or wire; and accordingly, under the modern
practice, the £.ling of a document i now generally under tood
to con ist in placing it in the proper official cu tody by the part
charged with the duty of £.ling it, and the receiving of it by the
officer, to be kept on file. The mo t accurate dennition of :filinoa pap r i that it is its delivery to the proper officer, to be kept on
file. '
In Christian v. O'Neal, 46 Mi . 6 2 (ai ca e of an attempt t
nforce a m hanic' li n in which a in a chancery .. uit th
filing of the p tition i the commencement of the ui ) it "a
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said : "If a petition was not on file when this or the writ of June,

1861, was issued, suit was not begun."

We have quoted thus largely from the authorities, because the

determination of this point will be decisive of the case. It is clear

that marking the paper "filed" is not filing it. A paper may be

marked filed, and yet not be in fact filed; and a paper may be in

fact filed, though not marked filed. And the entry on the general

docket does not constitute filing. All these indorsements of the

clerk are evidence, but not conclusive evidence, of a filing. What-

ever the nature of the paper, it can only be filed by dehvering it

to the proper officer, to be by him received and dealt with in the

manner usual with the particular character of paper. If a deed,

for example, or other paper required to be recorded, it must be kept

by the clerk until recorded; if any paper, in respect to which a

statute requires the original or a copy to be filed, the original may

not be withdrawn till a copy has been filed. If a bill in chancery,

it must be delivered to the clerk, to be by him received, indorsed,

and dealt with in the manner usual with such bills. It must be

delivered and recorded with the purpose of having process issue in
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due course. Suits in chancery begin, of course, from the filing of

the bill, and at law from the issuance of process, under the code of

1857 (for present practice, see § 670, code of 1892) ; but just as,

under code of 1857, at law, the suit is not begun, though process

be issued, unless it is intended that it be served as in regular course

.(Lamkin v. Nye, 43 Miss. 252), so, in equity, the suit will not be

begun unless the bill is delivered with the purpose that the usual

steps shall be taken. In the one case, there is no issuance of

process, and in the other, no filing of the bill, within the meaning

of the law. Clearly, there was no such filing here. The error of

counsel for appellant was in supposing that merely having the bill

marked "filed," and placed in a court wrapper, or docketed, with-

out more, and with the declared purpose that the process should

not issue, would constitute filing, because of the rule that in chan-

cery the suit is begun by the filing of the bill. But the filing

meant, as we have shown, must be a filing in the legal sense, with

the purpose that process and all usual steps shall follow in due

course. Lamkin v. Nye, 43 Miss, 252, explains the principle. It

it is not necessary to decide whether the provision in our statute

against withdrawing papers (§ 463, code 1892) means to prohibit

the taking out of a pleading by counsel for examination, except

FILING THE BILL

aid : 'If a petition wa not on :file when this or the writ of June,
1861, was is ued, suit was not begun."
We ha e quot d thu largely from the authoritie , becaiu e the
determination of this point will be deci ive of the case. It is clear
that marking the paper ":filed" is not :filing it. A paper may be
marked :filed, and yet not be in fact :filed; and a pa1p er ma.y be in
fact :filed, though not marked :filed. And the entry on the general
docket does not constitute filing. All these indorsements of the
clerk are evidence, but not conclusive evidence, of a :filing. Whatever the nature of the paper, it can only be filed by delivering jt
to the proper officer, to be by him received and dealt with in the
manner usual with the particular character of paper. If a deed,
for example, or other paper required to be recorded, it mu t be kept
by the clerk until recorded; if any paper, in respect to which a
statute require the original or a copy to be :filed, the original may
not be withdrawn till a copy has been filed. If a bill in chancery,
it must be delivered to the clerk, to be by him received, indorsed,
and dealt with in the manner usual with such bills. It must be
delivered and recorded with the purpose of having process issue in
due course. Suits in chancery begin, of course, from the :filing of
the bill, and at law from the issuance of process, under the code of
1857 (for present practice, see § 670, code of 1892) ; but just as,
under code of 1857, at law, the suit is not begun, though process
be issued, unless it is intended that it be served as in regular course
. (Lamkin v. Nye, 43 Miss. 252), so, in equity, the suit will not be
begun unless the bill is delivered with the purpose that the usual
steps shall be taken. In the one case, there is no issuance of
process, and in the other, no :filing of the bill, within the meaning
of the law. Cl arly, there was no such :filing here. The error of
counsel for appellant was in supposing that merely having the bill
marked ":filed," and placed in a court wrapper, or docketed, without more, and with the declared purpo e that the proce should
not i ue, would con titute :filing, because of the rule that in chancery the suit i b gun by the filing of the bill. But th :filing
meant, a we ha e shown, must be a :filing in the legal ense, with
the purpo e that proce and all u ual t p hall follow in due
cour . Lamkin v. Ny e 3 Mi . 252, explain the principl . It
it i not n c ary to d cide wh ther th provi ion in our tatute
again t withdrawing paper ( § 463, ode 1 92) mean to prohH>it
th taking out of a pl ading by coun 1 for examination c.- cpt

1
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on the terms named in the statute, or whether withdrawal means

permanent withdrawal from the files.

It is doubtless true, as suggested by learned counsel, that it is

the custom for attorneys to take out pleadings, giving their re-

ceipt, and usually no question would arise, as the instances are rare

in which the priority of a lien is determined by the filing of a par-

ticular pleading. But we desire to be understood as deciding

nothing on this precise point, resting our decision in this case on

its own facts. We cannot hold that what was done with this bill

constituted a filing of it, under the general rule as to the filing of

pleadings, nor under the terms of this statute, without deciding

that the mere marking upon a pleading of the word "filed," etc.,

and a docket entry thereof, and a placing momentarily of the bill

in a court file, without more, in a cover, where it was at once

handed back and taken away, and kept away until another bill

had been filed regularly, with the direction not to issue process

added, constitute filing; and this, manifestly, is in the face of all

principle and of all the authorities. We have gone carefully

through all the questions in the case, but it is unnecessary, in the
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view we have taken, to remark upon them.

When is Suit Commenced ?

Clarlc V. Slatjton, 63 N. H. 402. (18S5.)

A suit in equity is not commenced until the bill is'^led

Bill in Equity, to recover money verbally promised in support

of a base-ball club. The defendant in his answer alleges that there

is no equity in the bill, that the plaintiff has no adequate remedy

at law, and sets up the statute of limitations.

In 1877 the plaintifl: was the manager of a base-ball club in

•

1

L..1.YT

133

.r

on th' t rm· n m ·d in th tatut , r wh th r withdrawal mean
p rman nt withdrawal from th fil .
It i doubtl · · lru , a ugg t d by 1 arn d oun cl that it is
th u ·tom for attorne to tak out 1 ading , giving th ir rec jpt, and u ually n qu ' tion would ari: , a th in tan e ar rare
in whi h th priorit .r a li n i · d l rmincd by the filing of a parut w d ir to be under tood a deciding
ticular pl acling.
n
nothing on t.b.i pr i point, re ting our deci ion in thi a
ii own fa t . \
annot holcl that hat wa clan with thi bill
on tituwd a filing of it, und r th g n ral rul a to th filing of
pl ading , nor un 1 r the t rm o:f thi ta.tute, without deciding
that th m r marking upon a pl ading of he word ' fil cl, tc.,
and a clo k t ntry th reo.f, and a placing mom ntarily of the bill
in a court fil , without more, in a co er, where it wa at once
handed back and tak n away, and kept away until another bill
had b en filed r gularly, with the direction not to i sue proce
added, con titute filing; and this, manife tly, i in the face of all
principle and of all the authoritie . We have gone carefully
through all the que tion in the ca e, but it i unneces ary, in the
view we haive taken, to remark upon them.
Affirmed.

'--{ '

Manchester. He, the defendant, and three others, verbally agreed

to pay each one sixth part of the excess of the expenses over the

receipts of the club. The plaintiff, as manager, advanced the ex-

penses, and at the end of the season, in the fall of 1877, demanded

WHEN IS

payment of the defendant of his share of the excess over the re-

UIT

OMMENCED?

ceipts, Avhich the defendant refused to pay. About the first of

Clark v.

June, 1883, the plaintiff drew the bill and sent it to the clerk, who

layton, 63 N. H. 402.

~~

(1885.)~

A suit in quity i not ommenc d until the bill i Illed.
BILL IN EQUITY,

~

to reco er money verbally promi ed in upport

of a ba e-ball club. The d fondant in hi an wer allege that there
is no equity in the bill, that the plaintiff ha no ad quate remedy
at law and et.s up th tatui:e of limitation .
In 1
th plaintiff wa th manaa r of a ba e-ball club in
Man h t r.
th d f ndant and thr oth r v rbally agreed
f the p nse ov r the
to pay a h on ixth part f th x
th e. r c ipt of th lub. Th plaintiff a rnanaa r, advan
p n
an 1 at th nd of th ea on in th fall of 1
01 r th r pa 1 nt f th d I ndant of hi hare of th
bout th fir t of
ip
which the d fendaint r fu d to pay.
Jun , 1 ' th plaintiff dr w the bill and nt it to the l rk who
l

;,.

ti7 /

~
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notified him that by the rule it could not be fil d and entered until
the entry fee wa I aid.. February 12, 1884, the necessary fees
ha ing been pro ided, the bill wa filed and an order of notice
i ued, which wa.. rved upon the defendant February 28, 1884.
I1h court dismissed the bill, and the plaiintiff excepted.

]^34 When is Suit Commenced

Qotified him that by the rule it could not be iiled and entered until

the entry fee was paid. February 12, 1884, the necessary fees

havino- been provided, the bill was filed and an order of notice

issued, which was served upon the defendant February 28, 188-1.

The court dismissed the bill, and the plaintiff excepted.

Cakpentek, J. :

An action at law is in general regarded as commenced, so as to

J. :
An action at law is in general regarded as commenced, so as to
avoid the tatute of limitation , when the writ i completed with
the purpose of making immediate ervice. But when there is no
intention to have it served, or it cannot be served until ome further act i done, the ruction is not deemed to be commenced until
,uch act is performed. Robinson v. BU'J~leigh, 5 N. H. 225; Graves
v. Ticknor, 6 N. H. 537; Hardy v. Carlis, 21 N. H. 356; Mason v.
Cheney, 47 N. H. 2-±; Brewster v. Brewster, 52 N. H. 60. The
,ame rule i applicable to suits in equity. Leach v. Noyes, 45 N. H.
364. A bill in equity must be filed in the clerk's office, and an
ord r of notice obtained, before it can be erved upon the defendant. Rule 11, 13. The date of the filing i therefore the earliest
time which cain be taken as the commencement of the suit.
The plaintiff's action is barred by the tatute of limitations.
Thi result makes it unnecessary to consider other questions raised
by the case.
Exceptions overruled.
ALLEN, J., did not sit; the others concurred.
ARPE TTER,

avoid the statute of limitations, when the writ is completed with

the purpose of making immediate service. But when there is no

intention to have it served, or it cannot be served until some fur-

ther act is done, the action is not deemed to be commenced until

such act is performed. BoUnson v. BuAeigli, 5 N. H. 225 ; Graves

V. Ticknor, 6 N. H. 537; Hardy v. Corlis, 21 N. H. 356; Mason v.

Cheney, 47 N. H. 24; Brewster v. Brewster, 52 N. H. 60. The

same rule is applicable to suits in equity. Leacli v. Noyes, 45 N. H.

364. A bill in equity must be filed in the clerk's of&ce, and an

order of notice obtained, before it can be served upon the defend-

ant. Rules 11, 13. The date of the filing is therefore the earliest

time which cam be taken as the commencement of the suit.
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The plaintiff's action is barred by the statute of limitations.

This result makes it unnecessary to consider other questions raised

by the ease.

Exceptions overruled.

Allen, J., did not sit; the others concurred.

L,^

^^nited States v. Am. Lumber Co., 85 Fed. Rep. 827. (1898.)

Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the

tkern District of California.

I yOiLBERT, Circuit Judge:

jL^ The United States brought a suit in equity against the American

^ Lumber Company and the Central Trust Company to declare null

U and void certain patents issued by the United States for lands in

California, the title to which is vested in the American Lumber

Company, subject to the lien of a trust deed to the Central Trust

6^^ Company, securing bonds of the former company to the amount of

i^> ' «-^ ^i^O 000. The defendants pleaded in bar of the suit that by an

States v. Am. Lumber Co., 85 Fed. Rep. 827.

{1898.}

Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the
~rn District of California.

f?'. .

"" ~~ILBERT Circuit Judge:
Th Unit d tatcs brou ht a uit in equity again t th American
~
Lumber ompany and th
ntral Tru t ompany to d clare null
l,v and void ertain pat nt i u d by th Unit i tat for land jn
\ /~· alifornia, the titl to whi h i v t d in the m ri an Lumber
.}YI' _:
Company, ubj t to the li n of ai tru t d ed to th
ntral Tru"t
e
v -·~
ornpany
uring bond of th former company to th amounJ of
,;Y'~
poo 000. Th d fendants pl add in bar of th uit that by an
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United States v. Am. Lumber Co. 136

act of congress approved March 3, 1891 (26 Stat. 1093, § 8), it is

provided that "suits by the United States to vacate and annul any

patent heretofore issued shall only 1x3 brought within five years from

the passage of this act," and that the patents which it was the

object of the suit to annul and vacate had been issued before the

enactment of said statute, and that the suit had not been brought

within five years from the passage of the act. The bill was filed

on rel)ruary 3, 1890, in the circuit court for the Xorthern district

of California. It contained the allegation that the defendant the

American Lumber Company is a corporation organized under the

laws of the state of Illinois, and that the Central Trust Company

is a corporation organized under the laws of the state of Xew

York. On the day on which the bill was filed, two subpcenas bear-

ing date February 3, 1896, were issued out of the clerk's oflBce,

upon a prsecipo which reads as follows:

"To the Clerk of Said Court — Sir: Please issue two originals

and two copies of subpoena ad respondendum herein, for service

upon respondents, returnable March 2, 189G; one original and copy

being necessary for service upon, and for marshal to make return
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of service upon, the res|)ondent American Lumber Co., in Chicago,

and the other original and copy of subpoena ad respondendum being

necessary for marshal to serve upon, and to make return of service

upon, the respondent Central Tnist Co., in Xew York."

Both of the subpcenas so issued were sent as soon as issued, the

one to the United States marshal for the Northern district of Illi-

nois, and the other to the LTnited States marshal for the Southern

district of Xew York. The marshal for the Northern district of

Illinois returned the subpoena with the indorsement that the de-

fendants were not found within his district. A subpoena was again

issued February 18, 1896, and was sent to said marshal, and was

thereafter returned with the indorsement that on February 24,

1896, it had been served upon the secretary of the American Lum-

ber Company, in that district. Tlie marshal for the Southern

district of New York served the subpoena on the Central Trust

Company, in New- York, on February 11, 1896. On March 5, 1896,

and two days after the expiration of the five-years period of limi-

tation for the commencement of the suit, an order was entered in

the suit, reciting that it appeared from the affidavit of Benjamin

F. Bergen, solicitor for tlie complainant, that the defendants were

foreign corporations, having no officer or representative or agent.

T TE
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act of ongr
approv d nfar ·h
'tat. 1093, 8), it i.·
provid d that uit 1y th
nit
a at and annul any
patent h r t for' i: uccl hall I ly b br ugh wi hin five years from
the pa , ag oi thi ncl an that th pat nt ' which it wa th
obj ·t f th uit i.o annul and v ·at hacl l n i ued before the
na trn nt of aicl ta UL " and that th uit had not been brought
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on F bruary
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t ontainecl the all gati n that th d fendant th
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rganized under the
f h tat f Illinoi , and that th { ntral Tru t ompany
i a orporation rganiz d und r the law f the tate of l. ew
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n th day on whicili. th bill wa filed, two ubpama bear1 96 wer i ued out of the clerk office,
ing date F bruary
upon a prrecip which r ad a follow :
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and two copi of ubpamai ad T pond ndum herein, for ervice
upon r pond nt , r turnable Mar h 2, 1 96; on original and copy
being ne
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of er i upon, the re pondent American Lumb r o., in hicago,
and th other original and copy of ubpama ad re pondendum being
ne e ary for marshal to erve upon, and to make return of rv1ce
upon th re pondent entral Tru t o., in ew r ork. '
Both of the ubpcena o i ued were ent a oon as i ued the
mar hal for the T orthern di trict of Illion to the United ta
noi and the oth r to the nited tat marshal for the outhern
di tri t of ~ w ork. Th mair hal for the Northern di trict of
llinoi r turned th ubpcena with the indor ement that the deubpcena wa aaain
f ndan were not found within hi di trict.
i u d February 1 , 1 96, and wa ent to aid marshal, and a"
thereafter r turned with th indor ment that on ebruary 2-±
1 9 it had b en rv d upon the cretary of th American Lumber ompany in that di trict. The mar hal for the outhern
di trict of ew r ork erved th ubpcena on the entral Tru t
ompan · in ~ w York on 1 bruary 11 1 96.
n Iarch 1 9 ,
an l two day atft r th xpiration of he fiv - ' ar period of limitation for th comm n m n of th uit an ord r wa ~ ent r m
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nor any office or place of business, within the state of California,

and that the defendants could not be found in said state, and had

not voluntarily appeared in the suit, and requiring them to appear

on April 6, 1896. A copy of this order was served on the Amer-

ican Lumber Company March 9, 1896, and on the Central Trust

Company March 16, 1896. On June 22, 1896, the service of this

order was quashed upon the motion of the defendants; and on

June 25, 1896, another order was thereupon entered, containing

recitals similar to those of the first order, and directing the defend-

ants to appear on August 3, 1896. It was upon the service of this

last order that the defendants appeared and filed the pleas of the

statute of limitations above set forth. Upon the hearing before

the circuit court, the pleas were sustained, and the bill was dis-

missed. The case upon appeal to this court presents the single

question whether or not, upon the record above set forth, the suit

was begun within five years after March 3, 1891.

Was the suit begun on or before March 3, 1896 ? It is contended

by the appellant that by filing the bill in equity and causing process

to be issued thereon, for both the defendants, in good faith, before
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that date, it took all the steps necessary to bring or commence the

suit before the expiration of the time limited by the act of congress.

Just at what point of time a suit in equity may be said to have been

begun under the practice of the federal courts has not been deter-

mined by any statute, or by any rule of court, or by any authorita-

tive decision. A solution of the question must be found by reference

to the English chancery practice, which has been made the rule of

procedure in those courts.

The origin of the English chancery practice is involved in some

ol)scurity, but from tlie earliest treatises upon the subject it ap-

pears that the jurisdiction of the court of chancery was invoked

formerly, as now, by filing a petition or bill setting forth the com-

plainant's grounds for relief, and praying that a writ of subpoena

issue. Upon the petition so presented, the chancellor determined

whether a cause was made for the issuance of the writ. He had

the power to grant or to withhold the writ. If the writ was

granted, the suit was begun; otherwise, there was no suit. The

issuance of the writ was the commencement of the suit. In Harg.

Law Tracts, 321, 435, may be found treatises on the writ of sub-

poena, in which the suit in chancery is designated a suit by sulipoena'.

In course of time the practice was modified so that the signature

WHEN IS SUIT COMMENCED

nor any office or pla e of bu in , within the tate of California,
and that th d f nclan could not be found in aid tate, and had
not voluntarily app ared in the uit, aind r quiring them to appear
on pril 6, 1 96. A opy of thi ord r was erved on the American Lumber ompany March 9, 1896, and on the C ntral Tru ' t
ompany Mar h 16, 1 96. On June 22, 1896, th ervice of thi ,
ord r wa qua ied upon the motion of th defendants; and on
June 25, 1 96, another order wa thereupon ent red, containing
recital imilar to tho of th :fir t order, and directing the defendant to app ar on Augu t 3, 1 96. It wa upon the ervice of thi
la t order that the defendants appeared and :filed the plea of the
tatute of limita·t ion above set forth. Upon the hearing before
the circuit court, th plea wer su tained, and the bill was dismi ed. The ca e upon appeal to thi court pr ents the single
question whether or not, upon the r cord above et forth, the suit
wa begun within :five y ars after March 3, 1 91.
Wa the uit begun on or before March 3, 1896? It is contended
by the a·p pellant that by :filing the bill in quity and causing proce ,
to be i ued thereon, for both the defendant , in good faith, before
that date, it took all the steps neces ary to bring or commence the
suit before the expiration of the time limit d by the act of congre s.
Ju t at what point of time a suit in equity may be aid to have been
begun under the practice of the federal courts has not been determined by any tatute, or by any rul of court, or by any authoritative deci ion. A olution of the qu tion mu t be found by reference
to the Engli h chancery practice, which has been made the rule of
proc dure in tho e courts.
The origin of the Engli h chanc ry practice i involved in ome
ob curity but from the earli t treati e upon the subje t it app ar that the juri di tion of the court of chanc ry wa invoked
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of counsel for tlie complainant was taken as sufficient authority

for the issuance of the writ, and it wan no longer necessary for the

chancellor to pass upon the case made in the petition. It was held

that the suit was pending from the teste of the subpoena. Pigott

Vi Noiuer, 3 Swanst. 534. Such, in brief, was the English chan-

cery practice at the time of its adoption as the rule of procedure

in the courts of the United States. And while it is true that, in

cases where the suit was instituted on behalf of the crown, the

matter of complaint was presented to the court by way of informa-

tion instead of by petition or bill, it was only in form that the in-

formation differed from a bill; and it appears that from the filing

of the information the subsequent procedure was substantially the

same as iu other suits. Mitf. Ch. PI, 7, 22, 119; Attorney General

V. Vernon, 1 Vem. 277, 370. The present suit on behalf of the

United States might, no doubt, have followed the procedure of

the English courts upon information (1 Barb. Ch. Prac. 34) ; but

no warrant would be found from that fact for departing from the

ordinary course of a suit in equity. Our equity rule Xo. 7 follows

the English statute (4 Anne, c. 16, § 22) in providing that "no
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process of subpoena shall issue from the clerk's office in any suit in

equity until the bill is filed in the office." Rule 5 provides that

while all motions for the issuance of mesne process in the clerk's

office shall be grantable, of course, by the clerk of the court, "the

same may be suspended or altered or rescinded by any judge of the

court upon special cause shown." In tiie frame of the bill there

is still inserted the prayer that the writ of subpcena may issue;

but, under equity rule 24, signature of counsel is "an affinnation,

upon his part that, upon the instructions given to liim and the

case laid before him, there is good ground for the suit in the man-

ner in which it is framed"; and it takes the place of an examina-

tion of the bill by the chancellor under the original practice. The

writ of subpo3na in the English chancery practice ran in the name

of the king, and was returnable before the chancellor. Our writ

is issued in the name of tlie president of the United States, and

is returnable before the court in chancer3\ It has been the inter-

pretation of the English chancerv practice, as the same has been

followed and appliwl l>y the American state courts, that a suit is

begun, within the meaning of the statute of limitations, when the

subpoena has been issued, provided that its issuanc-e has been fol-

lowed by a bona fide effort to sen^e the same.
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In the case of Hayden v. Buchlin, 9 Paige, 512, Chancellor Wal-

worth thus stated the law:

"At the present day the filing of a bill, and taking out a subpoena

thereon, and making a bona fide attempt to serve it without delay,

may be considered as the commencement of the suit for the purpose

of preventing the operation of the statute of limitations, if the suit

is afterwards prosecuted with due and reasonable diligence."

The language of the opinion so quoted is adopted as an authorita-

tive formulation of the law in Busw. Lim. § 365, and in Ang. Lim.

§ 330.

In Fitch V. Smith, 10 Paige, 9, the chancellor again declared

the rule:

"It is true, in common parlance we use the expression 'filing of

the bill' to denote the commencement of a suit in chancery, instead

of referring to the issuing and service of subpcena, or the making

of a bona fide attempt to serve it after the bill has been filed, which

is the actual commencement of the suit in this court."

In Pindell v. Maydiv&U, 7 B. Mon. 314, the supreme court of Ken-

tucky said:
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"In bringing a suit in chancery, the first step taken by the com-

plainant is to file his petition or bill; and hence writers on this

subject frequently speak in general terms of this act as the com-

mencement of the suit. But, so far as it relates to the defendant,

the suing out process against him is the commencement of the

suit, preferring the bill being only preparatory to this being done."

Counsel for appellant rely upon the language of the court so

quoted, and upon similar expressions of other courts, to sustain

the doctrine that suing out process is beginning the suit, and con-

tend that the present suit was begun on February 3, 1896, for the

reason that process was sued out upon that date. They argue that

it does not follow from the fact that the defendants were non-

residents of the state of California, and were corporations created

under the laws of other states, that they might not have been found

within the Northern district of California for the purpose of service

of the writ, and that there is nothing in the bill to indicate that

the defendants had not agents or officers within the district upon

whom such service might have ])een had. In short, they contend

that process was sued out in good faith, and that, therefore, the

suit was begun.

This leads us to inquire what is meant by the term "suing out

WHEN IS SUIT COMMENCED

In the ca e of Hayden v. Bucklin, 9 Paige, 512, Chancellor Walworth thus tated the law:
"At the pre ent day the filing of a bill, and taking out a subpama
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The language of the opinion so quoted is adopted as an authoritative formulation of the law in Busw. Lim. § 365, and in Ang. Lim.
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process." From the authorities it appears that suing out process

in equity is the same in meaning as suing out process in an action

at law. It means that, upon the filing of a bill, a writ of subpana

is filled out by the clerk, and is delivered for service. Blain v.

Blain, 15 Vt. 538; Day v. Lamb, 7 Vt. 426; Mason v. Cheney,

47 X. H. 24; Hardy v. Corlls, 21 N. H. 356; Updike v. Ten

Broech, 32 N". J. Law, 105; Burdich v. Green, 18 Johns, 14;

Jackson v. Brooks, 14 Wend. 650; Haughton v. Leary, 3 X. C. 21;

Webster v. Sharpe (?s\ C), 21 S. E. 912; IlailY. Spencer, 1 R. I.

17; Gardner v. Webber, 17 Pick. 407; Evatis v Galloway, 20 Ind.

479; Whitaker v. Turnbull, 18 X. J. Law, 172. In order that the

writ be deemed to be sued out, it must have left the possession of

the officer who issued it, and must cither have reached the possession

of the officer who is to serve it, or the possession of some one who

is the medium of transmission to such officer. But this is not suffi-

cient to toll the statute of limitations. The delivery of the writ

must be followed either by a service of the same or by a bona fide

effort to serve it. If nothing be done with the writ after its issu-

ance, if it be returned unserved, or without the bona fide effort to
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serve it, and a new writ be taken out, the date of the commence-

ment of the suit will be postponed to the date of the second writ.

Equity rule 7 prescribes that '*the process of subpoena shall consti-

tute the proper mesne process in all suits in equit}', in the first

instance, to require the defendant to appear and answer the exi-

gency of the bill." There can be no doubt, in view of the averments

of the bill, that if the subpoena in this case had been delivered

upon its issuance to the marshal for the Northern district of Cali-

fornia, for service upon the defendants in case they could be found

in that district, and a bona fide effori; had been made to serve them

therein, and that effort had been followed by timely proceedings

to acquire jurisdiction by substituted service, the commencement

of the suit would relate back to the date when the writ was so

issued. So, also, it would seem that if, under the bill in this case,

without the issuance of a subpoena, proceedings had been had ac-

cording to the act of March 3, 1875, to obtain the special order

therein provided for, the suit would have been begun at the moment

wlien the special order was issued and delivered for service. For-

syth V. Picrson, 9 Fed. 801 ; Batt v. Proctor, 45 Fed. 515. But

see, contra, Branson v. Keokuk, 2 Dill. 498, Fed. Cas. No. 1,928.

But, whether w<^ measure the effort to make service in this case
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by what was actually done or by the intention, the steps that were

taken come short of the requirement of the rule. The only informa-

tion we have concerning the intention of complainant or its counsel

in suing out the writ is afforded — First, by the prsecipe, and, sec-

ond, by what was done with the writ. From the praecipe it appears

that the intention was to send the subpoenas forthwith without the

state for service. From the writs themselves it appears that they

never came into the hands of the officer who was authorized to

serve them, the marshal of the Northern district of California, but

that they were sent to persons who were without authority to serve

the same, and were by them subsequently returned to tlie clerk's

office. It is needless to say that the process of the court could not

run beyond the court's territorial jurisdiction. In deciding whether

there was an effort to serve the subpcenas in good faith, we must be

guided by a consideration of what the law required in order to effect

a valid service. It does not aid the bona fides of the attempt to

serve that the appellant's counsel thought that the subpoenas could

be legally served by the persons to whom they were sent. It is

immaterial what may have been his belief or his opinion in that
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regard. The bona fides must be shown by proof that an effort was

made to proceed according to law, and that use was made, or at-

tempted to be made, of the means which the law prescribes. After

the writs were issued in this case, not a step was taken in the line of

lawful procedure. Sending the writs without the district in which

only they could be served, and to persons who were without power

to serve them, were vain and futile acts. The delivery of copies of

the subpoenas to the defendants at their offices in Illinois and New

York, while it was sufficient to give them actual notice that a bill

had been filed against them, was neither a service nor an attempted

service upon them, and was of no greater effect than any other

notice which they might have received of the same fact. In short,

it may be said that up to the 5th day of March, 1896, nothing had

])cen done to begin the suit except to file the bill, and to cause sub-

pcenas to issue, which subpoenas were subsequently returned to the

clerk's office.

It is argued that the court should construe liberally, in favor of

the United States, a self-imposed statute of limitations, and the

case of U. 8. v. American Bell Td. Co., 159 U. S. 548, 16 Sup. Ct.

69, is cited. The doctrine of that case, and of the precedents on

which it is sustained, is confined in its application to cases in which

WHEN IS SUIT COMMENCED
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uncertainty exists as to the intention of the legislature to' impose

the limitation In the present case no doubt is suggested by the

language of the statute, and there is no room for construction. It

is clear that congress has said that all suits by the United States

to vacate patents shall l)e l)rought within the period limited by the

act. The only question we are called uix)n to decide is whether

this suit has been within that period. In determining at what

point in the proceedings a suit shall be dcHjmed to be commenced,

we have no warrant for holding that the rule applicable id a suit

on behalf of the United States shall differ from that applicable

to other cases. When the United States, through its congress, has

said that suits in its favor shall be brought only within a stated

period, we have no criterion for determining whether a given suit a

was commenced within that period, except to apply the rules and ^'j^

principles applicable to all suitors. The decree of the circi^^^ourt

will be atlirmed.

Process. ^Y ^f fyi^^y

Crowell V. Botsford, 16 N.J. Eq. 1^58^ (186^) ^^^^ J-

The bill in this cause was filed to foreclose a chattel mortgage.-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 16:37 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t3223129q
Public Domain in the United States / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-us

The subpoena was issued before the filing of the bill, but no notice

nt · e no doubt i ugg ted by th1::
thcr i no room for o tru ·tion. t
1
icl that all uit by the nited tates
br ught within tl~
rio limited by the
t o va at paten ·
act. Th nly qu tio w ar all cl u1 u t d ide i whether
thi uit ha b n within tlmt p riod. In d ·t rmining at what
point in th pr e ·ng a uit hall b d m d t be mm nc d,
w ha no warrant for holding that the rule appli able te1 a suit
on b hall o.f th Unit d tat
hall diff r from that applicable
nit d tat , through i
ongre , ha
to oth r a e .
h n th
aid that uii:s in ii:s fa or hall b brought only within a tat d
p riotl, w hav no rit rion for d t Tmining wheth r a gi en uit
wa omm n d ' ithin that period, x pt to apply the rules and ;
pri i11 appli able to all uitor . The decree of the ci~c~ourt
,
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to final decree and execution. The defendant now asks to set

aside all the proceedings in the cause, on the ground that the sub-iV
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have been set aside as illegally issued. The effect would have been

to compel the complainant to pay the costs of the motion and to

sue out a new subpoena.

But no such motion was made. The complainant was permitted,

without objection, to proceed to final decree and to sue out exe-

cution.

Where a party seeks to set aside the proceedings of his adversary

for an irregularity which is merely technical, he must make his

application for that purpose at the first opportunity. If a solicitor,

after notice of an irregularity, takes any step in the cause, or lies

by and sufi^ers his adversary to proceed therein under a belief that

his proceedings are regular, the court will not interfere to correct

the irregularity, if it is merely technical. Hart v. Small, 4 Paige

288; Parher v. Williams, Ibid. 439.

It is now insisted that the irregularity is not technical ; that the

statute is not directory merely, but imperative; and that no valid

decree can be made, except there be a strict compliance with its

requirements.

The provision of the statute is a regulation of the practice of
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the court, directing the mode in which its proceedings shall be con-

ducted. The time or form in which the thing is directed to be

done is not essential. The proceedings in such cases are held valid,

though the command of the statute is disregarded or disobeyed.

Sedgwick on Statutes, 368.

That this is the effect and operation of the statutes is apparent,

not only from the nature and design of the enactment, but from a

reference to its origin and the history of the practice under it.

The commencement of a suit in chancery was originally by bill,

before the issuing of a subpoena. The bill contained, as it still does,

a prayer for subpcena, which issued as soon as the bill was filed.

Gilbert's For. Eom. 64; 3 Bl. Com. 442-3.

Yet in a very early treatise upon the proceedings of the Court

of Chancery, it is stated that "notwithstanding the practice before

this time hath been that no subpcena should be sued forth of the

Court of Chancery, without a bill first exhibited; yet of late, for

the ease of all suitors and subjects, it hath been thought good that

every man may have a subpoena out of the same court, without a

bill first exhibited." Tothill's Proceed. 1.

And by Lord Clarendon's orders in chancery, in 1661, it is

directed, "that all plaintiffs may have lil)eTty to take forth suh-

PROCESS

have been set aside as illegally issued. The effect would have been
to compel the complainant to pay the cost of the motion and to
sue out a new subpama·.
But no uch motion was made. The complainant was permitted,
without objection, to proceed to final decree and to sue out execution.
Where a party seeks to set aside the proceedings of his adversary
for an irregularity which is merely technica1, he must make his
application for that purpo e at the :first opportunity. If a solicitor,
after notice of an irregularity, takes any tep in the cause, or lies
by and suffer hi adversary to proceed therein under a: belief that
his proceedings are regular, the court will not interfere to couect
the irregula.rity, if it is merely technical. Hart v. Small, 4 Paige
288; Parker v. Williams, Ibid. 439.
It is now insisted that the irregularity is not technical; that the
statute is not directory merely, but imperative; and that no valid
decree can be made, except there be a strict compliance with its
requirements.
The provi ion of the statute· is a regulation of the practice of
the court, directing the mode in which its proceedings shall be conducted. The time or fonn in which the thing is directed to be
done is not e sential. T'he proceedings in such cases are held valid,
though the command of the statute is disregarded or disobeyed.
Sedgwick on Statutes, 368.
That thi is the effect and operation of the statutes is apparent,
not only from the nature and design of the enactment, but from a.
reference to its origin and the history of the practice under it.
The commencement of a suit in chancery was originally by bill,
before the i uing of a subpama. The bill contained, a it still does,
a prayer for subpama, which issued as soon as the bill was filed.
Gilbert' For. Rom. 64; 3 Bl. Com. 442-3.
Yet in a very early treatise upon the proceedings of the Court
of Chancery, it i stated that "notwithstanding the practice before
thi time hath been that no subprena should be u d forth of the
Court of Chancery, without a bill first exhibited; yet of late, for
the ease of all suitors amd ubj cts, it hath b n thought good that
ev ry man may have a ubprena out of the ame court, without a
bill :first exhibited." Tothill Proceed. 1.
And by Lord Clarendon's orders in chancery, in 1661, it is
directed, "that all plaintiff may have liberty to take forth sub-
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pcenas ad respondendum before the filing of their bills, if they

please, notwithstanding any late order or usage to the contrary.*'

Beames' Orders in Chan. 1C8.

This order continued in force until 1705, when it was enacted

(by statute of Ann, ch. 16, § 22), that no "subpoena or any other

process for appearance, do issue out of any court of equity, till

after the bill is filed, except in cases of bills for injunctions to stay

waste, or stay suits at law commenced." The statute is equally

peremptory in its terms with our own, yet it has always been re-

garded as directory only, and a departure from its requirements

a mere irregularity, which subjected the party to costs.

In Hinde's Ch. Pr. 76, it is said that, notwithstanding the

statute, "solicitors, through ignorance and inattention, frequently

sue out and serve this writ before the bill be filed, taking care to

file the bill on the return day, yet that practice is altogether irregu-

lar (except in cases in the statute excepted), and the complainant

does it at the risk of costs.''

The elementary books all treat the issuing of the subpoena l^efore

the filing of the bill, since the passage of the statute, as an irregu-
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larity, which exposes the complainant to the hazards of costs.

1 Xewland's Pr. 62; 2 Maddock's Ch. Pr. 197; 1 Smith's Ch. Pr.

110; 1 Daniell's Ch. Pr. 592.

The same rule prevailed under the ancient practice of the court,

prior to the adoption of Lord Clarendon's order, authorizing the

subpoena to be issued before the filing of the bill.

Cases are very frequent, during the reign of EKzabeth, where

costs are adjudged to the defendant, for want of a bill after the

service of a subpana. Cary's E. 98, 103, 105, 114, 118, 143, 145,

153, 156.

Although the defendant was entitled to costs, yet by "preferring

costs" he was not relieved from appearing when the bill was filed,

and so little was gained by the proceeding, that the practice has

become obsolete. It is considered most advantageous for the de-

fendant, when he has been improperly served with a subpoena before

filing the bill, to wait till the attachment has been issued against

him, and then to move to set the process aside for irregularity.

The effect of such a proceeding is to oblige the plaintiff to sue out

and serve a fresh subpoena. 1 Daniell's Ch. Pr. 593.

This, in its operation, is in accordance with the practice in this
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The issue of the subpoena before bill filed, is an irregularity so

purely technical, that it is waived by an appearance. 1 Daniell's

Ch. Pr. 593.

There is another objection which is equally decisive against the

motion. It appears, by the evidence, that the subpoena was issued

before the filing of the bill, in consequence of a written offer by the

defendant's solicitor to enter an appearance for the defendant. An.

acknowledgment of the legal service of the subpoena was endorsed

upon the writ. At the time of the endorsement, the defendant's

solicitor knew that the bill had not been filed. The complainant's

solicitor was justified in regarding the acts of the defendant's

solicitor, as an appearance for the defendant, and as a waiver of

the irregularity in the issue of the writ. Nix. Dig. 98, § 20.

There is no evidence of surprise or merits. The application,

rests solely on the ground of illegality of the proceedings on the

part of the complainants.

The motion must be denied, and the rule to show cause dis-

charged, with costs.

/^

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 16:37 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t3223129q
Public Domain in the United States / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-us

{r,i fPhcen^ Ins. Co. v. Wulf, 9 Bissl. (U. S.) 2S5. (1880.)

^J^J dfiESHAM, J. :

(/ fty^^^he defendant. Bertha Wulf, owned certain real estate in In-

\ /v ^'^dianapolis, which she conveyed, her husband joining, to a third

/^ person, who conveyed it back to her husband, Henry Wulf. The

~

r y husband, the wife joining, then mortgaged the same property to

rr the Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Company to secure a loan.

The mortgage showed upon its face that it was to secure a loan

to the husband. The loan was not paid at maturity, and afterward

J^\Q mortgage was foreclosed in this court. Bertha Wulf subse-

y qucntly brought suit in this court to set aside her deed to the third

~ ,,J tf'hre

"^ husband to the insurance company, on the sole ground that she

the foreclosure suit was after Bertha Wulf had attained her ma-

jority, and the decree against her was by default.

The marshal's return shows that the subpoena in the foreclosure

suit was properly served on Henry Wulf, in compliance with equity

A

->^

The i ue of the ubpama before bill filed, is an irregularity so
purely technical, that it is waived by an &ppearance. 1 Daniell's
Ch. Pr. 593.
There i anoth r objection which is equally deci ive against the
motion. It appears, by the evidence, that the ubpama was issued
before the filing of the bill, in con equence of a written offer by the
defendant' olicitor to enter an appearance for the defendant. An
acknowledgment of the legal ervice of the subpama was endorsed
upon the writ. At the time of the endorsement, the defendant's
olicitor knew that the bill had not been filed. The complainant's
olicitor was ju tified in regarding the acts of the defendant's
solicitor, as an appearance for the defendant, and as a waiver of
the irregularity in the is ue of the writ. Nix. Dig. 98, § 20.
There is no evidence of surprise or merits. The application
re ts olely on the ground of illegality of the proceeding on the
part of the complainants.
The motion mu t be denied, and the rule to show cause disarged, with co ts.

jH Y:r~

^^ party, his deed to her husband, and the mortgage of herself and

was a minor when she executed those instruments. The service in

PROCESS

ti
~~

!.: Ins. Co. v. Wulf, 9 Biss!. (U. S.) 285.

{1880.)

.

ESH.AM, J.:
The defendant, Bertha Wulf, owned certain real estate in In\
dianapolis, which she conveyed, her husband joining, to a third
~
v
per on who conveyed it back to h r hu band, Henry Wulf. The
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v \
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jority, and th
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The mar hal r turn
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rv d n - enr
ulf in ompliance with quity

.

y

1

r •

PnoE rx I
Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Wulf 145

rule 13. As to the wife, the return read thus: "I served Bertha

Wulf by leaving a copy for her vrith her husband." Sometime

after the wife commenced her suit, as already stated, the marsh.il

appeared and asked leave to amend his return, so as to show that

he had sensed the subpoena on her by leaving a copy for her with

her husband, at her dwelling house or usual place of abode.

The defendant Henry Wulf, occupied a building at the comer

of Virginia avenue and Cobum street, in Indianapolis, both as a

dwelling and a family grocery. In the lower story there were two

rooms, the main one being occupied as a grocery and the back

smaller one for storage purposes. These two rooms were separated

by a hall wliich was entered by a door from Cobum street, and

also from Virginia avenue through the grocery. A stairway led

from the hall to the second story, where the family dwelt, eating

and sleeping. The hall and stairway were accessible in both ways,

and were, in fact, approached in both ways. The deputy marshal

found the husband in the grocery and there served the subpoena

on him and then inquired for his wife, and was informed that it

was early in the morning and she was upstairs in bed where the
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family lived. The officer then, in the grocery, handed to the

husband a copy of the subpoena for his wife.

Upon these facts was there a valid service on the wife under the

13th equity mle, which declares that the service of all subpoenas

shall be by delivery of a copy thereof, by the officer serving the

same, to the defendant personally, or by leaving a copy thereof at

the dwelling house or usual place of abode of each defendant with

some adult person who is a member or resident in the family?

It is urged by counsel that the officer handed to the husband a

copy of the subpoena when he was not at the "dwelling house or

usual place of alx)de"— that the grocery room was as distinct from

the residence in the upper story, as if the two had been in separate

buildings wide apart. That construction of the rule is narrow and^

unreasonable. It is conceded that if the officer had handed the copy

to the husband in the hall the service would have been good, be-

cause the upper story was approached only through the hall, and

it was therefore connected with the dwelling. There were but two

ways of ingress to the residence or upper story — one from Virginia

avenue, through the grocery, and the other through the door open-

ing from Cobum street. The family passed in and out both ways,

as best suited their convenience. A copy was left with one who

10
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understood its contents and was likely to deliver it to the person

for whom it was intended.

The ease of Kihhe v. Benson, 17 Wallace, 625, is cited against

the sufficiency of the service. That was an action of ejectment in

the Circuit Court of the United States for the JSTorthem District

of Illinois, which had adopted the statute of that state relating

to actions of ejectment. After judgment was entered for the

plaintiff by default, the defendant filed a bill in equity to set aside

the judgment on the ground that he had no notice or knowledge

of the pendency of the suit, and for fraud. The Illinois statute

required that in actions of ejectment, when the premises were

actually occupied, the declaration should be served by delivering

a copy to the defendant named therein, who should be in the occu-

pancy of the premises, or, if absent, by leaving the same with a

white person of the family of the age of ten years or upwards "at

the dwelling house of such defendant."

On the trial of the equity suit one Turner swore that when he

called at Benson's house to serve upon him the declaration, he was

informed by Benson's father that Benson was not at home, and
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that while the father was standing near the southeast corner of

the yard, adjoining the dwelling house and inside the yard, and

not over 125 feet from the dwelling house, he handed him a copy

of the declaration, explaining its nature, and requesting him to

hand it to his son, after which the father threw the copy upon the

ground muttering some angry words.

There was a conflict in the testimony, but the Circuit Court

decided that even if the copy was handed to the father, as testified

to by Turner, the service was not sufficient, and set aside the judg-

ment which had been entered by default, and the decree was

affirmed on appeal. In deciding the case the Supreme Court say

"it is not unreasonable to require that it (copy of the declaration)

should be delivered on the steps or on a portico, or in some out

house adjoining to or immediately connected with the family man-

sion, where, if dropped or left, it would be likely to reach its

destination. A distance of 125 feet and in a corner of the yard

is not a compliance with the requirements."

Eule 13 should receive a liberal construction. It does not require

the copy of the subpoena to be left with a person in the dwelling

house ; it is sufficient if the person who receives the copy is at the
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under tood its contents and was likely to deliver it to the person
for whom it was intended.
The case of Kibbe v. Benson~ 17 Wallace, 625, is cited against
the ufficiency of the service. That was an action of ejectment in
the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern Di trict
of Illinois, which had adopt d the statute of that state relating
to actions of ejectment. After judgment was entered for the
plaintiff by default, the defendant filed a bill in equity to set aside
the judgment on the ground that he had no notice or knowledge
of the pendency of the suit, and for fra:ud. The Illinois statute
required that in actions of ejectment, when the premises were
actually occupied, the declaration should be served by delivering
a copy to the defendant named therein, who hould be in the occupancy of the premise , or, if absent, by leaving the same with a
white per on of the family of the age of ten years or upwards "at
the dwelling hou e of uch defendant."
On the trial of the equity suit one Turner swore that when he
called at Ben on' hou e to serve upon him the declaration, he was
informed by Benson's father that Benson was not at home, and
that while the father wa standing near the outhea t corner of
the yard, adjoining the dwelling house and inside the yard, and
not over 125 feet from the dwelling house, he handed him a copy
of the declaration, explaining its nature, and reque ting him to
hand it to his on, after which the father threw the copy upon the
ground muttering ome angry words.
There was a conflict in the testimony, but the Circuit Court
decided that even if the copy was handed to the father, as testified
to by Turner, the ervice wa not sufficient, and set aside the judgm nt which had been entered by default, and the decree was
affirmed on appeal. In d ciding the ca e the Supreme Court say
"it i not unr a enable to require that it (copy of the declaration)
hould be deliv red on the tep or on a portico, or in ome out
hou e adjoining to or immediately connect d with the family manion, where, if dropped or left, it would b likely to reach its
d tination. A di tan e of 1 5 f et and in a corner of the yard
i not a compliance with the r quirem nt ."
Rule 13 hould rec ive a lib ral con tru tion. It doe not require
the opy of th ubpcena to be 1 ft with a p r on in th dw lling
hou e ; it is sufficient if th person who receive the copy is at the
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dwelling house. The rule is satisfied by a service outside the dwell-

ing house at the door, just as v/ell as inside the house.

I think Bertha Wulf was in court when the decree of fore-

closure was entered. This is not a motion to correct the pleadings,

judgment or process.

Courts have the power to pennit officers to amend their returns

to both mesne and final process, and the power is exercised li])crally

in the interest of justice, especially when the rights of third parties

are not to be afi!ected by the amendment.

In the exercise of a sound discretion they have allowed officers

to amend their returns according to the real facts after the lapse

of several years, and when there is no doubt ahout the facts such

amendments have been allowed after the officer's term has ex-

pired.*

I think justic^ Tequires that the amendment should be allowed

in this case. . > -'

7r

s^ ^Default and Decree Pro Confesso. "yr .SJ ^

.<■ \^homson v. Wooster, lU U. S. lOJt. (188JfJi .)} J^ A ^
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Tlie appellee in this case, who was complainant below, filed his ll^i/t

bill against the appellants, complaining that they infringed certainxA' ^^\ f

letters patent for an improved folding guide for sewing machines, ^ U

granted to one Alexander Douglass, of which the complainant was Jr ^'^

the assignee. The patent was dated October 5, 1858, was extended ^ y ^

for seven years in 1872, and was reissued in December, 1872. The rT" v (/^

suit was brought on the reissued patent, a copy of which was V/^^

annexed to the bill, which contained allegations that the invention .Jj^ ^

patented had gone into extensive use, not only on the part of the r f y

complainant, but by his licensees; and that many suits had been L^ J/^

brought and sustained against infringers. The bill further alleged r ^

that the defendants, from the time when the patent was reissued^^^^i-^

down to the commencement of the suit, wrongfully and withoutC l^^ i

license, made, sold and used, or caused to be made, sold and u?cd,U-

one or more folding guides, each and all containing the said im-

* Adams v. Rohiiison. i Pickering, 461; Johnson v. Dav. 17 Pickering, l/^^ ^

106: People V. Ames. 35 xN'ew York, 482: Jackson v. O. '& M. R. R.. 15 ^^

Indiana. 102; DeArmon v. Adams. 25 Indiana, 455. Freeman on Execu*^ » ^J^^

tions, §§358 and 359; Herman on Executions, §248. C^' " i/

14:8
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provement secured to the complainant by the said reissued letters

patent, and that the defendants derived great gain and profits

from such use, but to what amount the complainant was ignorant,

and prayed aj disclosure thereof, and an account of profits, and

damages, and a perpetual injunction.

The bill of complaint was accompanied with affidavits verifying

the principal facts and certain decrees or judgments obtained on

the patent against other parties, and Douglass's original applica-

tion for the patent, made in April, 1856, a copy of which was an-

nexed to the affidavits. These affidavits and documents were

exhibited for the purpose of obtaining a preliminary injunction,

which was granted on notice.

The defendants appeared to the suit by their solicitor, May 3,

1879, but neglected to file any answer, or to make any defence to

the bill, and a rule that the bill be taken pro confesso was entered

in regular course June 10, 1879. Thereupon, on the 2d of August,

1879, after due notice and hearing, the court made a decree to the

following effect, viz. : 1st. That the letters-patent sued on were

good and valid in law. 2d. That Douglass was the first and
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original inventor of the invention described and claimed therein.

3d. That the defendants had infringed the same hy making, usipg

and vending to others to be used, without right or license, certain

folding guides substantially as described in said letters patent.

4th. That the complainant recover of the defendants the profits

which they had derived by reason of such infringement by any

manufacture, use or sale, and any and all damages which the com-

plainant had sustained thereby; and it was referred to a master

to take and state an account of said profits, and to assess said

damages, with directions to the defendants to produce their books

and papers and submit to an oral examination if required. It was

also decreed that a perpetual injunction issue to restrain the de-

fendants from making, using, or vending any folding guides made

as theretofore used by them, containing any of the inventions

described and claimed in the patent, and from infringing the

patent in any way.

Under this decree the parties went before the master, and the

examination was commenced in October, 1879, in the presence of

counsel for both parties, and was continued from time to time

until lsroveml)cr 3, 1880, when arguments were beard upon the

matter, and the case was submitted. On November 12th the report

DEFAULT AND DECREE PRO CONFESSO

provement secured to the complainam.t by the said reissued letters
patent, and that the defendants derived great gain and profits
from such u e, but to what amount the complainant wa ignorant,
and prayed ai di clo ure thereof, and an account of profits, and
damage , and a p rpetual injunction.
The bill of complaint was accompanied with affidavits verifying
the principal facts and certaiin decrees or judgments obtained on
the patent against other parties, and Douglas 's original application for the patent, made in April, 1856, a copy nf which was annexed to the affidavits. These affidavits and documents were
exhibited for the purpose of obtaining a preliminary injunction,
which was granted on notice.
The defendants appeared to the suit by their solicitor, May 3,
1879, but neglected to :file any answer, or to make any defence to
the bill, and a rule that the bill be taken pro confesso was entered
in regular course June 10, 1879. Thereupon, on the 2d of August,
1879, after due notice and hearing, the court made a decree to the
following effect, viz.: 1st. T'hat the letters-patent sued on were
good and vaJid in law. 2d. That Douglass was the first and
original inventor of the invention described and claimed therein.
3d. That the defendants had infringed the same by making, usi:p.g
and vending to others to be used, without right or license, certain
folding guides substantially as described in said letters patent.
4th. Tha:t the complainant recover of the defendants the profits
which they had derived by reason of such infringement by any
manufacture, use or sale, and any and all damages which the complainant had sustained thereby; and it was referred to a master
to take and state an account of said profits, and to assess said
damages, with directions to the defendants to produce their books
aind paper and submit to an oral examination if required. It wa
al o decreed that a perpetual injunction i sue to restrain the defendants from making, using ·or vending any folding guides made
a theretofore used by them, containing any of the invention
d cribed and claimed in the pat nt, and from infringing the
patent in any way.
Und r thi d cree th partie went b fore the ma ter and the
examination was commenc d in Octob r, 1879, in the pr ence of
and wa continued from time to time
coun 1 for both parti
until o mber 3 1 0 wh n ar ument w re heard up n the
matter, and th a e wa ubmitt d. On ovember 12th the r port
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was prepared and submitted to the inspection of counsel. On the

18th motion was made by the defendants' counsel, before the mas-

ter, to open the proofs and for leave to introduce newly discovered

evidence. This motion was supported by affidavits, but was over-

which it was found and stated that the defendants had used at

various times, from January 18, 1877, to the commencement of

the suit, twenty-seven folding guides infringing the complainant's

patent, and had folded 1,217,870 yards of goods by their use, and

that during that period there was no means known or used, or

open to the public to use, for folding such goods in the same,

or substantially the same manner, other than folding them by

hand, and that the saving in cost to the defendants by using the

folding guides was three cents on each piece of six yards, making

the amount of profit which the complainant was entitled to re-

cover, $6,089.35 ; and that during the same period the complainant

depended upon license fees for his compensation for the use of

the patented device, and that the amount of such fees constituted

his loss or damage for the unauthorized use of his invention : and
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that, according to the established fees, the defendants would have

been liable to pay for the use of the folding guides used by them

during the years 1877, 1878 and 1879 (the period covered by the

infringement), the sum of $1,350, which was the amount of the

complainant's damages. The evidence taken by the master was

filed with his report.

By a supplemental report, filed at the same time, the master

stated the fact of the application made to him to open the proofs

on the ground of surprise and newly discovered evidence (as

before stated), and that after hearing said application upon the

affidavits presented (which were appended to the report), he was

unable to discover any just ground therefor.

Tlio defendants did not object to this supplemental report, but

on the 10th of January, 18S1, they filed exceptions to the principal

report, substantially as follows:

1. That instead of the double guide or folder claimed in the

complainant's patent being the only means for folding cloth or

strips on ea^ edge during the period of the infringement (other

than that of folding by hand), the master should have found

that such strips could have been folded by means of a single guide

or folder, and that the use of such guldens was known and open to
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ruled l)y the master, and his report was filed December 10, 1880, in
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the public long before 1877, and that such guides were not em-

braced in the complainant's patent.

2. That the amount of profits found by the master was

erroneous, because it appeared that folded strips such as those

used by the defendants were an article of merchandise, cut and

folded by different parties at a charge of 25 cents for 144 yards.

3. That the profits should not have been found greater than

the saving made by the use of the double guide as compared with

the use of a single guide, or greater than the amount for which

the strips could have been cut and folded by persons doing such

business.

4. That the damages found were erroneous.

Other exceptions were subsequently filed, but were overruled

for being filed out of time.

Before the argument of the exceptions the defendants gave

notice of a motion to the court to refer the cause back to the

master to take further testimony in reference to the question of

profits and damages chargeable against them under the order of

DEFAULT A
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the public long before 1877, and that such guides were not embraced in the complainant's patent.
2. That the amount of profits found by the master was
erroneous, because it appeared that folded strips such as those
used by the defendants were an article of merchandise, cut and
folded by different parties at a charge of 25 cents for 144 yards.
3. That the profits should not have been found greater than
the saving made by the use of the double guide as compared with
the use of a single guide, or greater than the amount for which
the strips could have been cut and folded by persons doing such
business.
4. That the damages found were erroneous.
Other exceptions were subsequently filed, but were overruled
for being filed out of time.
Before the argument of the exceptions the defendants gave
notice of a motion to the court to refer the ca use back to the
master to take further testimony in reference to the question of
profits and damages chargeable against them under the order of
reference. In support of this motion further affidavits were presented.
The exceptions to the report and the application to refer the
cause back to the master were argued together. The court denied
the motion to refer the cause. back, overruled the exceptions to
the report, and made a decree in favor of the complainant for the
profits, but disallowed the damages. That decree the respondents
brought here by appeal.
They assigned fourteen reasons for appeal, of which the first
nine related to the proceeding before the master and his report,
and the last five to the validity of the reissued patents.
1

reference. In support of this motion further affidavits were pre-
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sented.

The exceptions to the report and the application to refer the

cause back to the master were argued together. The court denied

the motion to refer the cause back, overrviled the exceptions to

the report, and made a decree in favor of the complainant for the

profits, but disallowed the damages. That decree the respondents

brought here by appeal.

They assigned fourteen reasons for appeal, of which the first

nine related to the proceedings before the master and his report,

and the last five to the validity of the reissued patents.

Mr. Justice Bradley delivered the opinion of the court. After

stating the facts in the foregoing language, he continued:

The appellants have assigned fourteen reasons or grounds for

reversing the decree. The first nine relate to the taking of the

account before the master and liis report thereon ; the last five

relate to the validity of the letters patent on which the suit was

brought. It will be convenient to consider the last reasons first.

The bill, as we have seen, was taken pro confesso, and a decree

pro confesso was regularly entered up, declaring that the letters

patent were valid, that Douglass was the original inventor of the

invention therein described and claimed, that the defendants were

MR. JusTICE BRADLEY delivered the opinion of the court. After
stating the facts in the foregoing language, he continued:
The appellants have assign d fourteen reasons or grounds for
reversing the decre . The first nine relate to the taking of the
account before the ma ter and his report thereon; the last five
relate to the validity of the letters patent on which the suit was
brought. It will be convenient to con id r the la t reasons fir t.
The bill, as we ha1ve een, wa taken pro confessoJ and a decree
pro confe so was r gularly entered up d daring that the l tters
patent wer vali 1, that Douglass wa th ori O']nal inv ntor of the
invention therein d cribed and claimed, that the defendants were
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infringing the patent, and that they must account to the com-

plainant for the profits made by them by such infringement and

for the damages he had sustained thereby; and it was referred

to a master to take and state an account of such profits and to

ascertain said damages.

The defendants are concluded by that decree, so far at least

as it is supported by the allegations of the bill, taking the same

to bo true. Being carefully based on these allegations, and not

extending beyond them, it cannot now be questioned by the

defendants unless it is shown to be erroneous by other statements

contained in the bill itself. A confession of facts properly pleaded

dispenses with proof of those facts, and is as effective for the

purposes of the suit as if the facts were proved; and a decree

pro confcsso regards the statements of the bill as confessed.

By the early practice of the civil law, failure to appear at the

day to which the cause was adjourned was deemed a confession

of the action; but in later times this rule was changed, so that

the plaintiif, notwithstanding the contumacy of the defendant,

only obtained judgment in accordance with the truth of the case
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as established by an ex parte examination. Keller, Proced. Eom.

§ 69. The original practice of the English Court of Chancery

was in accordance with the later Eoman law. IlawTcins v. Crook,

2 P. Wms. 556. But for at least two centuries past bills have been

taken pro confcsso for contumacy. Ibid. Chief Baron Gilbert

says : "Where a man appears by his clerk in court, and after lies

in prison, and is brought up three times to court by habeas corpus,

and has the bill read to him, and refuses to answer, such public

refusal in court does amount to the confession of the whole bill.

Secondly, when a person appears and departs without answering,

and the whole process of the court has been awarded against him

after his appearance and departure, to the sequestration; there

also the bill is taken pro confcsso, because it is presumed to be

true when he has appeared and departs in despite of the court and

withstands all its process without answering." Forum Eomanum,

36. T^rd Hardwicke likened a decree pro confesso to a judgment

by nil dicit at common law, and to judgment for plaintiff on

demurrer to the defendant's plea. Davis v. Davis, 2 Atk. 21. It

was said in IlatvJcins v. CrooTc, qua supra, and quoted in 2 Eq. Ca.

Ab. 170, that "The method in equity of taking a bill pro confess^

is consonant to the rule and practice of the courts at law, where.
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infringing th pa ent, and that th y mu t account to the complainant for th profit made by th m by uch infringement and
for th 1amag h ha 1 u tain d thereby; and it wa r ferrecl
io a ma t r t tak ancl tate am account of such profit and to
a c rtain aid damage .
Th d f n ant are concluded by that de r e, o far at lea t
a it i upp rted by th all gation of the bill, taking the same
to b tru .
ing carefully ba d on the e allegation , and not
. t nding b ond· th m, it .cannot now be qu tionedi by the
de.f ndant unle it i hown to be erroneou by other tat men
ontain cl in th bill itself. A confe sion of fact properly pl aded
di p
with proof of tho e fact , and is as effective for the
purp
of th ui t as if the facts wer proved; and a decree
pro conf e so regard the tatements of th bill as conf ed.
By the early practice of th civil law, failure to appear at the
day to which th cause wa adjourned was deemed a confes ion
of the action; but in later times this rule was changed, so that
the plaintiff, notwith tanding the contumacy of the defendant,
only obtain d judgm nt in accordance with the truth of the case
as tabli hed by an ex parte examination. Keller, Proced. Rom.
~ 69.
The original practice of the English Court of Chancery
wa in accordance with the later Romam law. Hawkins v. Crook,
2 P. Wm . 556. But for at lea t two centuries pa t bills have been
taken pro confesso for contumacy. Ibid. Chief Baron Gilbert
ay : "Where a man appear by hi clerk in court, a:nd after lies
in pri on, and i brought up three times to court by habeas corpus,
and ha the bill read to him, and refuses to answer, such public
refu al in court do amount to the confes ion of the whole bill.
econ ly, when a per on aippear and departs without an wering,
and the whole proce of the court has been awarded again t him
after hi appearance and departure, to the seque tration; there
al o the bill i tak n pro confesso, becau e it is pre urned to be
tru when he ha appeared and d part in de pite of the court and
with tand all it proces without an wering.' Forum Romanum,
36. Lord Hardwicke likened a decree pro confesso to a judgment
b ' nil dicit at ommon la· and to judgment for plaintiff on
d murr r to th d f ndant plea. Davi . Davis, 2 tk. 1. It
ai in Ilawkins \. rook, qua upra and quoted in 2 Eq. Ca.
b. 1
that The method in equit of taking a bill pro confe ~
i~ on onant to the rul and practic of th court at law 1rher ,
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if the defendant makes default by nil dicit, judgment is imme-

diately given in debt, or in all cases where the thing demanded

is certain; but where the matter sued for consists in damages, a

judgment interlocutory is given; after which a writ of inquiry

goes to ascertain the damages, and then the judgment follows."

The strict analog}' of this proceeding in actions of law to a general

decree pro confesso in equity in favor of the complainant, with a

reference to a master to take a necessary account, or to assess

unliquidated damages, is obvious and striking.

A carefully prepared history of the practice and effect of taking

bills pro confesso is given in WMliams v. Corwin, Hopkins Ch.

471, by Hoffman, master, in a report made to Chancellor Sanford,

of New York, in which the conclusion come to (and adopted by

the Chancellor), as to the effect of taking a bill pro confesso, was

that "when the allegations of a bill are distinct and positive, and

the bill is taken as confessed, such allegations are taken as true

without proofs," and a decree will be made accordingly; but

"where the allegations of a bill are indefinite, or the demand of the

complainant is in its nature uncertain, the certainty requisite to a
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proper decree must be afforded by proofs. Tlie bill, when con-

fessed by the default of the defendant, is taken to be true in all

matters alleged with sufficient certainty; but in respect to mat-

ters not alleged with due certainty, or subjects which from their

nature and the course of the court require an examination of

details, the obligation to furnish proofs rests on the complainant."

We may properly say, therefore, that to take a bill pro confesso

is to order it to stand as if its statements were confessed to be

true; and that a decree pro confesso is a decree based on such

statements, assumed to be true, 1 Smith's Ch. Pract. 153, and

such a decree is as binding and conclusive as any decree rendered

in the most solemn manner. "It cannot be impeached collaterally,

but only upon a bill of review, or [a bill] to set it aside for fraud.

1 Daniell Ch. Pr. 696, 1st Ed. ;* Ogilvie v. Heme, 13 Ves. 563.

*Note by the Court. — Reference is made to the ist Edition of Daniell

(pub. 1837) as being, with the 2d Edition of Smith's Practice (published

the same year), the most authoritative work on English Chancery Prac-

tice in use in March, 1842, when our Equity Rules were adopted. Sup-

plemented by the General Orders made by Lords Cottenham and Lang-

dale in August, 1841 (many of which were closely copied in our own

Rules), they exhibit that "present practice of the High Court of Chancery

in England," which by our 90th Rule was adopted as the standard of equity

practice in' cases where the Rules prescribed by this court, or by the
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if the defendant makes default by nil dicit judgment i immediately giv n in debt, or in all ca e where the thing demanded
is c rtain; but where the matter sued for consists in damage , a
judgment interlocutory is given; after which a writ of inquiry
goe to a cerfain the damage , and then the judgment follow . '
The trict analogy of thi proceeding in action of law to a general
deer pro confesso in equity in favor of the complainant, with a
reference to a ma ter to take a nece ary account, or to assess
unliquidat cl damag , is obvious and striking.
A carefully prepared hi tory of the practice and effect of taking
bill pro confesso i given in Wvlliams v. 001·win, Hopkins Ch.
471, by Hoffman, ma6ter, in a report made to Chane llor Sanford,
of New York, in which the conclu ion come to (and adopted by
tlie Chancellor), as to the effect of taking a bill pro conf esso, was
that "wh n the allegations of a bill are distinct and positive, and
the bill i taken a conf e eel, uch allegation are taken as true
without proof ," and a decree will be made accordingly; but
"where th allegations of a bill are indefinite, or the demand of the
complainant i in it nature uncertain, the certainty requisite to a
proper decree must be a:fforded by proofs. The bill, when confessed by the default of the defendant, is taken to be true in all
matter alleged with sufficient certainty; but in re pect to matters not alleged with due certainty, or subjects which from their
nature and the course of the court require an examination of
details, the obliga·t ion to furni h proofs re ts on the complainant."
We may properly say, therefore, that to take a bill pro confesso
is to order it to tand a if its statements were oonfe ed to be
true; and that a decree pro conf esso i a decree based on uch
stat ment , a urned to be true, 1 Smith's Ch. Prad. 153, and
su h a decre i a binding and conclu ive as any cl cree rendered.
in the mo t olemn manner. 'It cannot be impeach d collaterally,
but only upon a bill of review, or [a bill] to et it aide for fraud.
1 Daniell h. Pr. 696, 1 t Ed.;* Ogilvie v. H erne, 13 Ve . 56 .
*Note by the Court-Reference is made to the r t Edition of Daniell
(pub. 1837) a being, with the 2d Edition of mith' Practi e (publi hed
the sam y ar . the m t a uth ritative work on E ngli h Chane ry ractice in u e in farch, I 42 when our Equity Rul
were adopted.
upplem nted by the Gen ral
rd r mad by L rd Cotten ham and Langdal in Augu t, I 4r many of whi h w r
lo ly c pi d in ur wn
Rul ), th y xhil it that "p r ent pra tice of th Iigh C urt f Chane ry
in England,' which by ur goth ule wa adopt d a the tanda rd f quity
practice in case wh re th Rul
pr scrib d by thi
urt, or by the
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Such being the general nature and effect of an order taking

a bill pro confesso, and of a decree pro confesso regularly made

thereon, we are prepared to understand the fuU force of our rules

of practice on the subject. Those rules, of course, are to govern

so far as they apply; but the effect and meaning of the terms

which they employ are necessarily to be sought in the books of

authority to which we have referred.

By our rules a decree jjto confesso may be had if the defendant,

on being served with process, fails to appear within the time re-

quired; or if, having appeared, he fails to plead, demur or answer

to the bill within the time limited for that purpose; or, if he fails

to answer after a former plea, demurrer or answer is overruled or

declared insufficient. The 12th Rule in Equity prescribes the time

when the subpoena shall be made returnable, and directs that "at

the bottom of the subpo3na shall be placed a memorandum, that

the defendant is to enter his appearance in the suit in the clerk's

office on or before the day at which the writ is returnable; other-

wise the bill may be taken pro confesso." The 18th Rule requires

the defendant to file his plea, demurrer or answer (unless he gets
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an enlargement of the time) on the rule day next succeeding that

of entering his appearance; and in default thereof the plaintiff

may at his election, enter an order (as of course) in the order

book, that the bill be taken pro confesso, and thereupon the cause

shall be proceeded in ex parte, and the matter of the bill may Ije

decreed by the court at any time after the expiration of thirty

days from the entry of said order, if the same can be done without

an answer, and is proper to be decreed; or the plaintiff, if he,

requires any discovery or answer to enable him to obtain a proper

decree, shall be entitled to process of attachment against the de-

fendant to compel an answer, etc. And the 19th Rule declares that

the decree rendered upon a bill taken pro confesso shall be deemed

absolute, unless the court shall at the same term set aside the

Circuit Court, do not apply. The 2d Edition of ^Ir. Daniell's work, pub-

lished by Mr. Hcadlam in 1846. was much modified by the extensive

changes mtroduced by the English Orders of May 8, 184^; and the 3d

Edition, by the still more radical changes introduced by "the Orders of

April, 1850, the Statute of 15 & 16 Vict. c. 86, and the General Orders after-

wards made under the authority of that statute. Of course the subse-

quent editions of Daniell are still further removed from the standard

adopted by this court in 1842: but as they contain a view of the later

decisions hearing upon so much of the old system as remains, they have

on that account, a value of their own, provided one is not misled'bv the

new portions.
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Such being the g n ral nature and effect of an order taking
a bill pro confe so, and of a decree pro confesso regularly made
ther on, we are pr pared to und tancl the full force of our rule
of practice on th ubject. Tho e rule , of course, are to go ern
o far a they apply; but the eff ct and meaning of the term
h1 ·h they mploy ar nece arily to be ought in the book of
authorit o whi h ' have ref rred.
y our rul a d r pro conf e so may be had if the defendant,
on b ing ervcd with proc , fails to appear within the time reuir d; or if having app ared, be fail to plead, demur or an wer
t th bill within th time limited for that purpo e ; or, if he fail
to an wer aft r a form r plea, d murrer or an wer i o erruled or
lar l in uffici nt. The 1 th Rule in Equity pr crib the time
wh n the ubp na hall be made returnable, and directs that "at
th bottom of the ubpama ball be placed a memorandum, that
the def ndant i to enter hi app arance in the uit in the clerk
offi on or before th day at which the writ i returnable ; otherwi the bill ma b taken pro confes o." The 1 th Rule require
th
fendant to file bi plea, demurrer or an wer ( unle be gets
an nlargemen t of the time) on the rule day next ucceeding that
of entering hi appearance ; and in default thereof the plaintiff
may at hi el ction, enter an order (a of course ) in the order
book, that the bill be taken pro conf esso, and thereupon the cau e
hall be proceeded in ex parte, and the matter of the bill may be
d r d by the ourt at any time after the expiration of thirty
day from th entry of aid order, if the ame an b done without
an an w r, a·n d i proper to be decreed; or the plaintiff, if be
r quir an3 di cov ry or answer to enabl him to obtain a proper
d er , hall b entitled to proce o-f attachment agaJinst the def nd nt to comp 1 an an w r etc.
nd th 19th Rule d lare that
th d r rend r d upon a bill taken pro conf esso hall be deemed
a olut , unl
the court hall at the ame term et a ide the
Circuit Court, do not apply. The 2d Edition of Ir. Daniell' 'rnrk publi hed by ).fr. H eadlam in I _.i6 wa much modified by the exten ive
ha ng . introduced by th e Eno-Ji h
rder of May , 1
; a nd th e
d
diti on. by the till m re radical change intr duced by the
r de r of
• ril, I 50, the tatute of 15
16 Viet. c. 86 and the General r de r a fter" a rd made und r th authority of that tatute. Of co ur e the uh equ nl edition of
a ni II a re till further rem oved fro m th e tanda rd
acl optccl hy thi cour t in I .f2: but a they conta in a v iew of the la ter
cl ci io n hea rin up n o mu h of th e old
tern a remai n-. they ha ve.
11 th a t account, a valu
of their O\ n pro ided one i not mi led -b , the
ne' portion .
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same, or enlarge the time for filing the answer, upon cause shown

upon motion and affidavit of the defendant.

It is thus seen that by our practice, a decree pro confesso is

not a decree as of course according to the prayer of the bill, nor

merely such as the complainant chooses to take it ; but that it is

made (or should be made) by the court, according to what is

proper to be decreed upon the statements of the bill, assumed to

be true. This gives it the greater solemnity, and accords with,

the English practice, as well as that of New York. Chancellor

Kent, quoting Lord Eldon, says: "Where the bill is thus taken

pro confesso J and the cause is set down for hearing, the course (says

Lord Eldon, in Geary v. Sheridan, 8 Ves. 192), is for the court

to hear the pleadings, and itself to pronounce the decree, and not

to permit the plaintiff to take, at his own discretion, such a decree

as he could abide by, as in the case of default by the defendant at

the hearing." Rose v. Woodruff, 4 Johns. Ch. 547, 548. Our

rules do not require the cause to be set down for hearing at a

regular term, but, after the entry of the order to take the bill

pro confesso, the 18th rule declares that thereupon the cause shall
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be proceeded in ex parte, and the matter of the hill may he decreed

hy the court at any time after the expiration of thirty days from the

entry of such order, if it can be done without answer, and is proper

to he decreed. This language shows that the matter of the bill

ought at least to be opened and explained to the court when

the decree is applied for, so that the court may see that the decree

is a proper one. The binding character of the decree, as declared

in Eule 19, renders it proper that this degree of precaution should

be taken.

We have been more particular in examining this subject be-

cause of the attempt made by the defendants, on this appeal, to

overthrow the decree by matters outside of the bill, which was

regularly taken pro confesso. From the authorities cited, and the

express language of our own Rules in Equity, it seems clear that

the defendants, after the entry of the decree pro confesso, and

whilst it stood unrevoked, were absolutely barred and precluded

from alleging anything in derogation of, or in opposition to, the

said decree, and that they are equally barred and precluded from

questioning its correctness here on appeal, unless on the face of the

bill it appears manifest that it was erroneous and improperly

granted.

DEFAULT AND DECREE PRO CONFESSO

ame, or enlarge the time for filing the answer, upon ca;use shown
upon motion and affidavit of the defendant.
It i thu een that by our practice, a decree pro confesso is
not a decree as of course according to the prayer of the bill, nor
merely uch as the complainant choo es to take it; but that it is
made (or hould be made) by the court, according to what is
proper to be decreed upon the statements of the bill, assumed to
be true. Thi gives it the greater solemnity, and aocords with
the Engli h practice, a well as that of New Yark. Chancellor
Kent, quoting Lord Eldon, ays: "vVbere the bill is thu taken
pro confesso, and the cau e i set down for hearing, the course ( ays
Lord Eldon, in Geary v. Sheridwn, 8 Ves. 192), is for the court
to hear the pleading, and itself to pronounce the decree, and not
to permit the plaintiff to take, at hi own di cretion, such a decree
a he could a:bide by, as in the case of default by the defendant at
the hearing." Rose v. Woodruff, 4 John . Ch. 547, 548. Our
rule do not require the cau e to be et down for hearing at a
regular term, but, after the entry of the order to take the bill
pro confesso, the 18th rule declares that thereupon the cau e shall
be proceeded in ex parte, and the matter of the bill may be decreed
by the court at any time after the expiration of thirty days from the
entry of such order, if it can be done without an wer, and is proper
to be decreed. This language shows that the matter of the bill
ought at least to be opened and explained to the court when
the decree i applied for, so that the court may ee that the decree
is a proper one. The binding character of the deer e, as declared
in Rule 19, renders it proper that this degree of precaution should
be taken.
We have been more particular in examining thi subje.!t because of the attempt made by the defendant, on thi appeal, to
overthrow the decree by matters outside of the bill, which was
r ernlarly taken pro confesso. From the authoritie cited, and the
ex1 r
language of our own Rul in Equity, it eem clear that
the defendant , after the entry of th decree pro confesso, and
whil t it tood unr vok d, w re ab olutely barr d and precluded
:from all ging anything in derogation of, or in opp ition to, the
aid decree, and that they are equally baned and precluded from
ue tioning it correctn her on appeal, unle on th fac of the
b111 it app ar manifest that it was erroneous and improperly
granted.
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CHAPTER V.

PROCEEDINGS ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT.

Appearance. %^0^

Flint V. Comly, 95 Me. 251. (1901.)

Exceptions by defendants. Overruled. \ ^

PRO EEDI G

0

~
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~

OF DEFENDANT.

Bill in equity by Lucy M. Flint of Cornish, in the county of

York, administratrix of the goods and estate of Fred T. Flint, late

APPEAR

CE.

of said Cornish, deceased, against Eobert Comly of Philadelphia,

and William Flanigen of Woodbury, New Jersey, co-partners in

business under the firm name and style of Comly and Flanigen, and

Flint

. Comly> 95 Me . 51 .

{1901 .)

against Charles E. Perkins of Portland. The bill asserts a lien or

interest in certain mortgages and pledges of real estate and per-

sonal property held by the non-resident defendants, and against the

estate of the said Fred T. Flint.

After several hearings the plaintiff moved to convert the cause

into an action at law. This motion having been granted the

defendants excepted.
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Sitting: Wiswcll, C. J., Emery, Whitehouse, Strout, Fogler, JJ.

WiSWELL, C. J. :

The plaintiff commenced a bill in equity against three defend-

ants, one a resident of the state, the other two non-residents, which

was duly entered and filed in the office of the clerk of this court

for Cumberland county, on July 7, 1899. Thereupon a subpoena

issued against the resident defendant, who subsequently entered

his appearance, and an order issued as to the non-resident de-

fendants to appear and answer within one month from the first

Tuesday of August, 1899. There was no service of this order in

this state, but upon November 8, 1899, counsel for the non-resident

defendants entered upon the docket a general and unconditional

appearance in the manner provided by Chancery Rule YIII, and

on Janua-ry 23, 1900, the joint answer of these non-resident de-

fendants was filed, signed in their names by their solicitors.

E c ption by defendant . Ov rruled.
ill in equity by Lucy M. ~lint of Corni h, in the county of
York admini tratrix of the good and e tate of Fred T . Flint, late
of aid orni h decea ed, again t Robert Comly of Philadelphia,
and William Flanigen of Woodbury, ew Jersey, co-partner in
bu ine under the firm name and tyle of Comly and Flanigen, and
again t har 1 E . Perkin of ortland. The bill as ert ai lien or
intere t in certain mortgage and pledge of real e tate and peronal property held by he non-re ident defendants, and again t the
e tat of th aid Fred T'. Flint.
fter everal hearing the plaintiff moved to convert the cau e
into an action at law. Thi motion having been granted the
defendant xcepted.
it incr: \\i well C. J . Emery Whitehouse, trout, Fogler, JJ.

Prior to this, on July 7, 1899, a preliminar}- injunction had
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\\I WELL
. J .:
The plaintiff commenced a bill in equity again t three defendant one a re ident of the tate the other two non-resident which
wa dul entered and filed in the office of the clerk of thi court
umberland county on Jul , 1 99 . Th reupon a ubpama
again t the re ident defendant, who ub equently entered
hi app aranc and an ord r i ued a to the non-re ident def ndant t app ar and an wer ithin one month from the fi t
Tu day of uru t 1 99. There wa no ernce of thi order in
thi tate but upon ovember 1 99 coun"el for the non-re ident
a r ndant nt r d upon the do ket a g neral and unconditional
in th manner pro id d b r hancer
ule VIII, an
190 the joint an w r of th e non-re ident eon anua•r
f n ant wa fil 1 irned in th ir nam by their olicitor .
Prior to hi on Jul
1 9 a p liminary injunction had
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been issued against the resident defendant, without a hearing, but

upon the filing of the statutory bond. Later, he filed a motion to

dissolve this injunction, upon which motion a hearing was had, but

before a decision had been rendered, on January 24, 1900, the

plaintiff moved to discontinue as to the resident defendant and

three days later this motion was granted with costs for him. On

January 24, 1900, the plaintiff also filed this motion: "Now

comes the plaintiff in the above entitled cause and shows unto your

Honors that the matter in controversy may be adequately and com-

pletely determined in a suit at law, and that the issues presented

may be more conveniently described according to the course of the

common law, than in equity. Wherefore, she prays leave of the

court to convert her said action into an action at law upon such

reasonable terms as the court may be pleased to order, etc." The

docket shows this entry under date of January 27, 1900 : "Motion

to convert cause into an action at law granted."

To this order the defendants took exception and, without any

thing further being done in the case, entered the same at the next

law court. It might be questioned as to whether this bill of
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exceptions was not prematurely brought forward, as the exception

was to an interlocutory order and perhaps should not have been

entered until the completion of the case, when it might have

become unnecessary to prosecute the exceptions. K. S., c. 77, §§

22 and 25; Maine Benefit Association v. Hamilton, 80 Maine, 99.

But, as the procedure under the Act of 1893 is somewhat anoma-

lous, and as there has already been considerable delay in the case,

we think it more in the interests of justice that the question

involved should now be determined, which course is not without

precedent in this state, even if it were clear that the exceptions

were prematurely brought forward. Stevens v. Shaw, 77 Maine,

566.

It is argued that this court had no jurisdiction over the non-resi-

dent defendants, that no service of the bill was ever made upon

them in Maine, and no fact set up in the bill which would subject

them to the jurisdiction of this court, except the alleged fact that

their co-defendant had in his possession certain property or evi-

dences of indebtedness belonging to the non-resident defendants

not open to attachment ; that when the bill was discontinued as to

the resident defendant, the court then had no jurisdiction whatever

over these defendants ; and that this discontinuance as to the other

APPEARANCE

been issued against the re ident defendant, without a hearing, but
upon the filing of the statutory bond. Later, he filed a motion to
di olve thi injunction, upon which motion a hea·r ing was had, but
before a decision had been rendered, on January 24, 1900, the
plaintiff moved to di continue a to the re ident defendant and
three days later this motion was granted with costs for him. On
January 24, 1900, the plaintiff al o filed thi motion: "Now
com s the plaintiff in the above entitled cause and show unto your
Honors that the matter in controversy may be adequately and completely determined in a suit at law, and that the issues presented
may be more conveniently de cribed according to the cour e of the
common law, than in equity. Wherefore, she prays leave of the
court to convert her said action into an action at law upon such
reasona:ble terms as the court may be pleased to order, etc." The
docket shows this entry under date of January 27, 1900: "Motion
to convert cause into an action at law granted."
T'o this order the defendants took exception and, without any
thing further being done in the case, entered the same at the next
law court. It might be questioned as to whether this bill of
exceptions was not prematurely brought forward, a the exception
was to an interlocutory order and perhaps should not have been
entered until the completion of the case, when it might have
become unnecessary to prosecute the exceptions. R. S., c. 77, §§
22 and 25; Maine Benefit Association v. Hamilton, 80 Maine, 99.
But, a the procedure under the Act of 1893 i omewhat anomalou , and as there ha already been consid rable delay in the case,
we think it more in the interests of justice tha·t the question
involved should now be determined, which cour e i not without
pr cedent in thi tate, even if it were clear that the exception
were prematurely brought forward.
tevens v. Shaw, 77 Maine,
566.
It i argued that thi court had no juri diction over the non-resident def ndant , that no ervice of the bill wa ever made upon
th m in Maine, an no fact t up in the bill which would ubject
them to the juri di tion of thi court, xcept th alle d fact that
th ir co-def ndant had in hi po e sio
ertain pr p rty or evidence of ind 1t dn
b loncring to th non-re id nt defendants
not op n to attachment; tha wh n th bill a di continu d a to
th r ident d f n ant th ourt th n had no juri diction whait v r
o r th e d fondant · and that thi di ntinuance a to the oth r
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defendant, by leave of court and upon the plaintiff's motion, was

equivalent to an admission by the plaintiff and a decision by the

court that the court had no further jurisdiction over these defend-

ants.

The answer to all this is, that the defendants by their duly

authorized counsel entered a general and unconditional appearance,

thereby voluntarily submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of the

court, although independently of this voluntary action upon their

part the court may have had no jurisdiction over them. It is said

in Daniell's Chancery Pleading and Practice, p. 536: "Appear-

ance is the process by which a person, against whom a suit has

been commenced, submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court."

And in the Encyl. of Pleading and Practice, Vol. 2, page 639,

"It is a universal rule, which admits of no exception, that, if the

court has jurisdiction of the subject matter, a general appearance

gives jurisdiction over the person. The principle that a general

appearance confers personal jurisdiction is of great importance

when a non-resident is sued. In a personal action brought against

a citizen of another state, the court does not acquire jurisdiction
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over him by virtue of notice served on him in such other state.

WTiile process can not extend beyond the limits of the state, yet a

non-resident becomes subject to the jurisdiction of the court by a

general appearance." In support of these propositions authorities

are cited from nearly every state in the Union ; they are too numer-

ous, and the matter is too well settled to require a citation of these

authorities here.

This principle has been several times recognized by this court in

actions at law. Maine Bank v. Ilervey, 21 Maine, 38; BucJcfield

Branch 7?. R. Co. v. Benson, 43 Maine, 374; Thornton v. Leavitt,

63 AEaine, 384; Mahan v. Sutherland, 73 Maine, 158. That the

principle is equally applicable to causes in equity will be seen by

an examination of the cases above referred to as cited in the

Encyl. of Pleading and Practice.

It is suggested in the argument, by defendant's counsel, that in

accordance with the equity practice in this state, the court will not

assume jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant merely upon the

general appearance of counsel and upon an answer signed by coun-

sel, but will require in addition to the general appearance of coun-

sel an answer personally signed by such non-resident defendant,

unless service has been made upon him in the state. We are not

v.
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d fendant, by 1 ave of court and upon th plaintiff's motion, wa
quival nt to an admi ion by th plaintiff and a deci ion by the
ourt that th
urt had no forth r juri di tion over th e defendant .
Th, an. w r
all thi i that the d f ndant by their duly
authoriz d un 1 nteT d a g n ral and unconditional appearance,
th r b v luntarily ubmitting th m lv to the juri diction of the
· urt alth ugh ind p ndently ·of thi voluntary action upon their
th ourt may ha had no juri diction over them. It i aid
ban ry 1 ading and radic , p. 36 : ' ppearani 11
by whi h a p r n, again t horn a uit ha
an i th
b n ornm need ubmit him lf to th juri diction of the ourt."
d in th 1 ncyl. of Pleading and Practice, Vol. 2, page 39,
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ourt ha juri.. diction of the ubject matter, a general appearance
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a citizen of another tate, the court doe not acquire juri diction
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non-re ident become ubject to the juri di tion of the court by a
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l\fain 3 -± · Mahan . utherland, 3 Maine, 158. That the
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an .·amination of th ca e above ref rred to a cited in the
1
nc. ·l. of 1 ading and Practi .
It i.. uacr t 1 in the ar!lUill nt b defendant' coun el that in
accorlan with the quity practi e in thi tate the court will not
a um juri ) tion O\'er a non-r ident dPfendant merely upon the
<'11 ral app aranc of coun. el an 1 upon an an w r ~irned by
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f ou . l nn an w r p r nally ignel )' uch non-r .. id nt d f n a t
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aware of any such practice, and no authority to that effect has

been called to our attention. Upon the other hand, the rule is

that, in the absence of anything to the contrary, the presumption is

that an attorney has full right, power and authority to make such

appearance. In support of this proposition the authorities are

unanimous. Here, there is no suggestion of any want of authority

upon the part of the counsel for these defendants to enter a general

appearance for them. If these non-resident defendants had desired

to object to the jurisdiction of the court, they should have entered a

special or conditional appearance. Such an appearance, made for

the purpose of urging jurisdictional objections, is clearly recognized

by all courts and works upon practice.

It is argued that by Chancery Eule XIV defenses by demurrer

or plea may be inserted in an answer, and that an appearance fol-

lowed by an answer, in which is contained a plea to the jurisdic-

tion, should not have the effect of giving the court jurisdiction

over the person of a non-resident defendant, when jurisdiction is

acquired in no other way. But, in this ease, the defendants' answer
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does not contain any plea to the jurisdiction of the court over

these defendants, nor is objection to the jurisdiction of the court

raised in any way; it merely, in one paragraph, denies that the

resident defendant had in his possession, or under his control, any

property belonging to them. But, even if the defendants in their

answer, in which they make answer to the merits of the cause, had

also objected to the jurisdiction of the court as to them, it seems,

in accordance with the authorities, that even this course would

have subjected them to the jurisdiction of the court. The rule is,

that when a defendant appears solely for the purpose of objecting

to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, such motion is not

a voluntary appearance of defendant which is equivalent to service.

Where, however, the motion involves the merits of the case, the

rule is otherwise. Elliott v. Lawliead, 43 Ohio State, 172. See

also St. Louis Car Co. v. Stillwater St. By. Co., 53 Minn. 129;

Carroll Y. Lee, 3 G. & J. (Md.) 504; Fitzgerald, etc. Construction

Company v. Fitzgerald, 137 U. S. 98; Tipton v. Wright, 7 Bush,

(Ky.) 448.

These defendants having, as we have seen, voluntarily submitted

themselves to the jurisdiction of the court, must be held to have

done so subject to the method of procedure in this state and to all

statutory provisions in relation to procedure, including, among

APPEAR.ANOE

aware of any such practice, and no authority to that effect has
been called to our attention. Upon the other hand, the rule is
that, in the absence of anything to the contrary, the presumption is
that an attorney has full right, power and authority to make such
appearance. In support of this proposition the authoritie are
unanimous. Here, there is no suggestion of any want of authority
upon the part of the counsel for these defendants to enter a general
appearance for them. If these non-resident defendants had desired
to object to the juri diction of the court, they should ha:ve entered a
special or conditional appearance. Such an appearance, made for
the purpose of urging jurisdictional objections, is clearly recognized
by all courts and works upon practice.
It is argued that by Chancery Rule XIV defenses by demurrer
or plea may be inserted in an answer, and that an appearance followed by an answer, in which is contained a plea to the jurisdiction, should not ha·ve the effect of giving the court jurisdiction
over the person of a non-resident defendant, when jurisdiction is
acquired in no other way. But, in this case, the defendants' answer
does not contain any plea to the jurisdiction of the court over
these defendants, nor is objection to the jurisdiction of the court
raised in any way; it merely, in one paragrnph, denies that the
resident defendant had in his possession, or under his control, any
property belonging to them. But, even if the defendants in their
answer, in which they make answer to the merits of the cause, had
also objected to the jurisdiction of the court as to them, it seems,
in accordance with the authoritie , that even this course would
have subjected them to the jurisdiction of the court. The rule is,
that when a defendant appears solely for the purpose of objecting
to the jurisdiction of the court over his per on, such motion i not
a voluntary appearance of defendant which is equivalent to service.
Where, however, the motion involves the merit of the case, the
rule is otherwise. Elliott v. Lawhead, 43 Ohio State, 172. See
al o t. L01.tis Car Co. v. Stillwater St. Ry. Co., 53 Minn. 129;
Carroll v. Lee, 3 G. & J. (Md.) 504; Fitzgerald, etc. Con truction
Company v. Fitzgerald, 137 U. S. 98; Tipton v. Wright, 7 Bush,
(Ky.) 448.
These defendant having, as w have se n, voluntarily ubmitted
them Ives to the jurisdiction of the court, mu t be h ld to have
don o ubject to the method of procedure in thi tate and to all
tatutory provi ion in relation to proc dure including, among
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other things, the power of the court, under chap. 217 Public Laws

of 1893, in an equit}- proceeding, to strike out the pleadings in

equity and require the parties to plead at law in the same cause,

whenever it appears that the remedy at law is plain, adequate and

complete and that the rights of the parties can be fully determined

and enforced by a judgment and execution at law, and to then hear

and determine the case at law. This provision of the statute

applies to all cases pending in equity, and this order may be made

by the court, under the conditions named, whenever the court has

jurisdiction of the subject matter of the cause and over the persons

of the defendants. That this court has jurisdiction of the subject

matter of the cause is not denied, and that it acquired jurisdiction

over the persons of the defendants, we have already decided. The

important thing is that the court has jurisdiction; it matters not

how that jurisdiction was acquired over the person of a defendant.

If a non-resident defendant has voluntarily submitted himself to the

jurisdiction of the court, the procedure must in all respects be the

same as if the defendant was a resident of the state.

We have no question, therefore, of the power of the court in this
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cause, under the conditions named in the act, to order that the

pleadings in equity be stricken out and to require the parties to

plead at law in the same cause, which may then be heard and

determined by the court upon the law side of the court. The cause

is the same notwithstanding it has been converted from a cause in

equity to an action at law. The section of the act refers to it as

"the same cause" and provides that the court may hear and deter-

mine "the cause" at law, while by another section of the act it is

provided that no attachment shall be affected by this procedure.

It is further contended, by the counsel for the defendants, that

although the court attempted to proceed under this Act of 1893, it

did not in fact accomplish this intention because of various infor-

malities, and our attention is called to the insufficiency of the plain-

tiff's motion ; the fact that no terms were imposed ; and the further

fact that in making the order the court did not use the language of

the act. It is true that the plaintiff's motion did not cont<iin an

averment, "that the remedy at law is plain, adequate and complete,

and that the rights of the parties can be fully determined and

enforced by a judgment and execution at law." It simply said

"that the matter in controversy may be adequately and completely

determined in a suit at law, and that the issues presented may be

v.
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oth r thing , th power of the ourt under chap. 217 Public Laws
of 1 9 , in an quity proc ding, t trik out the pleading in
equity and r quir th partie to pl ad at law in the am cause,
wh n v r it app a•r that l r m dy at law i plain, ad quate and
ompl t and that h right of the partie can b fully determined
and nforced by a judgment and x cution at law, and to then hear
and det rmin the a at law. Thi pro i ion of the taitute
appli to all a
p nding in equity, and thi order may be made
by the ourt, und r the condition named, whenever the court has
juri di tion of th ubject matter of the ca.u e and over the per ons
of th d f ndant . Tl1at thi court has juri diction of the ubject
matt r of the au i not deni d, and that it acquired juri diction
o r th person of the defendants, we have already decided. The
imp rtant thing i that the court ha juri diction; it maUers not
how that juri di tion was acquired over the per on of a defendant.
fa non-re ident defendant has voluntarily submitted himself to the
juri diction of the court, the procedure must in all respects be the
am as if the defendant wa a resident of the state.
We have no que tion, therefore, of the power of the court in thi
cau , under the conditions named in the act, to order that the
pleading in equity be stricken out and to require the partie to
pl ad at law in the same cause, which ma·y then be heard and
det rmined by the court upon the law side of the court. The cau e
i the ame notwith tan.ding it ha been converted from a cau e in
equit' to an action at law. The ection of the ad refer to it as
'th am cau e" and provides that the court may hear and deterat law, while by another section of the act it is
min 'the cau
proYid d tha.t no attachment shall be affected by thi procedure.
It i furth r ont nded, by the oun el for the defendant , that
although th ourt attempted to proceed under thi Act of 1893, it
did not in fact a ompli h thi int ntion because of various informa liti and our att ntion i called to the in ufficiency of the plaintiff m tion · th fa t that not rm were impo ed; and the further
fa t that in makin the order the court did not u e the languaa of
th act. It i tru that th plaintiff motion d•i d not contain an
av rm nt, 'that th r medy at law i plain ad quat and compl te
and that th ri ht of th parti Cc n b full determin d and
11f r d b
a jud m nt and e e ution at law.
It ~imply aid
that th matt r in ontrov r ma be ad quat l,i and ompl t l,i
d t rmin d in a uit at law and that th i~ u pr ent d ma b
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more conveniently tried according to the course of the conunon

law than in equity." It would have been better practice if the

motion had followed the language of the act, but we do not think

that any written motion was necessary, or even that tliis order of

the court need be made at the instance or request of either party.

It may be made by the court without the motion of either party

during the progress of the hearing, if it appears to the court that

the conditions named in the act exist. See Ridley v. Ridley, 87

Maine, 445. Whatever the form of the motion in any case, or if

there is no motion, these facts must be made to appear to the court

before an order of this kind is made.

Again, the act provides that the order may be made "upon

APPEARANCE

more conveniently tried according to the course of the common
law than in equity." It would have been better practice if the
motion had followed the language of the act, but we do not think
that any written motion wa necessary, or even that this order of
the court need be made a.t the in tance or reque t of either party.
It may be made by the court without the motion of either party
during the progre of the hearing, if it appears to the court that
the condition named in the act exist. See Ridley v. Ridley, 87
Maine, 445. Whatever the form of the motion in any ca e, or if
there is no motion, these fact mus t be made to appear to the court
before an order of this kind is made.
Again, the act provides that the ord r may be made "upon
reasonable terms." Here no terms were imposed, and it is claimed
thait upon this account that the order was not properly made.
But we do not think that the statute make it obligatory upon the
court to impo e terms: any terms might be unreasonable in a given
ca e. The language of the act is similar to the provision of R. S.,
c. 82, § 10, "such errors and defects may be amended on motion
of either pa:rty, on such term as the court orders." Under this
statute it has been held by this court that the matter of imposing
any terms was discretionary upon the court. Bolster v. I nhabitants of China, 67 Maine, 551. Both of these statutes differ from
the one allowing an amendment after demurrer, which caID only be
done, by expre provision of the statute, upon the payment o.f
co ts.
La"tly, it is argued that the order of the court wa not in the
language of the act, that the court did not strike out the pleading
in equity and require the pa>fties to plead at law in the same cause,
and that it does not appear that the justice who made the order
found that the tatutory conditions existed. But thi finding by
th itting ju tice wa a condition precedent to making the order.
vV mu t a ume that, before making the order to convert the
ciau in equity into an action at law, it was made to appear to him
that, in the langua e of th act, "the rem dy at law i plain, adean be fully
quate and complete and th t the rights of the pa.rti
1etcrmined and nforc d by ai judgment an execution at law."
The court in th order did not trike out th pleading in equity
and requir the part.ie to pl ad at law in th ame cau e. This,
how v r wa th pr i e ff t of th ord r to convert th cau e in
quity into an action at law, and wa in ub tan and ff t what
1

reasonable terms." Here no terms were imposed, and it is claimed

that upon this account that the order was not properly made.

But we do not think that the statute makes it obligatory upon the

court to impose terms : any terms might be unreasonable in a given

case. The language of the act is similar to the provision of R. S.,

c. 82, § 10, "such errors and defects may be amended on motion

of either party, on such terms as the court orders." Under this
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statute it has been held by this court that the matter of imposing

any terms was discretionary upon the court. Bolster v. Inhabi-

tants of China, 67 Maine, 551. Both of these statutes differ from

the one allowing an amendment after demurrer, which can only be

done, by express provision of the statute, upon the payment of

costs.

Lastly, it is argued that the order of the court was not in the

language of the act, that the court did not strike out the pleadings

in equity and require the parties to plead at law in the same cause,

and that it does not appear that the justice who made the order

found that the statutory conditions existed. But this finding by

the sitting justice was a condition precedent to making the order.

We must assume that, before making the order to convert the

cause in equity into an action at law, it was made to appear to him

that, in the language of the act, "the remedy at law is plain, ade-

quate and complete and that the rights of the parties can be fully

determined and enforced by a judgment and execution at law."

The court in the order did not strike out the pleadings in equity

and require the parties to plead at law in the same cause. This,

however, was the precise effect of the order to convert the cause in

equity into an action at law, and was in substance and effect what

ISHAM
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was authorized by the statute. It was a brief and concise form of

order, by which the court exercised the authority given by this

statute.

Exceptions overruled. Case remanded to 7iisi prim for further

proceedings.

v.

161

MILLER

wa authoriz d by the tatut . It wa a brief and concise form of
order, by whi h the court ex rci d th authority given by this
' tatute.
1
a e remand d to nisi prius for further
·c ption ov rruled.
proce dings.

.■'A

Disclaimer.

Isliam V. Miller, U N. J. Eq. 01. (1S88.)

On motion to take a disclaimer from the files.

Van Fleet, V. C. :

Dr

The principal object of the suit in this case is to procure a

CL IMER.

decree declaring a deed, absolute on its face, to be a mortgage.

The deed was made by the complainant to the defendant. The

Isham v. Miller, 44 N . J. Eq. 61.

bill alleges that the debt, which the deed was intended to secure,

{1888.)

has been paid, and also that the defendant, on its payment, con-

n motion to ta.ke a disclaimer from the :file .

veyed part of the land, which she held as security, to the com-

plainant, and the residue to another person, but that at the time

these conveyances were made the defendant was a married woman,

VAN FLEET,

having a husband living, who did not join with her in the exe-
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cution of the deeds, and so, in consequence of the invalidity of

her effort to convey, she still stands seized of the legal title to

the lands. To unravel this tangle, the complainant seeks a

decree declaring that the deed is a mortgage, and that the mort-

gage debt has been paid, and thus procure an establishment of

his own title by a judicial declaration that the defendant's right

in the lands has been discharged.

To meet the case thus made by the complainant, the defendant

says that she did not have, at the time the complainant filed his

bill, any right, title or interest, either legal or equitable, in the

lands in question, nor did she claim to have, and also, that if the

complainant had applied to her before filing his bill she would

have executed any conve3Tance or release necessary to perfect his

title. The complainant moves to strike the defendant's disclaimer

from the files. The ground of liis motion is that the actionable

facts alleged in the bill make a case against which a disclaimer

constitutes no defence. Or, to state the ground in another form.

v. c.:

The principal object of the uit in thi ca e i to procure a
d cree d claring a deed, ab olute on its face, to be a mortgage.
The d d wa made by the complainant to the defendant. The
bill alleg that the debt, which the deed was intended to ecure,
ha been paid, and al o that the defendant, on its payment, convey d part of the land, which she held as ecurity, to the complainant, and the residue to another pernon, but that at the time
th e conveya·ncee were made the defend.ant wa a married woman,
having a hu band living, who did not join with her in the execution of the d d , and o, in consequence of the invalidity of
her effort to con ey, he sitill tands seized of the legal title to
the land . To unravel thi tangle, the complainant eek a
d ree d laring that the deed i a mortgage, and that the mortgag debt ha been paid, and thu procure an e tablishment of
hi own titl by a judicial declaration that the defendant' right
in the land ha b n di charged.
T m t th a thu made by the complainant, the defendant
ay that h did not have at th time the complainant filed his
bill an right titl or intere t, ith r I al or equitaible, in the
land in qu ti n nor did h la~m to ha , and al o, that if the
· mplai ant had appli d to h r before :filino- hi bill h would
hav xe ut
an ' onv ~an or r 1 a n
ary to perf t hi
titl . Th omplainan mo
to trik the d f ndant di laim r
fr m th
. Th
round of hi
otion i hat th a i a1 I
fu ·t < 11
in th bill make a a e again t hich a di laim r
IL titut
n 1 f n e.
r,
tat th round in anoth r form
1

,,
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IQ2, Disclaimer

the complainant says, for & defendant standing in the position

which the defendant in this case does, to say, I disclaim all right

and interest in the subject matter of the litigation, neither shows

that the complainant is not entitled, as against the defendant, to

the relief he asks, nor that the defendant is entitled to a dis-

missal. A disclaimer is a mode of defence, and if it prevails

the defendant must be dismissed, and, as a general rule, he will

have a right to be dismissed with costs to be paid by the com-

plainant. If, however, a defendant attempts to disclaim in a

case where his disclaimer does not entitle him to a dismissal, but

he must, notwithstanding his disclaimer, still be retained as a

party defendant, in order that the relief, which the facts alleged

in the bill show the complainant to be entitled to, may be decreed

to him, the pleading, being useless to the defendant and without

effect in the cause, except as an obstruction, will be ordered to

be taken from the files. Judge Story states the rule on this

\ subject as follows: "A defendant cannot, by a disclaimer, de-

prive the plaintiff of the right of requiring a full answer from

I him, unless it is evident that the defendant ought not, after such
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disclaimer, to be retained as a party to the suit. For a plaintiff

may have a right to an answer, notwithstanding a disclaimer;

and in such a case the defendant cannot shelter himself from

answering by alleging that he has no interest." Story's Eq. PI.

§ 840. This statement of the rule simply repeats what was de-

claired by Lord Eldon in Glassington v. Tliwaites, 2 Euss. 458,

and by Chancellor Walworth in Ellsworth v. Curtis, 10 Paige

105. And Lord Cottenham, in Graham v. Coape, 3 Myl. & Cr.

638, held that the course to be pursued, where a defendant dis-

claimed when he ought to answer, was to order the disclaimer to

be taken from the files.

Now, it is entirely certain that the defendant is not entitled to

a dismissal, for, giving her disclaimer its utmost effect, it is still,

on the admitted facts of the case, so plain as to be beyond dis-

pute that, notwithstanding her conveyances, she still holds the

legal title to the lands in question, and will, while she and her

husband both live, continue to do so until one of two things

happens, namely, until she and her husband join in making a

conveyance of the lands, or it is judicially declared that she sim-

ply held the legal title to them in pledge as security for the pay-

ment of a debt, and that the debt has been paid. For the

-:.

DISCLAIMER

the complainant ay , for a; defendant tanding in the po ition
which the defendant in thi case does, to say, I disclaim all right
and int r t in the subject matter of the litigation, neither hows
that the complainant i not entitled, a aga~n t the defendant, to
the relief he a k , nor that the defendant is entitled to a dismi al. A di claimer i a mode of defence, and if it prevails
the d fendant mu t be di mi ed, and, as a general rule, he will
have a right to be di mi ed with co ts to be paid by the complainant. If, however, a defendant attempts to di claim in a
case where hi di claimer doe not entitle him to a di missal, but
he mu t, notwith tanding hi di claimer, till be retained a a
party defendant, in order that the relief, which the fact alleged
in the bill how the complainant to be entitled to, may be decreed
to him the pleading, being u eles to the defendant and without
effect in the oau e, except as an ob truction, will be ordered to
be taken from the files. Judge tory tates the rule on this
ubj ct a follow : "A defendant cannot, by a di claimer, deprive the plaintiff of the rig.ht of requiring a full answer from
him, unle it is evident that the defendant ought not, after such
disclaimer, to be retained a a party to the uit. For a plaintiff
may have a right to aill an wer, notwithstanding a di claimer;
and in such a case the defendant cannot shelter himself from
answering by alleging that he has no initerest." Story's Eq. Pl.
840. T'hi tatement of the rule imply repeats what wa declaired by Lord Eldon in Gla.ssington v. Thwaites, 2 Ru s. -±58,
and by Chancellor Walworth in Ellsworth v. Curtis, 10 Paige
105. And Lord Oottenham, in Graham v. Ooape, 3 Myl. & Or.
3 , held that the course to be pur ued, wher a d€fendant di~
claim d when h ought to an wer, wa to order the di claimer to
be taken from the file .
ow it i ntir ly erta,i n that the def nclant i not entitled to
a di mi al, for giving her disclaim r it utmo t effect, it i till,
on th admitt d fa t of the ca e, o plain a to be b yond di put that, notwith tanding her con e ance she till hold the
1 al title to th land in question, and will, while he and her
hu l and both liv , continue to do o until one of two thing
happ n , nam ly until h and her hu band join in makinc; a
·om· ·ance of th land , or it i judicially d lar d that h imply h Id the legal till t them in pl dg a
curi f r th paym nt of a d bt an thart the d bt ha b n paid. For the
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defendant to say that she disclaims all right and title to tlie

lands amounts to absolutely nothing at all, either as a ground

of dismissal, or as a means of transmitting or relinquishing her

right. The thing that the complainant wants is a judicial decla-

ration that the deed which he made to the defendant is not what

on its face it purports to be, but a mortgage. If the facts stated

in his bill are true, the complainant is unquestionably entitled

to such a declaration. In view of the facts alleged in the bill,

such a declaration can be made against nobody but the defend-

ant. Without her before the court as a party defendant, the

suit, for all practical purposes, will be abated, and no decree can

be made, for she is the only person against whom relief, of the

kind sought, can be given. Tliis statement of the issue tendered

by the bill shows, as I think conclusively, that any pleading on

the part of the defendant which docs not in substance either deny

or admit that the deed is a mortgage, does not in any manner

meet the complainant's case. A disclaimer, in view of the case .x^J^

made by the complainant's bill, is obviously without either object '

or effect. The complainant's motion must prevail. _
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Demurrer, jjs, ^P^

Rohinson v. Smith, 3 Paige Ch. (N.Y.) 222. (1832.)

The bill in this cause was filed by certain stockholders of j^\ ^

the New York Coal Company against the directors of that cor-

poration, charging them with improper conduct in the manage-

ment of their trust. The company was incorporated in April,

1824, with a capital of $200,000. By its charter the company

.

1

163

MITII

d fondant to ay that he ili cla1im all right and title to th
land a unt t ab olutely nothing at all, either a a ground
of <li mi al r a a m n of tran ·mitting or r linqui hing her
riaht.
h thin that th
mpla1inant wan i a judicial declar Lion lha. th d cl whi h h mad
th <l f ndant i not what
on it f · · it I urp rt- to , but a mortga . If the facts tated
in hi · bill ar
ru
h
ompl inant i unquc tionably ntitl
t u ·h · d 1 rati n. In i w of the fa t all ged in he bill,
u ·h a.
laration an be made again t nob dy but the d f n<lant. \\ i h ut h r b for the ourt a a party defendant, the
-nit for all pr ti al purpo , will be aibated, and no deer e can
be a
for h i the only p rson again t whom r eli f, of th
kind u ht an b i en. Thi tat ment of the i ue tendered
b ' th bill h w a I think conclu ively, that any pleadin on
th
arrt of th d f noont which do not in 1ib'tance either deny
or admit thait th deed i a mortgage, do not in any manner
m t the complainant ca e. A di claimer, in iew of the ca e
mad by the complainant' bill, i obviou ly without either object
or effect. Th complainant' motion must pre ail.

was restricted from canning on any banking business, and was

limited solely to carrying on the business of exploring for, digging, ,

and vending coal. (Laws of 1824, p. 217.) The bill charged that

the commissioners named in tlie act opened books for the subscrip-

D EM RRER.

tion to the stock, and that the corporation went into operation

in June, 1824, when T. L. Smith, M. Hoffman, J. Minturn, C.

Lawton, W. F. Pell, F. Pell, W. Israel, S. Leggett and S. L.

Robinson v.

mith, 3 Paige Oh. (N. Y.)

~22.

( 1832.)

Govemeur, were chosen directors of the comptinv. Tliat T. L. vX

Smith, was elected president, and R. A])bot was appointed secrettiry.

That soon aft^^r the company was organized, the directors pur-

The bill in thi cau e wa fil d by certain tockholder of
the
w ork oal ompany against the dir ctors of that corpora•tion harging them with improper conduct in the manaaem nt of th ir tru t. The company wa incorporated in April,
1 ~-± with a capital of · 00 000. By its charter the company
\rn r tricted fr m arr ring on any banking bu ine , and wa
limit d ol 1 to arr ring on the bu ine of exploring for, digITT.na
and Y ndina coa 1. (Law of 1 24 p. 21 . ) Th bill char ed that
th
nm i i n r nam d in the ad opened book for the ub cripti n t h
to k an that th orporation went into operation
in Jun 1 '
T. L. mith 1. o:ffman J. Iin urn,
La \d n
11 W. I ra 1 . L aaett and
lOY rn ur w r
0£ th company. That T.
bbot a aippoint d
r
hnl
mpan ' wa~ OfCTaniz , th dire tor
ur1
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chased thirty acres of land, supposed to contain a coal bed, for

which they paid $13,000. That they procured from the land about

3000 bushels of coal, which they took to the city of New York,

as a sample. That some time in the course of the same year they

sold the land, and, as the bill alleged, they had never since employed

the funds of the company for the purpose of carrying on the

business of exploring for, diggmg or vending coal. The bill further

stated, that since that time the directors of the company had used

and employed their funds almost exclusively in the purchase and

sale of the stocks of various corporations and institutions. That

they came to a determination to purchase a majority of the stock

of the City Bank, and did by their agent purchase 16,000 shares of

the stock of that bank at a premium of from two to nine and a

half per cent. That they pledged the same to individuals to raise

money thereon, at about 90 per cent, upon the par value of the

stock, and paid the difference out of the funds of the coal com-

pany; and that the individuals to whom the bank stock was

pledged, gave to the agent of the coal company their proxies to vote

for directors of the bank. That the company ordered its agent to
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vote for T. L. Smith, C. Lawton, W. F. Pell, and others, as

directors of the bank; that he did so vote, and that they were

accordingly elected such directors on the first Monday of June,

1825. That the stock of the City Bank was afterwards sold at a

loss of from 10 to 20 per cent., by which the coal company lost

$50,000. The bill also charged that this operation of the directors

of the coal company was to subserve their private purposes, and

was in violation of their known duty as directors of the company.

The bill further charged that the directors of the coal company

also purchased 1500 shares of the New York Gas Light Company,

at a premium of from 80 to 100 per cent. ; 1000 shares of the New

York and Schuylkill Coal Company, at an advance or premium

of from 10 to 30 per cent.; 1500 shares of the Bank of America,

at a premium of from 3 to 8 per cent. ; 1000 shares of the Jersey

City Bank, at a premium of from 12 to 25 per cent.; 1500 shares

of the Mercantile Insurance Company, at a premium of from 8

to 12 per cent. ; 1000 shares of the Franklin Fire Insurance Com-

pany, at a premium of from 8 to 20 per cent.; and 1500 shares

of the Brooklyn Gas Light Company, at a premium of 7 per cent.

That a portion of the said stocks had been since sold and on which

the company sustained a loss of about $62,000, exclusive of the

DEMURRER

chased thirty acres of land, supposed to contain a coal bed, for
which they paid $13,000. That they procured from the land about
3000 bushels of coal, which they took to the city of New York,
as a sample. Tha.t some time in the course of the same year they
sold the land, and, as the bill alleged, they had never since employed
the funds o.f the company for the purpose of carrying on the
busines of exploring for, diggmg or vending coaJ.. The bill further
stated, that since that time the directors of the company had used
and employed their funds almost exclusively in the purchase and
sale of the stocks of various corporations and institutions. That
they came to a determinait ion to purchase a majority of the stock
of the City Bank, and did by their agent purchase 16,000 shares of
the tock of that bank at a premium of from two to nine and a
half per cent. That they pledged the same to individua·ls to rai e
money thereon, at about 90 per cent. upon the par value of the
stock, and paid the difference out of the funds of the coal CO'Il1pany; and that the individuals to whom the bank stock was
pledged, ga,ve to the agent of the coal company their proxies to vote
for directors of the bank. That the company ordered its agent to
vote for T. L. Smith, C. Lawton, W. F. Pell, and others, as
directors of the bank; that he did so vote, and that they were
accordingly elected such directors on the first Monday of June,
1825. That the stock orf the City Bank was 3!fterwards sold at a
loss of from 10 to 20 per cent., by which the coal company lost
$50,000. The bill also ·charged that this operation of the directors
of the coal company was to subserve their private purposes, and
was in violation of their known duty as directors of the company.
The bill further charged that the di.redo.rs of the coal company
also purchased 1500 shares of the New York Gas Light Company,
at a premium of from 80 to 100 per cent.; 1000 share6 of the New
York and Schuylkill Coal Company, at an advance or premium
orf from 10 to 30 per cent.; 1500 ha·res o;f the Bank of Am rica,
at a premium of from 3 to 8 per cent.; 1000 hare of the J erscy
City Bank, at a premium of from 12 to 25 p r cent.; 1500 hares
of the Mercantile n urance Oompany, at a premium of from 8
to 12 per cent.· 1000 har of th Franklin Fire In uranc Company, a·t a pr mi um of from 8 to 20 per c nt.; and 1500 hare
f th Brooklyn Ga Liaht ompany, at a pr mium of 7 per c nt.
That a poTtion of the aid to k had b en ince ld and on whi h
th company u tain d a lo of about $6 000, x lu iv of the
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loss on the City Bank stock. Tliat a considerable portion of the

stocks thus purchased had not been re-sold, and were greatly

diminished in value. Tliat the whole amount of these and other

stocks purchased by the directors, or in which the company was

interested, amounted to nearly two millions of dollars. By which

dealings the directore caused a loss to the coal company of not less

than $150,000, and thereby rendered its stock of very little value.

The bill further charged that the amount of debts owing by the

coal company during a part of the time when these stock specula-

tions were going on, exceeded fifteen times the amount of the

capital paid in. The president and secretary were also made de-

fendants; the bill charging that the books and papers of the com-

pany were in their possession. The complainants prayed a dis-

covery and for general relief.

The defendant F. Pell, put in a general demurrer to the bill

for want of equity. The other defendants put in a general and

special demurrer. And for causes of demurrer, they stated that

it appeared by the bill; that the complainants were owners of

their stock in severalty, and had no joint interest therein; that
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the capital stock of the company was 4000 shares, and that the

complainants were owners of only 160 shares. They therefore

insisted that the owners of the other shares should have been made

parties.

The Chancellor:

Before I proceed to examine the merits of this case, it may be

proper to refer to the causes assigned as special grounds of de-

murrer. And first, it is said there are other stockholders who

ought to be made parties. Where it is not apparent from the bill

itself that necessary parties are omitted, it can be taken advantage

of only by plea or answer; showing who are the necessar}- parties,

and making the objection of a want of parties in a plain and

v.
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los on th
·ty ank tock. That ai considerable portion o:f the
tock thu pur ha d had not been re- old, and were greatly
dimini hed i
alu . That th whol amount o:f the e and other
to k pur h d by the dir tors, or in which the company was
int r t d am unt to n arly two million of dollars. By which
d 'a1ing th dir t r au d a 1 to the oal company of not less
than $1
0 , an th r by r nd red it tock of ery little value.
1e bill furth r charg d that th amount of debts owing by the
al o pany uring a part of th time when the e tock p culation w r goino- on, e ceed d fifteen tim s the amount f the
·apital paid in. The pr id nit and ecretairy were al o mad def ndant ; th bill charging that th books and papers of the ompany ere in th ir p ession. The complainants prayed a discov ry and for general relief.
The d fenda·n t F. Pell, put in a general demurrer to the bill
for want of quity. The other defendants put in a general and
pecial demurrer. And for causes of demurrer, they stated that
it appear d by the bill; that the complainants were owneTs of
their tock in everalty, and had no joint intere t therein; that
the capital tock of the company was 4000 hares, and that the
complainants were owners of only 160 share . They therefore
in i ~d that th owners of the other hares hould have been made
parti .

explicit manner. {2 Paige's Pep. 280. 1 Monro's Kent. Rep. 107.

1 A. K. Marsh. Pep. 112. 1 Hogan's Pep. 70.) The defendants

can demur only when it is apparent from the bill itself that there

are other persons who ought to have Ijecn made parties. And the

demurrer should show who are the proper parties. It is true the

capital stock of the corporation is, by the charter, to consist of

4000 shares; and the complainants own but IfiO. But it also

appears from the act of incorporation, that the defendants who were

TIIE H NCELLOR :
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pro r to r f r to th caus a igned a special grounds of de-murrer. And first it i said th.er are other tockholders who
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an 1 making th obj ction of a want of partie in a plain and
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aige' ep. 0. 1 Monro
ent. Rep. 10 .
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apital o k i th
rporati n i b.' th hart r, to con it f
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directors must also have been stockholders. And from aught that

appears to the contrary, they may now be the owners of all the

residue of the stock subscribed.

The objection for multifariousness cannot be sustained. All

of the complainants are cestui que trusts, having similar interests,

in every respect, and arising out of the same trust. They are

seeking precisely the same redress against their trustees, and for

the same acts; by which they allege they have received a similar

and common injury. There is, therefore, no good reason for

requiring them to file separate and distinct bills. It is a favorite

object of this court to prevent a multiplicity of suits. And where

several persons have a common interest, arising out of the same

transaction, although tlieir interest is not joint, even the defendant

may sometimes insist that they shall all be made parties, that he

may be only subjected to the trouble and expense o'f one litigation.

Upon the principle of the decision of this court, in Brinckerlioff v.

Brown (6 John. Ch. Eep. 139), the complainants were authorized,

if not required, to join in this suit.

The objection that a discovery may subject the company to a
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forfeiture of its charter, is not sufficient to support this general

demurrer to the whole bill, both as to the discovery and relief,

even if it would have authorized a demurrer to the discovery of

particular facts. Under the provisions of the revised statutes, the

defendants may be compelled to make a discovery, in certain cases,

although it may subject the corporation to a forfeiture of its

corporate rights. (2 E. S. 465, § 52.)

If the allegations in this bill are true, there is no doubt that

the directors of this company were guilty of a most palpable

violation of their duty, by engaging in this gambling speculation

in stocks, which was wholly unauthorized by their charter; and

which the bill alleges was carried on to subserve their own indi-

vidual interests and purposes. I have no hesitation in declaring

it as the law of this state, that the directors of a monied or other

joint stock corporation, who wilfully abuse their trust, or misapply

the funds of the company, by which a loss is sustained, are per-

sonally liable as trustees to make good that loss. And they are

equally liable, if they suffer the corporate funds or property to be

lost or wasted by gross negligence and inattention to the duties of

their trust. Independent of the provisions of the revised statutes,

which were passed after the filing of this bill, this court had juris-
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directors must also have been stockholders. And from aught that
appears to the contrary, they may now be the owners of aill the
re idue of the stock subscribed.
The objection for multifariousne s cannot be susfained. All
of the complainants are cestui que trusts~ having similar interests,
in every re pect, and arising out of the same trust. They are
seeking precisely the same redress against their tru tees, and for
the same acts; by which they allege they have received a similar
and common injury. TheTe is, therefore, no goo.d reason for
requiring them to file separate and distinct bills. It is a favorite
obj ct of this court to prevent a multiplicity of suits. And where
several persons have a common interest, arising out of the same
transaction, although their interest is not joint, even the defendant
may ometimes insist that they shall all be made parties, that he
may be only subjected to the trouble and expense of one litigation.
Upon the principle of the decision of this court, in Brinckerhoff v.
Brown ( 6 John. Ch. Rep. 139), the complainants were authorized,
if not required, to join in this suit.
T'he objection that a dis-covery may subject the company to a
forfeiture of its charter, is not sufficient to support this general
demurrer i:o the whole bill, both as ro the discovery and relief,
even if it would have authorized a demurrer to the discovery of
particular :facts. Under the provisions of the revised statutes, the
defendants may be compelled to make a discovery, in certain cases,
although it may subject the corporait ion to a forfeiture of its
corporate rights. (2 R. S. 4()5, § 52.)
If the alle~ations in this bill are true, there is no doubt that
the directors of this company were guilty of a most palpable
violation o.f their duty, by engaging in this gambling speculation
in si:ocks, which wa wholly unauthorized by their charter; and
which the bill alleges was carried on to subserve their own individual interests and purposes. I have no hesitation in declaring
it a the law of this state, that the director of a monied OT other
joint tock corporation, who wilfully abu e their tru t, or misapply
the fund of the company, by which a loo is sustained, are personally liable a tru tee to make good that lo . And they are
equally liable if they suffer th corporate fund or prop rty i:o be
loot or wa ted by gro negligence and inattention to the duties of
th ir trust. Independent of the provi ion of the revi ed statute ,
which were pa d after the filing o.f thi bill, thi court had juris-
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diction, so far as the individual rights of the corporators were

concerned, to call the directors to account; and compel them to

make satisfaction for any loss arising from a fraudulent breach

of trust, or the wilful neglect of a known duty. To this extent

Chancellor Kent, in the case of The Attorney Generdl v. The Utica

Ins. Co. {2 Johns. Oh. Rep. 389), admitted the court had juris-

diction; although he doubted the general powers of this court

over the corporation itself to prevent an abuse of its corporate

privileges. Until very recently, but few incorporated companies,

in which individuals had any direct pecuniary interest, existed in

England, except corporations for charitable purposes. And this

court would very reluctantly interfere with the concerns of mere

municipal corporations, where a sufficient remedy is afforded, by

mandamus or quo warranto, or by an indictment against the

officers of the corporation, for any abuse of their powers by which

the public has sustained an injury. But since the introduction of

joint stock corporations, which are mere partnerships, except in

form, the principles which were formerly applied to charitable

corporations in England, may be very appropriately extended to
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such companies here. The directors are the trustees or managing

partners, and the stockholders are the cestui que trusts, and have a

joint interest in all the property and effects of the corporation.

(See Wood's Inst. B. 1 ch. 8, p. 110. 11 Coke's Rep. 98, b.) And

no injury the stockholders may sustain by a fraudulent breach of

trust, can, upon the general principles of equity, be suffered to pass

without a remedy. In the language of Lord Hardwicke, in a

similar case, 'T will never determine that a court of equity cannot

lay hold of every such breach of trust. I will never determine

that frauds of this kind are out of the reach of courts of law or

equity; for an intolerable grievance would follow from such a

determination." (3 Atk. Rep. 406.) The demurrers on the record

are therefore not well taken, and should be overruled.

The defendants have, however, assigned as causes of demurrer,

ore tenus, that is not alleged in the bill that the corporation, by its

officers, refused to sue, or that the defendants are the present

directors, having the control of the corporation, and that there-

fore the suit should have been in the name of the corporation.

That even if a sufficient excuse is shown by the bill, for bringing

the suit in the name of the stockholders, the coqwration should be

before the court as a party defendant. I tliink at least one of these

v.
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form th prin i11 s which were :formerly applied to haritable
·orporation in England may be very appropriately extended to
u h co pani h re. The directors are the trustee or managing
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objections is well taken ; and that the corporation should be before

the court, either as complainant or as a defendant.

Generally, where there has been a waste or misapplication of

the corporate funds, by the officers or agents of the company, a

suit to compel them to account for sudi waste or misappHcation

should be in the name of the corporation. But as this court never

permits a wrong to go unredressed merely for the sake of form,

if it appeared that the directors of the corporation refused to

prosecute by collusion with those who had made themselves

answerable by tlieir negligence or fraud, or if the corporation was

still under the control of those who must be made the defendants

in the suit, the stockholders, who are the real parties in interest,

would be permitted to file a bill in their own names, making the

corporation a party defendant. And if the stockholders were so

numerous as to render it impossible, or very inconvenient to bring

them all before the court, a part might file a bill, in behalf of

themselves and all others standing in the same situation. {Hichens

V. Congreve, 4 Russ. E. 563.) Although the revised statutes have

provided for cases of this kind in future, this bill cannot be sus-
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tained, unless it is made to conform to the law as it existed at the

time the suit was commenced.

The demurrer ore tenus is therefore allowed, upon payment by

the defendants of the costs of the demurrer on the record. (Attor-

ney General v. Brown, 1 Swanst. Eep. 288. Durdant v. Redmond,

\ '\ \1 Vern. 78.)* But the complainants are to be at liberty to amend,

\ V^ ^ t^^y ^^y ^^ advised.

/^ ^ J^^n'botham V. Burnet, 5 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 18Jf. (1821.)

f^ \r, ' The bill stated, that lot No. 81, in Manlius (part of military

^^' /' bounty lands), was patented to Archibald Elliot. That on the

^j-/ *^' 17th day of January, 1785, before the patent was issued, Elliot,

<^'yr f^ by an agreement contained in the condition of a bond, sold the

(^ J^ lot to Leonard Smith, and ])Ound himself to execute a deed of

.y conveyance. On the 4th of November, 1789, Smith, by an assign-

Vr' *A demurrer ore tenus appears to be in the nature of a new demurrer

to the same part of the bill which was before demurred to. And it was

allowed in this form, upon the argument of the demurrer on record, to
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objection is well taken; and that the corporation should be before
the court, either a complainant or as a defendant.
Generally, where there has been a wa te or mi application of
the corporate funds, by the of:Iicers or agents of the company, a
uit to compel them to account for u'Ch waste a:r misapplication
should be in the name of the corporation. But as this court never
permits a wrong to go unredre ed merely for the ake of form,
if it appeared that the directors of the corp-0ration refused to
pro ecute by collu ion with tho e who had made themselves
an w rable by their negligence or fraud, or if the corpora.tion was
till under the control of those who must be made the defendants
in the suit, the stockholders, who are the real parties in interest,
would be permitt d to file a bill in their own names, making the
corporation a party defendant. And if the stockholders were so
numerous as to render it impoo ible, or very inconvenient to bring
them all before the court, a part might file a bill, in behalf of
themselves and all others standing in the same situation. (Hich ens
v. Congreve, 4 Russ. R. 562.) Although the revised statutes have
provided for cas of this kind in future, this bill oannot be sustained, unless it i ma.de to conform to the law as it existed at the
time the suit was commenced.
The demurrer ore tenus is therefore allowed, upon payment by
the defendants of the costs of the demurrer on the record. (A ttorn ey General v. Brown, 1 Swanst. Rep. 288. Durdant v. Redmond,
1 Vern. 78.) * But the complainants are to be at liberty to amend,
a they may be advised.

prevent injustice; as the defendant cannot again be allowed to demur

to the same matter in any other way. (See ii Ves. Rep. 70.)

>'

;Higinbotham v. Burnet, 5 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 184.

(1821.}

bill tat d, that lot No. 81, in Manliu (part o•f military
bounty lands), was patented to Archibald Elliot. That on the
17th day of January, 17 5, b for the pat nt wa i ued, Elliot,
by an agreement contained in th condition of a bond old the
lot to L onard mith and bound him f to x cut a d 1 of
conveyanc . On the 4th of ovember, 1789, mith, by an a ignTHE

*A demurrer ore tenus app ar to be in th nature of a n w demurr er
to th
m part of th bill whi h was b for d murr d to. And it was
all w d in thi s f rm , up o n th argum nt f th d em urr r on r cord, to
prev nt inju ti ce; a th def ndant ann t again b all w d to d emur
to th
am matt r in a ny th r way. (See I I V . R p. 70.)
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ment endorsed on the bond, sold and assigned the lot and the bond

to William I. Vredenbergh. The bond, with the assignment en-

dorsed, was duly deposited in the office of the clerk of Onondaga,

pursuant to the act of IT'J-i. On the 28th of August, 1790, Vre-

denbergh sold and assigned the bond, by an endorsement thereon,

together with all his rights title and interest in and to the land,

to which he was entitled by the said bond, to John Carpenter: and

v., at the same time, delivered to Carpenter the patent for the

lot, and Elliot's discharge from the army. About the year 1792,

Carpenter conveyed the lot in fee to Jeremiah Jackson, who entered

upon it, built a house and mills, and made valuable improvements.

On the 25tli of June, 1799, Jackson reconveyed the lot in fee to

Carpenter, with warranty. C. entered on tlie premises, and con-

tinued in possession until his death, in Fobruarj', 1800. In

February, 1806, a partition of the lands of C. was made among

his heirs, pursuant to the statute, and the premises in question

were allotted to the share of his son, Benjamin C. Ever since the

conveyance of Jackson to John C, he and his heirs have been in

the peaceable occupation of the preonises, to the present time.

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 16:37 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t3223129q
Public Domain in the United States / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-us

Since his death (and since the right, if any, of the heirs of V. had

accrued), several houses, mills, bams, &c. have been erected on

the premises, and other improvements made, to the value of

eighteen thousand dollars. That Vredenbergh, at the time of the

death of John C, lived at Marcellus, within twenty miles of the

premises, and continued to reside there until his death, in 1813;

and he was well acquainted with the improvements making on the

premises. The plaintiffs are severally seised in fee of p'arts of the

lot, under Benjamin C. ; and the defendants are the children and

heirs of Vredenbergh.

The bill furtlier stated, that Vredenbergh, at all times, and

particularly after the death of Jo'hn C, disclaimed all interest

in the lot, declaring that his whole interest had been conveyed

to J. C, and that his heirs were seised thereof in fee. That the

heirs of V. claim the lot, denying that any other than an estate

for life was conveyed by their father, for want of words of inherit-

ance. But the plaantifTs charged, that the conveyance to J. C.

was intended to create, and did create an estate in fee. That in

May, 1820, the defendants brought actions of ejectment against the

plaintiffs, to recover possession of the premises. The plaintiffs

prayed a discover}^ as to the facts stated in the bill, and for a

169
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release from the defendants of any claim to the lot, and that they

may be enjoined, &c., and for other relief, &c. An injunction was,

accordingly, awarded.

The defendants demurred to the bill: 1. Because the plaintiffs

claiming to be seised in fee of the premises, under the conveyance

from v., it was a question of law only. 2. Because the bill con-

tained no matter of equity.

The Chancellor:

DEM RREl{

relea e from the d fondant of any claim to the lot, and that they
ma be enjoined, &c., and for other relief, &c. An injunction wa ,
accordingly awarded.
The d fendants demurred to the bill: 1. Becau e the plaintiffs
claiming to be ei ed in fee of the premi e , under the conveyaince
from V., it wa a question of law only. 2. Because the bill contained no matter of equity.

This is a demurrer to the whole bill, and there are two causes

of demurrer assigned. (1.) That the plaintiffs claim to be seised

in fee of the premises, and therefore the matter is properly and

THE CHANCELLOR:

exclusively cognizable at law. (2.) That the bill contains no

matter of equity.

Perhaps it would be sufficient to dispose of the demurrer, by

referring to the rule {Laight v. Morgan, 1 Johns. Cases, 429),

that if a demurrer be general to the whole bill, and be bad in part,

it must be overruled. If it be good for discovery, and not for relief,

a general demurrer to the whole bill is bad. The defendants should

in such a case give the discovery, and demur to the relief; and this
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rule was so settled, in the case referred to, in the Court of Errors.

I cannot see any doubt, in this case, of the right of the plaintiffs

to a discovery concerning the deeds charged in the bill to have

been lost, and concerning their contents.

But the bill appears to me to state several distinct and sufficient

heads of equity jurisdiction.

It is easy to perceive, that the real ground of the claim of the

defendants, as heirs of Vredenbergh, rests on the defective con-

veyance from him to John Carpenter, under whom the plaintiffs

claim title; and that defect consists in the omission of words of

inheritance, the want of which, I apprehend, would confine the

operation of the assignment, in a Court of law, to an estate for

life. But when the right of the soldier rested originally in

equity, and continued so when he conveyed his right to Smith,

and when Smith transferred that right to Vredenbergh, and when

we consider the charge in the bill that Vredenbergh and Carpenter

negotiated and agreed for the sale and purchase of that entire

right, and the circumstances attending the assignment from V. to

C, and the language and mode of the assignment, and the accom-

panying delivery of the patent and original discharge of the soldier,

This i a demurrer to the whole bill, and there are two causes
of demurrer assigned. ( 1.) That the plaintiffs claim to be sei ed
in fee of the premi es, and therefore the matter is properly and
exclu ively cognizable at law. (2.) That the bill contains no
matter of equity.
Perhap it would be ufficient to di pose of the demurrer by
referring to the rule (Laight v. Morgan) 1 John . Ca ffi, 429),
that if a demurrer be general to the whole bill, and be had in part
it mu t be overruled. If it be good for di covery and not for relief
a general demurrer to the whole bill i bad. The defendants hould
in uch a case give th di covery, and demur to the relief; and thi~
rule was so settled, in the ciase referred to, in the Court of Errors.
I ca·n not ee any doubt, in thi ca e, of the right of the plaintiff
to a di covery concerning the deed charged in the bill to have
been lo t, and concerning their content .
But the bill appears to me to tate several distinct and sufficient
h ad of equity juri diction.
It i ea y to perceive, that the real ground of the claim of the
defendant , as h irs of Vredenbergh, r86ts on the defective conveya·nce from him to John Carpenter under whom the plaintiff~
claim title; and that defect con i t in the omi sion of word of
inheritanc , th want of whi h, I appreh nd, woul confine the
op ration of th a ignment, in a Court of law to an e tat for
lif . But wh n th right of the oldi r re ted originall} in
equity, and ontinu d o wh n he conv y d hi right to mith
and wh n mith tran f rr d thait ri ht to Vred nb rgh and wh n
we con. ider th ·bar in the bill that\ r denb r h and arpenter
n gotiat d and agr d for the ale and purcha of that ntire
i nm nt from . to
riaht, and th circum tan e att nding the
. and the lan ua an mod of th a ianm nt an the accompanying , liv n of th patent and oriainal 1i charg of the oldi r
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there is good cauf^e to infer a mistake in that assignment; and that,

owing to a defect in drawing it, the intention of the parties was

not carried into effect. To remedy this defect, and to prevent an

unconscientious advantage being taken of it, may afford a very fit

case for equitable interposition. Under such special circumstances,

a trust in fee may be considered as created, which this Court would

execute according to the conscience and intention of the parties.

There are many cases at common law in which a fee has been held

to pass without the word heirs (Co. Litt. 9. b.) ; and if a trust

interest in fee was intended to be created by the a>ssignment from

Y. to C, in like manner as a trust interest in fee was conveyed by

the deed from Elliot to Smith, and by the assignment from Smith

to Vredenborgh, then this Court, according to the doc-trine in

Fisher v. Fields (10 Johns. Rep. 495), would decree an adequate

legal conveyance, according to that intention, notwithstanding the

want of words of inheritance.

The allegations in the bill on wliieh so much stress has been

laid by the counsel for the defendants, that the plaintiffs were

seised of the land in question, must be understood to mean an
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equitable, and not a legal seisin. The whole scope of the ])ill,

and the very fact of coming into this Court, demonstrate thJs

meaning.

The bill also states facts, from which we are to infer that

Vredenbergh and his heirs, the present defendants, are equitably

estopped from asserting any claim to a reversionan^ interest in the

land. It is charged, that Y., after the death of Carpenter, for 13

years, stood by and saw great and costly improvements made upon

the land, by persons claiming, and believing themselves to be

owners in fee, under Carpenter, and never interposed any preten-

sion of right or title. It appears from the cases referred to in

Wendell v. Van Rensselaer (1 Johns. Ch. Eep. 354), that though

the right of the party, who thus misleads third persons by his

silence, be merely a reversionary interest, and subject to a life

estate, in the very person whom he suffers to deal with the prop-

erty as absolute owner, the rule of equity still applies, that he

never shall be permitted to exercise his legal title against such

person. He is bound, and all persons claiming under him, are

bound, by his silence. This case is much stronger than ordinary

ones of the kind ; for here the silence was maintained for thirteen

vcnr<. nftcr ilv^ nssumod life interest of Carpenter had terminated.

I IBOT IIA. l

1 1

th r i: g cl cau:' t inf ·r a mi tak in that a ianment; and that,
win a t a c1 'l} t in drawin it th int ntion or th parti wa ~
n t ·arri d into ff -t. 'I r •m, 1 thi tl I t and t pr nt an
un on ·i nti u aclvanta 1 ing tak n f it may aff rd a v ry :fit
f r quitahl int rpo ·ition.
nd r u h p cial ·ircum tance ,
n itl r d a r at d whi ·h thi iourt would
a tru · in fe • may 1
•. · , ·u t • a · · rtljn t th
of th partie .
at ommon law in whi h a f ha b n held
to pa · with ut th w rd h ir ( o. Litt. 9. b.); and if a tru t
in r ·t in f
wa int nded to b reat d by the a ignment from
. in lik mann r a a tru t int r t in fee was con eyed by
mi th and by th a ~ ignm nt from mith
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ourt, ac ording to th dodrin in
Fdzer v. Field (10 obn .
p. ±9 ) would d ree an adequate
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h all gation in th bill on which o much tre ha been
laid b th coun 1 for the defendant that the plaintiff were
. i d of th land in que tion, must be under toad to mean an
quitable and not a le al ei in. The whole cope of the bill,
ery fact of oming into thi Court, d mon trate thi
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from which we are to infe r that
Th
Yr 1 nb rah and hi h ir th pr ent d f ndant are equitably
. t pp d from a , rtin any laim to a rev r ionaIJ intere t in the
land. It i. hara d that '\. aft r the death of arpenter for 13
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If Carpenter was bound to know the duration of his title, those

who succeeded to the estate, after his death, were certainly en-

couraged and misled by the studied silence or express admissions

of Vredenbergh ; and the case as stated presents one of the strongest

claims for the assistance of this Court against the assertion of a

title under him by his heirs. It is to be traced up to imposition

and fraud.

The demurrer must, therefore, be overruled with costs, and the

defendant ordered to answer.
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Order accordingly.

DEMURRER

If Carpenter was bound to know the duration of his title, those

who succeeded to the estate, aifter his death, were certainly encouraged and misled by the studied silence or express admissions
of V redenbergh; and the case as stated presents one of the strongest
claims for the assistance of this Court against the assertion of a
title under him by his heirs. It is to he traced up to imposition
and fraud.
The demurrer must, therefore, be overruled with costs, and the
defendant ordered to answer.
Order accordingly.
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CHAPTER VI.

Harrison v. Farrington, 38 N. J. Eq. 358. (ISSJ^.jX \y''

Bill for relief. On plea in bar. ^. ^ ^ ^v\

The Chancellor : /V - \*j * v

This matter comes before me on the hearing of the defendant's^ wV

PROCEEDINGS ON BEHAL 1 OF DE 1 ENDA.r T [Continued] ..

This matter comes before me on the nearmg ot tne defendant's^ w'

PLE

plcti in bar. The bill states that John C. Johnson, the com-V V

:

DEFINED,

ATURE AND

FFICE.

plainant's intestate, and the defendant were copartners up to'\P A

the death of the former; that the complainant, after having

Harrison v. Farrington, 38 N. J. Eq. 358.

\P

{1884.)

/.y^r the aeath oi tne lormer; mat me compiainaui, aiuex- navijug

v%.^ jrrepeatedly applied, without success, to the defendant for an

BILL for reli f.

On plea in bar.

d \-^ account of the partnership affairs, received a statement from him ' Q

\ which showed that there was due Johnson's estate from the part- .yj^ ,

TIIE

IIANCELLOR:

nership the sum of $14,578.85; that the complainant was entirely <-^^ i

ignorant of the affairs of the partnership ; that in the accounts the - y*~'^

defendant fraudulently charged Johnson's estate with the amount X^ .
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of a note made by one William C. Miller, which the defendant' I i^'

ought to have required Miller to pay &c. &c., and that the com- Jq/\

plainant, by the false and fraudulent representations of the de- -

fendant, was induced to accept a smaller sum than the amount 'i v-

which appeared to be due by the statement. The defendant de- -^

murred to part of the bill and pleaded to the rest. The demurrer; *• [\

was overruled. 9 Stew. Eq. 107. The plea was also overruled Ij.-^-""

(11 Stew. Eq. 1), with leave to amend. The defendant has i ^ ^

amended the plea, and answered also in support of it. By the plea 0^1^ ^^^

he pleads that an account was stated between him and the com- \ ^"4^

plainant, and negatives, by separate denials, supplemented by a \WJi ^

general one, the charges of fraud made against him in the bill.'

His answer is to the same effect. \

The complainant's counsel insists that the plea should be over-

ruled on various grounds: First, because it is not duly verified;

second, because it does not appear whether it is intended to cover

the whole or only part of the bill ; third, because the answer is to

173

X

Thi matter m before me on the hearing of the defendant's
plea in bar. The bill tate that John C. John on, the complainant inte tate, and the defendant were copartners up to
the d ath of the former; that the complainant, after having
rep atedly applied, without success, to the defendant for an
aic unt of th partnership affair , received a statement from him
which howed that there was due Johnson's estate from the partner hip the um of $14,578.85; that the complainant was entirely
ignorant of th affai1 of the partnership; that in the accounts the
def ndant fraudul ntly charged Johnson's e tate with the amount
of a note made by one W.illiam C. Miller, which the defendant
ught to have required Miller to pay &c. &c., and that the complainant by the fal e and fraudulent represen-00.tions of the de- '
f ndant, wa induced to accept a smaller sum tha:n the amount
which appear d to be due by the statement. The defendant demurred to part of the bill and pleaded to the re t. The demurrer
wa overrul d.
tew. Eq. 107. The plea wa al o overruled
(11 t w. Eq. 1) with leave to amend. The defendant has
am n led th pl
and an wered al o in upport of it. Bj the plea
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arate d nial
uprplemented b ' a
lainant, and n o-ativ
0n ml on t11 hara of fraud mad ag:iin t him in th bill.
Hi~ an w r i .. to th
ame ff ct.
Th
rnplainant conn el in i t that th plea hould b O'rerru1 cl on ariou ar und : Fi t, be au it i not duly verified·
Il t app a.r whf'th r it i i tende
to over
nd b au it a
th whol or onl part of th bill· thir becau th an wer i to
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the same matter as the plea, and so overrules it; fourth, because

the plea is multifarious in separately negativing the various facts

stated in the bill in charging fraud ; fifth, because it does not show

what the balance was that was found due on the alleged account-

ing.

The first objection cannot be entertained. The defendant has

made the oath required by the statute that the plea is not inter-

posed for delay, but in good faith. The old rule on the subject

was that to a plea of matter in pais in bar the defendant must

make oath that it is true. And it has been held that such oath

is requisite, even though the bill pray an answer without oath.

Heartt v. Corning, 3 Paige 566. But where the statute directs

what the verification of the plea shall be, it must be assumed

that no further or other verification is necessary. It may be

added that a plea will not be overruled on the hearing for want

of the requisite oath. The objection must be made on motion,

on notice to take the plea off the files. 1 Dan. Ch. Pr, 688.

The objection that it does not apjjear whether the plea is to

the whole bill or only to part of it, is not tenable. The plea states
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that it is to the "whole of said bill or to so much and such part

of it as prays an accounting." The bill is, in fact, only a bill

for an account. It is true there are also prayers for the payment

of any balance that may be found due, for discovery and for relief

generally, but these are only incidental and subordinate to the

great object of the suit, which is the account, or consequent upon

the attainment thereof, provided the result of the accounting shall

be in favor of the complainant. But if it be conceded that the

bill should not be considered as merely a bill for an account, the

plea is evidently intended to go merely to the claim of the bill

to an account. If that is properly to be regarded as the whole

object of the bill, then the plea is to the whole bill ; and if not,

then it is a plea to so much and such part of the bill as seeks an

account. It is very clear that the pleader intended to confine the

plea to the demand for an account.

The next objection is that the answer is to the same matter as

the plea. This objection is based on a misapprehension of the

extent of the rule on the subject. The general rule is, that when

the defendant, at the same time, sets up the same defence both

by answer and plea in bar, the former overrules the latter. The

reason is, that by interposing the plea, he claims that he ought not

PLEAS :
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th llillle ma titer as the plea, and o overrule it; fourth, because
the plea i multifariou in separatel} n gativing the various facts
tat d in the bill in charging fraud; :fifth, becau e it does not how
what the balance wa that was found due on the alleged accountrng.
The :first objection cannot be entertained. The defendant has
made the oath required by the statute that the plea is not interpo ed for delay, but in good faith. The old rule on the subject
wa that to a plea of matter in pais in bar the defendant mu ~ t
make oath that it is true. And it has been held that such oath
is requisite, even though the bill pray an an wer without oath.
H eartt v. Corning) 3 Paige 566. But where the tatute directs
what the veri:fioation of the plea shan be, it mu t be as umed
that no further nr other verification is nece ary. It may be
added that a plea will not be overruled on the hearing for want
of the requi ite oath. The objection mu t be made on motion,
on notice to take the plea off the :fil . 1 Dan. Ch. Pr. 688.
The objection that it doe not appear whether the plea is to
the whole bill or only to part of it, is nort tenable. The plea state
that it is to the "whole of said bill or to so much and uch part
of it a pray an accounting." T'he bill is, in fact, only a bill
for an account. It is true there are al o prayers for the payment
of any balance that may be found due, for discovery and for relief
generally, but these are only incidental and subordinate to the
great object of the suit, which i the account, or con equent upon
the attainment thereof, provided the re ult O'f the accounting shall
be in favor o·f the complainant. But if it be conceded that the
bill hould not be con idered a merely a bill fQII' an account, the
plea i evidently intended to go merely to the claim of the bill
to an account. If that i properly to be regarded as the whole
object of the bill, then the plea i ~ to the whole bill; and if not,
th n it i a pl a to so much and su h part of the bill as eeks an
account. It i v ry clear that the pleader intend d to confine the
pl a to th demand for an ac ount.
The n xt obj tion i that the an wer i to the ame matter as
th plea. Thi objection i ba
on a mi apprehen ion of the
ext nt of the rul on the ubje t. Th gen ral rul i , that when
th
efendant at the ame time
up th am d £ nee both
by an w r and plea in bar, th form r overrule th latter. The
rea on i . that by jnt rpo ing th p1 a he claims that he ought not
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to bo required to answer, and yet at the same time, does answer.

But wiiere, as in the present case, the bill anticipates the bar and

alleges facts to avoid it, an answer is neeessary, in subsidium, to

support the plea. In such case, it is proper not only that the plea

sliould contain all necessary averments to overthrow those allega-

tions, but the defendant must support his plea by an answer, also

denying those allegations. Ferguson v. O'Harra, 1 Pet. C. C. 493.

"A plea should be drawn," says Professor Langdell, " in the same

manner, whether it requires the support of an answer or not, i. e.,

if it is a defence to the whole bill, it should be pleaded to the

whole bill, and then the answer should give such discovery as the

plaintiff is entitled to for the purpose of trying the truth of the

plea." Lang. Eq. PI. § 105. See, also, Mitf. Ch. PI. 244, 298;

Story Eq. PI. § G84. The answer in this case is, according to the

sitatement in the beginning of it, in aid of the plea, and "to give

the complainant the discovery he is entitled to touching and con-

cerning the matters in the bill alleged and charged in avoidance

of the plea." It is urged that the conclusion of the answer, the

general denial of combination and confederacy, and the general
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traverse are evidence of the general character of the answer, and

that it is intended to go to the whole bill. The insertion of the

c-onclusion referred to is contrary to the rule of this court which

requires that it be omitted. It has no significance, however, in

favor of the objection under consideration.

It is also urged that the answer is not sufficient, in that it does

not answer all of the bill which is not covered by the plea. I

see no ground for sustaining this objection. Tlie scope of the biU

has already been adverted to, and if the complainant is barred

from an account, his claim to relief wholly fails.

The next objection is that the plea is multifarious, because it

negatives the various facts stated in the bill in charging fraud.

The objection is not well taken. The charges in the bill to sup-

port the allegation of fraud, must be met in the plea. Mitf. Ch.

PI. 240, 271. They may be met by a general denial (no matter

how general), provided it be sufficient to put the charges of fraud

contained in the bill in issue. Mitf. Ch. PI. 244. It is no ground

of objection that the denials are explicit and particular. Bogardus

V. Triniiij Church, 4 Paige 178, 195. They merely put the fraud

in issue.

It remains to consider the objection that the ploa does not state

AR INGTON
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to b r iuir d
an ·w r, ain d yet at the ame time, doe answer.
ut wher , a in th" pr nt ca ·e, he bill anticipate th bar and
all g fa ·t to a oid it, an an ~ wer i n ce ary, in subsidium, to
. upport th plea. n u h as , it i proper not only that the pleai
:-;hould contain all nece ary a erm n to overthrow tho e all gation., but the d f ndant mu t upport hi pl a by an an wer, al o
1lcnying th · all •gation . Ferguson v. O'Harra, 1 Pet.
. 493.
·· . .\ pl ·a h uld be drawn, ay
rof or Langdell, ' in the ame
111ann r, wlPth r it r quir the upport of an an wer or not, i. e.,
if it i ~ a d fen e to the whole bill, it hould be pleaded to the
wh le bill, and th n the an wer houlcl give uch di cover_)· a the
plaintiff i entitl cl to for the purpo e of trying the truth of the
i l a.'
ang. , q. Pl. § 105. See, al o, Mitf. Ch. 1. 2±4, 298 ;
f 't r · El· Pl.
· ±. The an wer in thi ca e i , according to the
. tatement in the beginning of it, in aid of the pl a, and 'to give
th · mplainant the di co ery he is entitled to touching and con·erning h matters in the bill alleged and chargecl in avoidance
f the plea. '
t i urged that the conclusion of the an wer, the
en ral d nial of combination and confederacy, and the general
trav r e are evidence of the general character nf the an wer, a•n d
tha.t it i intended to go to the whole bill. The in ertion of the
·on lu ion referred to i contrary to the rule of thi court which
require that it be omitted. It ha no igni:ficance, however, in
favor of the obj ction under con ideration.
It i al o urg d that the an wer i not ufficient, in that it does
not an wer all of the bill which i not covered by the plea. I
.: no ground for u taining thi objeotion. The cope of the bill
ha ~ alr c dy been adverted ro and if the complainant i barred
from an a count bi claim to reli f wholly fails.
Th next obj ction i that the plea i multifariou , becau e it
ne atiY the ariou facts tat d in the bill in charging fraud.
Th bj ction i not well taken. The charge in the bill to uppor the all gation of fraud, mu t be met in the pl a. lllitf. h.
1. · 0
1. They may be met by a general denial (no matter
how o- •n ral) pro i d it be ufficient to put the charge of fraud
·ontain d in th bill in i ~ u . 1itf. h. Pl. 2±±. t i no crround
f ol j ction that the d nial ar explicit and particular. Bogardus
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lzurch -± Paig 1 , 1 . The merely put the frau
1

in 1s u .

I r main t

onj

r th ohj ction that th plea doe not tate

17 6
176 Pleas: Defined, Natuee and Office

the balance found to be due on the accounting. It is laid down

as a requisite to a plea of account stated in equity, that it set

forth what the balance was. Beam. PL Eq. 230. In the case in

hand, the plea makes no statement on that head. The bar set up

in the plea is, in fact, not the accounting but the executed agree-

ment, for the purchase, by the defendant, of the interest of the

complainants invested in the assets of the firm. Hence, the amount

of that interest, according to the accounting, is not stated, nor

is it stated that it was ascertained thereby. The plea is silent as

to tlie result of the account. Nor does it even state what amount

the defendant agreed to pay the complainant for the interest of

his intestate in the property of the firm. It states that they

accounted and that the complainant urged the defendant to buy

the interest of his intestate, for the sum of $10,000, and as an

inducement, offered to allow him the amount of a note of $262.72,

made by Samuel Thompson and held by the firm, and to waive the

interest on the notes to be given in payment, and that "a memo-

randum of that agreement was then and there drawn in writing,

in words and figures following :
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"New York, Aug. 10th, '76.

"It is agreed between the undersigned that the interest of the-

estate of John C. Johnson, deceased, in the late firm of John C.

Johnson & Co., shall be settled for the sum of $10,000, less the

amount of Samuel Thompson's note — $262.72.

"$10,000 00

"262 72

"$9,737 28
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the balanc found to be due on the accounting. It i laid down
a a requi ite to ai plea of aocount sfated in equity, that it set
forth what the balance w.as. Beam. PL Eq. 230. In the case in
hand, the plea makes no statement on that head. The bar set up
in the plea is, in fact, not the accounting but the executed agreement, for the purchase, by the defendant, of the interest of the
complainants inve ted in the assets of the firm. Hence, the amount
of that interest, according to the a'Ccounting, is not stated, nor
is it tated that it was ascertained thereby. The pleai is silent as
to the re ult o-f the account. Nor does it even state what amount
the defendant agreed to pay the complainant for the interest of
his intes.tate in the properly o.f the firm. It states tha1t they
accounted and that the comp1ainant urged the defendant to buy
the interest of his intestate, for the sum o.f $10,000, and as an
inducement, offered to allow him the amount of a note of $262. 72,
made by Samuel Thomps·on and held by the firm, and to waive the
interest on the notes to he given in payment, and that "a memorandum of that agreement was then and there drawn in writing,
in words and figures following:

"To be settled by notes as follows : [then follows a statement of

notes], said notes to be without interest."

It is not stated that this instrument was signed by anybody.

The plea adds that the complainant afterwards agreed to allow,

as a "further payment thereon," another claim, which is speci-

fied, thereby reducing the amount to be paid to $9,582.28; that

an attachment was issued out of the supreme court of New York,

at the instance of creditors of the estate of the intestate, against

the complainant, and served on the defendant, and that a notice

was served on the latter, by the public administrator of the city

of New York, "claiming said assets and forbidding the payment

"NEW YORK, Aug. 10th, '76.
"It is agreed between the undersigned that the interest of the·
estate of John C. J o-hnson, deceiased, in the late firm of John C.
Johnson & Co., shall be settled for the sum of $10,000, less the
amount of Samuel Thompson's note--$262. 72.
"$10,000 00
"262 72
"$9,737 28
"To be ettled by notes as follows: [then follows a statement of
notes], said nortes to be without interest."
It i not tailed tha.t this in trument was igned by anybody.
The plea add that the comprainant afterward agreed to allow,
as a "further paym nt ther on," another claim, which is specified, ther by reducing th amount to be paid to $9 5 2.28; thait
an attachment wa i ued out of the supreme court of New York,
at the in tance of creditorn of the ootate of the intestate, against
th complajnanit, and erved on the def ndant, and that a notice
wa. rv d on the latter, by the public admini trator of the city
of N w ork "claiming aid a et and forbidding the payment

HEARTT
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of said moneys to said complainant"; that on the 10th of July,

1878, the complainant sued the defendant in the circuit court of

Essex county, in this state, for "said balance of $9,582.28," and

obtained judgroent therein against the defendant on the 31st of

August following, which the latter paid on the 6th of December

following, and the complainant gave him a warrant (which is set

out) for the satisfaction of the judgment. The plea does not allege

that the complainant ever agreed to take $10,000, or $9,737.28, or

$9,582.28, for the interest of his intestate in the partnership prop-

erty. It may be gathered from it that the pleader intended to

say tha>t he agreed to take the last-mentioned sum for it, but he

has not done so. He says (to restate it) that the complainant

urged the defendant to give $10,000, and as an inducement agreed

to allow him the Tliompson note; that a memorandum of that

agreement (but it does not say that the defendant agreed to take

tlie interest and pay any sum for it) was drawm (it does not even

state that it was signed) ; that the complainant afterwards agreed

to allow, as a further pajonent thereon, another claim, thereby re-

ducing the amount to be paid to $9,582.28, and that the complain-
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ant sued the defendant for that sum and recovered judgment, wliich

the defendant paid. A plea must clearly and distinctly aver all

the facts which are necessary to render it a complete equitable

defence to the case made by the bill. This plea is defective, as has

just been shown; it will therefore be overruled, with costs.

Eeartt v. Coming, 3 Paige Ch. (N. Y.) 566. (1832.)

This was a bill filed by Heartt, the surviving partner of the

firm of Heartt & Smith, against the executor of Smith for an

account and settlement of the copartnership concerns. The bill

stated that in September, 1804, Heartt & Smith entered into co-

partnership, in the hardware business, to commence on the first

of January thereafter; that Heartt was expected to furnish the

principal part of the capital, and that Smith was to take the whole

charge of keeping the books and accounts of the firm, and was

to make up and state the copartnership accounts annually on the

v.

177.

CORNING

of aid mon y to aid oomplainant"; that on the 10th of July,
1 , th
mplainant u d the d fendant in the circuit court of
E x ounty, in thi tatc fo·r " aid balanc of $9,58 . 8," and
obtain 1 judgm nt ih rein again t th d fend.ant on the 31 t of
uru t f 11 win0 whi h th latt r paiid on the 6th of ecember
foll wing, and h 01 iplainant gav him a: warrant ( whi h i et
out) .r r th ati fac ion of th judgmen . Th pl a doe not all ge
that th omplainant ev r agr d to take $1 , 0 or $9,
. , or
."!J
. , f r th int r t of hi inte tat in th part:a hip proprl '· It may b gath r cl from it that the pleader intended to
,·ay that h agr ed to take the la t-m ntioncd um for it, but he
ay (to r tate it) that th complainant
ha not don o.
urg the d fondant to give $10,000, and as an inducement agreed
t allow him th Thompson note; that a memorandum of thait
agreem nt (but it do not ay that the d fendant agreed to take
he intere t and pay any um for it) was drawn (it does not even
tat thait it wa igned); that the complainant afterwards agreed
t allow, a a further payment thereon, another claim, thereby reducing the amount to be paid to $9,582.28, and that the complainant u d the def ndant for thait sum and recovered judgment, which
the d f ndant paid. A plea mu t clearly and distinctly aver all
th .fact whi h are nece ary to render it a complete equitable
f n to th ca e made by the bill. Thi plea is defective, a has
ju 't b en hown; it will therefore be overruled, with costs.
1

first of January in each year; that the partners were to be allowed

interest on the amount of stock furnisliod ])y thorn respectively,

to bo computed annually on llio first of January, and carried into

Heartt

orning 3 Paige Ch. (N. Y.) 566.

{183fJ.)

Thi wa a bill fil d by Heartt the urviving partner of the
firm of H a•r tt & mit.h a ain t the executor of Smith for an
a cunt and
tl ment of th copartner hip concern . Th bill
ptemb r 1 04 H artt & Smith entered into cotat d that in
l artner hip in th hardwar bu ine , to mmence on the fir t
f Tan uar ther after ; that Heartt wa e pect d to furni h th
1 rin ipal part of th caipital and that mith wa to take th whol
harcr o k ping th book and a count of th firm, and wa
t rnak up and tat th
partn r hip account~ annually on th
w r t b allow d
fir:t f anuary in a h ' ar · that th partn
int r , t n th amount f t k furni.::h d 1 y th m r p cfr1 1.
t h
rn1 ut 1 annua11 ' on th firt f anuary, and carri into
l'.!
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the accounts; and that Heartt was to receive two thirds of the

profits of the business, and Smith one third. The bill further

stated that the partnership continued until the first of April, 1812,

when it was dissolved by mutual consent, and that Smith died in

March, 1826; that from the commencement of the copartnership.

Smith took the sole charge of the books, notes and accounts of

the firm; that complainant did not, during continuance of the

copartnership, nor until after the death of Smith, inspect the

books of the firm, or know the contents thereof; and that he was

not acquainted with his own and his partner's accounts, kept in

the books, except from the postings in the ledger; that there were

no annual statements made of the demands or accounts of either

of the partners, and no annual inventories were taken of the stock,

demands, or property of the firm; and that there had never been

any statement or settlement of accounts of the copartnership con-

cerns made by or between the partners. It was further alleged in

the complainant's bill, that during the continuance of the copart-

nership, and afterwards. Smith had received large sums of money

belonging to the firm, which he had not entered upon the books
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of the company, but had appropriated the same to his own use;

that he had subscribed for and purchased stocks, in the Bank of

Troy and other incoq^orated companies, in the name of the firm,

and in his own name, and had paid for the same with the part-

nership funds; that he had afterwards appropriated the stock to

his own use, without the assent of the complainant, and had re-

ceived the dividends thereon; that during the continuance of the

copartnership. Smith loaned the partnership funds without interest

and against the will of the complainant, by which large sums were

lost ; and that he had also used the name of the firm in endorsing

for the accommodation of various individuals, by which the part-

nership was made liable, and sustained losses. The complainant

also claimed to be credited for the hire of a store, for the keeping

and hire of a horse and carriage for the use of the firm, and for

boarding clerks ; and also for large sums of money belonging to the

complainant, alleged to have been received and appropriated for

the purposes of the company, and not credited on the books of the

copartnership. The complainant waived an answer from the de-

fendant on oath, under the provision of the revised statutes, and

in conformity to the 40th rule of the court.

To all that part of the bill which related to errors in the books

PLEAS :

DEFINED,
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AND OFFICE

th accoun ~ ; and that Heartt was to receive two thirds of the
profit of the bu in , and Smith one third. The bill further
tat d that the partner hip continued until the first of April, 1812,
wh n it wa di olved by mutual consent, and that Smith died in
~Iarch, 1826; thait from the commencement of the copartnership,
Smith took the ole charge of the books, notes and accounts of
th firm; that complainant did not, during continuance of the
copartner hip, nor until after the death of Smith, inspect the
book of the firm, or know the contents thereof; and that he was
not acqua;inted with his own and his partner's accounts, kept in
the book , except from the postings in the ledger; that there were
no annual statements made of the demands or accounts of either
of the partner , and no annual inventories were taken of the stock,
demand , or property of the firm ; and that there had never been
any tatement or settlement of accounts of the copartnership concern made by or between the partners. It was further alleged in
the complainant' bill, that during the continuance of the copartnership, and afterwards, Smith had received large sum~ of money
b longing to the firm, which he had not entered upon the books
of the company, but had appropriated the same to his own use;
that he had ub cribed for and purchased stock , in the Bank of
Troy and other incorporated companies, in the name of the firm,
and in hi own name, and had paid for the same with the partnership funds; that he had afterward appropriated the stock to
hi own use, without the assent of the complainant, and had rec ived the dividend thereon; that during the confanuance of the
copartner hip, Smith loaned the partnership funds without interest
and again t the will of the complainant, by which large sums were
lo t; and that h had al o used the name of the firm in endorsing
for th accommodation o.f various individua1 , by which the partn er hip wa mad liable, and u rtain d lo e . The complainant
al o claimed to be credited for the hire of a store, for the ke ping
and hire of a hor e and ·c aniage for the u e of th firm, and for
boelrdin cl rk ; and al o for large um of mon y b longing to the
mplainant, alleg d to have b n re ived and apprnpriat d for
th purpos of th ompany, and not er di t d on the book of th
oparln r hip. Th omplainant waived an an wer from the d f n lant on oath, un l r th provi ion of the revi ed tatute and
in nformity to th Oth rule of the court.
T all that part of th bill whi h r Jat to error in th book

Heartt v. Cok2;ing 179

of the company, by supposed improper credits to Smith, or by the

neglect to make proper charges against him, or to the neglect to

give all pro]K!r credits to the complainant, and to that part which

sought to charge Smith with the losses upon moneys loaned or

endorsements made i'or the accommodation of other persons, or

which related to the bank stock subscribed for or purchased by

Smith with the funds of the firm, or which related to any other

errors in the books of the company previous to the first of January,

1812, the defendant pleaded that Smith, on the first day of Janu-

ary, 1811, did cause the partnership accounts of the firm, as

between the company and the complainant, and as between it and

the defendant, from the commencement of the partnership up to

and inckuliug the first day of January, 1811, to be made and stated

in the ledger of the company, and caused the balance to be ascer-

tained and struck in the several accounts of the said partners, under

that date; which balances were then carried to the new accounts

of the partners respectively for the succeeding year, kept in the

ledger, as by reference to the accounts so stated, balanced and

settled on the ledger fully appeared. And also that the complain-
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ant and Smith, on the first of Januar}', 1812, caused the partner-

ship accounts as between the partners respectively and the com-

pany, from the first of January, 1811, up to and including the

first of January, 1812, to be made and stated upon the ledger;

that a balance of $5,432.11 was found due from the partnership to

the complainant, and of $3,127.35 to Smith; and that the balances

were struck in the accounts so stated and settled, and were carried

by the parties to the new accounts kept in the same ledger. And

that the scheduler A. and B. annexed to the plea were true copies

of the accounts as stated on the ledger, and that the schedules of

C. D. contained the items and particulars of those accounts, from

the other books of the firm, as referred to in the accounts so

stated, balanced and settled on the ledger. The plea also averred

that the accounts so stated, balanced and settled were just and true

to the best of the defendant's knowledge and belief; that the com-

plainant, from the commencement of the copartnership, had at all

times had free access to the ledger, and all the other books of the

firm, and was well acquainted therewith and with the matters

therein contained ; and that he always acquiesced in the justice and

accuracy of the several accounts from the times of the statement

and settlement thereof until at or about the time of the death of

of th compan , by uppo d improp r er dit to mith, or by the
ucgl ·t l mak prop r ·ha 'g · agt in t him, or to th n egl ct t
giv all I rap r r <lit Lo U1 • mplainant, and to that part whi ·h
·o ught t
harg, ~ 'mith with th 1
upon man y loan d or
·n l r m nt mad .f r th ac · m odation of oth r pe on , or
whi ·h r •lat cl
lh 1 a.nl~ to ·k ub ril cl f r or purcha d by
'mith wiLh th fund of th firm, r whi h r lated to any oth r
rr i in th b k of th ompany pr viou to th fir t of January,
1 'l ·, th cl f n ant pl ad d that mi th, on th fi t day of J anuary 1 '11 c]j
au
th partn r hip accoun of the firm, a
1 lw ·n ill om1 any and th omplainant, and a between it and
th d .f •ndnnl from th ommencement of the partn r hip up to
and in ·ludi1JO' lh fir t day of January 1 11, lo be made an tated
in th 1 lcr r of th ompany, and au d th balance to be a certain d ancl tru k in th ev ral ac aunt of the aicl partner , under
that <lat ; which balance were then carried to the n w ac oun
of the par n r r p ctively for th uc e ding year, kept in the
lc<l ()' r, a by r .f r n
to the aiccount o tated, balanc cl and
· tUctl on th 1 d er full.) app ar 1.
nd al o that the omplainant and mith n th first of January, 1 1 · cau cl the partnerhip ac aunt a b tw n th parin r re 'Pectiv ly and th company from th fir t of January, 1 11, up to and including the
fir t of anuar 1 1 , to b mad and tat d upon the 1 dg r ·
that a balan of 5 -13 .11 wa found du from th partnership to
th omplainant and of
1 .3 to mith; and that the balance
w r ·tru k in th ac oun o tat d and ettl d and were carried
b · th parti to th n w a count k pt in the ame 1 dger. And
that th
h dul
. and . ann x d to the pl a wer true copie
tat d on the 1 cl er, an l that th ch dule of
. ontain d th it m and particular of tho e a count from
th'
h r l o k of th firm a r ferred to in the account o
~tat 1, balan cl and
ttl l on the 1 dcrer. The plea al ~ o av rred
that lh a ount o tated balan d and ttl d were ju t and true
t th' be t f ih d fon ant kn wl cl
and b li f · that the complainant, fr m th
mm n m nt .f th opartner hip had at all
im " ha l fr a
t th 1 cl r and all th oth r book~ of the
firm, ·ml wa '" 11 a quaint d th r with and with th matt r
th r in ntain d · and that h alwa · a qui c d in th ju ti and
n ·cu rm·.' f th
" ral a ount fr m th tim
f th ~ta m nt
, ncl -.. ttl ' 111 •nt th r of until at or about th tim f th d ath f
J
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Smith, in 1826. The defendant put in an answer to the rest of the

bill; but as the complainant had waived an answer on oath, the

plea and answer were not sworn to by the defendant. And the

cause was brought to hearing, upon the plea, in the usual form.

PLEAS : DEFINED, NATURE AND OFFICE

mith, in 18 6. The defendant put in an answer to the rest of the
bill; but as the complainarnt had waived an answer on oath, the
plea and an wer were not sworn to by the defendant. And the
cau e was brought to hearing, upon the plea·, in the usual form.

The Chancellor:

It is necessary in the first place to dispose of a question of form,

as to the verification of the plea. The complainant having waived

an answer on oath, the defendant's counsel supposed the waiver

extended to the plea, which in this case is connected with the an-

swer, as the plea covers only a part of the bill. A plea for some

purposes may be considered a special answer. And for this reason

it has been held that the defendant might put in a plea to the whole

bill, under the usual order for time to answer, although the defend-

ant in such a case is not permitted to demur. (2 Dicken's K.

554. 1 Grant's Pr. 166. 1 Brown's Ch. Pr. 356.) But it is not

an answer within the meaning and intent of the statute under

which this complainant has waived an answer on oath. A plea

was never considered as evidence in behalf of the defendant, as to

the facts stated therein, so as to require the testimony of more
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than one witness to contradict it, even where it negatived a material

averment in the bill. The object of the statute (2 R. S. 175, § 44)

was to prevent the complainant from being concluded by the answer

of the defendant, in a case where he was compelled to come into this

court for relief, but in which he did not need a discovery, and where

he was unwilling to permit the defendant to be a witness in his

own favor, by the forms of pleading. Bills filed under this new

provision in the revised statutes, are strictly bills for relief only,

and not bills for discovery and relief. Hence, in a case which

is proper for a plea, as the complainant is not entitled to a dis-

covery, it cannot be necessary for the defendant to support his

plea by an answer, as he must do in most cases where the answer

on oath is not waived. A plea to a bill of this description can

seldom be necessary, as the answer cannot be excepted to for in-

sufiiciency; and the defendant may set up any matter of defence

in the answer. But where the defendant finds it necessary or ex-

pedient to resort to this mode of defence, to prevent the trouble

and expense of a protracted litigation, he must conform to the

former practice of the court, so far as to verify the allegations

and averments in his plea by oath, in the usual form. In a case

THE CnANCELLOR:

It i nece ary in the first place to di po e of a que tion of form,
a to the verification o.f the plea. The complainant having waived
an an wer on oath, the defendant' counsel upposed the waiver
extended to the plea, which in thi ca e i connected with the anwer, as the plea covers only a part of the bill. A plea for some
purposes may be con idered a special answer. And for this reason
it ha been held that the defendant might put in a plea to the whole
bill, under the u ual order for time to an wer, although the defendant in such a case i not permitted to demur. (2 Dicken's R.
55-±. 1 Grant's Pr. 166. 1 Brown' Ch. Pr. 356.) But it is not
an answer within the meaning and intent of the tatute under
which thi complainant has waived an answer on oath. A plea
wa never con idered as evidence in behalf of the defendant, as to .
the facts stated therein, s·o as to require the testimony of more
than one witness to contradict it, even where it negatived a material
averment in the bill. The object of the statute (2 R. S. 175, § 44)
wa to prevent the complainant from being concluded by the answer
of the defendant, in a case where he was compelled to come into this
court for relief, but in which he did not need a discovery, and where
he was unwilling to permit the defendant to be a witne s in his
own favor, by the forms of pleading. Bills filed und r this new
provision in the revi ed statutes, are tricily bill for relief only,
and not bill for di co very and relief. H nee, in a ca e which
is proper for a plea, a the compfainant i not entitl d to a di covery, it annot b nee ·ary for the defend ant to upport his
plea by an an w r, a he mu t do in most ca e wh re the an w r
on oath i not waiv d. A plea to a bill of thi de ription an
ldom b n
ary a the an wer cannot b x epted to for insuffici ncy · and th defendant may et up any matt r of d f n e
in the an wer.
ut wher the d f ndant find it n c ary or xp di nt to r ort to tbi m d of d f n e, to pr vent th tr uble
and xp n e of a protr t d litigation h mu t onform to the
rm r pra •tj of th ourt o far a t v rify th allegations
and av r nt · in hi pl a by oath in the u ual form. In a ca e
1

HEAR'rT
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of this kind, however, where the negative averments in a plua of

an executor relate to transactions in the life time of the testator,

or to acts done by others, it is sufficient if the averments are made

upon the dcfeiidant's belief only; and they need not be sworn to

positively. (Drew v. Drew, 2 Vcs. & Beame, 160.) The averments

in this plea were therefore correct in point of form; but the plea

should have been put in upon oatli in the usual manner.

The complainant, however, is wrong in supposing that this is an

objection which he can take advantage of at the hearing as to the

sulllcieney of the plea. As well might he object, at the hearing,

that a plea or demurrer wanted the signature of counsel. The

proper mode of taking advantage of a formal defect of this descrip-

tion, is by an application for an order to set aside the pleading,

or to take it off the files for irregularity. The case of Wall v.

Iluhhs, 2 Yet!. & Bea. 354, referred to by the complainant's counsel

on the argument, shows such to be the practice. The application

there was, to take the plea off the files ; and the only question was,

whether the complainant was not too late in making the motion,

after he had entered an order, in the register's office, setting down

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 16:37 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t3223129q
Public Domain in the United States / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-us

the plea for argument. The application would have been wholly

unnecessary in that case, if the want of a proper verification

would have been a sufficient ground for overruling the plea on the

hearing. If a plea or answer was taken off the files for irregu-

larity, on the ground that it had not been properly sworn to, the

defendant, as a matter of course, would have the right to file a new

one, properly verified. But if a plea is overruled on the hearing,

the defendant cannot have the advantage of his plea without spe-

cial leave from the court to amend. The case of Wall v. Iluhhs,

merely decided that the complainant, by taking a step in the cause

after the irregularity accrued, was not precluded from making

a motion to take the plea off the files of the court. But where,

with full notice of the irregularity, he brings on the argument

of the plea without asking to have it taken of the files, he is not

entitled to have it overruled as an insufficient defence, if in other

respects it is well pleaded. In the case of Beach v. The Fulton

Banl-, 2 Paige's Ch. R. 307, Wendell's Rep. 36, S. C, although

an answer had been put in -wathout oath, as to one of the defend-

ants, and was therefore irregular, it was held that both parties

were precluded from making any abjection to the answer after a

replication had been filed, and the proofs had been taken in the

.

1

R ·1 ' G

1 1

of thi. kind) h we er, wher th n ga iv a erments in a plea of
an x utor r lat to tran a tjon in the life time of the te tafor,
r
a t <l. n l y th r,, it i uili i nt if the a rments are made
upon th
f ndan , b li f
ly; and th y n
not be worn to
l 'iiv'l 1 • (Drw . rew,
.&
am,1 .) Theaerments
in thi · pl a' ·r th r r corr t jn p int of form; l ut the plea
'h uld ha b n put in upon ath in he u ua1 manner.
Th
rnpla1nan , lww r, i wrong in uppo ing thait thi is an
bj ·tion whi l h an tak ad antag of at th hearing as to the
:ufli i n ·y of th plea. A well might he object, at the heairing,
hat
pl a r d murr -r want d the ignature of coun el. The
p1 p r mod of takin ad an ag of a formal defect of thi description i by an appli ati n for a:n ord r to et a ide the pleading,
r to tak i off th file for irregularity. 'Dhe ca e of Wall v.
II ubb , V .
a. 54, ref rred to by the complainant's coun el
n the argument, how uch to be the practice. The application
th r wa to tak the plea off the fil ; and the only question was,
wh her h omplainant wa not too late in making the motion,
after he had nt red an order, in th r gi teT' office, etting down
h pl a for argument. The application would have b en wholly
unne
ar ' in that a e, if the want of a proper verifi artion
would hav b en a u.fficient ground for overruling the plea on the
h aring.
f a pl a r an w r wa tak n off th fil for irregularity on the ground that it had not been prop Tly woTn to) the
d f nda t a a ma·tt r of oure, would have the right to file a n ew
on
r p rl eri.fi d. But if a plea i o errul d on th hearing,
th d I ndant cannot ha the ad antage of hi plea without pei 1 l a from th court to amend. The ca of Wall v. Hubbs,
that the complainant b3 akinO' a tep in the cau e
aft r th irr rularit a crued wa not pr lud d from making
a. m i n to tak th pl a: off th file f th court. But where,
with full notic of th irr O'ularit 11 bring on th aro-ument
f th pl 1vithout a king to ha it ta.ken of th fil
h i n t
n ilk l l hav i OY rrul d
an in ufficient d fence if in oth r
r p ·ls it i::> w 11 pl a 1 l In the ca of Beach . Th e Fulton
I ank. ·
h. . 0
W nd 11
an nn:-w r hacl l n put in without oath a t n
t11 t, nnd 1 a th r f r
irr ·ular, it wa h ld that
th parti
w ' f pr lu 1 1 fr m mnkino- any hj ti n ~ th an w r aft r
r J li ntion hnd
n :fil d and th pr f had b en tak n in the

r
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cause. And Chief Justice Savage there held that the complainants

would have been precluded from objecting to the answer on the

ground of the irregularity, by the filing of a replication thereto

after notice of such irregularity. (See also, Bihy v. Kemmis,

Beatty's Ch. Eep. 322.)

2
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cau e. And Chief Ju tice Savage there held that the complainants
would have been precluded from objecting to the an wer on the
ground of the irregularity, by the filing 01f a replication thereto
after notice of uch irregularity. (See also, Riky v. Kem mis,
Beatty Ch. Rep. 322.)
Upon the merits of the plea, if it turns out to be true in point
of fa ot, my pre nt opinion i , that it will be sufficient to prevent
the partie from going into a general ac ount of the partner hip
tran action , a between the copartner , previous to the :first of
January, 1812. The late chief baron of the exchequer in England,
in a recent ca e, The Attorney-General v. Brooksbank, 2 Young &
J erv. R. 42, expre ed an opinion that an account stafod must be
actually signed by the parties to enable the defenclant to plead it
in bar to a uit for an account; although he eemed to suppose an
account not ·igned might be a good d fence if set up in the an wer
and proved at the hearing. That opinion is cl arly not law; and it
i, directly oppo ed to that of Lord Hard wicke, in Willis v. J ernegan, 2 Atk. Rep. 252; where he say in expre term , that it is
not nee s ary that the account hould be . igned by th parties.
(See al o, Jessup v. Cook, 1 Halst. Rep. 436; La Malaine v. Gaze,
· P. A. Brown's Rep. 128.) As th re i no statute, or rule of law
·which requires the ignatures o·f the partie to an account stated
and ettled between them elve , to make it binding and obligatory,
provided the fact of the ettlement can be stablished by other
proof, it cannot, upon any principle of pleading, be necessary to set
out any particular ·species of evidence, in a plea in bar, to enable
the defendant to avail himself of the stated account as a defence.
In the ca e under consideration it app ars by the statement in
the complainant' bill, that it was one of the tipulation in the
agre ment of oparlner hip that mith hould make up and tate
the partner hip ac aunt , annually, on the :first of January in ach
year.
nder that tipulation, v n if mith made up and tated
the account e parte, in th ab n of Heartt, it was the duty of
the latter to 1 ok into th m within a r a onabl time, and to point
out the errors, if any exi t d th r in, or h mu t be con id red
cl in th corr tn
o·f th account a tated
a having a quj
on th book of the firm ; t whi h book both parti had a c
during th exi tenc of the opartner hip. In tatinc; the a count
n th partn rship
of partne a bctw en them Iv , th ntri
b ok to whic11 th partn r hav had a c at h time wh n those
n

Upon the merits of the plea, if it turns out to be true in point

of fact, my present opinion is, that it will be sufficient to prevent

the parties from going into a general account of the partnership

transactions, as between the copartners, previous to the first of

January, 1812. The late chief baron of the exchequer in England,

in a recent case, Tlie Attorney-General v. BrooJcshanh, 2 Young &

Jerv. E. 42, expressed an opinion that an account stated must be

actually signed by the parties to enable the defendant to plead it

in bar to a suit for an account; although he seemed to suppose an

account not signed might be a good defence if set up in the answer

and proved at the hearing. That opinion is clearly not law ; and it

is directly opposed to that of Lord Hardwicke, in Willis v. Jerne-

gan, 2 Atk. Eep. 252 ; where he says, in express terms, that it is

not necessary that the account should be signed by the parties.
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(See also, Jessup v. Cook, 1 Halst. Eep. 436; La Malaine v. Caze,

2 P. A. Brown's Eep. 128.) As there is no statute, or rule of law

Avhich requires the signatures of the parties to an account stated

and settled between themselves, to make it binding and obligatory,

provided the fact of the settlement can be established by other

proof, it cannot, upon any principle of pleading, be necessary to set

out any particular species of evidence, in a plea in bar, to enable

the defendant to avail himself of the stated account as a defence.

In the case under consideration it appears by the statement in

the complainant's bill, that it was one of the stipulations in the

agreement of copartnership that Smith should make up and state

the partnership accounts, annually, on the first of January in each

year. Under that stipulation, oven if Smith made up and stated

the accounts ex parte, in the absence of Heartt, it was the duty of

the latter to look into them within a reasonable time, and to point

out the errors, if any existed therein, or he must be considered

as having acquiesced in the correctness of the accounts as stated

on the books of the firm; to which books both parties had access

during the existence of the copartnership. In stating the accounts

of partners, as between themselves, the entries on the partnership

l)ooks, to which both partners have had access at the time when those
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ho"' v · L th right f iih .r party to . h w a mi tak or rror in
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b n·q ui rt•t1 x · pl um1 r v r p uliar ·ir ·um tan
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opartn 'l" hip ·on ti nu <l. bu a f w m nth
ft r the tat m nt of
th a·· un · n th £ir ' t t J nuar , 1 1· ; and it i:" p ibl that
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whi·h ma r r nd r it
prop r t p ·rmit th
mr lainant to ur ·harg or fal ify the ac·ou11 a· :tat d on that day for th pr · ding , ar, at 1 a t .
ut
thi: ann l 1 n if th pl a i now allowed a a onclu iv l ar
:wain t p nin 0 th a ount. I th r for think thi i a pr p r
·a: • f r a ing th b n :fit of th plea to the defendant until th
h arin0 .
An rd r m t b ent r d accordingly, directing the plea to
ian 1 ov r until th h aring of the cau ; and aving to the defendant th b n fit ther f at that time. n u h a ca e n ither party
r · ' t again t h oth r on the argument of th pl a, unle
th · ntrary i '
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entries wore made, or immediately afterwards, are to be taken as

prima facie evidence of the correctness of those entries; subject,

however, to the riglit of either part}' to show a mistake or error in

the charge or credit. And vouchers for the specific items can never

be required except under very peculiar circumstances. Here the

copartnersliip continued but a few montlis after the statement of

the accounts on the first of January, 1812; and it is possible that

some fact nuiy be disclosed in the evidence which may render it

proper to permit the complainant to surcharge or falsify the ac-

count, as stated on that day for the preceding year, at least. But

this cannot be done if the plea is now allowed as a conclusive bar

against opening the account. I therefore think this is a proper

case for saving the benefit of the plea to the defendant until the

hearing.

An order must be entered accordingly, directing the plea to

stand over until the hearing of the cause; and saving to the defend-

ant the benefit thereof at that time. In such a case neither party

recovers costs against the other on the argiiment of the plea, unless

the contrary is specially directed by the court. (1 Brown's Ch.
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Prac. 359.)

'IJ^

Farley v. Kittson, 120 U. S. 303. (1SS7.)

Mr. Justice Gray, after stating the case, delivered the opinion

of the court.

A brief abstract of the pleadings will help to make clear what

is presented for decision upon this record.

Tlie suit was brought by Farley to enforce an agreement by which

JJri11ict

1·

mad

f acie

id<m ·,

he and the defendants Kittson and Hill agreed to purchase, for

their joint and equal benefit, the bonds, secured by mortgages, of

two railroads, of one of which he was receiver, by appointment of

the court, and of the other of which he was the general manager,

by appointment of the trustees named in the mortgages.

Farley v. Kitt on, 1,.,0 U.

The bill alleged the making of the agreement; that its object

. 30 .

{1887.)

was, by means of the Ijonds so purchased, to purchase the railroads

at sales under decrees of foreclosure in suits then pending ; that it

was agreed that Kittson and TTill should conduct the negotiations

for procuring the necessary funds and purchasing the bonds, and

fa. J
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aft r fating the ca e, deli ered the opinion

of th court.
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h.1· npp intrn nt of th tru t
nam d in the mortaao- .
Th hill a11 o- cl th
m nt · tha·t it obje t
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n lu t th n g tin i n:
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the plaintiff should furnish such facts, information and advice, and

render such assistance, from time to time, as should be required

of him; that the plaintiff had knowledge, not possessed b}' the

other parties, as to who held the bonds and at what rate, and how

they could be procured, and as to the nature and value of the rail-

roads, and as to the pending suits for foreclosure, and his services

and cooperation were indispensable to the success of the enterprise ;

that he performed the agreement on his part; that Kittson and

Hill obtained the requisite funds from other persons, and pur-

chased the bonds from the bondholders through one Kennedy, the

authorized agent of the latter, and afterwards purchased the rail-

roads at sales under decrees of foreclosure; that pending the

negotiations for the purchase of the bonds, the plaintiff infonned

Kennedy of his interest, and his connection with Kittson and Hill,

in the project to purchase them; that the plaintiff at all times,

to the best of his knowledge and ability, gave full and true answers

and information to all inquiries made by Kennedy, or by any of

the trustees or bondholders, or by any person interested in the

property under his charge as receiver and as manager, and kept
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Kennedy fully informed of all matters coming to his knowledge

affecting the property, and in all things acted honestly and in good

faith towards all persons interested in it; that Kittson and Hill

had organized a new corporation, which was joined as a defendant;

and that the defendants had thereby obtained a great amount of

property and of profits, and had refused to account to the plaintiff

for his share. The bill prayed for a discovery, an account, and

other relief.

The individual defendants filed a plea, which, on the motion

of the defendant corporation, was ordered to stand as its plea also,

consisting of three parts :

First. A restatement in detail of some of the facts alleged

generally in the bill.

Second. Averments that the plaintiff never informed Kennedy

or any of the bondholders of his interest in the project for pur-

chasing the bonds and thereby acquiring the mortgaged property,

as alleged in the bill; and that neither Kennedy nor the bond-

holders knew, suspected, or had any information or belief, that the

plaintiff had or claimed to have any interest in the project, until

after the foreclosure sales.

Third. Averments that the making l)y the plaintiff of the agree-
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the plaintiff hould furni h uch facts, information and advice, and
render uch a i tanc , from time to time, a should be required
f him; that th plaintiff had knowledge, not po e ed by the
other parli , a to who held the bonds and at what rate, and how
th could b procured and a to the natur and value of the rnilroad and as to the pending suit for foreclo ure, and his ervices
and cooperation were indi pen aobl to th success of the enterprise;
that he performed th agre ment on hi part; that Kittson and
Hill obta·i ned the requi ite fund from other per,:;on , and purhas d the bond from the bondholders through one Kennedy the
authorized agent of the latter, and af.terward purcha ed the railroad at al s under decrees of foreclosur ; that pending the
n gotiation for the purcha e of the bond , the pla·i ntiff informed
Kennedy of hi intere t, and his connection with Kittson and Hill,
in the project to purcha e them; that the plaintiff at all times,
to the b t of hi knowledge and ability, gave full and true an wers
and information to all inquirie made by Kennedy or by any of
the tru te or bondholders, or by any person int re,ted in the
properly under hi charge a receiver and a manager, and kept
Kennedy fully informed of all matters coming to his knowledge
affecting the property, and in all thing acted hone tly and in good
faith towards all persons inter ted in it; that Kittson and Hill
had organized a new corporation, which wa joined as a defendant;
and that the defendant had thereby obtained a great amount of
property and of profit , and had r fu ed to account to the plaintiff
for hi hare. The bill prayed for a discovery, an account, and
other relief.
The individual def ndants filed a plea, which, on the motion
of the d fendant orporation wa order d to tand as its plea al o,
con i ting of thr e part :
Fi t.
r tat m nt in detail of ome o·f the facts alleged
gen rally in th bill.
nd.
v rm nt that th plaintiff never inform d K nnedy
or any f the bondholde of hi int r t in th proj t f r purha ing th bond and ther by a quirin th morto-ag d pro1 rty,
in th l ill · and that n ith r \: nn d ' n r th bonda all
hold
u p t 1 or ha 1 an inf rmati nor b li f that th"
plaintiff had r ·lai rn 1
ha v any int r t in th proj ct until
aft r th f r 1 ur a·l .
Thir .
1.\ th plaintiif of the agree-
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liient sued on, and his engag-ing in the enterprise of purchasing

the bonds and thereby acquiring the railroads, were, as to that rail-

road of which he was receiver, unhiwful, a breach of his trust as

such receiver, and a fraud upon the bondiiolders and the court;

and, as to the railroad of which he was general manager for the

trustees under the niorl^^ages, a ijreach of trust towards the trustees

of the fiduciary positions so occupied by him the plaintiff was not

entitled to the aid of a court of equity to enforce the agreement or

any rigiits growing out of it.

To this plea the plaintiff filed a general replication, and the

hearing in the Circuit Court was upon the issue thus joined.

The pleader and the court below appear to have proceeded upon

the theory that by a plea in equity a defendant may aver certain

facts in addition to or contradiction of those alleged in the bill;

and also not only, if he" proves his averments, avail himself of

objections in matter of law to the case stated in the bill, as modified

by the facts proved ; but even, if he fails to prove those facts, take

any objection to the case stated in the bill, which would have been
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open to him if he had demurred generally for want of equity.

But the proper office of a plea is not, like an answer, to meet

all the allegations of the bill; nor like a demurrer, admitting those

allegations, to deny the equity of the bill ; but it is to present some

distinct fact, which of itself creates a bar to the suit, or to the part

to which the plea applies, and thus to avoid the necessity of making

the discovery asked for, and the expense of going into the evi-

dence at large. Mitford PL (4th ed.) 14, 219, 295; Story Eq. PI.

§§ 649, 652.

The plaintiff may either set down the plea for argument, or file

a replication to it. If he sets down the plea for argument, he there-

by admits the truth of all the facts stated in the plea, and merely

denies their sufficiency in point of law to prevent his recovery.

Tf, on the other hand, he replies to the plea, joining issue upon

the facts averred in it, and so puts the defendant to the trouble

and expense of proving his plea, he thereby, according to the Eng-

lish chancery practice, admits that if the particular facts stated in

the plea are true, they are sufficient in law to bar his recovery;

and if t1i(>y are proved to be true, the bill must be dismissed, with-

out reference to the e(piity arising from any other facts stated in

the bill. :Mitford PI. 302,303; Story Eq. PL § 697. That practice
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and the bondholders, and a fraud upon them; and that by reason
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in this particular has been twice recognized by this court. Hughes

V. Blake, 6 Wheat. 453, 472; Rhode ISland v. Massachusetts, 14

Pet. 210, 257. But the case of Rhode Island v. Massachusetts

arose within its original jurisdiction in equity, for outlines of the

practice in which the court has always looked to the practice of the

Court of Chancery in England. Eule 7 of 1791, 1 Cranch, xvii,

and 1 How. xxiv; Eule 3 of 1858 and 1884, 21 How. v, and 108

U. S. 574. And the case of Hughes v. Blake, which began in the

Circuit Court, was decided here in 1821, before this court, under

the authority conferred upon it by Congress, had established the

Eules of Practice in Equity in the Courts of the United States, one

of which provides that "if upon an issue the facts stated in the

plea be determined for the defendant, they shall avail him as far

as in law and equity they ought to avail him." Eule 19 in Equity

of 1822, 7 Wheat, xix; Eule 32 in Equity of 1842, 1 How. li. The

effect of this rule of court when the issue of fact joined on a plea

is determined in the defendant's favor need not, however, be con-

sidered in this case, because it is quite clear that at a hearing upon

plea, replication and proofs, no fact is in the issue between the par-
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ties but the truth of the matter pleaded.

In a case so heard, decided by this court in 1808, Chief Justice

Marshall said: "In this case the merits of the claim cannot be

examined. The only questions before this court are upon the suffi-

ciency of the plea to bar the action, and the sufficiency of the

testimony to support the plea as pleaded." Stead v. Course, 4

Cranch, 403, 413. In a case before the House of Lords a year

afterwards. Lord Eedesdale "observed, that a plea was a special

answer to a bill, differing in this from an answer in the common

form, as it demanded the judgment of the court, in the first in-

stance, whether the special matter urged by it did not debar the

plaintiff from his title to that answer which the bill required. If

a plea were allowed, nothing remained in issue between the parties,

so far as the plea extended, but the truth of the matter pleaded."

"Upon a plea allowed, nothing is in issue between the parties but

the matter pleaded, and the averments added to support the plea."

"Upon argument of a plea, every fact stated in the bill, and not

denied by answer in support of the plea, must be taken for true."

Roche V. Morgell, 2 Sch. & Lef. 721, 725-727.

Tlie distinction between a demurrer and a plea dates as far back

as tlie time of Lord Bacon, by the 58th of whose Ordinances for
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in thi particular ha been twice recognized by thi court. Hughes
v. Blake, 6 Whea·t. 453, 472; Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 14
P t. 210, 257. But the case of Rhod(') Island v. Massachusetts
aro e within it original juri diction in quity, for outlines of the
practice in which the court has alwa} looked to the practice of the
Court of Chancery in England. Rule 7 of 1791, 1 Crnnch, xvii,
anc.1 1 How. xxiv; Rule 3 of 1858 and 1884, 21 How. v, and 108
U. S. 574. And the case of Hughes v. Blake, which began in the
ircuit Court, was dec.ided here in 1821, before this court, under
the authority conferred upon it by Congress, had established the
Rules of Practice in Equity in the Courts of the United States, one
of which provides that "if upon an issue the facts stated in the
plea be determined for the defendant, they sihall avail him as far
as in law and equity they ought to avail him." Rule 19 in Equity
of 1822, 7 Wheat. xix; Rule 32 in Equity of 184:2, 1 How. li. The
effect of this rule of court when the is ue of fact joined on a plea
i determined in the defend'ant's favor need not, however, be considered in this case, because it is quite clear that at a hearing upon
plea, replication and proofs, no fact is in the is ue between the partie but the truth of the matter pleaded.
In a case o heard, decided by this court in 1808, Chief Justice
Marshall said : "In this ca e the merits of the claim cannot be
examined. The only questions before this court are upon the sufficiency of the plea to bar the action, and the sufficiency of the
te timony to support the plea as pleaded." Stead v. Course, 4
Cranch, 403, 413. In a case before the House of Lords a year
afterward , Lord Redesdale "observed, that a plea was a special
an wer to a bill, di:ff ering in this from an answer in the common
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the Administratio'n of Justice in Cliancery, "a demurrer is properly

upon matter defective contained in the bill itself, and no foreign

matter; but a plea is of foreign matter to discharge or stay the

suit, as that the cause hath been formerly dismissed, or that the

plaintiff is outlawed or excommunicated, or there is another bill

depending for the same cause, or the like." Orders in Chancery

(Beames's ed.) 2G. Lord Redesdale, in his Treatise on Pleadings,

says: "A plea must aver facts to which the plaintiff may reply,

and not, in the nature of a demurrer, rest on facts in the bill."

Mitford PI. 297. And Mr. Jeremy, in a note to this passage, com-

menting on the ordinance of Lord Bacon, observes, "The prominent

distinction between a plea and a demurrer, here noticed, is strictly

true, even of that description of plea which is termed negative, for

it is the affirmative of the proposition which is stated in the bill";

in other words, a plea, which avers that a certain fact is not as the

bill affirms it to be, sets up matter not contained in the bill. That

an objection to the equity of the plaintiff's claim, as stated in the

bill, must be taken by demurrer and not by plea is so well estab-

lished, that it has been constantly assumed and therefore seldom
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stated in judicial opinions; yet there are instances in which it has

been explicitly recognized by other courts of chancery, as well as

by this court. Billing v. Flight, 1 Madd. 230; Steff v. Andrews,

2 Madd. G ; Varich v. Dodge, 9 Paige, 1-19 ; Phelps v. Garrow, 3

Edw. Ch. 139; Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 14 Pet. 210, 258,

262; National Bank v. Insurance Co., 104 U. S. 54, 76.

It only remains to apply these elementary principles of equity

pleading to the case before us.

The averments in the first part of the plea, restating in detail

some of the facts alleged in the bill, were admitted by stipulation

of counsel in writing to be true, and no controversy arose upon

them.

The substance of the averments in the second part of the plea

was that neither Kennedy, nor the bondholders whose agent and

representative he was, had any notice or knowledge that the

plaintiir had or claimed to have any interest in the project set forth

in the bill, until after the sales of the railroads under decrees of

foreclosure. The matter of fact thus averred was put in issue by

the replication. The testimony of the plaintiff (in connection with

Kennedy's letter to him), which was uncontradicted, and was the

only evidence upon the matter pleaded, shows tliat Konnedv. Ix--

v.
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fore the completion of the sale and purchase of the bonds, knew

that the plaintiff was to have an interest in the project, although

he may not have known the extent of that interest, or that it had

been already acquired. The want of any notice to Kennedy and

the bondholders, averred in the plea, was thus disproved.

The plea, indeed, is supported by the affidavit of one of the

defendants that it is true in point of fact. But the oath of the

party to its truth in point of fact is added only for the same pur-

pose as the certificate of counsel that in their opinion it is well

founded in matter of law, in order to comply with the 31st Rule

in Equity, the object of which is to prevent a defendant from de-

laying or evading the discovery sought, without showing that the

plea is worthy of the consideration of the court. Ewing v. Bright,

3 Wall. Jr. 134; Wall v. Stuhhs, 2 Ves. & B. 351. An answer

under oath is evidence in favor of the defendant, because made in

obedience to the demand of the bill for a discovery, and therefore

only so far as it is responsive to the bill. Seitz v. Mitchell, 91

U. S. 580. But a plea, which avoids the discovery prayed for, is

no evidence in the defendant's favor, even when it is under oath
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and negatives a material averment in the bill. Heartt v. Corning,

3 Paige, 566.

The allegations of the bill, that the plaintiff at all times, to the

best of his knowledge and ability, gave full and true answers to all

inquiries made by Kennedy or any of the trustees or bondholders,

or any person interested in the property under his charge as re-

ceiver and as manager, and in all things acted honestly and in

good faith towards all persons interested in it, were not denied by

the plea, and therefore, for the purposes of the hearing thereon,

were conclusively admitted to be true. So much of the plaintiff's

testimony, as tended to show that he intentionally concealed his

interest from the stockholders and from the court, was outside of

the averments of the plea, and therefore irrelevant to the issue to

be tried.

The plaintiff having neither moved to set aside the plea as irreg-

ular for want of an answer supporting it, nor set down the case

for hearing upon the bill and plea only, but having replied to the

plea, and the only issue of fact thus joined having been determined

by the evidence in his favor, it is unnecessary to consider whether

the averments of fact in the second part of the plea ought to have

PLEAS :
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fore the completion of the sale and purchase of the bonds, knew
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been supported by an answer, or whether, if proved, they would

liave made out a defence to the bill.

The averments in the third part of the plea, that, by reason of

the plaint ill's position as receiver and general manager of the rail-

roads, his entering into the agreement sued on, and engaging in

the enterprise of purchasing the bonds and thereby acquiring the

railroads, were unlawful, and did not entitle him to the aid of a

court of equity to enforce the agreement or any rights growing out

of it, were averments of pure matter of law, arising upon the

plaiutilfs case as stated in the bill, and affecting the equity of the

bill, and therefore a proper subject of demurrer, and not to be

availed of by plea.

The result is, that the principal question considered by the court

below and argued at the bar is not presented in a form to be decided

upon the record before us; and that, for the reasons above stated,

and as suggested in behalf of the plaintiff at the reargument, the

plea was erroneously sustained, and must be overruled, and the

defendants ordered, in accordance ^vith the 34th Eule in Equity,

to answer the bill.
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Decree reversed, and case remanded, with directions to overrule

the plea, and to order the defendants to answer the hill.

Spangler v. Spangler, 19 III. App. 28. (1886.)

Error to the Circuit Court of Jefferson county ; the Hon. C. 0.

BoGGS, Judge, presiding. Opinion tiled April 15, 1886.

Wilkin, J. :

At the DcM?ember term, 1885, of the Circuit Court of Jefferson

county, defendant in error filed his bill for divorce against plaint-

iff in error. This bill alleges that both parties reside in said

Jefferson county. To this bill plaintiff in error filed a plea den3'ing

18
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Decree r ever ed, and ca,se remanded, with directions to overrule
the peea, and to order the defendants to answer the bill.

that defendant in error was at the time of filing his bill or since,

a resident of Jefferson county, and averring that he was at that

time and still is a resident of Washington county in this State.

The plea concludes by demanding the judgment of the court

pangler

whether she ought to l)e compelled to make any answer to the

.

pangler, 19 Ill. App. BB.

{1886.)

bill, dc. To this i)lea the defendant in error filed a general de-

murrer, which was sustiiined. The plaintiff' in error failing to
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answer further she was defaulted and on a hearing a decree was

rendered in favor of the defendant in error. The onl}' question

presented for our decision is as to whether or not the court erred

in sustaining the demurrer to the plea.

It was not proper practice to dispose of a plea in chancery on

demurrer. Story's Equity Pleading, Sec. 697; Daniells' Chan-

cery Pleading and Practice, Vol. 1, Sec. 4, p. 713 ; Cochran et al.

V. McDowell, 15 111. 10; Dixon v. Dixon, 61 111. 324. The de-

murrer may, however, be treated as equivalent to setting the plea

for hearing, and we shall so consider it. By Sec. 5, Chap. 40, E. S.,

it is expressly provided that divorce proceedings shall be had in

the county where the complainant resides. The latter clause of

Sec. 2, Chap. 40, of the statute of 1845, was the same. In ^Vaij v.

Way, 64 111. 410, the Supreme Court say : "The language is im-

perative, and excludes the right to commence proceeding in any

other county than the one in which the residence of the complainant

is fixed." if the statute could, by possibility, be construed into a

different meaning, this case effectually disposes of all that is said

by counsel for defendant in error as to the right of a complainant
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to bring a bill for divorce in any other county than that in which

he resides. The allegation in the bill that the complainant resided

in Jefferson county was a material and necessary one, and the

plaintiff in error unquestionably had the rigM to put it in issue.

Counsel for defendant in error seem to maintain that this can

not be done by plea, and in the argument confound this plea with

a plea in abatement to the jurisdiction as at common law, objecting

to the manner in which it concludes, and citing authorities as to

the requisites of a plea at law. It scarcely need be suggested that

pleas in equity are not to be determined by the rules of pleading at

law and hence the authorities cited both as to the office and form

of this plea have no application whatever. The plea in this case is

not a plea to the jurisdiction, but a plea in bar. The same defense

set up in the plea might have been interposed by answer, as was

done in Way v. Way, supra. It may with equal propriety be done

by plea. A plea to a bill in chancery is proper whenever the de-

fendant wishes to reduce the cause, or some part of it, to a single

point, and from thence to create a bar to the suit. Smith's Chan-

cery Practice, Vol. 1, page 216; Story's Equity Pleading, Sec. 652.

Pleas in chancery are pure pleas and pleas not pure. Pleas not

pure are sometimes called negative pleas — Ibid. Sec. 651. It was
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in J effer on county was a material and nee ary one, and the
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formerly doubted whether a purely negative plea was a legitimate

mode of defense in equity; but that doubt has been dissipated,

and it is now firmly established that such a plea is good— Ibid. 668.

In Sec. 652, supra, the author says : "The true end of a plea is

to save to the parties the expense of an examination of witnesses

at large." It would, therefore, seem to be eminently proper in

this kind of proceeding, if the complainant did not reside in the

county in which the bill was brought, such residence being a "pre-

requisite to the existence of the right to file the bill," as was said

in Wai/ V. Way, supra, to raise the question, by plea, and thus save

the expense of a general hearing. We see no objection to this

plea, either in form or substance, as a plea in bar to a bill in chan-

cery. The court below erred in holding it bad, and the decree is

reversed and cause remanded for that reason.

Pendency of Another Suit.

Radford v. Folsom, U Fed. Rep. 97. (1S82.)

This cause is now before the court upon a plea to the bill inter-

posed by the respondents, which is termed a plea in bar, but which,
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in effect, is a plea in abatement. The present bill is filed by George
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W. Eadford, assignee in bankruptcy of Frank Folsom, against Jere-

miah Folsom in his own right, Jeremiah Folsom, administrator of

the estate of Sarah M. Folsom, deceased, and Adele, Florence, and

George B. Folsom, minor heirs of said Sarah M. Folsom, who ap-

PE IDEN CY OF

N OTHER

IT.

pear by J. B. Blake, their guardian; and in substance the bill

avers that complainant is the owner of certain realty in the bill

Radford

described, and prays that his title thereto may be confirmed and

. Folsom; 14 Fed. Rep. 97.

{1882.)

quieted as against the respondents, and that he may have a writ

of possession. The plea sets forth that prior to the commencement

of this proceeding, to-wit, in the year 1873, Frank Folsom, to whose

rights his assignee, George W. Radford, was afterwards substituted,

brought an action against Jeremiah Folsom and Sarah M. Folsom,

in the circuit court of Pottawattamie countv, Iowa, "for the same

matters and to the same effect, and for the like relief and purpose

as the now complainant doth by his present bill set forth ; in which

said action issue was joined, and the same is still depending in

said honorable court, and is undisposed of." To this plea the com-

Thi cau e i now b fore the court upon a plea to the bill interpo ed by th r ponden , which i termed a pl a in bar, but which,
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plainant interposes a demurrer, thus presenting the question

whether an action pending in the state court of Iowa can be

pleaded in abatement of a subsequent action commenced between

the same parties in the United States court for the district of Iowa,

for the same subject-matter and the same relief.

plainant interipo
a demurrer, thu pre nting the question
whether an action pending in the state court of Iowa can be
pleaded in abatement of a; ub equent action commenc d between
the ame parties in the United States court for the di trict of Iowa,
for the ame ubject-matter and the aime relief.

Shiras, D. J.:

The doctrine is now well settled that an action pending in a

foreign jurisdiction cannot be pleaded in abatement of an action

commenced in a domestic forum, even if there be identity of parties,

of subject-matter, and of relief sought. Smith v. Lathrop, 44 Pa.

St. 326; Bowne v. Joy, 9 Johns. 221; Allen v. Watt, 69 111. 655;

Insurance Co. v. Brune's Assignee, 96 U. S. 588; Stanton v. Em-

Irey, 93 U. S. 548. It is equally well settled that at law the pen-

dency of a former action between the same parties, for the same

cause and relief, in a court of the state in which the second action

has been brought, will be cause of abatement if pleaded in the

second action. Insurance Co. v. Brune's Assignee, 96 U. S. 588.

In equity, the general rule is the same. Story Eq. PI. §§ 736-741.

In Insurance Co. v. Brune's Assignee, 96 U. S. 588, it is held
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that "the rule in equity is analogous to the rule at law," and the

statements of Lord Hardwicke in Foster v. Vassall, 3 Atk. 587, is

quoted approvingly, to-wit, that "the general rule of courts of

equity with regard to pleas is the same as in courts of law, but

exercised with a more liberal discretion."

The case of Insurance Co. v. Brune's Assignee further states the

rule to be that "a bill in equity pending in a foreign jurisdiction

has no effect upon an action at law for the same cause in a domestic

forum, even when pleaded in abatement"; and further, "it has no

effect when pleaded to another bill in equity" ; that is to say, a bill

pending in a foreign forum will not, if pleaded, abate a bill pending

in a domestic forum.

The reasons usually assigned in support of this doctrine are that

the court of the one state or county cannot judicially know whether

the rights of the plaintiff arc fully recognized or protected in such

foreign state or count}^, nor whether the plaintiff can enforce to full

satisfaction any judgment he may obtain in the foreign tribunal;

and further, that a court will not compel a plaintiff to seek his

remedy in a foreign forum; or, as it is said by the supreme court

of Connecticut in Hatch v. Spofford, 22 Conn. 485 : "Tbat country

D. J .:
The doctrine i now well ettled that an action pending in a
foreign juri diction cannot b pleaded in abatement of an action
commenc din a dam ~ tic forum ven if there be identity of parties,
of ubject-matter, and of relief ought.
mith v. Lathrop, 44 Pa.
Si:. 3'>6; Bowne v. Joy, 9 John . 221; Allen v. Watt, 69 Ill. 655 ;
Insurance Co . v. Brune's Assignee, 96 U. S. 5 8; Stanton v. Embrey, 93 U. . 5-±8. It i equally well settled that at law the pendency of a former action between the a:me partie for the same
cau e and relief, in a court of the bate in which th econd action
ha been brought, will be cause of abatement if pleaded in the
second action. Insurance Co. v. Brune s Assignee, 96 U. S. 588.
In equity, the general rule i the ame.
tory Eq. Pl. §§ 736-741.
In Insurance Co . v. Brune's Assignee, 96 U. S. 5 8, it is held
that "the rule in equity is analogou to the rule at law," and the
tatements of LOl'd Hardwicke in Foster v. Vassall, 3 Atk. 587, is
quoted approvingly, to-wit, that "the general rule of courts of
equity with regard to pleas i the sam a in courts of law, but
ex rci ed with a more liberal di cretion."
The case of Insurance Co. v. Brune's Assignee further states the
rule to be that "a bill in equity pending in a foreign jurisdiction
ha no effect upon an action at law for the same cause in a domestic
forum even when pleaded in abatement'; and further "it has no
ffcct when pl aded to another bill in equity' ; that i to say, a bill
p nding in a foreign forum will not, if plead d, abate a bill pending
in a dam ti forum.
Th rea on u ually a igned in support of thi do trine ar that
th court of th on tate or county cannot judicially know wh ther
th righ of th plaintiff ar fully recogniz d or prot t d in uch
for ign tat or aunty nor wh ther th plaintiff can nforc to full
ati. faction any judgm nt h may obtain in the for io·n tribunal;
ancl furth r that a court will not comp 1 a plaintiff to eek hi
r m cly in a for ign forum; or a it i aid by th upr me ourt
of 1onn i.icut in Ilatch . pofford,
onn. 4
That ountry
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is undutiful and imtaitliful to its citizens which pends them out of

its jurisdiction to seek justice elsewhere." None of these cases,

however, meet the exact point presented by the plea interposed

in the case now under consideration; for in all of them it will

be found that the proceedings were pending in the courts of differ-

ent states or circuits, whereas in this case the two proceedings are

pending within the same state, but the one in the state and the

other in the federal court. We do not find that this question has

ever been finally settled by the supreme court of the United States,

nor by the circuit court for this circuit.

In the case of Brools v. Mills Co., 4 Dill. 524, is found a full and

able discussion of the question in the opinion of Judge Love, both

upon principle and authority, with a review of the decision of Mr.

Justice Clifford in Loring v. Marsh, 2 Cliff. 322; and the evils

resulting from permitting parties to litigate the same subject-

matter in two courts exercising judicial power within the same

territorial limits, are very clearly and forcibly shown; and the

conclusion is reached that "it would seem most rational and just

that a plea in abatement should be allowed in order to avert con-
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sequences so mischievous." The judgment of the court, however,

in that cause was placed upon another ground; the plea in abate-

ment being overruled for the reason that it appeared upon the face

of the plea that the parties to the suit in the state court were not

the same as the parties to the bill in the United States court, and

the question now before the court, though discussed, was not

authoritatively determined. To the report of this cause in 4 Dill,

is attached a full note by the learned reporter, citing the leading

cases on the general question; and it is therein stated that "it is

clear that the foregoing cases do not go to the length of holding

that the pendency of a prior suit in a state court is not a valid

plea in abatement to a suit for the same cause, and between the

same parties to an action, in a United States court sitting in the

same state"; and the reporter further states that Mr. Justice

Miller, in a case in the Minnesota circuit, "intimated his inclina-

tion to the opinion that where the parties are identical, and the

scope of the subject-matter equally so, the pendency of a prior suit

in the state court, within the territorial limits of the district where

the second suit is brought in the federal court, may be properly

pleaded in abatement, or, at all events, will operate to suspend

the action in the latter"; but, as we' understand the statement of
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the reporter, this was not decided or ruled in the cause, so that,

as already stated, the question remains an open one. As authorities

bearing upon the question more or less directly, see Earl v. Ray-

mond, 4: McLean, 233; U. S. v. Dewey, 6 Biss. 502; Lawrence v.

Remington, Id. 44:; Smith V. Atlantic F. Ins. Co., 23 N. H. 21.

In this condition of the authorities, what is the conclusion that

should be reached from a consideration of the reasons .upon which

is based the doctrine that under certain circumstances the pendency

of a prior action may be pleaded in abatement of an action com-

menced in the courts of the same state? The reason for the rule

that the pendency of a former action may be pleaded in abatement

of a second action, is, that if the complaining party has already

an action pending in which he can obtain full relief, there is no

justification for harassing the defendant by a second action for the

same subject-matter. If it should appear, however, that in the

second action the plaintiff can avail himself of some legal or equit-

aible advantage, not open to him in the first action, then a legal

reason is shown for the bringing of the second action, and the

pendency of the one would not ordinarily abate the other. This is
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the reason why, as a rule, the pendency of an action at law cannot

be successfully pleaded in abatement of a suit in equity.

As is said in Story, Eq. PL § 742 : "It can scarcely ever occur

that the remedial justice and the grounds of relief are precisely

the same in each court, for if the remedy be complete at law, that

is an objection to the jurisdiction of a court of equity."

In the well-considered opinion of the supreme court of Connecti-

cut in Hatch v. Spofford, supra, it is stated in substance, that while

the pendency of a prior suit of the same character, between the

same parties, brought to obtain the same end, is at the common

law good cause of abatement, yet the rule is not one of unbending

rigor nor of universal application, nor a principle of absolute law,

but rather a rule of justice and equity, and that a second suit is

not, as a matter of course, to be abated as vexatious, but all the

attending circumstances are to be carefully considered, and the true

inquiry is, what is the aim and purpose of the plaintifl^ in the insti-

tution of the second action, — is it fair and just, or is it oppressive ?

If it appears that the former proceeding, whether at law or in

equity, is pending in a foreign state or country, and in this respect

the states of the Union are foreign to each other, this fact in itself

determines the question adversely to the plea in abatement.

PENDENCY OF ANOTHER SUIT

the reporter, thi wa not decided or ruled in the cau e, so thait,
a already stated, the que tion remains an open one. As a:Uthorities
bearing upon the que tion more or le s directly, see Earl v. Raymond, 4 McLean, 233; U. S. v. Dewey, 6 Biss. 502; Lawrence v.
Remington, Id. 44; Sniith v. Atlantic F. Ins. Co., 22 N. H. 21.
In this condition of the authorities, what is the conclusion that
bould be reached from a consideration of the reason .upon which
i ba ed the doctrine that under certain circumstances the pendency
of a prior action may be pleaded in abatement of an action commenced in the courts of the same state? The rea on for the rule
that the pendency of a former action may be pleaded in abatement
of a second action, is, that if the ,complaining party bas alrea;dy
an action pending in which he can obtain full relief, there is no
justification for harassing the defendant by a second action for the
same subject-matter. If it should appear, however, that in the
second action the plaintiff can avail him elf of some legal or equitaible advantage, not open to him in the first action, then a legal
reason is shown for the bringing of the second action, and the
pendency of the one would not ordinarily abate the other. This is
the rea on why, as a rule, the pendency of an action at law cannot
be uccessfully pleaded in abatement of a uit in equity.
A i said in Story, Eq. Pl. § 742: "It can scarcely ever occur
that the remedial ju tice and the ground of relief are precisely
the same in each court, for if the remedy be complete at law, that
i an objection to the jurisdiction of a court of equity."
In the well-considered opinion o-f the supreme court of Connecticut in Hatch v. Spofford, supra, it is stated in substance, that while
the pendency of a prior suit of the same character, between the
ame partie , brought to obtain the same end, i at the common
law good cau e of abatement, yet the rule i not one of unbending
rigor nor of universal application, nor a principle of ab olute law,
but rather a rule of justice and equity, and that a econd uit i
not, a a matter of cour e, to be abated a vexatiou but all the
attending circum tances are to be carefully con ider d, and the true
inquiry i , what i the aim and purpo e of the pl1ainti:ff in the in titution of the econd adion,-i it fair and ju t or i it oppre iv ?
If it appears that the former proceeding, whether at law or in
equity i pending in a foreign tate or country and in thi r pect
th tate of the Union are foreign to each other thi fact in itself
a t rmines the question adversely to th plea in abatement.
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If it appears that the two actions are pending within the same

state, and are both at law or both in equity, and are identical in par-

ties, subject-matter and relief sought, then no necessity appears for

the institution of the second proceeding, in which event it would

clearly be oppressive upon the defendant, subjecting him to unnec-

essary costs, and in such case the pendency of the first should abate

the second proceeding.

On the other hand, if the two proceedings are pending in the same

state, between the same parties, and concerning the same subject-

matter, yet the relief sought is different, as in cases of an action at

law and suit in equity, when the pendency of the one should not

ordinarily operate to abate the other; for the difference in the relief

obtainable in the two jurisdictions constitutes a sufficient legal

reason for the maintenance of both proceedings.

But it is urged that while the second of the rules as above given

may be applicable to cases pending in courts of the same state, yet

it is inapplicable when one case is pending in the state and the

other in the federal courts for the same state, the argument being

that the two jurisdictions are foreign to each other, and hence that
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the pendency of a suit in the one court cannot be pleaded in abate-

ment of a suit in the other. It is true that the state and federal

tribunals owe their origin to different sources, but when created

and brought into action within the same territorial limits, can it

be fairly said that there are two states or jurisdictions co-existing

within the same limits, and yet foreign to each other, in the sense

that Iowa is foreign to New York? The same statutory and com-

mon law is enforced by both tribunals, and it cannot be said that

if a party is relegated to the state court for the enforcement of his

rights, that he is thereby sent into a foreign state or country,

whose laws and modes of proceeding are unknown or unfamiliar.

As we have already shown, the main purpose of the rule allowing

the pendency of one action to be pleaded, under given circum-

stances, in abatement of a second, is to prevent a defendant from

being unnecessarily harassed, and subjected to additional costs by

two proceedings when one will fully protect all the rights of the

plaintiff. Xow, it is apparent that the cost and vexation caused

to the defendant by the institution of the second suit is, to say

the least, not lessened by the fact that it is brought in the federal

while the first is pending in the state tribunal. Tlie evil to be

remedied is not obviated by the fact that the two proceedings are
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pending in tribunals owing their origin, the one to the state, the

other to the federal government, yet acting within the same tevri-

torial limits.

If it appears that the two proceedings, being between the same

parties, and for the enforcement or protection of the same rights,

will result in the granting of the same remedy, operative within the

same territorial limits, then it would seem clear that the second is

not needed to protect or enforce the plaintiff's rights, and as the

defendant must of necessity be put to additional trouble and ex-

pense in defending the second action, it follows that he is thereby

vexatiously harassed, and in such case he should be enabled to pro-

tect himself by causing the abatement of the second action. It is

the duty alike of the state and the United States court to protect

a defendant from unnecessary and vexatious litigation. If the first

action is brought in the state and the second in the federal tribunal,

or vice versa, it is the bringing of the second action that constitutes

the oppressive and unnecessary act on part of plaintiff, and the

corrective should be applied in the court whose jurisdiction is in-

voked oppressively and wrongfully. Again, the fact that the one
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action is pending in the state and the second in the federal court,

instead of being a reason why the second should not be abated,

is, on the contrary, a weighty argument for just the opposite con-

clusion; for if the two proceedings are allowed to proceed at the

same time, there may arise all the difficulties from a conflict be-

tween the two jurisdictions, acting within the same state, which

are so fully presented in the opinion in the case of Brooks v.

Mills Co., already cited.

Applying these principles to the case before the court, it follows

that the demurrer to the plea must be overruled, for the demurrer

admits the allegation of the plea that the former suit pending in

the state court is for the same subject-matter, and to the same

effect, and for the like relief and purpose, that is contemplated in

the second proceeding; and if that be true, then in the absence

of any showing justifying tbc institution of the second suit, as being

needed for the full protection of complainant's rights, it would

necessarily follow that the second suit was uncalled for, and there-

fore vexatious.

In the argument of the demurrer, it was urged that the second

suit was necessary for the enforcement of plaintiff's rights, for the

reason that the supreme court of the state had decided in the first
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proceeding tlmt the suit was prematurely brought, and hence should

be dismissed. The effect of such fact cannot be considered on the

demurrer, as it is not presented by the record, and the complain-

ant, if he desires to urge the same as a reason justifying the bring-

ing of the second suit, must bring the same to the knowledge of

the court in the further progress of the cause.

19
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pro •djng that Lb uit wa pr maturely brought, and hence hould
be di mj d. Th ff ct of u h fact annot be considered on the
demurr r, a it i n t pr nt d l y th r ord, and the complainant, if h 1 ir to urg he a
a a r a on j tifying the bringing of th
· n
uit mu t bring t11 am to the knowl dg of
the court in th l'urth r progr
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McCiuuY, C. J., and Love, U. J., concur.

Answer to Support Plea.

Bdton V. Gardner, 3 Faige Ch. (N. Y.) 273. (1832.)

M

RAR ,

C. J., and Lo

E,

J., concur.

The bill in this cause was filed by the administratrix of J. Bolton,

deceased, to obtain the distributive share of the decedent in the

estate of A. McLachlan, his half-brother. The bill charged that

McLachlan died in January, 1819, leaving a large personal estate,

and that the defendant D. Gardner, who married his sister, admin-

ANSWER TO

istered thereon: that in February, 1821, Bolton received a letter

UPPORT PLEA.

from the defendant S. S. Gardner, a brother of D. Gardner, re-

questing him to call and see him relative to the estate of McLachlan ;

Bdlton

. Gardner, 3 Paige

h. (N. Y.) 273.

(1832.)

that Bolton called accordingly, and S. S. Gardner told him he was

entitled to some portion of the estate, and that as the agent of his
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brother, the administrator, he wished to settle it with him, and he

referred him to S. ^liller, the surrogate, for further information;

that Bolton called on Miller, who advised him that he was entitled

to about seven or eight hundred dollars out of the estate of Mc-

Lachlan, but that, as the administrator was a liberal man, he

thought it probable he would give him a thousand dollars: that

Miller offered to undertake the business and obtain the money for

him for a fee of $50, to which Bolton agreed : that a few days

afterwards Bolton met Miller and S. S, Gardner, by appointment,

at the otlice of the latter, where Bolton agreed to accept $1,000 for

his share of the estate of McLachlan; and that he then executed

a release or assignment of his interest therein to D. Gardner, on

receiving $050, the remaining $50 being paid to ^filler as his fee.

The bill further charged that Bolton, at the time of executing

the release and assignment, was wholly ignorant of his rights as

one of the next of kin of "McLachlan, and that lie was also ignorant
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that Miller was the counsel of D. Gardner, which he subsequently

ascertained to be the case; that during the negotiation Bolton did

not see any statement of the personal estate of McLachlan, nor

was he informed of its value, or of his rights therein, either by

Gardner or by Miller, but that he was induced to sign the release

and assignment by the representations made to him by S. S. Gard-

ner, the solicitor, and Miller, the counsel of D, Gardner : that if

Bolton had known the amount of the personal estate of McLachlan,

and of his interest therein, he would not have released such interest

for $1,000, which the complainant averred was less than one-fifth

of his just distributive share of the estate, and to which he was

entitled as one of the next of kin. The complainant, therefore,

insisted that the release and assignment were void, by reason of this

fraud and imposition ; and that she, as the personal representative

of Bolton, was entitled to one-fourth of the personal estate of

McLachlan, deducting therefrom the $950 received from Gardner.

The bill further stated, that D. Gardner had not filed an inventorv,

and that he had refused to es:hibit to Bolton in his lifetime, or to

the administratrix since his death, an account of the estate: that
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at the time of executing the release and assignment, D. and S. S.

Gardner and Miller well knew that $950 was not one-fifth of the

distributive share of Bolton in the estate of McLachlan ; that they

then also knew that Bolton -ftTas ignorant of his rights, and of the

proportion of the estate to which he was entitled ; and they did not

produce or show to him any statement or inventory of the estate.

The bill prayed that the defendant D. Gardner might set forth

an accoimt of the personal estate of McLachlan which had come to

his hands as administrator, &c., and of the administration thereof;

and that he might be decreed to pay to the complainant the dis-

tributive share of such estate to which she was entitled, as the

personal representative of Bolton; and for general relief.

The defendant D. Gardner, as to so much of the bill as sought

for a discovery or account of the estate of McLachlan, and of the

administration thereof, and as to all the relief sought by the bill,

pleaded in bar the release and assignment executed by Bolton, in

February, 1821. He averred in his plea that it was not true, to his

knowledge or belief, that Bolton, at the time of executing the re-

lease, was wholly ignorant of his rights as one of the next of kin of

McLachlan : that Miller was not at that time his counsel : that

Bolton was, according to his l^elicf, infonncd of the value of the

AKSWER TO SUPPORT PLEA

that Miller was the coun el of D. Gardner, which he subsequently
ascertained to be the case; that during the negotiation Bolton did
not see anJ statement of the per onial tate of lVIcLachlan, nor
wa he informed of its value, or of hi rights therein, either by
Gardner or by Miller, but that he wa induced to sign the release
and a ignment ·by the representation made to him by S. S. Gardner, the solicitor, and Miller, the counsel of D. Gardner : that if
Bolton had known the amount of the per onal estate of McLachlan,
and of his intere t therein, he would not have released such interest
for $1,000, which the complaina·n t averred was less than one-fifth
of hi just di tributive share of the estate, and to which he was
entitled a one of the next of kin. The complainant, therefore,
in isted that the release and a ignment were void, by reason of this
fraud and imposition; and that she, as the personal representati e
of Bolton, was entitled to one-fourth of the personal e tate of
l\lcLachlan, deducting therefrom the $950 recei' ed from Gardner.
The bill further stated, that D. Gardner had not filed an inventor ,
and that he had refu ed to exhibit to Bolton in his lifetime, or to
the administraJtrix since his death, an account of the estate : that
at the time of executing the release and assignment, D. and S. S.
Gardner and Miller well knew that $950 was not one-fifth of the
di tributive share of Bolton in the estate of McLachlan; that th y
then also knew that Bolton was ignorant of his rights, and of the
proportion of the estate to which he was entitled; and they did not
produce or show to him a:ny statement or inventory of the e tate.
The bill prayed that the defendant D. Gardner might set forth
an account of the personal e tate of McLachlan which had come to
hi hands as administrator, &c., and of the administration thereof;
and that he might be decreed to pay to the complainant the distributive hare of such e tate to which he wa entitl d, as the
per onal repre entative of Bolton; and for general relief.
The defendant D. Gardner, a to so much of the bill as ought
for a di covery or account of the tate of McLachlan, and of the
admini tration thereof, and a to an the relief ought by the bill,
pleaded in bar the relea e and a ·gnment e 'ecuted by Bolton, in
F bruar , 1821.
averred in hi plea that it wa not tru , to hi
knowledae or b lief, that olton, at the time of xe uting the relea e wa wholly ignora-nt of hi right a one of the next of kin of
foLachlan: that fill r wa not at that time hi coun el: that
Bolton wa a cor lin to hi b li f inf rm d f th al u f the
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estate, and af his rights and interest therein : that the sum of $1,000

was not less than one-fifth of his distributive share of the estate to

which lie was entitled as one of the next of kin: that the release

was not procured by the contrivance and management of S. S.

Gardner and ]\Iillcr, and by false and untrue representations : that

it was not true that either the defendant S. S. Gardner, or Miller,

knew, at the time of making the release, that $950 was not one-

fifth of Bolton's share of the estate, or that it was far less than his

distributive proportion thereof; or that they knew he was ignorant

of his rights and of the proportion of the estate to which he was

entitled. The defendant further averred in his plea, that he could

not state whether S. S. Gardner and Miller produced and exhib-

ited to Bolton any inventory or statement of the property at the

time of the execution of the release; but that the defendant was

informed and believed that S. S. Gardner did, at that time, state

to Bolton and Miller the amount of the estate of McLachlan.

There were also some other informal averments in the plea as to

other matters stated in the bill.

The plea was accompanied by an answer, admitting most of
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the allegations in the bill relative to the original right of Bolton

to a distributive share of the estate of McLachlan; and containing

a general denial, according to the defendant's knowledge, informa-

tion and belief, as to most of the circumstances stated in the bill,

as evidences of fraud or imposition, to avoid the release. The de-

fendant also denied, in his answer, that the sum of $1,000 paid to

Bolton on the execution of the release, was less than one-fifth of

his distributive share of the estate ; and he alleged that, according

to his belief, it was fully equal to what he was rightfully entitled

to. He also alleged that he filed in the office of the surrogate an

inventory of the estate of McLachlan, in February, 1819; which

inventory he averred to be in all respects just and true, except

that after the filing of the inventory, he received eleven volumes

of books and $132,81, belonging to the estate, which came to his

knowledge after the filing of the inventory. He also denied that

Miller was his counsel at the time of the execution of the release;

but admitted he had since been informed, and that he believed

Miller, previous to that time, had, as his counsel, signed a plea put

in by him, the defendant, to a bill filed by Jane Garness relative

to the estate; but that the name of Miller was affixed to the plea

without the knowledge or approbation of the defendant.

V.

1
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c·tafo1 and of hi right and inte1ent h rein : that the um of $1 1 000
wa not 1 than on -fifth of hi ili tributi e hare of the e tate to
which he wa ntitl d a on 0£ the next of kin : that th rclea e
wa not pro ur d by th• ·ontrivance and management of
ardn r and iller1 and by fal and uniru r pr ntati n : that
it wa not tru that either th d f ndant 1 • , • ardner1 r '.Liller,
knew1 at th time of making the relea
that 9 0 wa n t one.fifth of olton har of the e tate1 or hat it a far les than hi
1i ·tributi proportion thereof; or that they kn w he wa ignorant
of hi right and of the proportion of the tate to which he wa
ntitled. Th defendant further averred in hi plea, that he could
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ardn r a·n d 1iller produced and exhibit d to olton any in entory or tatement of the propert; at the
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ecution of the r lea e · but that the d f ndant wa~
inform d and believed that
ardner did, at that time, tate
to Bolt n and Miller th amount of the e tate of McLachlan.
Th re w r al o ome other informal avennent in the plea a to
other matt r tated in the bill.
The pl a wa accompanied by an an wer admitting mo t of
the all ga ion in the bill relative to the ori inal right of Bolton
t a di ~tributi
hare of the e tate of McLachlan; and containing
a creneral d nial according to the defendant knowledcre, information and b li f a to m t of the circum tance fated in the bill,
a evidence of fraud or impo ition, to avoid the r elea e. The def mlant al o denied in hi an wer, that the um of $1 1 000 paid to
ol ton on th .xecution of the rel ea e wa le than one-fifth of
hi · 1i tributiv har of the e fate; and he alleged that, according
to hi b li f, it wa fully qual to what he wa rightfully entitled
t . H al~o all cred that h filed in th office of the urrogate an
in entor of th e tat of ~ Lachlan, in February 1 19; which
inv n ory h a1 rred t be in all re pect ju t and true except
that aft r th filing of the inventory he received eleven olume,
f book and 13 1 belon in to th e tate which cam to hi
kn wl dg aft r the filing of th in entory. He al o denied that
.. Iill r wa hi coun el at th time of th execution of the r lea e ·
hu admitte 1 h had ince b n inform d and that h b lie ed
.. I ill r. I re iou to that time had, a.. hi coun el iD"ned a pl put
in 1 .Y him h d fondant to a bill fil d l .y Jan :dune.. r la tile
the i'tat · but that th name of :Jiill r m ~ affix d to the pl
wi h ul lh' kn wl drr or a1 I robati n f th d f ndant.

200
200 Answek to Support Plea

Upon argument before the late vice-chancellor of the first cir-

cuit, the plea was allowed; with liberty to the complainant to

reply to the same within ten days, or in default thereof, that her

bill be dismissed. From this decision the complainant appealed to

the chancellor.

A

SWER TO SUPPORT PLEA.

Upon argument before the late vice-chancellor of the first circuit, the plea wa allowed; with liberty to the complainant to
reply to the ame within ten day , or in default thereof, that her
bill be di mi ed. From this deci ion the complainant appealed to
the hancellor.

The Chancellor:

Several objections are made to this plea which are merely formal ;

but the principal objection is that it is pleaded in bar to the dis-

covery of what the complainant's counsel considers a material fact

to destroy the defence arising out of the release and assignment of

Bolton. I believe the answer is sufficiently full as to all the mat-

ters of the bill not professedly covered by the plea. Whether the

plea does not cover the discovery of some facts as to which the

complainant was entitled to an answer, I shall presently consider.

The rule which requires an answer in support of a plea, in certain

cases, does not render it necessary that the defendant should deny

positively, in the answer, matters of which it cannot be presumed

he has any personal knowledge. Where fraud or other circum-

stances are charged for the purpose of avoiding a release, the
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defendant pleading the release, must by proper negative averments

in his plea, deny the allegation of fraud, &c., and must support

his plea by a full answer and discovery as to every equitable cir-

cumstance charged in the bill to avoid the bar. (Mad. & Geld.

Eep. 64; 2 Ves. & Beam. Rep. 364.) But in the case of negative

averments as to matters not alleged to be the act of the defendant,

or where, from the nature of the case, he cannot be supposed to

have any personal knowledge of the subject, it is sufficient for him

to deny the facts charged upon his belief only. {Drew v. Drew, 2

Ves. & Beam. 159.) The defendant, however, must be careful so

to frame his averments that the complainant may put the facts in

issue by a replication. And where the negative averments in the

plea are permitted to be made upon the belief of the defendant,

it will be sufficient for him, in the answer in support of such plea,

to deny the equitable circumstances stated in the bill, according

to his knowledge, information and belief only.

One objection which is urged by the complainants' counsel,

to the form of the plea in this case, is that some of the averments

therein professing to negative the charges in the bill, are not direct

and issuable, but are involved and argumentative. I am inclined

T '.HE

HANCELLOR:

everal objection are made to this plea which are merely formal;
but the principal objection is that it i pleaded in bar to the disco ery of what the complainant's coun el con iders a material fact
to destroy the defence a-ri ing out of the relea e and as ignment of
Bolton. I believe the answer i suffi iently full as to all the matters of the bill not profe edly covered by the plea. Whether the
plea doe not cover the discovery of some facts as to which the
complainant wa entitled to an answer, I shall presently consider.
The rule which requires an an wer in support of a plea, in certain
case , does not render it nece ary that the defendant hould deny
positively, in the an wer, matters of which it cannot be presumed
he has any personal knowledge. Where fraud or other circumtances are charged for the purpose of a-voiding a release, the
defendant pleading the release, mu t by proper negative averments
in bis plea, deny the allegation of fraud, &c., and must support
bi plea by a full an wer and discovery as to every equitable circumstan ce charged in the bill to avoid the bar. (Mad. & Geld.
Rep. 64; 2 Ve. & Beam. Rep. 364.) But in the case of negative
averment.s a to matter not alleg d to be the act of the defendant,
or where, from the na·ture of the case, he cannot be upposed to
have any per anal knowledg of the ubject, it i ufficient for him
to leny the fact barged upon hi b lief only. (Drew v. Drew, 2
Ve. & Beam. 159.) The defendant, however, mu t b careful . o
to frame bi av rmen that the complainant may put the fact in
i ue by a repli ation. And where the negative averment in the
pl a are permitt d to be made upon the belief of th d fendant
it will
uffici nt for him, in th an wer in upport of uch 1 l a,
to d ny the quitabl ircum tanc
tat d in the bill, ac ordin~
to bi kncwl ge, information a d b li f only.
omplainant
oun el,
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th r in prof ing to n o-ativ th haro- in th bill ar not dir ct
and i uahlc l ut ar inv lv 1 an l ar um ntativ . I am inclined
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to think this objection is well taken. One of those averments com-

mences thus: "And this defendant further avers, that for the

reasons in his answer particularly set forth, he cannot say whether

or not," &c., concluding with two or three involved exceptions,

and embracing in a parenthesis another distinct averment of ig-

norance. This mode of denying an allegation in the bill might

not perhaps be deemed objectionable in an answer, where every

allegation, not admitted by the defendant, is put in issue by the

formal traverse at the close of the answer. But it is bad in a plea

where the negative averments must tender an issue directly.

Another objection to the plea is that it is overruled by a part

of the answer. The defendant, by his plea, objects to answering

any allegations in the bill which call for a discovery as to the

situation or amount of the estate of MicLachlan, which has come

to his hands as administrator; yet he does answer in part as to

those matters. He alleges, in substance, that the inventory filed

by him in the office of the surrogate contains a just and true ac-

count of the estate which had come to his hands, except eleven

volumes of books and $132, which came to his hands afterwards.
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He also states that the $1,000 paid Bolton at the time of making

the release, was fully equal to what he was rightfully entitled to,

and was not, as alleged in the bill, less than one-fifth of his just

distributive share of the estate. If it was necessary or proper to

put these allegations in an answer in support of this plea, then it

was improper to plead the release in bar of the discovery as to the

amount of the estate. The defendant should have pleaded in bar

of the relief merely, and have given a full discovery as to the actual

amount of the estate. If the allegation in the answer, that the

amount paid to Bolton at the time of the execution of the release

was not less than one-fifth of his distributive share of the estate

and that it was fully equal to what he was rightfully entitled to,

was not necessary to support the plea, it overrules the whole plea

and constitutes a double bar. (3 Sim. & Stu. R. 281.) Taking

this answer to be true, Bolton received from the defendant his full

distributive share of the estate, and all he had any right to claim.

This of ii^elf is a full defence to the suit, and to the whole relief

asked for by the bill.

Independent of these objections to the plea, in point of form

I think the complainant was entitled to a full discovery as to the

actual amount of the personal estate of McLachlan. We have
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201

to think tbi obj ction i w ll tak n. One of those averments com" nd thi def ndant further aver , that for the
m nee thu
r a on in hi an w r particularly et forth he cannot ay whether
or not, &c., on ludino- with two or three involved exception,
nd mbracing in a par nth i another di tin t av rment of ignoran . Thi mod of nying an allegiation in the bill might
n t p rhap be d m d obj tionable in an an wer, where very
all gation not admitted by the defendant, i put in i ue by the
formal trav r e at the lo e -0£ the an w r. But it i bad in a plea
wher then gativ av nnent mu t tender an i ue directly.
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of the r lief m r l; and hav gi en a full di covery a to the actual
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and that it a full equal to what h wa rightfully entitled to,
no n ce ar t upport th pl a it overrule the whole plea
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before seen that the party pleading a release which the complain-

ant seeks to impeach upon equitable circumstances, must, in his

answer supporting the plea, make a full discovery as to every ma-

terial circumstance relied on to avoid the bar. One equitable cir-

cumstance relied upon here is, that Bolton understood from Miller

that his share of the estate was less than $1,000, whereas the com-

plainant alleges it was more than five times that amount, and that

this fact was then known to the defendant and his solicitor. If this

was so, although Miller himself was probably misinformed as to

the amount, I am not prepared to say that a trustee can be per-

mitted to support a release from his cestui que trust, founded on

such a gross inadequacy of consideration; although there was no

actual fraud intended. I think,, in such a case, the defendant

should be required to show that the parties were treating for a

settlement at arms' length, or that he gave the cestui que trust

a fair statement of the amount of tlie property, so far as was

necessar}^ to enable him to act understandingly in relation to his

rights. Although the defendant denies knowledge of the amount

of property charged in the bill, the complainant has a right to
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know what the property was, and when it came to the defendant's

hands, to enahle the court to see whether the allegation is true.

I think the vice-chancellor erred in allowing this plea; and

his decision must be reversed, with the costs of this appeal. The

plea is to be overruled, but without prejudice to the right of the

defendant to insist upon the release and assignment, in his answer,

as a bar to the relief sought by the complainant's bill.

As the complainant is prosecuting her cause before the vice-

chancellor in forma pauperis, the question whether she is to receive

costs upon the argument of the plea before the vice-chancellor,

must be reserved until the hearing; but they are not to be allowed

if the defendant succeeds in his defence. This court will not

encourage the prosecution of suits in forma pauperis, merely for

the purpose of obtaining the costs of interlocutory proceedings,

if there is no reasonable hope of succeeding on the merits. As

the complainant cannot prosecute an appeal as a poor person, and

is also obliged to give security for the costs of the adverse party

in such a case, it is reasonable that she should recover dives costs

for the proceedings on the appeal.

ANSWER TO SUPPORT PLEA

before een that the party pleading a release which the complainant eek to impeach upon equitable circumstances, must, in his
an wer upporting the plea, make a full discovery a to every material circum tance relied on to avoid the bar. One equitable circum tance relied upon here i , that Bolton understood from Miller
that hi hare of the e tate wa le 'S than $1,000, whereas the complainant alleg it was more than five times that amount, and that
thi faot was then known to the defendant and his solicitor. If this
wa o, although Miller himself was probably misinformed as to
the amount, I am not prepared to ay that a trustee can be permitted to support a release from hi cestui que trust, founded on
such a gros inadequacy of consideration ; although there wa no
actual fraud intended. I think,. in such a case, the defendant
should be required to how that the partie were treating for a
ettlement at arms' length, m that he gave the cestui que trust
a fair tatement of the amount of the property, o far as was
n eces ary to enable him to ad under tandingly in relation to his
right . Although the defendant denies knowledge of the amount
of property charged in the bill, the complainant has a right to
know what the property was, and when it came to the defendant's
hands, to enaible the court to ee whether the allegation is true.
I think the vice-chanc llor erred in allo.wing this plea; and
his decision must be reversed, with the costs of this appeal. The
plea is to be overruled, but without prejudice to the right of the
defendant to insist upon the release and as ignment, in his answer,
as a bar to the relief sought by the compla·i nant' bill.
As the complainant i prosecuting her cau e before the vicechancellor in forma pauperis, the question whether she is to receive
co ts upon the argument of the plea before the vice-chancellor,
mu t be re erved until the hearing; but they are not to be allowed
if the d f ndant ucc ed in hi defenc . Thi court will not
encourag the pro ution of uit in forma pauperis, merely for
th purpo e of obtaining the co t of interlocutory proceeding ,
if ther i no rea onable hop of ucce ding on the merit . A,
the complainant annot pro ecut an appeal a a poor p rson, and
i al o oblicred to giv ecurity for the co t of th adv rse party
in uch a ca e, it i r a onabl that he hould recover dives costs
for the proceeding on the appeal.
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Goodnch v. Pendleton, 3 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 3S4. (1818.)

Phineas Miller, of Georgia, made his will, the 11th of December,

'oodrich

1797, appointing Decius Wadsworth, Samuel Kelloek, and liis wife,

. Pendleton, 3 Johns. Oh. (N. Y.) 384.

(1818.)

Catharine Miller, his executors, and died the 7th of December,

1803. Tlie two executors first named declined to act, and the

executrix administered, but did not take out any letters testa-

mentary in this state, x\.t the time of his death, the testator was

a creditor of the United St-ates to forty thousand dollars, and

upwards, on a contract made for supplying the United States

with ship timber. Some controversy having arisen between the

executrix and the United States, relative to this debt, the de-

fendant, professing great friendship for the executrix, who resided

in Georgia, wrote her a letter, dated December 4, 1806, in which

he takes notice of that debt, and expressed a belief, that if he were

duly authorized, he could obtain the money from the United States,

and he, at the same time, enclosed a power of attorney for her

to execute. The executrix received the letter, executed the power

of attorney, and returned it to the defendant. The power of

attorney was dated January 30th, 1807, by which the executrix
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authorized the defendant to demand and receive of and from the

United States, the debt above mentioned, being the balance of

account as awarded by arbitrators, to give acquittances for the

same, and to compound, if necessary, any controversy respecting

it, so far as she, as executrix, might lawfully do. The executrix,

afterwards, by a letter written by her agent, Eay Sands, from

Georgia, to the defendant, requested him not to act under the

power, which letter the defendant received prior to the 26th of

March, 1807. The defendant, afterwards, in pursuance or under

color of the power of attorney, on the 13th of January, 1808,

received from the United States 18,328 dollars, 50 cents, for the

balance due to the estate of the testator, and as attorney of the

executrix, gave a discharge to the United States. Tlie defendant

paid over to the executrix 7,960 dollars, 11 cents, but retained the

residue of the money so received by him, being 10,368 dollars,

39 cents, against her consent. The bill further stated that the

sum so received by the defendant was less than the sum due from

the United States to the estate of the testator, and less than could
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have been obtained before giving the power to the defendant ; that

the sum actually received was by way of compromise, and which

compromise the defendant was induced to make, not because he

considered that sum as the full amount due, but with a view to

obtain possession of it, and apply it to his own use. That the

executrix, residing in Georgia, and the defendant in New-York,

was unable to obtain the sum so withheld from her, by the de-

fendant; though the sum so received by him was as a trustee for

the estate of the testator, and he was liable to account for the same

as such trustee. That the executrix died in Georgia on the 3d of

September, 1814. That on the 9th of October, 1817, the plaintiff

took out letters of administration, with the will annexed, in New-

York. That the defendant refuses to account with the plaintiff,

for the money so received, or to pay it; pretending that when he

received the power of attorney as aforesaid, there was a debt due

to him from the estate of the testator, and that it was agreed

between him and the executrix, when he received the power, that

he might retain the amount of his debt out of the moneys to be

received by liim. The plaintiff denied any such agreement; or, if
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it was ever made by the executrix, it was through ignorance of

her duties, and from an undue confidence reposed in the defendant,

who professed his desire, in soliciting the power, to promote her

interest. That if any debt was due to the defendant, it was a

simple contract debt unsettled, and that the estate of the testator

was then indebted, by judgments and specialties, to more than the

amount of all the assets, which the defendant knew; and the

agreement, if made, would have been a devastavit in the executrix,

&<3. The bill prayed that the defendant might be decreed to

account with the plaintiff, as administrator, with the will annexed,

for the moneys so received by him from the United States, and to

pay the same, &c.

The defendant, on the 13th January last, put in a plea and

answer. For plea, he said, that every cause of action in the bill

contained, accrued above six years before filing the bill. That

after the cause of action (if any) arose, to wit, in June, 1808, the

said C. M., the executrix, was in this state, and that she, by her

will, appointed her daughter, Louisa Shaw, executrix, who proved

the will in Georgia. That the sum of money (if any), received

l)v the defendant, was not received as trustee for the estate of

P. M., the deceased testator, or for C. M. as executrix, and, there-
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have been obtained before giving the power to the defenda·n t; that
the um actually received was by way of compromise, and which
compromi e the defendant wa induced to make, not because he
con idered that sum a the full amount due, but with a view to
obtain pos e ion of it, and apply it to his own u e. That the
executrix, re iding in Georgia, and the defendant in New-York,
wa unable to obtain the sum so withheld from her, by the defendant; though th um o received by him was as a trustee for
the e tate of the testator, and he was liable to account for the same
a uch trustee. That the executrix died in Georgia on the 3d of
September, 1814. That on the 9th of October, 1817, the plaintiff
took out letters of admini tration, with the will annexed, in NewYork. That the defendant refu e to account with the plaintiff,
for the money o received; or to pay it; pretending that when he
received the power of attorney a aforesaid, there was a debt due
to him from the estate of the testator, and that it was agreed
between him and the executrix, when he received the power, that
he might retain the amount of his debt out of the moneys to be
received by him. The plaintiff denied any such agreement; or, if
it was ever made by the executrix, it was through ignorance of
her duties, and from an undue confidence reposed in the defendant,
who professed his desire, in soliciting the power, to promote her
interest. That if any debt was due to the defendant, it was a
imple contract debt unsettled, and that the estate of the testator
wa then indebted, by judgments and specialtie , to more than the
amount of all the assets, which the defendant knew; and the
agreement, if made, would have been a devastavit in the executrix,
&c. The bill prayed that the defendant might be decreed to
account with the plaintiff, a administrator, with the will annexed,
for the money o received by him from the United States, and to
pay the ame, &c.
The d f ndant, on the 13th January }a t, put in a plea and
answer. For plea, h aid that ev ry cau e of action in the bill
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fore, the defendant pleads the statute of limitations, in bar of the

plaintiff's bill. That in support of the plea, and as to so much

of the bill as charges that the money received by the defendant

was received as trustee, for the estate of P. M., deceased, and that

the defendant was, and is, accountable as trustee, he answers, and

says, that he denies that the said money was received by him as

trustee, but that the same was received by him on his own account,

and retained by him, at the time of the receipt, for his own use

(being applied by him for the payment of a debt justly due to

liim from 1*. M., in virtue of a special agreement between the

executrix and him), and not as trustee.

The cause came on to be heard on the plea in bar and the

answer in support of it.

The Chancellor:

This plea, with its attendant answer, is insufficient.

1. In the first place, it is multifarious, and contains distinct

Joints. It states that the cause of action did not arise within
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J: r , the d fendant pl ad th ta-tut of limitation , in bar of the
pl inti:ff bill. Tbat in upp rt of th plea, and a to o much
of th bill a char
that the m n y r c i ved by the def ndant
,ra recei d a ru tee for h e tate of P . M., decea ed, and that
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savs that h d ni that th a·icl money wa r c iv d by him as
tru te , but th t th am wa r
i d by him on hi own account,
au r tain cl by him, at th tim of the receipt, for hi own u
b ino- appli l by him for th paym nt of a d bt ju tly due to
him from . M., in irtue of a p cial agreement between the
•xccutri, and him), and not a tru t e.
Th
au
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six years, and that the plaintiff was barred by the statute of

limitations ; it also states, that the sole acting executrix of Phineas

THE
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Miller, deceased, made her will, and appointed her daughter, Louisa

Shaw, executor, and that the daughter had proved the will. This

last point seems to be wholly unconnected with any fact forming

the plea of the statute: if it meant any thing, it meant that the

plaintiff was not entitled to the character he assumed, and that

the suit ought to have been brought in the name of Louisa Shaw.

Xo doubt, it may, in certain cases, be a good plea, that a plaintiff,

who assumes to be administrator, was not entitled to that trust;

and of this we have an example in Ord v. Huddleston, cited in

:\[itford's PI. p. 189. But I do not mean to say, that the fact thus

stated would, if it had stood by itself, have been a good plea. It

is sufficient, however, for the present, to observe, that it is put

forward in the plea, as a matter of defence, or it would not have

appeared there, and the rule applies, that a plea containing two

distinct points is bad. Such a defective plea was overruled by

Lord Thurlow, in Wiifbrcad v. Brockhurst (1 Bro. 404); and

Lord Posslyn afterwards observed (6 Vesey, 17), that he would

not allow a plea of the statute of frauds, when it was coupled with

another defence. Every plea must rest the defence upon a single

I'oinf. and upon that point create a bar to the suit. Such is the

II
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policy and convenience of pleading, and the party must resort to

his answer, if he wishes to avail himself of distinct matters. It

is fit and, salutary that a plea, which mixes together different and

discordant matter, should be condemned ; for it uselessly encumbers

the record, and serves no other purpose than to produce confusion.

2. But I perceive a more important and stronger objection to

the plea.

The defendant is charged as a trustee, and with a breach of

his trust, and with fraud in the execution of it. These charges

formed an equitable bar to the plea of the statute, and they ought

to have been fully, particularly, and precisely, denied in the answer,

put in as an auxiliary to the plea.

The bill contains the following charges, viz. that the testator,

Phineas Miller, had a large demand against the United States;

that the defendant, professing a friendship for Catharine Miller,

the widow and sole acting executrix, and who resided in the state

of Georgia, wrote her a letter, in which he takes notice of her

demand, and expresses a belief that, if duly authorized, he could

obtain the money for her, and, at the same time, enclosed to her a
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power of attorney to be executed and given to him; that under

that solicitation she executed and sent him the power; that she

afterwards wrote him a letter by her agent, requesting him not to

act under that power, and which letter he received in March, 1807 ;

that the defendant, acting under color of the power, in January,

1808, received from the United States 18,328 dollars and 50 cents,

as for the balance due to the testator, which he received as such

attorney and trustee, and in that character gave a discharge to the

United States; that he, contrary to her consent and his duty,

appropriated, of that sum, 10,368 dollars and 39 cents, to his own

use; that he received the money upon a composition, made by

him with the United States, and which he was induced to make,

not because he considered the sum received to be the full amount

due, but with a view to obtain possession of it, and to apply it

to his own use, in discharge of some pretended unsettled debt by

simple contract, alleged to be due to him from the testator; that

the estate of the testator was indebted, by judgment and specialties,

to more than all the assets, and which fact was well known to the

defendant, and if the executrix had assented to any such appropria-

tion, she would have committed a devastavit, which the defendant,

from his professional knowledge, also knew.
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policy and convenience of pleading, and the party must re ort to
his answer, if he wi hes to avail him elf of distinct matters. It
is fit and, alutary that a plea, which mixes together different and
di cordant matter, should be condemned; for it uselessly encumbers
the record, and serves no other purpo e than to produce confusion.
2. But I perceive a more important and stronger objection to
the plea·.
The defendant is charged as a trustee, and with a breach of
hi trust, and with fraud in the execution of it. These charges
formed an equitable bar to the plea of the statute, and they ought
to have been fully, particularly, and precisely, denied in the answer,
put in as an auxiliary to the plea.
The bill contains the following charges, viz. that the t tator,
Phineas Miller, had a large demand against the United States;
that the defendant, professing a friendship for Catharine Miller,
the widow and sole acting executrix, and who re ided in the state
of Georgia, wrote her a letter, in which he takes notice of her
demand, and expresses a belief that, if duly authorized, he could
obtain the money for her, and, at the same time, enclosed fo her a
power of attorney to be executed and given to him; that under
that solicitation she executed and sent him the power; that she
afterwards wrote him a letter by her agent, requesting him not to
act under that power, and which letter he received in March, 1807;
that the defendant, acting under color of the power, in January,
1808, received from the United States 18,328 dollars and 50 cents,
as for the balance due fo the testator, which he rec€ived as such
attorney and trustee, and in that character gave a discharge to the
United Srtates; that he, contrary to her con ent and his duty,
appropriated, of that sum, 10,368 dollars and 39 cent , to hi own
u e; that he received the money upon a composi·tion, made by
him with the United States, and which he wa induced to make,
not becau e he con idered the um received to be the full amount
du , but with a view to obtain po
ion of it, and to apply it
to his own u e, in di · harg of some pret nded un ttl d debt by
simple contra· t, all ged to be du t·o him from the t tator; that
the e tate of th t tator wa indebt d, by judD"ment and pecialties
to more than all th a "'et , and which fact w.a well known to the
d fendant, and if the ex cutrix had a nt to any u h a·ppropriation, he would hav committ d a. devastavit; which the d f ndant,
from hi prof ional knowl dO"e, al o kn w.
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Upon such a case, as stated by Hie bill, and not denied by the

answer, I might well say, with Lord Ilardwicke, in Brereton v.

Gamul (2 Atk. 240), when he overruled a plea of the statute, as

not being particular enough, that "the case was of such a nature as

entitled the plaintiff to all the favor the Court could show her."

I need not stay to show that the defendant, being charged with

a fraudulent breach of trust, as an agent or trustee for the

executrix, cannot set up the statute of limitations, so long as the

trust is admitted. A trustee cannot protect himself by the statute

of limitations in a suit brought by the cestiiy que trust; it would

be a waste of time to look for authorities in support of a principle

so well known and established. The only question that can now be

made is, whether the defendant has sufficiently met and denied

the charges in respect to the creation and breach of this trust.

He contents himself with denying, in the plea, that the money

received by him was received as trustee for the estate of Phineas

Miller, deceased, and with denying, in the answer, that the money

was received by him as trustee, and with averring that it was

received on his own account, and retained for his own use, under
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some agreement not detailed. We have no denial of the letter

professing friendship, and soliciting the appointment, nor any

denial of the receipt of the letter from the executrix, suspending

the power, nor of the subsequent receipt of the money from the

United States, under a composition made in the injurious manner

and for the unjust purposes stated; nor have we any denial that

he gave the United States an acquittance or discharge, as attorney

for the executrix. The defendant cannot be permitted to shelter

himself under the statute, from the resjDonsibility of such grave

accusations, by a mere simple denial of the receipt of the money

as trustee, while he leaves all those facts or charges uncontradicted

which establish the existence of the trust, and show that he cer-

tainly did receive the money, as such agent or trustee. If such a

general denial, without meeting specific charges, was sufficient,

every trustee might escape from responsibility, by means of the

statute, and be left to his own construction of what was intended

by such a denial. But the rules of pleading are founded in better

sense, and in stricter and closer logic; they require the defendant

to answer, particularly and precisel}'', the charges in the bill, which

go to destroy the bar created by the statute.

Tlie rule is, that the equitable circumstances charged in the
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bill, and wliich will avoid the statute, must be denied by the

answer, as well as by the general averment in the plea; and the

answer in support of the plea (and which is indispensable to its

support) must be full and clear, and contain a particular and

precise denial of the charges, or it will not be effectual to support

the plea. The Court will intend that the matters so charged against

the pleader, are true, unless they be fully and clearly denied.

The facts requisite to render the plea a defence, must be clearly

and distinctly averred, so that the plaintiff may take issue upon

them; and the answer in support of the plea must contain par-

ticular and precise averments, to enable the plaintiff to meet them,

as the object of the answer is to give the plaintiff an opportunity

of taking exceptions to the traverse of the facts and circumstances

charged in the bill, which, if true, would destroy the bar set up.

These general principles of pleading are laid down in Lord

Eedesdale's Treatise of Pleading (p. 212. 214. 236, 237), a work

of great authority on the subject: they are also to be met with in

other treatises of established character. (Cooper's Eq. PI. 227,

228. Gilbert's For. Eem. 58. Van Heythuysen's Equity Drafts-
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man, p. 443.) They are, indeed, plain, elementary rules, which I

should have apprehended could not well be mistaken by the equity

pleader; but we will, for a moment, look into the cases in which

they have been declared and applied.

In Price v. Price (1 Vern. 185), the defendant pleaded that

he was a doiia fide purchaser for a valuable consideration; but

there being several badges of fraud stated in the bill, though the

defendant in his plea had denied them, yet, because lie had not

denied them, hy way of answer, so that the plaintiff might he at

liberty to except, the plea was overruled. In The South Sea Com-

pany V. Wymondsell (3 P. Wms. 143), the bill charged fraud,

and the defendant pleaded the statute of limitations, and denied

the matters of fraud; hut as there were some circumstances not

fully denied, the defendant was ordered to answer the bill, with

liberty to the plaintiff to except, and the benefit of the statute was

to be saved to the defendant. In Walter v. Glanville (3 Bro. P. C.

266), sometimes referred to, to show, that if the matters charged

are answered substantially, it will do, the only question was,

whether the answer in support of the plea did not fully and par-

ticularly (as it did in that case) answer the material charges in the

bill. The necessitv of such an answer was evidently admitted by
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bill, and which will avoid the statute, must be denied by the
an wer, a well a by the general averment in the plea·; and the
an wer in upport of the plea (and which is indi pen able to its
upport) must be full and clear, and contain a particular &nd
preci e denial of the charge , or it will not be effectual to support
the plea. The Court will intend that the matter o charged again t
the pleader, are true, unle s they be fully and clearly denied.
The fact requi ite to render the plea a defence, mu t be clearly
and di tinctly averred, so that the plaintiff may take i sue upon
them; and the answer in upport of the plea mu t contain particular and preci e averment , to enable the plaintiff to meet them,
a the obj ct of the an wer i to give the plaintiff an opportunity
of taking exceptions to the traverse of the fact and circum tance
charged in the bill, which, if true, would destroy the bar set up.
Th e general principle of pleading are laid down in Lord
Rede dale' Treati e of Pleading (p. 212. 214. 236, 237), a work
of great authority on the ubject : they are al o to be met with in
other treati es of establi hed character. (Cooper' Eq. PL 227,
228. Gilbert' For. Rem. 58. Van Heythuy en' Equity Draftsman, p. 443.) They are, indeed, plain, elementary rule , which I
hould have apprehended could not well be mi ta·ken by the equity
pleader; but we will, for a moment, look into the cases in which
they have been declared and applied.
In Price v. Price (1 Vern. 185), the defendant pleaded that
he wa a bona fide purchaser for a valuable con ideration; but
there being everal badge of fraud tated in the bill, though the
defendant in hi plea had denied them, yet, because he had not
denied them, by way of answer, so that the plaintiff might be at
liberty to except, the plea was overruled. In The oitih Sea Company v. Wymondsell (3 P. Wms. 143), the bill charged fraud,
and the defendant pleaded the tatute of limitation , and deni d
th matter of fraud; but as there were some circumstances not
fully denied, the defendant wa order d to an wer th bill with
lib rty to the plaintiff to except, and the benefit of the tatute wa
to b aved to th cl f ndant. In Walter v. Glanville (3 Bro. P. C.
G) ometime r f rr d to to how, that if the matt r harged
ar an w red ub tantially it will do the onl qu tion wa ,
wh th r the an wer in upport of th plea did not fully and parti ularly (a it dil in that
) an w r the mat rial har
in th
1 ill. Th n c it. f u h an an w r 'rn evid ntly admitt
by

OODRICII V.
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the counsel, and by the Court; and so it must have been under-

stood by Lord Ch, King, who made the decree appealed from, and

who, subsequentl}', in the case cited from P. Williams, required

such a full and particular answer.

Lord Hardwicke frequently noticed and supported these rules

of pleading. Thus, in Brereton v. Gamul, already cited, the plea

of a fine levied and of five years with non-claim was overruled,

as not being particular enough. So, in 3 Atk. 70, Anon., the bill

charged, that since the death of the intestate, the administratrix

had promised to pay the note as soon as she had effects, and the

administratrix pleaded the statute of limitations, and that she made

no ])romise. But the chancellor held the plea to be too general,

as there was a special promise charged; and he ordered the plea

to stand for an answer, with liberty to accept. Again; in Hild-

yard v. Cressy (3 Atk. 303), the defendant pleaded a fine and

non-claim to a bill for a discovery whether the defendant were a

bona fide purchaser, for a valuable consideration ; and it appearing

that the defendant had not made a complete answer, and therefore

not properly supported his plea, the plea was ordered to stand
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for an answer, with liberty to except. In Radford v. Wilson (3

Atk. 815), the defendant put in a plea of a purchase for a valuable

consideration, without notice; but as the instances of notice

charged in the bill were particular and special, it was held that a

general denial of notice was not sufficient, and that it must be

denied as specially and particularly as it was charged, and the plea

was overruled.

The modern cases before Lord Eldon contain the same rules.

Thus, in Jones v. Pengree (6 Vesey, 580), there was a plea of

the statute of limitations, and an answer. The former was ob-

jected to as multifarious, and as not covering enough; and the

answer was objected to as overruling the plea by answering to the

very parts to which the plea went, and as not answering the ma-

terial charge, which, if admitted, would have taken the ease out

of the statute. It was observed, ujwn the argument, that the plea

ought to go to every thing, except the charges introduced into the

bill to take the case out of the statute, and which it was necessary

to answer. The plea was overruled as covering too much, and

ordered to stand for an answer, with liberty to except ; and though

that ease (as well as the one which followed") does not strike me

as distinguished either for precision or clear distinctions, vet it is

14
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the coun 1 and by th
ourt; and so it must have been undertoocl by Lord h. ·ng, who made the deer e app aled from, and
who ub equently in the a ciited from P. William , r quired
·uch a full ancl parti ular an wer.
orcl arclwicke fr u ntly noti ed and ur ported the rule
of pleading. Thu , in rereton v. Gamul, alr ady cited, the plea
of a fin 1 vi cl and of five y ar with non-claim wa overrul d,
a· not being particu~ar enough.
o, in 3 Atk. 0, Anon., the bill
·b· rg cl, hat inc the death of the inte tate, the admini tratrix
h11] promi ed to pay th note a
oon a he had effect , and the
aclmi i tratrix plead d the tatute of limitation , and that she made
no promi e. Burt th chancellor held the plea to be too general,
a there wa a pecial promi e charg d; and he ordered the plea
to tand for an an wer, with liberty to accept. Again; in Hildyard . ressy ( 3 tk. 303), the defendant pleaded a fine and
non-claim to a bill for a discovery whether the defendant were a
bona fide pur ha er, for a valuable con ideration; and it appearing
that the defendant had not made a complete answer, and therefore
not properly upported hi plea, the plea wa ordered to stand
for an an wer, with liberty to except. In Radford v. Wilson (3
tk. 1 ~) the defendant put in a plea of a purchase for a valuable
on idera ion, without notice ; but as the in tances of notice
harg d in the bill were particular and pecial, it wa held that a
g n ral denial of notice wa not ufficient, and that it mu t be
d ni d a specially and particularly as it was charged, and the plea
a overruled.
Th mod rn ca e b fore Lord Eldon contain the ame rul .
Thu, in Jones . Pengree (6 Ve ey, 5 0), there wa a plea of
th tatute of limitation and an an wer. The former wa ob-.
j ted to a multifariou and a not covering enough; and the
an w r wa obj ted to a overrulin the pl a by an wering to the
\r ry par
to which th plea went, and a not an wering th mat rial haro- which if admitted would have taken the ca e out
of th tatute. t wa ob erved upon the argument that the plea
ucrht to go to v r thin
cept the charge introduc d into the
l ill t tak th a out of the tatute and which it wa ne · ~ar
l an wer.
h pl a wia o errul d a co rin too much an
rd r d t tand for an an
r with lib rty to exc pt· and thou h
thn t n
(as; w 11 a th on which follo d) d e not ~trik m
n 1i tingui. h d ith r r r pr i ion or clear di ~ tinction . t it i
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important in this respect, tliat Lord Eldon adopts and approves

of the rule, in the very words of Mitford, "that if any matter is

charged by the bill, which may avoid the bar created by the statute,

that matter mnst be denied generally, by way of averment in the

plea ; and it must be denied particularly and expressly, by way of

answer to support the plea." The reason of the rule his lordship

stated to be, that the plaintiff was entitled, by exceptions, to com-

pel the defendant to answer precisely to all the cases put in the bill

as exceptions to the statute. In the next case, of Bayhy v. Adams

(6 Vesey, 586), there was a plea of the statute of limitations,

supported by an answer, and the decision was, that the plea was not

sufficiently supported by the answer, because the charges in the

bill were not sufficiently answered. There was a good deal of dis-

cussion in that case, on the point, whether the averments meeting

the charges in the bill ought to be repeated in both plea and

answer; and two decisions in the Exchequer {Pope v. Bush, and

Edmundson v. Hartley, 1 Anst. 59. 97), which held, that if both

plea and answer met and denied the same charges by the aver-

ments, the answer would overrule the plea, were much questioned.
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I need not now enter into that discussion; and even the Ex-

chequer cases were declared to be confined to awards. It seemed

to be admitted, throughout the case, that the answer, at least,

must contain a full and particular denial of the charges; and

perhaps the better opinion is, that a general denial will be suf-

ficient in the plea.

The result is, that a plea of the statute is bad, unless accompanied

with an answer aiding and supporting it, by a particular denial

of all the facts and circumstances charged in the bill, and which

form an equitable bar to the plea of the statute. The plea in this

case has no such accompanying answer, and it must be overruled.

The usual order in such cases is, that the plea stand for an answer,

with liberty -to the plaintiff to except; but in some of the cases

the plea was declared to lie overruled, and the defendant ordered

to answer, saving to himself the liberty to insist on the statute

in the answer. That is the better course in this case ; for to order

the plea to stand for an answer, with liberty to the plaintiff to

except, would be prolonging the litigation, as we may take it for

granted, from the palpable insufficiency of the plea as an answer,

that the plaintiff would except, and the defendant be finally com-

pelled to a fuller answer.

ANSWER TO SUPPORT PLEA

important in thi re pect, that Lord EMon a fopt and approves
o.E the rule, in the ver; word of Mitford, "that if any matter is
charged by the bill, which may avoid the bar created by the statute,
that matter mu t be denied generally, by way of averment in the
plea; and it mu t be denied particularly and expres ly, by way of
an wer to upport the plea." The rea on of the rule his lordship
tated to be, that the plaintiff was entitled, by e:xrnptions, to comp 1 the defendant to an wer preci ely to all the cases put in the bill
a exception to the tatute. In the next ca e, of Bayley v. Adams
( 6 Ve ey, 5 6), there wa a plea of the natute of limitations,
supported by an an wer, and the decision wa , that the plea was not
sufficiently upporled by the answer, becau e the charges in the
bill were not ufficiently an wered. There was a good deal of di cu ion in that case, on the point, whether the av rment.s meeting
the charge in the bill ought to be repeated in both plea and
an w r; and two deci ion in the Exchequer (Pope v. Bush, and
Edniundson v. Hartley, 1 An t. 59. 9 ) , which held, that if both
plea and an wer met and denied the same charges by the averment.s, the an wer would overrule the plea, were much que tioned.
I need not now enter into that discu ion; and even the Exchequer ca e were declared to be confined to awards. It eemed
to be admibted, throughout the ca e, that the answer, at least,
mu t contain a full and pa-rticular denial of the charges; and
perhap the better opinion is, that a general denial will be sufficient in the plea.
The result i , that a plea of the statute is bad, unless accompanied
with an an wer aiding and upporting it, by a particular denial
of all the fact and circum tanc charged in the bill and which
form an equitable bar to the plea of the tatute. The plea in thi~
ca e ha no uch accompanying an wer, and it mu t be overruled.
The u ual order in uch ca
i , that the pl a tand for an an wer,
with liberty to th plaintiff to exc pt; but in ome of the ca e
th pl a wa d clared to b overruled and th d fendant ordered
to an wer avin to him lf th lib rty to in i t on the tatute
in th an wer. That i the b tit r com e in thi ca c · for to order
th ple to tand for an an wer, with lib rty to th plaintiff to
except would b prolonging th liti ation a w may tak it for
O'rant d, from th palpabl in ufficiency of th pl a a an an w r,
that th plaintiff would ex· pt, and the defendant be finally comp 11 a to a full r an wer.
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I shall, therefore, overrule the 2)lea, with costs, and order the

defendant to answer in six weeks, when he will still have the

liberty of insisting on the benefit of the statute in his answer.

Order accordingly.

.

DE

211

1EYER

I ,. hall, ther fore, ov rrul th pl a, with o t , and order the
tl f •nc} nt t an w r in i v1 'k when he will till have the
f in i ting on the b 11 fit f the tatut in hi an w r.
Ord r accordingly.

Souzer v. De Meyer, 2 Paige Ch. (N. Y.) 57^. (1831

-,-Kr^y

^

This was an appeal from a decretal order of the late vice chan-

ouzer v. De Meyer,

cellor of the second circuit. The defendants plead the statute of

Paige Ch. (N. Y.) 574.

{1831 .)

limitations to the whole bill, and at the same time put in an answer

denying the whole equity thereof. The vice chancellor made an

order, declaring, among other things, that the statute did not

apply, and was no defence to the matters and charges contained

in the bill; and for that reason he overruled the plea, with liberty,

however, to the defendants to insist on the statute in their answer

as a defence.

The Chancellor:

It is a well settled principle of equity pleading, that the de-

fendant cannot plead and answer, or plead and demur, as to the
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same matter. If he pleads to any part of the bill, he asks the

judgment of the court whether the matters of the plea are not

sufficient to excuse him from answering so much of the bill as is

covered by the plea. Therefore, if he answers as to those matters

Tur wa an appeal from a decretal order of th late vice chanf h econd ircuit. Th defendan pl ad the tatute of
limitation , o the whol bill, and at the am tim put in an an w r
u nving the whole equity ther of. The vie chancellor made an
orcl r d claring, among oth r thing , that the tatute did not
appl · and wa no d f nee to th matter and charg contained
in the bill; and for that reason he overruled the plea, with liberty,
h v
r to the def ndants to insist on the statute in their an wer
a a d fenc .

11 r

N

which by his plea he has declined to answer, he overrules the plea ;

and if he demurs to any part of the bill, and also puts in a plea,

which is a special answer to the same part, the demurrer is over-

ruled. If he is willing to give the discovery sought by the bill,

and has any defence which might be pleaded in bar of the relief

sought, he will have the full benefit of such defence, if he sets it

up and insists upon it in his answer. This is always the better

course, where the expense of a full answer will not be great;

especially if there is any doubt as to his right to set up the par-

ticular defence by way of plea.

In some cases, where the complainant anticipate? the plea, and

sets up equitable circumstances in his bill to defeat the same, the

defendant is not only permitted, but actually required, to support

bis plea by an answer as to those equital)le circumstances. This,

however, is only an exception to the general rule ; and the answer

Trrn CrrA :rcELLOR:
It i a well ettl d principle of equity plea-ding, thiait the def ndant annot plead and an w r, or plead and demur, a to the
am matt r.
f h plead to any part of the bill, he a k the
ju 1Q1.n nt of the court whether the ma.tt r of the plea are not
uffi i nt to :x:cu e him from an wering o much of th bill as i
or r 1 b ' h plea. Therefor if he an wer a to tho e matter
whi h b r hi plea he ha d clined to an wer, he overrules the plea;
an 1 if h demur to any part of th bill, and al o puts in a pl a,
whi h i a p cial an w r to the am part, the demurrer i o errul d.
f h i willincr to criv th di covery oucrht b the bill,
anu ha an: def n whi h micrht be pleaded in bar of the reli f
~ou h 11 will h
th full b n :fit of u h def nee if he et it
up an 1 i1ri ~ tn up n it in hi an w r. Thi i alwa th b tt r
urs wh r th
xp
of a full an wer will not be gr at ;
l ially if ther i an' doubt a to hi right to et up the parti ular c1 fen b wa, ' of pl a.
In m a.. , wher th omplaimmt anti ipate the plea an
: L ll} quitahl ir um tan
in hi ill to d f at th am , the
cl fl'rnlnnt is n t onl~· I rmitt 1 but a tually r quir
t upp rt
hi. J l < hy al an. ' r a t tho
quitahl ir um tanc . Thi
how r r. i. only an · 1 ti on to the er nc1 ~ l rule; and th answ r
N
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is not put in as a defence, but to give the complainant the benefit

of a discovery to defeat the plea, which only contains a general

denial of the equitable circumstances. Even in that case the plea

does not profess to cover the discovery as to those particular allega-

tions in the bill. If they are admitted, or not fully denied by the

answer, it may be used, on the argument of the plea to counter-

prove the same. If they are denied, the complainant still has

an opportunity to contradict the general denial in the plea, and

the particular denial in the answer, by taking issue on the plea.

And if the plea is falsified by the proofs, the complainant will not

lose the benefit of his discovery as to the other matters in the bill,

but may still examine the defendant on interrogatories, if a dis-

covery is necessary. (Lube's Eq. PL 237, 335, 342. Mitf. 277,

302 ;-i Lond. ed.) In the case now under consideration, the de-

fendants have answered, as well as pleaded, to the whole of the

charges in the bill, although no equitable circumstances were set

up in anticipation of the plea. It is very evident, therefore, that

this plea is overruled by the answer.

If the plea was bad in form only, but good in substance, as to
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the whole, or any part of the relief sought by the bill, and was

not put in by the defendants in bad faith, the same should have

been permitted to stand as a part of their answer, or they should

have been allowed the full benefit of insisting upon the statute in

their answer. But as the order has been drawn up in this case,

although the defendants are to be permitted to insist upon the

statute in their answer as a defence, it is somewhat doubtful, at

least, whether they would not be precluded, on the final hearing,

by the preceding part of the order, which declares that the statute

is no defence to the matters and charges in the bill.

As to so much of the bill as seeks for a discovery and satisfac-

tion of that part of the legacies which was not charged upon the

land, I apprehend the statute would be a valid bar. The statute

of this state having given a concurrent remedy in this court and

in a court of law, to recover such legacies, it seems to follow that

if the statute would be a good bar in an action at law for the

legacy, it should be equally so on a bill filed in this court, for the

same kind of relief. W^iether the same principle would apply to

the legacies chargeable on the land, after the defendants had sub-

jected themselves to the payment thereof personally, or whether

the comjilainants can call for an account for the period of twenty

ANSWER TO SUPPORT PLEA

is not put in a a defence, but to give the complainant the benefit
of a di covery to defeat the plea, which only contains a general
denial of the equitable circumstances. Even in that case the plea
doe not profe to cover the discovery a to tho e particular allegation in the bill. If they are admitted, or not fully denied by the
an wer, it may be u ed, on the argument of the plea to counterprove the am . If they are denied, the complainant still has
an opportunity to contradict the general denial in the plea, and
the particular denial in the an w r, by taking i ue on the plea.
And if the plea is fal ified by the proofs, the complainant will not
lo e the benefit of hi di covery as to the other matters in the bill,
but may till examine the defendant on interrogatorie , if a discovery i nece ary. (Lube' Eq. Pl. 237, 335, 3±2. Mitf. 277,
302; -± Land. ed.) In the ca e now under con ideration, the defendants have answered, a well as pleaded, to the whole of the
charge in the bill, although no equitable circumstances were set
up in anticipation of the plea. It is very evident, therefore, that
thi plea i overruled by the answer.
If the plea was bad in form only, but good in uibstance, as to
the whole, or any part of the relief ought by the bill, and was
not put in by the defendants in bad faith, the ame should have
been permitted to stand as a part of their answer, or they hould
have been allowed the full benefit of in i ting upon the statute in
their an wer. But as the order has been drawn up in thi ca e,
although the defendants are to be permitted .to insi t upon the
statute in their an wer a a defence, it is somewhat doubtful, at
lea t, whether they would not be precluded, on the final hearing,
by the preceding part of the order, which decla·re that the tatute
i no defence to the matters and charge in the bill.
A to o much of the bill a eek for a di covery and sati faction of that part of the legacie which was not charged upon the
land I appr hend the tatute would be a valid bar. The tatute
of thi tate having given a concurrent remedy in thi court and
in a court of law, to r eco er uch le acie , it eem to follow that
if th ~tatut would be a good bar in an action at law for the
l gacy, it hould be equall o on a bill filed in thi court for the
am kind of r lief. "711 th r th ame principle would apply to
th lega ·i
hargeable on th land a·f ter the defendant had ubto th pa ment th r f per anally or whether
j ct d them l
th om lainant an call for an a count for the riod of tw nty

D
D WIGHT V. Ry. Co. 213

years in analogy to the limitation of actions at law to recover the

possession of real estate, are questions not necessary to be decided

on this informal plea. Those questions can be discussed more

profitable at the hearing, when all the facts are before the court.

I think the order of the vice chancellor should be so modified

as to strike out that part thereof which declares that the statute

does not apply, and is no defence to the matters and charges in the

bill. So as to leave the whole question, as to the merits of that

defence, open for discussion at the hearing, if the defendants think

proper to amend their answer, and insist upon the statute as a bar

to all or any part of the complainant's claim. The costs on this

appeal must abide the event of the suit. And as the present vice

chancellor of the second circuit was formerly counsel in the cause,

the further proceedings in the case must be had before the chan-

cellor; the defendants to have thirty days, after notice of this

decision, to file a supplemental answer by way of amendment for

the purpose of insisting upon the statute.

Dwight V. By. Co., 9 Fed. Rep. 785. {1881.)

Wheeler, D. J.:
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Tlie orators, who are stockholders to a large amount in the

Vermont & Canada Railroad Company, and citizens of Xew York,

New Hampshire, and Rhode Island, bring this bill in behalf of

themselves and all other stockholders having like interests with

IGIIT

.

RY.

213

o.

years in analogy to the li ita ion of action at law to r ecover the
po e ion of real tate, are qu tion not n c ary t-0 be decided
on thi informal plea. 'Iho
qu tion can be di cus ed more
I rofitable at the hearing, wh n all the fa t a·r e before he court.
I think the ord r of th vie chan ellor hould be o modified
a to trike out that part thereof which d clare ..hat the tatute
Lloe no · pply, and i no d f nee to th matter and cha-rge in the
Lill.
o a to 1 ave the whole que tion, a to the merit of that
def nee, open for di u ion ait the hearing, if the defendants think
prop r to amend their an wer, and in i t upon th statute a ai bar
t all or any part of the complainant' claim. The co ts on this
app al mu t abide th event of the uit. And a the pre ent vice
hancellor of the econd circuit wa formerly coun el in the cau e,
the furth r proceed.in in the case mu t be had before the chanellor; the defendant to have thirty day , after notice of thi ·
deci ion to file a uppl mental an wer by way of amendment for
th purpo e of in i ting upon the taJtute.

them, not citizens of Vermont, Massachusetts, or Maine, against

the directors of that corporation, citizens of Massachusetts and

Pennsylvania, alleging that they refuse to take legal measures to

protect the rights of the orators, and against the Central Vermont

Railroad Company, in possession, and the Vermont Central Railroad

Company, lessee of, and the other defendants, security-holders,

Dwight v. Ry.

Co .~

9 Fed. Rep. '785.

(1881.)

claiming liens upon the Vermont & Canada Railroad, all citizens of

Vermont, Massachusetts, and Maine, to recover the possession of

llEELER,

D. J.:

that road for the Vermont & Canada Railroad Company.

The Central Vermont Railroad Company pleads that it is in

possession as a receiver of the court of chancer}- of Franklin county,

and of the state of Vermont, and the proceedings upon which its

possession took place are set forth.

Th orato
who are tockholders t-0 a large amount in the
\ ermont & anada Railroad Company, and citizen of ew York,
.. ew Hamp"hire, and hode I land, bring thi bill in behalf of
th=>m_ lv and all oth r tockholder having like interests with
th m not itizen of Vermont, :Ma achu ett , or Maine, again t
the direct
of that corporation, citizen of Ma: achusetts and
nn. ylYania alleo-ing tha·t the refu to take legal mea ure to
pr t t th righ of the orator , and again t the entral ermont
,ailroad ompany in po ~
ion and the\ ermont entral Railroad
ompan · 1 ~ ee of and th other def ndant , e urit ·-holders
·laimin0 Ii n upon th
rmont T anada Railroad all citizen of
... ' rm nt ~Ia a hu ett and :Main , to reco r the po e ion f
that r ad f th
rmont ,. anada Railroad ompany.
ntral Y rmont ailroad ompany plead that it i in
po· ~ ,., ~ ion a a r cei r f th
ourt of chanc ry of ranklin coun y
and of th ~t t of ... rmont an 1 the proce din ~ upon which it
po . . i n t k I lace ar
t f rth.
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John Gregory Smith pleads that security-holders, of the same

class as those made defendants, have brought proceedings in behalf

of themselves, and all others like security-holders, against the

Vermont & Canada Railroad Company, in the same court of chan-

cery, to establish and enforce their security upon this road, in which

a decision favorable to the validity of their lien has been made by

the supreme court of the state, and which are now pending in the

court of chancery to ascertain the amounts of, and facts concerning,

the different classes of securities; and these proceedings are set

forth.

Worthington C. Smith pleads that the Vermont & Canada Eail-

road Company brought a suit like this, and for the same relief, in

the same court of chancery, and through its directors, by precon-

cert with the orators, discontinued the same that this suit might be

lirought to evade the proper jurisdiction of the state court, and

confer a seeming, but unreal, jurisdiction upon this court, in

pursuance of which this suit was brought; and denying that the

directors have violated their duty, committed any breach of trust,

or done otherwise than as requested by the orators.
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Jed P. Clark pleads that the orators did not, before bringing this

bill, in good faith request the directors to take legal measures to

protect their rights, but that by the planning, suggestion, and re-

quest of the directors, and concert and arrangement made between

them and the orators for the sake of escaping from the jurisdiction

of the state court, to which the jurisdiction of right belonged,

and to confer upon this court a seeming jurisdiction not real or of

right, a simulated and unreal pretence of request and refusal were

made, and that this suit is prosecuted by the Vermont & Canada

Railroad Company, in the name of the orators, for the common

benefit of them all, and denying that there has been any such

refusal by the directors as amounts in legal effect to a breach of

trust.

The Vermont Central Railroad Company sets out by plea that

there were when this bill was brought, and are now, divers and

sundry stockholders of the Vermont & Canada Railroad Company,

citizens of Vermont, Massachusetts, and Maine, whose names are

known to and ascertainable by the oratoi-s, and not by the defend-

ant, and demurs to the bill for want of the necessary parties.

None of these pleas is supported by answer. All of them, and the

ANS\YER TO SUPPORT PLEA

John Gregory Smith plead that ecurity-holders, of the same
cla s a tho e mad defendant , have brought proceedings in behalf
of them lve , and all other like security-holders, against the
rmont & Canada Railroad Company, in the same court of chanc ry, to e tabli h and enforce their security upon this road, in which
a deci ion favorable to the validity of their lien has been made by
the supr me court of the state, and which are now pending in the
court of chancery to ascertain the amounts of, and fact concerning,
the different cla es of securitie ; and these proceedings are set
forth.
\Yorthington C. Smith pleads that the Vermont & Canada Railroad Company brought a suit like this, and for the same relief, in
the same court of chancery, and through its directors, by preconcert with the orators, discontinued the same that this suit might be
hrought to evade the proper jurisdiction of the state court, and
ronfer a seeming, but unreal, juri diction upon this court, in
pursuance of which this suit was brought; and denying that the
directors have violated their duty, committed any breach of trust,
or done otherwise than as reque ted by the orators.
J d P. Clark pleads that the orators did not, before bringing this
bill, in good faith request the directors to take legal measures to
protect their rights, but that by the planning, suggestion, and req ie t of the directors, and concert and arrangement made between
them and the orators for the sake of escaping from the jurisdiction
of the state court, to which the jurisdiction of right belonged,
and to confer upon this court a seeming jurisdiction not real or of
right, a simulated and unreal pretence of request and refusal were
mad , and that thi suit is prosecuted by the Vermont & Canada
Railroad Company, in the name of the orators, for the common
benefit of them all, and denying that there has been any such
refu al by the director as amount in legal effect to a breach of
trust.
The Vermont Central Railroad Company et out by plea that
ther w r wh n thi bill wa brought, and are now, diver and
·undry tockholder of the V rrnont & anada Railroad ompany,
itiz n of V rmont, Ma achu tt , and Maine, who narn are
known to an l a crtainabl by th orato1 , and not by th d fondant, and d mur to th bill for want of th n ce ary parti .
None of th e pl a i upported by an w r. All of them, and the
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demurrer, have been argued. They may properly be considered in

the inverse order of their statement.

The last one, that of the Vermont Central Eailroad Company, is

not in the proper form and sufficient, even if the fact that there

were stockholders, citizens of Vermont, Massachusetts, or Maine,

not invited to take part in the prosecution of the suit, would defeat

it. In such cases the defendant should, at law, give the plaintiif a

better writ, by setting out the name and identifying the party

whose existence is alleged to create a fatal non-joinder, so that the

plaintiff may traverse the allegation and form a definite issue to

be tried, or discontinue and bring a new suit, joining the proper

parties, upon the information given. The rules of pleading are the

same in equity as at law, unless the reasons of them are varied

by the different methods of procedure. There is no reason growing

out of the proceedings in equity for varying this rule. The orators

have the right to have the names of the stockholders, if there are

any in tliose states whose existence would defeat the suit, set forth,

so that they could traverse the existence of the persons or the fact

of their being stockholders. They could not do that upon these
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allegations. There is no person named whom they may say is not

a stockholder, or about whom they may say there is no such person.

A traverse of the plea in its terms would put in issue what the

orators know that the defendants do not know about the stock-

holders in those states. It would be quite singular if a suit should

be abated at the instance of defendants on account of the supposed

existence of persons whom they cannot name or identify. The

want of such persons as parties is not likely to harm them. Hotel

Co. V. Wade, 97 U. S. 13.

The pleas of Clark and Worthington C. Smith are to the same

effect, and so nearly alike that they may well be considered to-

gether. They have been spoken of in argument as pleas to the

jurisdiction of the court, or to the ability of the orators to brin""

suit, or as pleas in abatement otherwise; but, correctly speaking,

they are not either. Tlie orators and defendants are alleged in the

bill to be citizens of different states. This fact gives the court

jurisdiction of the controversy between them, and enables the

oratoi-s to bring the suit, and to maintain it if they can establish

their case. The refusal of the directors is a part of their case

wliicli they must establish, and not a fact on which the jurisdiction

of tlie court, or their ability to sue, at all depends. If they can
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establish the fact of refusal, together with the other facts necessary

to make out a case for the relief asked, then they have a case

on which they can rest; otherwise, not. They have the right to

a full answer and discovery from the defendants as to their whole

case, this part as well as the rest, unless there is some outside fact

which would show that they have no right to maintain the suit

at all; or some single fact on which the whole case depends is

objected to by plea, and full answer and discovery are made to that

part of the case. Pure and proper pleas in equity were such as set

up some fact outside of the bill which would show that the bill

should not be answered at all. These pleas required no answer to

support them, for they would not be included in that which the

party was called upon to answer. Anomalous pleas, denying a

single part of the case, may, by the bill on which the whole case

depended, come to be allowed, for convenience, to save trying the

whole case, when the failure of tliat part would be fatal, and for

safety against enforced discovery in a suit by those not in any

manner entitled to the discovery; but, as the ground of the plea

would be included in what the defendant was called upon to
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answer, he could not avoid the right to have at least that part

answered by merely pleading to it. He must answer that, although

the plea raising the objection and the answer supporting it might

show that no answer to the rest of the case ought to be required.

If this plea should be allowed, the orators would be deprived of the

discovery on oath to which they are entitled, as to this part of the

case, as evidence upon the traverse of the plea, if they should

traverse it, as they would have a right to do. This would be con-

trary to sound principles and to authority. Story, Eq. PL § 372 ef

seq. These views are not contrary to the decision in Memphis v.

Dean, 8 Wall. 64, cited and much relied upon in behalf of the de-

fendants. There was an answer by the party pleading, as well as

the plea, denying refusal of the directors to prosecute, and the

cause appears to have been decided in both courts in chief, and not

upon the plea alone.

The plea of John Gregory Smith depends solely upon the effect

of the pendency of the suit in the state court of chancery in favor

of himself and other security-holders, of which James E. Langdon

is the foremost plaintiff in the title to the suit against the Vermont

& Canada Pailroad Company, through whose rights the orators here

make claim. Doubts have been entertained by this court and some
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e tablish the fact ~f refusal, together with the other facts neces ary
to make out a case for the relief asked, then they have a case
on which they can rest; otherwise, not. They have the right to
a full an wer and discovery from the defendants as to their whole
ca e, thi part a well as the rest, unles there is some outside fact
which would sho·w that they have no right to maintain the suit
at all ; or some single fact on which the whole case depends is
objected to by plea, and full answer and discovery are made to that
part of the case. Pure and proper pl as in equity were such as set
up ome fact outside of the bill which would how that the bill
hould not be answered at all. These pleas required no answer to
suppor t them, for they would not be included in that which the
party was called upon to answer. Anomalous pleas, denying a
single part of the case, may, by the bill on which the whole case
depended, come to be allowed, for conv nience, to save trying the
whole case, when the fail.lure of that part would be fatal, and for
afety against enforced discovery in a suit by tho e not in any
manner entitled to the discovery; but, as the ground of the plea
would be included in what the defendant was called upon to
answer, he could not avoid the right to ha·ve at least that part
answered by merely pleading to it. He must answer that, although
the plea rai ing the objection and the answer supporting it might
show that no answer to the rest of the case ought to be required.
If this plea should be aUowed, the orators would be deprived of the
discovery on oath to which they are entitled, as to this part of the
case, as evidence upon the traver e of the plea, if they should
traverse it, as they would have a right to do. This would be contrary to ound principles and to authority. Story, Eq. Pl. § 372 et
seq. The e view are not contrary to the decision in Memphi,s v.
Dean, 8 Wall. 64, cited and much relied upon in behalf of the defendant . There was an answer by the party pleading, as well as
the plea, denying refusal of the dir tor to pro cute, and th'
cau e appears t have b en decided in both court in chi f, and not
upon the pl a alone.
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others as to whether the pendency of a suit in a state or federal

court in the same district might not be successfully pleaded to the

further prosecution of a like suit in the other court, and this court

inclined to the opinion that it could be. Mercantile Trust Co. v.

Lamoille VaUcy R. Co., 16 Blatchf. 324; Andrews v. Smith, 5 Fed.

Kep. 833. But it now seems to be well settled that it cannot be.

Gordon v. Gilfoil, 99 U. S. 168; Latham v. Chafee, 7 Fed. Rep.

520. If this were not so it has always been held that, in order to

have the mere pendency of one suit defeat another, the suits must

be between the same parties, or their representatives, upon the same

facts, and for the same relief. \Yatson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679. A

very slight examination and comparison of the two cases will show

that they are not brought upon the same facts nor for the same

relief. The plea is pleaded to the whole bill. According to l>oth

bills the Central Vermont Railroad Company is in ]X)ssession of the

road. In that case it is an orator as a security-holder seeking to

hold the road as security for its pay. This particular defendant is

a defendant there admitting the right of the Central Vermont Rail-

road Company. That is essentially a bill of foreclosure by security-
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holders in possession. Tlie decree would ordinarily be that those

interested must pay or be foreclosed of all right to redeem. The

decree could go no further than to cut off their right if they should

not redeem. If they should redeem, the possession would remain

to be maintained by any other right which the possessor might have

or claim to have, so far as it would prevail. Another suit would

be necessary to determine the rights of the Vermont & Canada

Railroad Company and its stockholders as to everj-thing but the

foreclosure. In this suit the right to the road is attempted to be

maintained outside of the right to redeem. If this plea should

prevail there would be no suit left in which that right could be

tried.

Tlie plea of the Central Vermont Railroad Company raises the

most important questions of any of these pleas, and has received

such careful consideration as its importance has seemed to demand.

The bill alleges that this defendant is in posseesion of the road

without right, and against the right of the Vermont & Canada

Ixailroad Company and of the orators. This plea asserts that it was

placed in possession by the court of chancery of Franklin county to

run, operate, and manage the road under the decree and orders

theretofore made, and under the direction of the court, so lono- as
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it should contiime to act as such receiver and manager, and denies

that it is in possession without right, and that it ought to be com-

pelled to surrender its possession to the Vermont & Canada Railroad

Company, and prays judgment whether it ought to answer further.

The proceedings upon which it was placed in possession show that

certain persons were, in regular course, made receivers of this road,

with other railroad property, to operate the roads, and out of the

income to pay the rent to the Vermont & Canada Railroad Com-

pany ; that pursuant to an agreement between the parties, according

to its terms embodied in a decree, the then receivers continued to

operate the roads according to the provisions of the agreement and

decree, by which they were to operate them and apply the income

to the payment of the rent ; then to the payment of the first-mort-

gage bonds of the Vermont Central Railroad; then to the second-

mortgage bonds of the Vermont Central Railroad; and then to

pay it to the Vermont Central Railroad Company; and that upon

the joint petition of those receivers and their successors, and the

Central Vermont Railroad Company, a decree was made by which

the Central Vermont Railroad Company was placed in possession
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in their stead.

The orators claim that the prior possessors had lost their right to

this road through their non-payment of rent, and that the transfer

to the Central Vermont Railroad Company was merely a transfer by

one to the other, although sanctioned by the court, and that the

transferee took no greater or different rights than the transferors

had. The defendants claim that the transfer was ordered by the

court; that the rights of the Central Vermont Railroad Company,

under the transfer, cannot be inquired into anywhere except in that

court ; and that they are valid everywhere else against all claimants.

The right of the orators, denied by the plea, is the same which they

set up and seek to enforce by their bill, and which they claim to

have tried and determined upon the answer of the defendants in

the usual course. As stated before, the parties are citizens of dif-

ferent states, and this is a suit in which there is a controversy

between them, and which those bringing it have the right to have

determined in this court, unless there is some unusual reason for

turning them out of court.

As said by Mr. Justice Campbell in Hyde v. Stone, 30 How. 170 :

"But the courts of the United States are bound to proceed to judg-

ment, and to afford redress to suitors before them, in every case to

A_
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it should con7,inue to act as uch receiver and manager, and denies
that it i in po session without right, and that it ought to be compelled to urrender its po se sion to the Vermont & Canada Railroad
Company, and prays judgment whether it ought to answer further.
The proce dings upon which it wa placed in posse ion show that
certain person were, in regular course, made receivers of this road,
with other railroad property, to operate the roads, and out of the
income to pay the rent to the Vermont & Canada Railroad Company; that pursuant to an agreement between the partie , accordiI).g
to its terms embodied in a decree, the then receivers continued to
operate the road according to the provi ions of the agreement and
decree, by which they were to operate them and apply the income
to the payment of the rent; then to the payment of the :first-mortgage bond of the Vermont Central Railroad; th n to the secondmortgage bond of the Vermont Central Railroad ; and then to
pay it to the Vermont Central Railroad Company; and that upon
the joint petition of those receivers and their successor , and the
Central Vermont Railroad Company, a decree wa made by which
the Central Vermont Railroad Company was placed in pos es ion
in their stead.
T'he orators claim that the prior pos e ors had lost their rig1t to
this road through their non-payment of rent, and that the transfer
to the Central Vermont Railroad Company was merely a transfer by
one to the other, although sanctioned by the court, and that the
tran feree took no greater or different rights than the transferors
had. The defendants claim that the tran fer wa ordered by the
court; that the rights of the Cenrtral Vermont Railroad Company,
under the transfer, cannot be inquired into anywhere except in that
court; and that they are valid everywhere el e again tall claimants.
The right of th orator , denied by the plea, is the ame which they
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which their jurisdiction extends. They cannot abdicate their

authority or duty in any case in favor of another jurisdiction/'

This is not a mere matter of abatement; it goes to the right, and

none the less because the right of the defendant may rest upon an

order of the court. The order of court, whatever its effect is, may

be discharged before any decision is reached, and, if it should be,

the rights of the parties otherwise would still remain to be deter-

mined. If it should not be, but should remain in force, whatever

right it should give to any party, or whatever immunity from

interference it should afford, could be maintained and upheld. If

that should be the defendant's title, and it should be found to be

good, it would prevail. There would be no conflict between courts,

for all rights acquired through the state court, and all protection

furnished by the authority of that court, would be respected.

There is no sound reason apparent why these rights may not stand

for trial according to the usual course, the same as rights acquired

by contract, or in any other mode. On principle this seems to be

the proper course. And there is not any case shown by counsel,

or which has been seen by the court, among the many wherein
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rights acquired under legal proceedings have come up for adjudica-

tion, in which the decision has been made otherwise than in chief.

In Ilagan v. Lucas, 10 Pet. -iOO, where the title of a sheriff to

property seized by him and receipted was upheld against a marshal

of the United States, who seized it subsequently, the trial was upon

the merits of these respective rights. So in Brown v. Clarhe, 4

How. 4, and in Pulliam v. Oshorne, 17 How. 471. And in Taylor

V. Carry], 20 How. 583, where the question was as to the right of a

state seizure, as against proceedings in admiralty, the trial was

not upon any plea denying the right to interfere, but was upon

the title acquired through the proceedings.

In Freeman v. Howe, 24 How. 450, the right of a mortgagee to

personal property taken by the marshal, on process against the

mortgagor, was tried on replevin in chief. So similar rights were

tried in an action of trespass in Buck v. Colhath, 3 Wall. 334.

And in Wisivell v. Sampson, 14 How. 52, the right acquired by the

levy of a marshal upon property in possession of a receiver was

tried upon ejectment on the merits.

In Pond V. Vermont Valley 7?. Co., 12 Blatchf. 292, the question

of this same receivership was raised, but not until after the decision

reported, and upon the hearing before Circuit Judge Johnson on

v.
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o in Brown . Clarke, 4
ow. ±, and in Pulliam . Osborne, 1 How. 4 1. And in Taylor
v. arryl, 0 How. 5 3, where the que tion wa a to the right of a
~tat
izure, a again t proceeding in admiralty the trial wa
n t upon any pl a d nying the right to interfere, but wa upon
th title a quired through the proceeding .
In Free11ian . Howe, 4 ow. ±50 the right of a mortga e to
p r anal rap rt ' tak n b the mar hal on proc
a ain t the
o imilar ri <Th were
m rtO'a or a tri d on r pl vin in hief.
lri a in an acti n of tr pa in Buck . Colbath 3 Wall. 33±.
. .\n 1 in 1 i,swell . amp on, 1± ow.
the right acquired b · th
1 "· f a marhal upon prop rt ' in po..
ion of a recei r wa
Lri d upo
j tment on the merit .
In Pond .
o., 12 Blatchf. 9· th qu tion
f thi am r fr r hip wa rai e but not un il after the de ision
r port c1 and up n th hearincr b f
obn on on
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answers and proofs, and it was disposed of as not affecting the

rights of the parties to the property involved, nor the jurisdiction

of the court over the case.

Attention has been particularly called to the provisions of section

5 of the act of March 3, 1875, to determine the jurisdiction of the

circuit courts, etc.; 18 St. at Large, 470 (Supt. Rev. St. 175),

enacting :

"That if, in any suit commenced in a circuit court, or removed

from a state court to a circuit court of the United States, it shall

appear to the satisfaction of said circuit court, at any time after

such suit has been brought or removed thereto, that such suit does

not really and substantially involve a dispute or controversy prop-

erly within the jurisdiction of said circuit court, or that the parties

to said suit have been improperly or collusively made or joined,

either as plaintiffs or defendants, for the purpose of creating a case

cognizable or removable under this act, the said circuit court shall

proceed no further therein, but shall dismiss the suit or remand

it to the court from which it was removed, as justice may require,

and shall make such order as to costs as shall be just," etc.
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Speaking of this section, Johnson, J., in Warner v. Pennsylvania

B. Co., 13 Blatchf. 231, said : "All that is necessary to bring the

case really and substantially within the jurisdiction is, that it in-

volves a controversy of the character, either as to the subject-matter

or the parties, specified in either the section which defines the juris-

diction by original suit, or that which authorizes removal, and the

acquisition of jurisdiction in that manner." As before stated and

shown, the parties to this suit are citizens of different states, and

the suit is one of which this court has jurisdiction for that reason,

if the orators can make out the ease presented by their bill, includ-

ing the refusal of the directors to prosecute as a part of their case ;

if they cannot they have no case. That part of their case, as also

before shown, has not been denied in the necessary manner by

answer to be effective to defeat the case upon that point, and there

is no evidence before the court, upon that or any other point, to

make it appear at all that parties have been either improperly or

collusively made or joined for the purpose of creating a case within

the jurisdiction. There is nothing before the court now on which

the court is authorized to act under the provisions of that section.

The pleas and demurrer are overruled ; the defendants to answer

over by the first day of next term.

ANSWER TO SUPPORT PLEA

an wers and proof , and it was di posed of as not affecting the
rights of the parties to the property involved, nor the jurisdiction
of the coul't over the case.
Attention ha been particularly called to the provisions 0f section
5 of the act of Ma-rch 3, 187 5, to determine the jurisdiction of the
circuit courts, etc.; 18 St. at Large, 470 (Supt. Rev. St. 175),
enacting:
''That if, in an3 uit commenced in a circuit court, or removed
from a tate court to a circuit court of the United States, it shall
appear to the satisfaction of said circuit court, at any time after
uch suit has been brought or removed thereto, that such suit does
not really and ub tantially involve a di pute or controversy properly within the jurisdiction of aid circuit court, or that the parties
to aid suit have been improperly or collu ively made or joined,
either as plaintiffs or defendants, for the purpo e of creating a ca e
cognizable or removable under this act, the aid circuit court shall
proceed no further therein, but shall di mi the suit or remand
it to the court from which it was removed, a ju tice may require,
and shall make such order as to costs as shall be ju t," etc.
Speaking of this ection, John on, J., in Warner v. Pennsylvania
R . Co ., 13 Blatchf. 231, said : "All that i nece sary to bring the
ca e really and ub tantially within the juri diction is, that it involves a controver y of the character, either a to the subject-matter
or the partie , peci:fied in either the ection which defines the jurisdiction by original uit, or that which authorize removal, and the
acquisition of juri diction in that manner." As before stated and
hown, the parti to thi uit are citizen of different tates, and
the suit i one of which this court ha juri diction for that rea on,
if the orator can make out the case pr ented by their bill, including the refu al of the directors to pro ecute a a part of their case;
if they cannot they have no ca e. That part of their ca e, a al o
befor ·hown, ha not been denied in th neces ary manner by
an wer to be effe tive to defeat the ca e upon that point, and th re
i no vidence b fore th court upon that or any other point, to
make it app ar at all that parti hav b n ither improperly or
collu i ly mad or join d for th purpo e of creati g a ca e within
th juri diction. Th r i nothinO' b f re the court now on which
the court i authorized to act und r th provi ion of that ection.
Th pl a an 1 d murr r are overruled; the defenda:n to an wer
over l y th e :th . da of n xt term.

HOLT \".
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Answer.

Holt V. Daniels, 01 Vt. 89. (18S8.)

A

WER.

This was a suit in chancery. Tlie bill alleges that some time pre-

viously the orator had bought of the defendant a colt, for which

he had given the defendant his note with the condition that the

Holt . Daniel, Gl

l. 89.

{1888.)

colt should be the property of the defendant until the note was

fully paid; that since the giving of said note there had been

other deal between them, and that there was due the orator a

large balance from the defendant, more than sufficient to dis-

charge the balance of the note, and that if upon an accounting

between them anything should be found due from the orator, he

was ready and willing to pay such balance to the defendant;

that the defendant for the purpose of embarrassing the orator

had begun a suit in trover against him for the conversion of the

said colt, and that such suit was then pending; that since the

giving of said note the orator had taken the farm of the defend-

ant to carry on upon shares, under a written memorandum, and

that the defendant was largely liable to the orator under such

written memorandum, but that the same was in the possession of
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the defendant, who refused to exhibit to the orator, or to settle

with him, and allow him the amount his due; that in the mak-

ing of the said farm trade he had been largely damnified by the

false representations of the defendant; that he had taken pos-

session of the defendant's farm, and carried on the same, and

that the defendant utterly refused to account to him in the prem-

ises; praying that an account be taken between the parties, and

that if upon such an accounting there is any balance due the

defendant upon said note, the orator may be allowed to pay the

same and redeem the colt, and that the suit at law be perpetually

enjoined.

Tlie answer admitted the making of the farm trade, and set

out the contract in cxtenso: denied that there was any lialanee

diK' tlie orator on it, or that tlie note secured by lien on the colt

had l>cen paid; insisted that the orator had a complete remedy

at law, and that therefore the court had no jurisdiction.

Tlie case was referred to a master who reportcxl with reference

Thi \ a a uit in hanc ry. Th bill alleg that om time preYiou 1 th orator had bought of th d f ndant a · lt, for whi ·h
h · had gi n th d f ndant hi not with the ondition that th·
ol hould be the prop rty of th defendant until the not wa
fully paid· that in
th ai1ing of aid not th r had been
other d al b tw n th m, and that there wa du th orator a
lar
balan
from th defendant, more than uffici nt to di th balan of th not and that if upon an accounting
n th m anything hould b found due from the orator he
wa r ady and willing to pay u h balanc to the def ndant;
that th d f ndant for the purpo e of mbarra ing the orator
hacl be 0 un a uit in trover again t him for th conv r ion of the
aicl alt and thait u h uit wa th n pending · that ince the
criying f aid not the orator had tak n th farm of the d f ndant to arry on upon har
und r a written memorandum and
that the d fendant wa laraely liable to the orator und r u h
writt n m morandum but that the ame wa in the p
ion of
th d f ndant, who refu ed to exhibit to h orator or to ettle
with him and allow him the amount hi due; that in the makincr of th aid farm trad h had b en laraely damnified by the
Ial r pr entation of the d f ndant · that he had taken p .. ~ ion of th d f ndant farm and arried on the ame and
Urn l the 1 f ndant utt rl · r fu d to aiccount to him in the pr mi~ ·; I raying that an a aunt be tak n b tween th partie
an
that if u1 n u h an a untina th re i any balan e du th
cl ,f ndant u1 n ai 1 not th orator may b allo11 d to pa_ th
. am nncl r d em th alt and that th uit at law b p rpetually
nj in d.
1"'1.1 an:-;wcr admitt 1 th makin()' of th farm trad an
t
ut th
ntract in e. ·ten o · 1 ni d that th r wa an· alan
dn L' lh' rat r on it r that th n t
ur d y li n n th
1t
h;H1 1 11 pail· in:-;i, l l that t11C' rat r hal a mpl t r Ill dy
at law, ( 11 l that th I' r r th
url had n juri di ti 11.
Th
wa r f rr d t a ma l r who r port cl 'lith r . , f r n e

~22

:<J22 Answer

to the circumstances under which the farm was leased and colt

sold as follows:

"A few days before the lease was executed but when the con-

tract was in contemplation, the defendant sold to the orator a

four-year-old horse colt at an agreed price of $116 and took from

him his promissory note therefor and reserved a conditional lien

on said colt for the security of the payment of said note by the

orator.

I lind that it was the express understanding and agreement

between the parties at the time this conditional sale was made

and the note given by the orator, they then having in view the

farm trade for the ensuing year, that the orators share of the

money that should be derived from the sale of butter produced

on the farm, when it should be sold in the fall of the ensuing

year, should be applied first to the payment of this note, and

that the orator and defendant both so understood it."

When the butter was so sold, there was more than enough of

the orator^s share to extinguish the note, and the orator desired

that it should be so applied, but the defendant refused to so
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apply it, and claimed to retain it as security for the fulfilment

of the terms of the lease on the part of the orator."

With reference to items 42 and 43 the master reported:

"If in the opinion of the court the orator can recover dam-

ages in this suit for the false representations made by the de-

fendant to the orator as to the productiveness of said farm,

then I find that the difference between what the farm was repre-

sented to be and what it really was, amounts to the sum allowed

on these two items, $118, and that they should he disallowed

to the defendant ; but if in the opinion of the court such damages

cannot be recovered by the orator in this suit, then said items

should be allowed as designated above."

There had been other deal between the parties, and as a result

of the entire accounting the master found that, allowing items

42 and 43, there would be due the defendant the sum of $75.02,

March 1, 1884; that disallowing said items, there would be due

the orator on said date the sum of $42.98.

The defendant had demanded the colt of the orator, and on

his refusal to surrender the same, had begun a suit against the

orator in trover for its conversion, which was then pending.

The master further reported that the defendant insisted at the

ANSWER

to the circum tance under which the farm wa lea ed and colt
~old

a follow :
A few day before the lease was executed but when the contract wa in contemplation, the defendant old to the orator a
four- ea·r-old hor e colt at an aO'reed price of $116 and took from
him hi promi ory note therefor and reserv d a conditional lien
on said colt for the security of the payment of aid note by the
orator.
I find that it wa the expr
understanding and agreement
between the parties at the time thi conditional sale was made
an l the note given by the orator, they then having in view the
farm trade for the en uing year, that the orator's share of the
money that hould be derived from the ale of butter produced
on the :farm, when it hould be old in the fall of the ensuing
year, hould be applied first to the payment of this note, and
that the orator and defendant both so under toad it."
When the butter was so old, there was more than enough of
th orator's hare to extingui h the note, and the orator desired
that it hould be so applied, but the defendant refused to so
apply it, and claimed to retain it as security for the fulfilment
of the term of the lea e on the part of the orator."
With reference to items 42 and 43 the master reported:
"If in the opinion of the court the orator can recover da.mage in thi suit for the fal e repre entations made by the defendant to the orator a to the productivene s of said farm,
then I find that the difference between what the farm wa represented to be and what it really was, amounts to the sum allowed
on the e two item , $118, and that they hould be di allowed
to the d fendant; but if in the opinion of the court such lamages
cannot be recovered by the orator in thi uit, then said items
should be allow d a de ignat d abov ."
There had b n other deal between the parti s, and a a r sult
of the entire accounting the ma ter found that, allowing items
there would be due the d fendant th um of $75.0'2,
42 and
March 1, 18 4; that di allowino- aid item , th re would be due
th orator on aid date th um of $-±2.98.
The d f ndant had dema-nd d th ·colt of the orator, and on
hi refu al to urr nd r th ame had begun a uit against the
orator in trover for it onve ion, which wa then p nding.
The ma t r furth r repmt d that the defendant in i ted at the
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earliest possible moment before him, that this suit could not be

maintained for the reason that the orator had a complete remedy

at law.

To this report the defendant filed exceptions, and the case

was heard at the March Term, 1888, Washington County, Rowell,

Chancellor, upon the pleadings, report and exceptions thereto,

whereupon it was ordered that the l)ill be dismissed. Appeal by

the orator.

Powers, J.:

•arlie t p ible mom nt befor him) that thi uit could not be
rna:intain d for th r a on ih t th rator had a compl te r rn dy
at Jaw.
To thi r p rt th d f ndant
x ·eption ) and the ase
wa heard .a t th far h T rm) 1
a hington ounty) ow 11,
1
ban ell r upon th pl adings r port and . c ption th r to)
wh r up n it wa ord r d that the bill be di mi ed.
ppeal 1 y
th orator.

The defendant, by a demurrer interposed into his answer, raises

the question of the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the bill.

The propriety of this mode of pleading has been considered of

late, and the effort has been to adhere to the rules of pleading laid

down in the text books and best considered eases.

The respective functions of a dennirrer and an answer are

entirely distinct and one cannot take the place of the other.

The answer serves the double pur])ose of pleading and evidence.

So far as it sets up matter as a bar it is a pleading. So far as

it serves the complainant's ]nirpose by discovering facts, it is a
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deposition. If the defendant would waive making an answer,

he may demur or plead. The object of a demurrer or plea, as

a general rule, is to excuse the defendant from answering the

bill on its merits. Both are dilatory pleadings, a demurrer being

proper if the fault of the complainant's case is apparent from the

face of the bill, and a plea being proper if the fault must be shown

by bringing matter dehors upon the record. Accordingly it has

been generally said in the books that a party cannot demur or

plead and answer the same matter, but he may demur to one part

of the bill, plead to another and answer to another. If he answers

to the same part that he demurs to, his answer will overrule his

demurrer. The rule is the same at law. 1 Chit. PI. 512. The

reason for the rule is thus given by Gilbert, Forum Rom. 58, in

speaking of dilatory defenses, "all these pleas with us are to be put

ante litem contestnm, because they are pleas only why you should

not answer, and therefore if you answer to anything to which you

may plead, you overrule your plea, for your plea is only why you

should not contest and answer, so that if you answer, your plea

is waived." This rule is laid down everywhere as expressive of the

true function of a demurrer or plea in its relation to the answer.

OWEH

J.:

Th tl f ndant, by a demurr r int rpo ed into hi an w r rai ~
th qu tion of th juri di tion of th
ourt to ntertain the bill.
Th propri ty of thi mod of pleading ha b n
n idered of
lat and th ffort ha b n to adh r to th rule of pleading laid
down in th text book and 1 . t con idered ca
T'h r p tiv function of a demurrer and an an wer are
ntir 1 di tinct and on cannot tak th place of the other.
The an w r erve the douibl purpo e of pl ading and vid nee.
o far a
o far a it et up matt r a a bar it i a pl ading.
it rv th
omplaina·n t' purpo b di ov rin()" fact ) it i a
po ition. If the d f ndant would waiv makin an an wer)
h may demur or plead. Th obj ct of a demurr r or plea a
a g n ral rule) i to excu e the d f ndant from an wering the
bill on i m rit .
oth are dilatory pl ading ) a d murr r b inoprop r if th fault of th
mplainant' a i appar nt from the
fa of th bill, and a pl a bein()" proper if the fault mu t be hown
by bringinD" matt r dehor u n th r ord. Accordin ly it ha,
b n ()" n rall
aid in th book that a party annot d mur or
pl ad and an w r th am matt r, but he may d mur to on part
f h bill pl al t anoth r and an wer to anoth r. If h an w r
t th am pa·r t that h d mur to hi an wer will ov rrule hi
c1 murr r. Th rul i th
am at law. 1 hit. Pl. 1 . Th
ilb rt F rum Rom.
in
pr a with u ar to b put
plea only wh you .. hould
r u an w r to anythincr to hi h you
ma. ' pl a 1 y u v rrul . ur I 1 a for our pl a i onl: why y u
,'h ull n t ·ont
and an w r . that if y u an w r. y ur pl a
i waiY 1.''
hi rul i laid c1o" n " rywh r a xpr s~i' of th
i.ru fun li n f a d murr 'r r pl a in it r lati n t th an w r.

224
234 Answer

Mitford (Tyler's Ed.) 304, 305, 411, Beames' PI. in Eq. 37;

WhaUy v. Dawson, 2 Sch. & Lef. 371; Jones v. Earl of Strafford,

3 P. Wms. 81; Oliver v. Piate, 3 How. 412; Clarl; v. Phelps, 6

Johns. Chan. 214; Wade v. Pulsifer, 54 Vt. 71.

Incorporating a demurrer into an answer is often done and no

violation of the rule is occasioned if the demurrer is left for

consideration as if it stood alone. In the old precedents in-

stances may be found of demurrers and pleas incorporated into

answers, but in each case the answer was provisional, the plea

ending with a demand for judgment, and then proceeding, "and

if this defendant shall by order of this honorable court be com-

pelled to make any other answer to the said bill, etc., then and

not otherwise the defendant saving, etc., answereth and saith,"

going through the answer as if no plea had been put in. The

more modern practice, however, and the one sanctioned by Mit-

ford and other standard writers, is to file each pleading by itself.

But in all cases the demurrer should be brought to a hearing

before the cause is tried on its merits. Wade v. Pulsifer, 54 Vt.

and cases there cited.
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In this case it is urged that a court of equity has no jurisdic-

tion, as a court of law could give the orator an adequate remedy.

This objection, if valid, is apparent upon the face of the bill and

so is the subject of a demurrer, and if it be sustained the case

is at an end. But an objection to the jurisdiction of the court,

if the court has general jurisdiction of the subject matter, will

not be entertained unless it is brought to a hearing before the

expense of a trial upon the merits has been incurred. In 1 Dan.

Chan. Prac. 579, it is said that if the objection to the jurisdic-

tion is not taken seasonably by plea or demurrer and the de-

fendant enters into his defense at large, the court having the

general jurisdiction will exercise it. To the same effect are the

cases Cong. Society v. Trustees, etc., 23 Pick. 148; Underliill

V. Van Cortlandt, 2 Johns. Chan. 369; Baiih of Bellows Falls

V. R. & B. R. R. Co., 28 Vt. 470. Indeed the rule in equity

appears to be the same as at law. A plea to the jurisdiction at

law is said to be analagous to a plea in abatement and is the

earliest in the order of pleading, and if the general issue be pleaded

the jurisdiction is confessed. So in equity it is a dilatory objection

that is waived by an answer. In equity, as at law, if the court

discovers that under no circumstances has it jurisdiction in the

ANSWER

l\Iitford (Tyler's Ed.) 304, 305, 411, Beames' Pl. in Eq. 37;
Whaley v. Dawson, 2 Sch. & Lef. 371; Jones v. Earl of Strafford,
3 P. Wms. 81; OZiver v. Piate, 3 Hmv. 412; Clark v. Phelps, 6
John. Chan. 214; Wade v. Pulsifer, 54 Vt. 71.
Incorporating a demurrer into an answer is often done and no
violation of the rule is occasioned if the demurrer is left for
consid ration a if it tood alone. In the old precedents intances may be found of demurrers and pleas incorporated into
answers, but in each ca e the answer was provi ional, the plea
ending with a demand for judgment, and then proceeding, "and
if thi defendant hall by order of this honorable court be compelled to make any other answer to the said bill, etc., then and
not otherwise the defendant saving, etc., answereth and aith,''
going through the an wer as if no plea had been put in. The
more modern practice, however, and the one sanctioned by Mitford and other standard writers, is to file each pleading by itself.
But in all .cases the demurrer . hould be brought to a· hearing
before the cau e is tried on its merit . Wade v. Pulsifer, 54 Vt.
and ca es there cited.
In this case it is urged that a court of equity has no jurisdiction, ·as a court of law could give the orator an adequate remedy.
This objection, if valid, is apparent upon the face of the bill and
so is the subject of a demurrer, and if it be sustained the case
i at a·n end. But an objeciion to the juri diction of the court,
if the court has general jurisdiction of the subject matter, will
not be entertained unless it is brought to a hearing before the
expen e of a trial upon the merit has been incurred. In 1 Dan.
Chan. Prac. 579, it i ·aid that if the objection to the jurisdiction i not taken seasonably by plea or d murrer and the defendant enter into hi defen e at large, the court having the
general juri diction will exercise it. To th same effect are the
ca es Cong . ociety v. Trustee , etc., 23 Pick. 148; Underhill
v. Van Cortlandt, 2 John . Chan. 369 · Bank of Bellows Falls
v. R. & B. R. R. Co., 2 Vt. 470. Indeed the rul in equity
app ar to be the am a at }aw. A plea to the juri diction at
law i said to be analagou to a plea in abat m nt and i the
earlie t in the order of pleading, and if the gen ral i ue be pleaded
th juri diction i onf
d.
o in qui ty it i a: dilatory objection
that j waiv d by an an w r. In equity, a at law, if the court
di. cov 1 that under no cir um tan
ha it juri~di ti n in the
1
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premises, it will, at any stage of the proceedings, dismiss the cause

svxi sponte, if no objection is raised.

In the case at bar a court of equity has jurisdiction. The

sale of the colt to the orator witli a lien reserved to the defendant

amounted to a mortgage of the colt. The orator all the time

had an equity of redemption and after condition broken might

sustain a bill to redeem as was held by this court in Blodgett v.

BlodgeU, M. 48 Vt. Tlie facts appearing from the master's report

show that the question whether the defendant's lien upon the colt

had been extinguished by payment in full depended upon an

accounting of the farm dealings. Courts of equity have concur-

rent jurisdiction with courts of law in all cases where the common

law action of account would lie, Fonblanque Eq. 1, 10; Cooper

Tr. 36; Bispham Eq. 484; Ludlow v. Stenard, 2 Caine's Cas. in

Error 1; Leach v. Beattie, 33 Vt. 195, and in many other cases

where the accounts are intricate and a discovery is demanded. In

the action of trover brought by the defendant against the orator,

no offset arising out of the farm dealings would be available to

the orator, and unless he could make out full payment of the lien,
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he would be cast in the suit. But in equity on an accounting he

can have applied all the indebtedness in his favor that he can

establish, and if this is insufficient to extinguish the lien, the court

can give him a day of redemption.

In taking the accounts of the parties, the master finds that

items 42 and 43 in the defendant's specification accrued from

false representations of the defendant. These items should be dis-

allowed, as in equity no one can be made a debtor by fraud.

The decree is reversed and the cause remanded with a mandate

to enter a decree for the orator to recover the sum of $42.98

reported by the master, with interest thereon from March 1, 1884,

and that the furtlior prosecution of the suit at law in favor of the

defendant against the orator mentioned in the pleadings be per-

petually enjoined.

vt

v.
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premi es, it will, at any tag of the proceeding , dismi the cau. e
sua ponte, if no objeotion i raised.
In th ca e at bar a court of quity ha juri diction. The
al of the colt to th orator with a lien reserved to the defendant
amounted to a mortgage of the colt. Th orator all the time
had an equity of red mption and after conditio broken might
u tain a bill to redeem a wa held by thi ourt in Blodgett v.
Blodgett, 1. 4 Vt. The fact appearing from th ma~ ter r eport
how that the que tion whether the defendant' ljen upon the colt
ha 1 b en extingui hed by payment in full depended upon an
a ounting of the farm dealing . Oourts of equity have concurr nt juri~ diction with court of law in all ca es where the ommon
law action of account would lie, Fonblanque Eq. 1, 10; ooper
Tr. 6; Bi pham Eq. 484; Ludlow v. tenard, 2 Caine' a . in
rror 1; Leach v. Beattie, 33 Vt. 195, and in many other ca e
wh re the accounts are intricate and a discovery is demanded. In
the action of trover brought by the defendant against the orator,
no off et ari ing out of the farm dealing would be available to
th orator, and unl
he could make ou full payment of the lien,
h would be ca t in the suit. But in equity on an accounting he
can have applied all the indebtedness in his favor that he can
e tabli h: and if thi is insufficient to extinguish the lien, the court
can gi e him a day of redemption.
In taking the account of the parties, the master find that
i em 49 and 43 in the defendant's pecification accrued from
fal repre entation of the defendant. These items should be disallow d, a in equit no one can be made a debtor by fraud.
The decree i re er d and the cau e remanded with a mandate
to nt r a decree for the orator to recover the um of ±'> .98
r port d by the ma ter with intere t thereon from March 1 1 ±,
and that the further pro ecution o·f the uit at law in favor of the
d f ndant against th orator mentioned in the pleadings be perpetuall enjoined.
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Moors V. Moors, 17 N. H. JfSl. (18Jk5.)

In Equity. The statements of the bill and answer, tfcgether

Moors v. Moors, 17 N. H. 481.

with important testimony in the case, are set forth by the court

{1845.)

in the opinion.

Woods, J. :

The plaintiff, in this suit, seeks to be relieved against a suit

commenced at law by the defendant upon a promissory note of

$1,025.52, signed by her, and delivered to him on the 18th day of

October, 1840. The grounds upon which she claims the inter-

IN

The statements of the bill and an wer, tbgether
with important te timony in the case, are set forth by the court
in the opinion.
EQUITY.

position of this court are, without any doubt, sufficient to entitle

her to the relief sought, if the evidence is sufficient.

She states, in substance, that she had a settlement with the

defendant on that day, relating to an item of rent, which he owed

her, and an item of money, paid by him for taxes which she owed

him, and a claim which was at first disputed, but afterward ad-

mitted by her, of $25, which he called on her to pay him for wood

he had furnished her father; that the balance due to him upon

the adjustment of tliese items was about $10, for which she was

willing to give her note, and for which she intended to give her
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note; but that, trusting her brother to write it, she, through his

fraud, had been made to sign a note for $1,025.52, the subject of

the controversy.

She states that she did not, at the time, owe him any further

or other sum, and interrogates him as to whether there were any

other demands or claims considered or included in the settlement,

and if so, what? Whether there were any claims presented for

money horrowed, and if so, what?

The answer of the defendant was quite full, and shows that he

held two notes against the plaintiff at the time of the settlement,

from the aggregate amount of which the small balance of accounts

due her was deducted, and the note in question for the remainder,

and that the old notes were given up to hex to be canceled.

This allegation in the answer does not derive direct support

from evidence ; but, on the other hand, the plaintiff has produced

one witness, who was present during the interview, and who ap-

pears to have had some knowledge of the business that was in

J.:
The plaintiff, in this suit, seeks rto be relieved against a suit
commenced at law by the defendant upon a promissory note of
$1,025.52, signed by her, and delivered to him on the 18th day of
October, 1840. The grounds upon which she claims the interposition of this court ar , writhout any doubt, sufficient to entitle
her to the relief sought, if the evidence is sufficient.
She states, in substance; that she had a settlement with the
defendant on that day, relating to an item of rent, which he O'Wed
her, and an item of money, paid by him for taxes which she owed
him, and a claim which was at first disputed, but afterward admitted by her, of $25, which he called on her to pay him for wood
he had furnished her father; that the balance due to him upon
the adjustment of these items was about $10, for which she was
willing to give her note, and for which she intended to give her
note; but that, trusting her brother to write it, she, through his
fraud, had been made to sign a note for $1,025.52, the ubject of
the controversy.
She states that she did not, at the time, owe him any further
or other sum, and interrogates him as to whether there were any
oth r demand or claims considered or included in the settlement,
and if so, what? Whether there were any claim presented for
money .borrowed, and if o, what?
Th answer of the defend·a nt was quite full, and hows thait he
held two not against th plaintiff at the time of the ettlement,
from the aggr gate amount of which the small balance of account
due her wa deducted, and the note in que tion for the remainder,
and that the old notes w Te given up to her to be cane led.
This allegation in the an wer doe not d riv dire t upport
from evidenc ; but on th other hand, the plaintiff has produced
one witnes , who was pre cnt during the interview, and who apthat wa in
p ar to hav ha ome knowl dg of the bu in
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progress, and who did not hear any mention made of the old

notes, or of money borrowed by the plaintiff of the defendant

on former occasions. This was Friend Moors.

His wife was also present a part of the time, and, although she

heard conversation about rent and taxes, and wood, did not learn

that the settlement comprehended the more important matters of

the notes.

The testimony of these witnesses tends undoubtedly to sustain

the allegations in the bill ; that the three items of mutual account,

which are described in it, were all that were comprehended in the

settlement, and that the small balance resulting formed the only

consideration for the note.

But that testimony has to be considered in connection with the

defendant's answer, which, in this material point in the con-

troversy, is in direct conflict with the allegations of the bill, and

the question arises as to the weight that is to be allowed to the

answer.

The general rule of law is quite clear, that when the answer

controverts a material allegation of the bill, no decree can be made
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for the plaintiff, unless the answer in that particular is overborne

by evidence that is more than equivalent to the testimony of one

witness. 2 Story's Eq., sec. 1528; Dodge v. Griswold, 12 X. H.

Eep. 577.

In order that the answer may have that force, it is necessary

that the statement of the bill which it controverts be a material

statement; that is, that it be essentially a part of the plaintiff's

ease, and that the answer, so far as it relates to the statement,

contain such matters only as the defendant is required by the

exigencies of correct pleading to embrace in his answer. Or, in

other words, that it go to the point of discovery, to which the

plaintiff is entitled, by the case that he has stated ; for it is clear

that a statement which the defendant volunteers is entitled to no

such consideration as is accorded to an answer strictly responsive

to, and clearly demanded by, the case of the plaintiff.

The plaintiff's case, as stated by the bill, is, that the note in

controversy was obtained by fraud ; that she did not intend to give

such a note ; that no such sum was due, and that no other demands

than those which she enumerated were embraced in the settle-

ment.

Now it is sometimes a question of fHfTHnilty to settle how f;ir

progro ) and who did not hear any mention made of tho old
note , or of money borrow d by the plaintiff of the defendant
on form r occa ion . Thi wa
ricmd J\ oors.
Hi wif wa al o pre ent a part of the time, and, although he
heard co v r ation about r nt and taxe , and wood) did not learn
that the ettlement compTeh nded th mor important matter of
the not .
Th te timony of the witne s tend undoubtedly to u tain
th allegation in the bill ; that the three item of mutual account,
which ar d eril>ed in it, were all thait were comprehend d in the
ettlement and that the mall balance re ulting form ed the only
con ideration fo r the note.
ut that testimony ha to be con idered in connection with the
defendant an w r, which) in thi material point in the ontrover y, i in dir ct conflict with the allegation of the bill, and
the qu ·t ion ari e as to the weight that is to be allowed to the
an wer.
The g n ral rul of law i quite clear, that when the an wer
ontrm· rt a material allegation of the bill, no decree can be made
for the plaintiff, unle th an wer in that particular i overborne
by evidence that i more than equival nt to the te timony of one
witne . 2 tory' Eq., sec. 1528; Dodge v. Gri.swold, 12 N. H .
Rep. 5 7.
In order that the answer may have that fo rce, it is neces ary
that the tat ment of the bill which it controverts be a material
stat ment; that i , that it be e entially a part of the plaintiff'
a e, and that the answeT, so far a it rel.ate to the tatement,
contain uch matters only a the defendant i required by the
exi enci of correct pleading to embrace in hi an wer. Or in
other word that it go to the point of di cov ry, to which the
plaintiff i ntitl d by th a that he ha tafod · for it i lear
that a tat m nt which th de·f ndant volunt eer i entitled to no
~ uch con id ration a i a corded to an an wer trictly re pan ivo
to and 1 rl d mantled by the ca e of the plaintiff.
The plaintiff ca
a tat d b th bill i that the not in
ontrov
wa obtained b fraud; that h did not intend to ITT'i
. uch a not · that no u h um a du an d that n th r demand"'
than th
whi h h enume:rat d w r
mbraced in th " ttlemcnt.
om tim a qu tion of iliffi ul( t ettl h w fa r
OW it
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a defendant is required to go in his answer, and how far he may

protect himself by saying that it is as particular as the plaintiff's

question. Story's Eq. PL, sec. 855, note. But one principle, well

stated, and stated in the books in the various forms, is this: that

a simple denial of the plaintiff's case literally, as stated, is wholly

insufficient. He must meet it with full and circumstantial denial,

and not with a negative pregnant, which, while it controverts the

case in the precise terms in which it is stated, is perfectly con-

sistent with one not substantially differing from it. Story's Eq.

PL, sec. 855 ; Woods v. Mornll, 1 Johns. Ch. 103. As, if he be

charged with the receipt of a sum of money, he must deny that

he has received that sum, or any part thereof, or else set forth

what part he has received.

If to that part of the bill which stated what items were com-

prehended in the settlement, the defendant had said no more than

that other items were comprehended, the plaintiff might still have

had substantially the case made by the bill, and the answer yet

have been true.

To that part of the bill which states that no more than the
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small sum named was due, the defendant was bound to answer,

not only how much was due, but, to the best of his ability, upon

what account it was due. Such discovery is important to enable

the plaintiff to amend her case, or to maintain it by disproving

the consideration, which, of course, it is the more difficult to do

before the defendant has been called on to specify it. These

obvious purposes of the discovery would have been defeated by a

less explicit answer.

The answer, therefore, in discovering what matters were em-

braced in the settlement, contained no more than the defendant was

bound by the statement of the plaintiff's ease to set forth, or was,

in other phrase, strictly responsive to the bill.

Although tending to sustain a material statement of the bill,

we cannot say that the testimony of Friend Moors and his wife

is in conflict with the answer in the particulars to which thoy in

common relate. Had those witnesses participated in the transac-

tion; had they, or either of them, had occasion or an interest to

know its details, or had they even been so situated that they could

have known them with reasonable certainty, the case would have

been different. As it was, it is not unreasonable to suppose that

they might have heard more of the smaller items, that required

ANSWER

a defendant is required to go in bis answer, and bow far be may
protect himself by saying that it is as particular as the plaintiff's
question. Story's Eq. PL, sec. 855, note. But one principle, well
tated, and tated in the books in the various forms, i thi : that
a simple denial of the plaintiff's case literally, as stated, is wholly
insufficient. He must meet it with full and circumstantial denial,
and not with a negative pregnant, which, while it controvert the
case in the preci e terms in which it i tated, is perfectly coni tent with one not ub tantially differing from it. Story's Eq.
PL, sec. 855; Woods v. Morrill~ 1 Johns. Ch. 103. As, if he be
charged with the receipt of a sum of money, he must deny that
he has received that sum, or any part thereof, or else set forth
what part he has received.
If to that part of the bill which stated what items were comprehended in the ettlement, the defendant had said no more than
that other item were comprehended, the plaintiff might still have
had substantially the case made by the bill, and the answer yet
have been true.
To that part of the bill which states that no more than the
small sum named was due, the defendant was bound to answer,
not only bow much was due, but, to the best of his ability, upon
what account it wa due. Such di covery is important to enable,
the plaintiff to amend her case, or to maintain it by disproving
the consideration, which, of course, it is the more difficult to do
before the defendant bas been called on to specify it. These
obvious purpo es of the discovery would have been defeated by a
le s explicit an wer.
The an wer, therefore, in diiscovering what matters were embraced in the ettlement, contained no more than the defendant was
bound by the tatement of the plaintiff's case to set forth, or was,
in other phra e, trictly responsive to the bill.
Although tending to u tain a material statement of the bill,
we cannot ay that the te timony of Friend Moors and hi wife
is in confli t with the an wer in the particulars to which th y in
common r late. Had tho e witne e particip t d in th tran action; had th y or eith r of th m had oc· a ion or an inter t to
know it d tail , or had th y ev n b en o ituat d that th y ould
hav known them with rea onable certainty th ca e would h ve
b n differ nt. A it wa it i not unr onable to uppo that
th y migl1t hav heard mor of th mall r item , that required
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and actually engaged discussion, than of the greater matters of

the notes and interest, which might have been adjusted with fewer

words, because of a nature to admit of no question.

It is plain that all that is stated in the answer, on the subject

of the settlement, might have been strictly true, and yet the facts

stated have wholly escaped the notice of both the witnesses. How-

ever their testimony, therefore, may tend to detract from the credit

that might otherwise be due to the answer, it ought not to be

considered as coming in direct conflict with it. The answer is the

testimony of one directly to a fact, about which it is scarcely

possible that he could have been mistaken, or that he could have

forgotten. The testimony of the witnesses, on the other hand,

is only to the point that they did not observe a transaction that

it is certainly possible might have taken place without their obser-

vation.

Nor can we say that the case of the plaintiff derives material

support from considering the other evidence which has been ad-

duced by either party. No part of it goes to the point of sustain-

ing the allegations of the bill against this denial in the answer,
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of the very essence of the plaintiff's case, even if we could say that

the preponderance was in favor of the plaintiff, on the secondary

matters on which it bears.

The conclusion is, that the plaintiff's case, having been denied

by the answer, and not sustained by sufficient evidence, no decree

can be pronounced in her favor.

Bill dismissed without prejudice.

Beech v. Haynes, 1 Tenn. Ch. 569. (187Jk.)

The Chancellor:

The question submitted to me on this record is one that savors,

perhaps, more of curiosity than of practical utility in the present

state of the law of evidence. It is, how far the complainant may

use the admissions of a defendant in his answer to charge him,

without giving him the benefit of the matters of discharge or avoid-

ance, with which the admissions are coupled. And the difficulty

is not so much in ascertaining the law bearing upon the point in

v. H y

229

ES

and a tually ngaged di cu ion, than of the greai:€r matter 0f
th not and intere t, which might have been adju ted with fewer
wo~'d , becau e of a natur to admit of no qu tion.
It i plain that all that i tat d in the an wer, on the subject
of the ettl ment, might hav b n trictly tru , and y t th fact
. tated hav wholly e caped the notic of both the witne e . Hower their t timon:y, th r for , may tend to detract from the credit
that might otherwi e be clue to the answer, it ought not to be
on id red a coming in direct conflict with it. The answer i the
t timony of one directly to a fact, about which it is carcely
po ible that he could have been mi taken, or that he could have
forgotten. The te timony of the witnes e , on the other hand,
i only to the point that they did not observe a transaction that
it i certainly possible might have taken place without their ob ervation.
Nor can we ay that the ease of the plaintiff derives material
support from considering the other evidence which ha been adduc d by either party. No part of it goes to the point o·f sustaining the all ga:tions of the bill again t this denial in the an wer,
of the very e ence of the plaintiff's ca e, even if we could ay that
th preponderance was in favor of the plaintiff, on the secondary
matters on which it bears.
The conclusion is, that the plaintiff's case, having been denied
by the an wer, and not sustained by ufficient evidence, no decree
can be pronounced in her favor.
Bill dism'issed without prejudice.

question as upon tlie application of that law to the facts of the

particular case.

Beech v.
T HE

Cn

.r

Hayn es~

1 T enn . Ch .. 569.

(1814.)

CELLOR :

The qu tion ubmitt d to me on thi record i one that a ors,
rhap , more of curio ity tha·n of practical utility in the pre ent
at of th law of evicl nc . It i , how far the complainant ma
u ' th admi ,ion of a defendant in hi an wer to charge him,
with ut ·il'in cr him th b nefit o·f the matters of di charge or a oidan , with which the admi ion are coupled.
nd the difficult
i n t o mu h i a rt· ining th law bearing upon th point in
qu ti
a upon the appli ation of that law to th fac
f the
parti ular a e.
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The general rule undoubtedly is that an answer which, while

admitting or denying the facts in the bill, sets up other facts

in" defense or avoidance, is not evidence of the facts so stated.

Sto. Eq. Jur. § 1,529; Gresley's Eq. Ev. 13. This rule, upon a

careful review of the authorities, was considered as well settled

by Ch. Kent in Hart v. Ten Eyck, 2 J. Ch. 88; and, although

its application to the facts of that case was held erroneous by the

court of errors, it has been approved by the Supreme Court of the

United States in Clements v. Moore, 6 Wall. 315, and by our Su-

preme Court in Napier v. Elam, 6 Yer. 113. The qualification of

the rule, or of its application, established by the Court of Errors

of New York upon appeal in the case of Uart v. Ten Eyck, is

stated to have been, for the decision was never reported, that if the

facts in discharge or avoidance are a direct and proper reply to

an express charge or interrogatory of the bill, then the answer

is evidence of those facts. Woodcock v. Bennett, 1 Cow. 74-1, note.

And this distinction has also been adopted by our Supreme Court.

Alexander v. ^Yill^ams, 10 Yer. 109; Goss v. Simpson, -4 Cold.

288; ^Valter v. McNahh, 1 Heisk. 703. And fhis whether the
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response be by a direct denial or by a statement of facts by way

of avoidance. HopTcins v. Spwfloch, 2 Heisk. 152. Some authori-

ties are quoted as holding that where a defendant, in response to

the bill, once admits liability, there is no escape except by proof

of the matters of discharge or avoidance. Dyre v. Sturgess, 3

Des. 553 ; Paynes v. Coles, 1 Munf . 395 ; Fisler v. Porcli, 2 Stock.

248. It is probable, however, that a careful analysis of the cases

would show that the rule is substantially the same everywhere,

but its application is varied by the particular facts of the several

cases.

A qualification of the general rule is, that where the transaction

is a continuous one, and the matters of charge and discharge occur

at the same time, the whole statement must be taken together.

'Robinson v. Scotney, 19 Ves. 582 ; Lady Ormond v. Hutchinson,

13 Ves. 50; Thompson v. Lamhe, 7 Ves. 588. The qualification

is more broadly stated under the English practice in 2 Dan. Ch.

Pr. 835, thus : "Where a plaintiff chooses to read a passage from

the defendant's answer, he reads all the circumstances stated in

the passage. If the passage so read contains a reference to any

other passage, that other passage must be read also." Bartlett v.

Gillard, 3 Euss. 157; Nurse v. Bunn, 5 Sim. 225. The old de-

ANSWER

The general rule undoubtedly is that an answer which, while
admitting or denying the facts in the bill, sets up other facts
in· defen e or avoidance, i not evidence of the facts so stated.
Sto. Eq. Jur. § 1,529; Gresley's Eq. Ev. 13. This rule, upon a
careful review of the authorities, was considered as well settled
by Ch. Kent in Hart v. Ten Eyck, 2 J. Ch. 88; and, although
it application to the facts of that ca e wa held erroneous by the
court of errors, it has been approved by the Supreme Court of the
United States in Clements v. Moore, 6 Wall. 315, and by our Supreme Court in Napier v. Elam, 6 Yer. 113. The qualification of
the rule, or of its application, established by the Court of Errors
of New York upon appeal in the case of Hart v. Ten Eyck, is
stated to have been, for the decision was never reported, that if the
facts in discharge or avoidance are a direct and proper reply to
an expre charge or interrogat:ory of the bill, then the answer
i evidence of tho e facts. Woodcock v. Bennett, 1 Cow. 74-±, note.
And this distinction has al o been adopted by our Supreme Court.
Alexander v. Williams, 10 Yer. 109; Goss v. Simpson, 4 Cold.
2 8; Walter v. McNabb, 1 Rei k. 703. And ibis whether the
re ponse be by a direct denial or by a statement of facts by way
of avoidance. Hopkins v. Spurlock, 2 Heisk. 152. Some authoritie are quoted as holding that where a defendant, in re pon e to
the bill, once admits liability, there is no escape except by proof
of the matters of discharge or avoidance. Dyre v. Sturgess, 3
Des. 553; Paynes v. Coles, 1 Munf. 395; Fisler v. Porch, 2 Stock.
248. It i probable, however, that a careful analysi of the case
would show that the rule is substantially the same everywhere,
but its application is varied by the pa·r ticular facts of the several
ca e.
A qualification of the general rule i that where th tran action
i a continuou one, and the matt rs of charge and di charge occur
at the same tim , the whole tatement mu t be taken toO'ether.
Robinson v. cotney, 19 Ve . 5 9 ; Lady Ormond v. Hutchinson,
13 Ve . 50; Thompson v. Lamb e, 7 V . 5 . The qualification
i more broadly tat d under th EnO'li h practic in 2 Dan. Ch.
Pr. 8 5, thu : "Where a plaintiff boo e to read a pa age from
the defendant' an wer, he read all th cir um tanc
tated in
th pa age. If the pa age o read ontain a r eference to an}
other pa age that oth r pas ag mu t 1 r ad al o. ' Bartlett v.
Gillard,
Ru" . 1 7 · Nurse v. Bunn, 5 im. 22 . Th old de-
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cisions went so far as to hold that a discharge in the same sentx^nce

with the charge woukl be evidence (be<3ause the whole context must

be read), when it would not have been if stated separately. Ridge-

way V. Darwin, T Yes. 404; TJioinpson v. Lanihe, 7 Ves. 588. The

consequence of which was, as siated by Mr. Gresley in his work

on Evidence in Equity, p. 15, that formerly much of the skill re-

quired in drawing an answer consisted in uniting by connecting

pai-ticles important points of the defendant's ease with admis-

sions that could not be withheld. The answer in the case now

before me seems framed on these old cases. But the modem de-

cisions are governed by the sounder rule of being contrx)lled by

the sense instead of the contiguity or grammatical structure of the

sentences. Passages connected in meaning may be read together

from distinct parts of the answer. Rude v. Whitechurcli, 3 Sim.

563. And, on the other hand, if the matter in avoidance has been

skilfully interwoven into the senten;ce6 containing responsive ad-

missions, the complainant w411 be entitled to have the matter of

avoidance considered as struck out. McCoy v. Rhodes, 11 How.

U. S. 131; Baker v. Williamson, 4 Penn St. 467; 3 Greenlf. Ev.
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§ 281.

The rule, it will be noted, which considers an admission as bind-

ing, and as throwing upon the defendant the burden of proving

the matter of avoidance, applies only to admissions wliich are

responsive to or go to support the charges of the bill. The reason

is, that otherwise the matter of admission would not be in issue,

and if tlie complainant reads it, he reads it as evidence, not as

pleading, and must read the whole; and no relief can ordinarily

be granted upon it except by conceding the facts to be as stated in

connection with the admission. Neal v. Robinson, 8 Hum. 438;

MuUoy V. Young, 10 Hum. 298; Jameson v. Shelby, 2 Hum. 201;

Ruse V. Mynatt, 7 Yer. 30.

The matter in avoidance or discharge, if in resjwnse to a direct

charge, is, as we have seen, evidence in favor of the defendant.

Smith V. Clark, 4 Paige, 373. But it seems that a statement of

the answer expressly waived or not called for, is not responsive,

and not evidence. Jones v. Best, 2 Gill. 106. Tliis limitation

may be important in the present case, for the bill expressly calls

upoii the defendant to declare "when, where and from whom he

purchased cotton for the complainants, and when, where and to

•
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c1 10n went o far a to hold that a di charge in th ame entence
with the harge would b vid n
(because the wh 1 context mu~ t
b r ad) wh n it ould not ha1e b n if tated eparatcly. Ridgeway . arwin, \ . -±0 ; Thonipson v. Lambe,
e .
e
con ·qu n
of whi h a , a stated by Ur. r 1 y in hi work
on Evid n e in 'quity, p. 1 , that formerly much of the kill requir d in drawing an an wer con · ted in uniting by conn cting
par ·cl
important points of the defendan ' ca e with admi ion thait
uld not be withheld. The an w r in the ca e now
old ca e .
ut the modern debefor me eem £ram d on th
·i ion are govern d by the ounder rule of b ing controll d by
the n e in tead of the contiguity or grammatical tructure of the
sentenc . Pa ag connected in meaning may be read to ether
from di tinct part of the answer. Rude v. Whitechurch, 3 im.
5 . And, on the other hand, if the matter in avoidance ha been
kilfull3 interwo-ven into the enterroa:; containing re pon i e admi ion , the complainant will be entitled to ha·ve the matter of
a oidance con idered as tn1ck out. JJicCoy v. Rhodes, 11 How.
u. . 1 1; Baker v. Williamson, 4 Penn St. 46 ; 3 Greenlf. E1.
1.
Th rule, it will be noted, which con ider an admi ion a bindino-, and as throwing upon the defendant the burden of proving
th matter of avoidance, a·p plie only to admi ion which are
re~pon ive to or go to upport the charge of the bill. The re on
i that oth rwi e the matter of admi ion would not be in i u ::.,
and if th complainant read it, he read it a evidence, not a
pl a ing and mu t mad the whole; and no relief can ordinaril.J
be rant d upon it except by conceding the fact to be a tated in
onn tion with th admi ion. Neal v. Robinson, 8 Hum. -±3 ;
]1 ulloy . Young, 10
um. 29 ; J a17ieson v. helby, 2 Hum. 901;
Ro e Y. Jlynatt, Y er. 30.
Th matter in a oidanc or di harg if in r po e to a direct
barg i , a we ha·v een e-vid nee in favor of the defendant.
'mith
lark, -! Pai , 3 3. But it eem that a ~tatem nt of
th an ~ ''° r .xpr 13 aiv d OT not call d for, i not re pon~i1
and not 1i n e. Jones . B est, 9 Gill. 106. Thi limitation
may b important in th pr nt a , for th bill pr sly an
n n th d f ndant to d lar
wh n wh re and from whom h
purchn" d tton for th omplainant~ and when_, wh r an 1 t
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whom he said it/' and adds : "The discovery which complainants

seek is confined exclusively to these points."

The bill is filed for the purpose of charging the defendant with

cotton bought by him with certain moneys of the complainants

acting as their agent, and with the proceeds of the sales of such

cotton. The answer admits the receipt of the money, the purchase

of cotton, and the sale thereof as complainant's agent, and dis-

closes "when, where and from whom the defendant purchased cotton

for the complainants, and when, where a^nd to whom he sold it."

The answer states the amount of cotton bought, but adds that at

least one-fourth was lost by stealage or otherwise. It also states the

prices at which the cotton was sold, and adds "that out of the pro-

ceeds of sale, the expenses of keeping, carr^'ing to market, and

selling the cotton, and a large government tax, contained in an

itemized schedule (annexed to the answers) were paid." The an-

swer is replied to under our practice, and there is no proof.

The answer admits the contract as alleged in the bill, and the

purchase and sale of cotton as agent, but states, in avoidance, that

the cotton was to be bought in the Confederate lines, the contract
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having been made in the Federal lines. The matter in avoidance

is clearly not evidence under any of the recognized rules and must

be proved.

In this state of the case and the pleadings, if there were nothing

more, it is clear that the complainant would be entitled to a decree

reciting the contract, and the fact that the defendant had bought

and sold cotton under it, and to a reference to the master to take

and state an account between the parties, in which he should charge

the defendant with all cotton which was purchased with the defend-

ant's money, and with the proceeds of such of the cotton as may

have been sold by him, allowing him all just credits in the way of

loss of cotton without fault on his part, and all proper disburse-

ments in the care, preservation and disposition of the cotton. Tlie

complainants are not compelled, either at the hearing or upon the

reference to read any part of the answer as evidence of the amount

of cotton bought or sold, and the defendant himself could only

read such parts of the answer as are responsive to the charges

and interrogatories of the bill, under the rules as hereinbefore set

forth. But the complainants claim now, upon the hearing, to use

against the defendants his admissions of charge without giving

him the benefit of the matters of discharge. And the question

ANSWER

whom he o1d it," and add : "The di covery which complainants
ek i confined exclu ively to the e points.'
The bill i filed for the purpose of chaTging the defendant with
cotton bought by him with certain money of the complainants
acting a their agent, and with the proceed of the sales of such
cotton. The an wer admits th receipt of the money, the purchase
of cotton, and the sale thereof as complainant's agent, and di.Belo es "when, where and from whom the defendant purcha ed cotton
for the complainant , and when, where and to whom he sold it."
The answer tate the amount of cotton bought, but adds that at
lea t one-fourth was lo t by tealage or otherwi e. It al o tates the
prices at which the cotton was old, and adds "that out of the proceeds of ale, the expen es of keeping, ca:rrying to market, and
elling the cotton, and a large government tax, contained in an
itemized chedule (annexed to the an wer ) were paid." The anwer is replied to under our practice, and there is no proof.
The an wer admits the contracl as alleged in the bill, and the
purchase and ale of cotton as agent, but sfates, in avoidance, that
the cotton was to be bought in the Confederate lines, the contract
ha·v ing been made in the Federal line . T'he matter in avoidance
is clearly not evidence under any of the recognized rule and mu t
be proved.
In thi tate of the ca e and the pleadings, if there were nothing
more, it is clear that the complainant would be entitled to a decree
reciting the contract, and the fa.ct that the defendant had bought
and old cotton under it, and to a reference to the ma ter to take
and state an account between the parties, in which he hould charge
the defendant with an cotton which wa purchased with the defendant' money and with the proceed of uch of the cotton a may
have been sold by him, allowing him all ju t er dits in the way of
lo of cotton without fault on hi pa!lt, and all proper di bur ements in the care, pre ervation and di po ition of the otton. The
complainant are not comp ll d, ith r at the h aring or upon the
referen · to read any part of the an w r a evid nc of the amount
of cotton bou ht or ld and the 1 f ndant him lf coul 1 only
r ad u h par of the an wcr a ar r pon iv to th charges
t
an interrogafori of th bill, und r th ml a her inbefor
forth.
ut th omplainant claim n w up n th h aring t u 'e
a ain t h d f n ant hi admi ion of har
without gi' inv
him th b n fit 1'. the matt r of cli ~c har .
nd the que tion
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for consideration is, can this be done under the pleadings in this

case?

The general rule, as we have seen, is that the complainant may

read any portion of the defendant's answer which goes to support

the case made in the bill. Barilett v. Gale, 4 Paige, 507. The ad-

missions which the complainants in this case propose to read do

clearly support the case made in the bill. The defendant was not

bound to make them, the discovery having been expressly waived;

but having made them, the complainant may, if he chooses, rely

upon them as fixing the defendant's liability. It is clear, also, that

the discovery called for having been limited so as not to include

the details, the defendant could not himself read any portion of the

matters of discovery, either of charge or discharge, unless they are

responsive to a direct charge or interrogatory of the bill. There is

no interrogatory calling for such discovery, the interrogatories hav-

ing been purposely limited. If, however, this part of the answer

were directly and properly responsive to a positive charge of the

bill, I think the defendant would have been entitled to read it,

notwithstanding the limitation quoted from the bill. For that
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limitation, it is obvious, was not intended to prevent the defendant

from answering the charging part of the bill, but merely to restrain

the discovery, so far as it could be evidence for the defendant, to

those charges. Smith v. Clark, 4 Paige, 373. Is there, then, any

charge in the bill which calls for the details of the answer in dis-

charge ?

The bill does charge that the money received by defendant

(which sum is admitted by the answer), invested at twenty-five

cents per pound, the price paid as averred, would have purchased

15,319 pounds, and adds: "Complainants are satisfied that ha

(defendant) realized from the cotton nearly or quite fifty cents

per pound net, and at least $7,500." If, now, the discovery had

not been expressly limited, the answer stating the real amount of

cotton bought and the net proceeds realized, would perhaps have

been responsive under the qualification of the general rule, as ''a

statement of facts by way of avoidance." Be this as it may, the

express limitation of the discovery rendered anything more than

a denial of the charges of the bill not responsive within the rule

which permits the defendant to use responsive matter of avoidance

as evidence in his favor. The complainant has the right so to limit

his charges, and his calls for discover}- as to confine the responsive

v.
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for con ideration i , can thi be done under the pleadings in thi
<.:a e?
The general rule, a we have een, i that the complainant may
read any portion of the defendant an wer which goe to upport
the ca e made in the bill. Bartlett . Gale) 4 aig , 0 . The admi ion which the complainant in thi ca e propose to read do
learly upport the ca e ma·d in the bill. The d f ndant wa not
bound to make them, the di covery having been xpr ly waived;
but ha ing made them, the complainant ma), if he choo ~, rely
upon th m a fixing the defendant' liability. It i clear, al o, that
th di co ery call d for having b en limited so a not to include
the detail , the defendant could not him elf read any portion of the
matt r of di covery, either of charge or di charge, unle they are
r pon~i e to a direct charge or interrogatory of the bill. There is
no interrogatory calling for uch discovery, the interrogatorie having been purpo ely limited. If, however, this part of the an wer
w r directly and properly responsive to a pooitive charge of the
bill, I think the defendant would have been entitled to read it,
notwith tanding the limitation quoted from the bill. For that
limitation, it is obviou , was not intended to prevent the defendant
from answering the charging part of the bill, but merely to restra·in
the di co ery, o far as it could be evidence for the defendant, to
tho c charge . Smith v. Clark) 4 P aige, 3 3. Is there, then, any
barge in the bill which call for the details of the an wer in diccharge?
Th bill does charge that the money received by defendant
(which um i admitted by the an wer), invested at twenty-five
cent per pound, the pric paid a averred, would have purcha ed
15,319 pound , and add : " omplainani:s are ati fied that he
( d fenda·n t) realized from the otton nearly or quite fift cent'
per pound net and at lea t $ , 00.
If, now the di covery had
not bee expre ly limit d, the an wer tating the real amount of
cotton bought and the net proce d realized, would perhap have
b en re pan ive under the quali:fi ation of the general rule a "a
. tat m nt of fact b way of avoidance.' Be thi a it ma r the
pr
limitation of the di COY r r ndered an rl:hing more than
a 1 nial of the har
of the bill not re pon iv
ithin the rule
whi h p rmit the d f ndant to u re pon ive matter of a oidance
a
i 1 nc in hi favor. Th complainant ha th ri ht o to limit
hi charO' and hi all for di co very a to con.fin th r pon i rn
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part of the answer within a narrow compass, and this has been

done in the present instance.

The conclusion is that the complainants may insist upon the

matters of charge in the defendant's answer without giving him

the benefit of the matters of discharge.

In the examination of the question discussed above, I think I

have discovered the source of the strange dictum of our Supreme

Court in Ragsdah v. Buford, 1 Hay. 194, that "in no case is an

answer replied to evidence against the plaintiff," a dictum com-

mented on by me in a note to that case in my edition of Haywood's

Eeports. An answer, as we all know, performs a double office, and

is both a pleading and a discovery. Sto. Eq. PI. § 850. This

distinction was noted by Sir Samuel Eomilly, then Solicitor-Gen-

eral, in his argument in the case of Lady Ormond v. Hutchinsan,

13 Ves. 50. The complainant having relied upon an admission in

the answer, the defendant seems to have insisted that the whole

answer should be read. No, said the Solicitor-General; for, al-

though the rules of evidence are the same in equity as at law,

and, if you undertake to read an answer at law you must read
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the whole of it, yet, he adds: "WTien passages are read from

an answer [at the hearing in Chancery] which is replied to, it

is not produced as evidence, but to show what he has admitted,

as to which, therefore, it is unnecessary to produce evidence; as

to the rest, the plaintiff, having replied to the answer, puts him

on proof. Upon a bill for discovery only, the answer being

produced as evidence, the whole of it must be read, not a part

only." This distinction was approved by the Lord Ch. (Erskine)

in his opinion in that case. Chancellor Kent in commenting on

this language in Hart v. Ten Eyck, 2 J. Ch. 91, says: "It was

said that when passages are read from an answer which is

replied to, and is not an answer to a mere bill of discovery, they

are not read as evidence, in the technical sense, but to show what

the defendant has admitted and which, therefore, need not be

proved." It is impossible to place the language of the Chancellor

and Solicitor-General in juxtaposition with that of our Supreme

Court above referred to, without seeing that the only object of the

latter was to call attention to this distinction. For, they add,

following the lead of Sir Samuel Eomilly, "the answer which

cannot be replied to is evidence for the defendant. That is the

case of an answer to a bill for discovery." The language is not

A

SWER

part of th an wer within a narrow compass, and this has been
done in the pre ent instance.
The conclu ion is that the complainants may insist upon the
matters of charge in the defendant's answer without giving him
the benefit of the matters of discharge.
In the examination of the question discussed above, I think I
have discovered the source of the strange dictum of our Supreme
Court in Ragsdale v. Buford, 1 Hity. 194, that "in no case is an
an wer replied to evidence against the plaintiff," a dictum commented on by me in a note to that case in my edition of Haywood':s
Report . An answer, a we all know, performs a double office, and
is both a pleading and a discovery. Sto. Eq. PL § 850. This
distinction was noted by Sir Samuel Romilly, then Solicitor-General, in his argument in the ca e of Lady Ormond v. Hutchinson,
13 Ves. 50. The complainant having relied upon an admission in
the answer, the defendant seem to have insisted that the whole
an"wer should be read. No, aid the Solicitor-General; for, although the rules of evidence are the a:rne in equity as at law,
aind, if you undertake to read an answer at law you must read
the whole of it, yet, he adds: "vVhen passages are read from
an answer [at the hearing in Chancery] which is replied to, it
i not produced as evidence, but to how what he has admitted,
a to which, therefore, it is unnece sary to produce evidence; as
to the re t, the plaintiff, having replied to the answer, puts him
on proof. Upon a bill for discovery only, the an wer being
produced as evidence, the whole of it must be read, not a part
only." This distinction was arpproved by the Lord Ch. (Erskine)
in hi opinion in that case. Chancellor Kent in commenting on
thi language in Hart v. Ten Eyck, 2 J. Ch. 91, says: "It was
aid that when pa sage are read from an an wer which is
replied to, ancl i not an an wer to a mere bill of discovery, they
are not read a evidence, in the technical en e, but to show what
the defendant ha admitted and which, therefore, need not be
proved." It i impo ible to plac the language of the Chancellor
and oli itor-General in juxtapo ition with that of our Supreme
Court abov referred to, without
ing that the only object of the
latt r wa to call attention to thi di tin tion. For, they add,
following the 1 ad orf ir Samu 1 Romilly, "the an wer which
annot be repli c1 to i vid n for th defendant. That i the
ca · of an an w r to a bill for di O\' ry. ' The language i not
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a.· a ·curate a tha·t of Ch.
nt, but wa m ant to convey th ame
idea, nam ly, that an an w r on ah aring in quity i not vidence,
in a t hni al n .
nd, it i abviou , that th ourt had no int ntion to lay d wn g n ra-1 principl in conflict with th ir own
po itive ruling , and that th oompil r of our ig t have erred
in arr) ing the worcJ. into th ir ig t a ab olut ruling .
In lik mann r, what th ourt ay in th am ca c about the
bill i tri tly a curat when th intention with which ii i made i
k pt in view. " ither, they ay, i more verity attributable to
a bill worn to than to one which i not o. The oath of th plaintiIT i required ad informandum conscientiam curim, not for the
purpo e of making it evidence again t his adversary who deni it.'
ith r the bill nor the an w r i evidence, in a technical en e, on
the h aring of a au in chanc ry, nor i ith r allow d to b read
in extenso und r the Engli h practice. The praintiff only read
such part of the an wer as he r li on to upport his c~ e a admi ion , and the defendant read uch part of the bill he relies on as
a :I.mi ion . We read the pleadings, ad informandum conscientiam
urim, in lieu of the preliminary tatement of coun el required in
England. 2 Dan. Ch. Pr. 996.
r
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as accurate as that of Ch. Kent, but was ineaiit to convey the same

idea, namely, that an answer on a hearing in equity is not evidence,

in a technical sense. And, it is obvious, that the court had no in-

tention to lay down general principles in conflict with their own

positive rulings, and that the compilers of our Digests have erred

in carrying the words into their Digest as absolute rulings.

In like manner, what the court say in the same case about the

bill is strictly accurate when the intention with which it is made is

kept in view. "jSFeither, they say, is more verity attributable to

a bill sworn to than to one which is not so. The oath of the plaint-

iff is required ad informandum conscientiam curice, not for the

purpose of making it evidence against his adversary who denies it."'

Neither the bill nor the answer is evidence, in a technical sense, on

the hearing of a cause in chancery, nor is either allowed to be read

in extenso under the English practice. The plaintiff only reads

such part of the answer as he relies on to support his case as admis-

sions, and the defendant reads such part of the bill he relies on as

admissions. We read the pleadings, ad informandum conscientiam

curia, in lieu of the preliminary statement of counsel required in
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England. 2 Dan. Ch. Pr. 996.

Exceptions to Answer,

Brools V. Byam, 1 Story, 296.

Bill in equity. Tlie bill in this case states, that one Alonzo D.

Phillips obtained letters patent for the making of friction matches ;

that he sold six rights therein, that is, the right to employ six per-

sons at the same time, in the manufacture of the said matches, to

one John Brown ; and that Brown sold one such right to the plaint-

iff; but that the deeds of conveyance, both to Brown and the

plaintiff, were not recorded in the Patent Office, as the law requires.

It also states, that the defendants, claiming to be the sole assignees

of Phillips, by a deed of conveyance from him to Byam, and from

Byam to the other defendants, but of later date than the deed to

the plaintiff, had commenced a suit against him, in the Circuit

Court of the United States, for Massachusetts District, for an

ExcEPTIO

TO ANSWER.

alleged invasion of their said right; the plaintiff averring, that he

B1·ooks v. Byam, 1 Story,

96.

BILL in equity. Th bill in thi ca e tat , that one Alonzo D.
Phillip obtained 1 tt r patent for the making of friction mat he ;
that h old ix right therein, that is, the right to employ ix peron at the am time, in the manufacture of th aid match to
n John Brown; and that Brown old one uch right to th plaintiff· but that the d d of conv anc both to rown and the
plaintiff w r not r ord d in th Patent Office, a the law r quire . .
t al o tate , that th d fendant , claiming to b th ole a irn e
f hillip by a d d of onveyanc from him to Bj am an 1 fr m
yam to the oth r d f ndant but of lat r dat than th
to
th plaintiff, ha 1 omm n e 1 a uit ac;ain t him in th
ourt f th
nit d tat
for ~Ia a hu~ett
i tri t for an
alJ cl inva ion of th ir aid ric;ht; th plainti a,· rrinc;, that h
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has done nothing therein not granted to him by the deeds from

Phillips to Brown, and from Brown to him.

It then i^roceeds to state, that at the time of the assignment from

Phillips to Byam, and before delivery of the deed, "the said Byam

was informed, and well knew, or had good cause to believe, that

the said Phillips had previously conveyed to the said John Brown

the right before mentioned, as set forth to have been so assigned

and conveyed; and that the said Brown had previously conveyed

to the plaintiff the right herein before set forth, and alleged to

have been so assigned and conveyed; and that the said Byam had

previously caused inquiry to be made, whether the said several

instruments of conveyance and assignment to the said Brown and

Brooks had been recorded." It then proceeds to allege the same

knowledge or belief, in like terms, by the other defendants, at the

time of the conveyance of their rights from Byam.

Prentiss Whitne}^, one of the defendants, whose answer is ex-

cepted to, says, that he "does not of his own knowledge know,"

whether Byam had any information, knowledge, or "any cause to

believe" the facts above stated; but that he "has been informed
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by said Byam, that at the time when" (&c.), "the said Byam had

no knowledge, information, or cause to believe, that said Phillips

had made any conve^-ance to said Brown" (&c.), "and this defend-

ant has no knowledge, information, or belief, that the information

so derived from said Byam is not true." He then proceeds to say,

that 'Tie has been informed by said Byam, and verily believes, that

he did not make any inquiry," whether Brown's and the plaintiff's

were recorded, as stated in the bill.

The plaintiff filed the following exception to the answer :

"The plaintiff excepts to the answer of Prentiss Whitney, one

of the defendants in this case, because, in stating in the said an-

swer, what lie has been informed of by the said Byam, he does

not say, whether he actually believes the same to be true. And he

prays, that the said Whitney may be required to put in a better

answer in that particular. By his Solicitor, S. Greenleaf."

Story, J.:

The question arising, in this case, is upon the exception taken

by the plaintiff in equity, to the answer of Prentiss Whitney, one

of the defendants, because, in stating in his answer, what he has

been informed of by Byam (another defendant), he does not say,

EXCEPTIONS TO ANSWER

ha done nothing therein not granted to him by the deeds from
Phillips to Brown, and from Brown to him.
It then proceed to tate, that at the time of the as ignment from
Phillips to Byam, and before delivery of the deed, "the said Byam
was informed, and well knew, or had good cause to believe, that
the aid Phillip had previou ly conveyed to the aid John Brown
the right before mention€d, a et forth to have been so a signed
and conveyed; and that the aid Brown had previou ly conveyed
to the plaintiff the right herein before set forth, and alleged to
have been o assigned and conveyed; and that the said Byam had
previou ly caused inquiry to be made, whether the said several
in trument of conveyance and a ignment to the said Bro·wn and
Brook had been recorded. ' It then proceed to allege the same
knowledge or belief, in like term , by the other defendant , at the
time of the conveyanoo of their rights from Byam.
Prenti Whitney, one of the defendants, whose answer is excepted to, ays, that he "does not of his own knowledge know,"
whether Byam had any information, knowledge, or "any cause to
believe" the facts above tated; but that he "has been informed
by aid Byam, that at the time when" ( &c.), "the said Byam had
no knowledge, information, or cau e to believe, that aid Phillip
had mad any conveyance to aid Brown" ( &c.), "and thi defendant has no knowledge, information, or belief, that the information
so derived from aid Byam is not true." He then proceed to say,
that ''he ha been informed by said B3 am, and verily believes, that
he did not make any inquiry," whether Brown' and the plaintiff's
were record d, a tated in the bill.
The plaintiff filed the following exception to the an wer :
"The plaintiff except to the an wer of Prentis Whitney, one
of the d f ndant in this ca e, becau e, in tating in the said answer, what he ha been informed of by the aid Byam, he does
not ay, wheth r h a tually b lieve the am to be true. And he
pra3 , that the aid Whitney may be r quired to put in a better
answer in that particular. By hi Solicitor, S. Greenleaf."

J.:
The que tion ari ing, in this ca e, i upon the exception taken
by the plaintiff in equity, to the an wer of Pr nti Whitney, one
of the defendant , "becau e, in tatinO" in hi an wer what h ha
l cen informed of 1 y B3 am ( anoth r d fendant) h doe not a ·
STORY,
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whether he a<jlually believes the same to be true." Certainly, this

exception is taken in a form and manner entirely too general, to

be upheld by the Court. The exception should have stated the

charges in the bill, and the interrogatory a2)plieable thereto, to

which the answer is addressed, and then have stated the terms of

the answer verbatim, so that the Court, without searching the bill

and answer througbout, might at once have perceived the ground

of the exception, and ascertained its sufficiency. It is very properly

observed by the Vice Chancellor (Sir John Leach) in Hodgson v.

Butterfield, 2 Sim. & Stu. ^36, that "if the plaintiff complains,

that a particular interrogatory of the bill is not answered, he must

fctate the interrogatory in the very terms of it, and cannot impose

upon the Court the trouble of first determining, whether the varied

expressions of the interrogatory and the exception are to be recon-

ciled."^ To wliich it may be added, that the same rule applies in

respect to the necessity of stating the charge or fact in the bill, on

which the interrogator}' is founded; for, if the interrogatory be

irrelevant to the matters charged in the bill, the defendant need

not answer the interrogatory at all.^ The Court ought, therefore,
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witbout searching through the whole bill, from the form of the

exception, to have the materials fully before it, by which to ascer-

tain at once its competency and propriety. In this respect the

exception is in itself insufficient and exceptionable. The objection,

however, has not been insisted upon at the bar.

Nothing is more clear in principle, than the rule, that in the

case of an interrogatory, pertinent to a charge in the bill, requiring

the defendant to answer it "as to his knowledge, remembra^nce,

information and belief" (which is the usual formulary), it is not

sufficient for the defendant to answer as to his knowledge; but he

must answer also, as to his infonnation and belief. The plain

reason is, that the admission may be of use to the plaintiff as proof,

if the defendant should answer as to his behef in the affirmative,

without qualification. Tlius, although a defendant should state,

that he has no knowledge of the fact charged, if he should also

state, that he has been informed and believes it to be true, or

simply, that he believes it to l)e true, without adding any qualifica-

^See also Gresley on Evid. 2i.

=Mitford Eq. PI. by Jeremy, 45; Cooper Eq. PI. 12; Gilh. For. Roman.

91. 218; Story on Equity Plead. §36; Gresley on Evid. 17 to 20, Am. edit.

1S37: Story on Equity Plead. §853; Harrison Ch. Pract. by Newland,

ch. 31, p. 181.
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whether he a: ually beli
the ame to be true.
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exc ption i tak n in a form and mamner entirely too general, to
b uph ld by the iourt. The :>xception hould ha e tated the
charge in h bill, and th int rrogatory applicable thereto, to
which the an w r i adclre d, and th n have tat d the term of
ourt, without earching the bill
the an w r rbatim, o that th
and an w r throughout, might at once have p rcei d the ground
of the e ·c ption, and a certained i ufficienc) . It i \'ery properl '
olJ rved b th Vice Chane llor ( ir John Leach) in Hodg on v.
Butterfield~ 2
im. & Stu. 236, that 'if the plaintiff complainn,
that a particular int rrogatory of the bill i not an w red, he mu t
·ta th int rrogatory in the very term of it, and cannot impo e
upon the Court the trouble of fir t determining, whether the va·r ied
expre "ion of the interrogatory and the exception are to be reconcil d. 1 To which it may be added, that the ame rule applie in
re, p ct to the nece ity of tating the charge or fact in the bill, on
which the interrogatory i founded; for, if the interrogatory be
irr levant to the matters charged in the bill, the defendant need
not an wer the interrogatory at all. 2 T'he ourt ought, therefore,
without searching through the whole bill, :from the form of the
exception, to have the materials fully before it, by which to a certain at once its competency and propriety. In thi re pect the
exception i in it elf in ufficient and exceptionable. The objection,
how ver, ha not been in i ted upon at th bar.
Nothing i more clear in principle, than the rule, that in the
ca e of an interrogatory, pertinent to a charge in the bill, requiring
the defendant to an wer it "a to hi knowledge, r membra·n ce,
information and belief" (which i the u ual formulary), it i not
ufficient for the def ndant to answer a to hi know ledge; but he
to hi information and belief. The plain
mu t an wer al o,
r a on i that th admi ion may be of u to the plaintiff a proof,
if the def ndant hould an wer a to hi belief in the affirmati"ve,
without qualification. Thu although a def-ndant hould tate,
that h ha no know1 dae of the fact charged, if h hould al o
. tate that he ha been inform d and b li e it to be true or
it to b tru , without addino- an· qualificaimpl · that h belie
e al o Gre Jey on EYid. 21.
-).litf rd Eq. Pl. by J remy, 45 · Cooper Eq. Pl. I · Gilb. F o r. Roman.
91. 21 ; tory on Equity Pl ad. § 36 · Gre ley n Evict. 17 to 20, • m . edit.
I ~7:
tor on Equity Plead.
S · Harri on Ch. Pra t. b
'ewland,
ch. I p. I I.
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tion thereto, such as that he does not know of it of his own knowl-

edge to be so, and therefore, he does not admit the same, it would

be taken by the Court, as a fact admitted or proved; for the rule

in equity generally (although not universally) is, that what the

defendant believes, the Court will believe.^ The rule might, per-

haps, be more exactly stated, as to its real foundation, by saying,

that whatever allegation of fact the defendant does not choose

directly to deny, but states his belief thereof, amounts to an admis-

sion on his part of its truth, or, that he does not mean to put it

in issue, as a matter of controversy in the cause. But a mere state-

ment by the defendant in his answer, that he has no knowledge,

that the fact is, as stated, without any answer, as to his belief

concerning it, will not be such an admission, as can be received as

evidence of the fact.^ Such an answer is insufficient; and, there-

fore, the defect properly constitutes a matter of exception thereto,

since it deprives the plaintiff of the benefit of an admission to

which he is justly entitled.^ However; Courts of Equity do not,

in this respect, act with rigid and technical exactness, as to the

manner, in which the defendant states his belief, or disbelief, if it
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can be fairly gathered from the whole of that part of the answer,

what is, according to the intention of the defendant, the fair result

of its allegations.*

It is obvious, that in answers as to the information and belief of

the defendant, there may be, and indeed, ordinarily will be, partial

admissions and partial denials, of every shade and character, some

of which may be delivered in terms of great ambiguity and uncer-

tainty, and some mixed up with various qualifications, and at-

tendant circumstances.^ No general rule, therefore, can be laid

down, which will govern all the different classes of cases, which

may thus arise, as to the sufficiency or insufficiency of an answer

in this respect. A man may have an undoubting belief of a fact,

or he may disbelieve its existence, or he may believe it highly

probable, or merely probable, or the contrary, or he may have no

belief whatsoever, as to it. In each, of these cases, he is bound to

^2 Danicll Chan. Prac. 257; Id. 402; Gresley on Evid. 19, 20; Potter v.

Potter ( I Vcs. 274) ; Carth v. Jackson (6 Ves. 2i7, 38) ', Story on Eq.

Plead. §854.

-2 Daniell Ch. Pr. 257; Id. 402; Coop. Eq. PI. 314; Harris. Ch. Pract.

by Newl. ch. 31, p. 181.

nbid.

*2 Daniell Ch. Prac. 257; Amhurst v. Kin^ (2 Sim. & Stu. 183).

f^Gresley on Evid. 2d edit. 1837.
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tion thereto, uch a that he doe not know of it of his own knowledge to be so, and therefor , he doe not admit the same, it would
be taken by the Court, a a fa t admitted or proved; for the rule
in equity generally (although not universally) is, that what the
defendant believes, the Court will believ .1 The rule might, perhap , be more exactly tated, a to it real foundation, by aying,
that whatever allegation of fact the defendant doe not choose
directly to deny, but tates his belief thereof, amounts to an admision on hi part of its truth, or, that he doe not mean to put it
in is ue, a a matter of controver y in the cau e. But a mere tatement by th d fendant in his an wer, th.a t he has no knowledge,
that the fact i , a stated, without any an wer, as to his belief
concerning it, will not be uch an admi ion, a can be received as
vidence of the fact. 2 Such an an wer is in ufficient; and, therefore, the defect properly constitute a matter of exception thereto,
since it d prives the plaintiff of the benefit of an admission to
which he is justly entitled. 3 However; Courts of Equity do not,
in thi resp ct, ad with rigid and technical e:xiactnes , as to the
manner, in which the defendant states his belief, or disbelief, if it
can be fairly gathered from the whole of that part of the answer,
what i , according to the intention of the defendant, the fair result
of its allegations. 4
It is obvious, that in a·nswer as to the information and belief of
the defendant, there may be, and indeed, ordinarily will be, partial
admissions and partial denial , of every hade and character, ome
of which may be delivered in term of great ambiguity and uncertainty, and ome mixed up with variou qualifications, and attendant circum tance .5 No general rul , th refore, can be laid
down, which will govern all the different la es of ca 86, which
may thu ari e, a to the ufficiency or in ufficiency of an an wer
in this r pect. A man may have an undoubting b lief of a fact,
or he may cli b li v it xi tence, or he may b lieve it highly
pr babl , r mer ly probabl , or the contrary, or he may have no
belief what o v r, a to it. In ea·ch of the ca 86, he i bound to
1
2 Daniell Chan. Prac. 257; Id. 402; Gresley on Evid. 19, 20; Potter v.
Potter (I Ve . 274) ; Carth v. Jackson (6 Ve . 37, 38) ; Story on Eq.
Plead. § 854.
2
2 Dani 11 Ch. Pr. 257; Id. 402; Co p. Eq. Pl. 314; Harris. Ch. Pract.
by N wl. ch. 31, p. 181.
3lbid.
4 2 Daniell Ch. Prac. 257; Amhurst v. Kini{ (2 Sim. & Stu. 183).
GGresley on Evid. 2d edit. 1837.
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answer conscientiously, as to the state of his mind, in the matter

of his belief; and if he does, that is all, which a Court of Equity

will require of him. If a man truly states, that he cannot form

any belief at all respecting the truth of the fact or information,

that is sufficient, and it puts the plaintiff upon proof of it. If, on

the other hand, the defendant should state (as in the present ciase

the defendant does in effect state), that he "has no knowledge, in-

formation, or belief, that the fact or information inquired about,

is not true," or if he states (as in the present case), that he has

been informed by a party, and verily believes, that such party did

not possess any knowledge, information, or belief of the fact, which

the interrogatory points out; in each of these cases, it seems to

me, that the answer, if expressive of the true state of mind of the

defendant, might at least, for some purposes, be held sufficient.

But, then, if such language were unaccompanied by any other

qualifications, or explanations, I should understand, that the de-

fendant did mean to assert his belief of the truth of the informa-

tion or statement of fact, because, if he had no knowledge, in-

formation, or belief, that it is not true, he must be presumed to
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give credit to it; and if he did not intend so to be understood,

it would be his duty to say in express terms, that he had no belief

about the matter ; and he ought not to be allowed to shelter himself

behind equivocal, or evasive, or doubtful terms, and thereby to mis-

lead the plaintiff to his injury. And this leads me to remark, and

it is the real and only point of difficulty, which I have felt upon

the exception, whether, although the plaintiff may agree to take

and accept such an admission, interpreting it as affirmative of the

defendant's telief, if in that sense it would be beneficial to himself,

he is positively bound to receive it, when it is clearly susceptible of

a different, or even of an opposite interpretation, which may affect

the nature and extent of his proofs at the hearing of the cause.

Uj)on full reflection, I think, that he is not positively bound to

receive it, although certainly I should interpret it as an affinnative,

if it would be favoral)le for the plaintiff; but he has a right to

require, that the defendant should state in direct terms, or, at

least, in unequivocal terms, either that he does believe, or that he

does not believe the matter inquired of, or that he cannot form

any belief, or has not any belief concerning the matter, and ac-

cording as the answer shall be the one way or the other, that he
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calls uiDon the plaintiff for proof thereof, or he admits it, or he

waives any controversy about it.

Upon this ground my opinion is, that the exception is well

founded, at least, as to some of the allegations in the answer. It

may, perhaps, be sufficient for the Court merely in this general

manner to intimate its present opinion upon the case; and it will

be easy for the counsel to make its application to the various parts

of the answer comi)lained of. But to make myself more clearly

understood, I wish to give an illustration of the principle, drawn

from the present bill and answer, especially as the nature of the

objection may thereby be seen in a more strong and exact light.

The object of the bill is to obtain, among other things, a per-

petual injunction to a suit now pending, on the Law side of this

Court, brought by the defendants in the bill (Byam and others)

against the plaintiff (Brooks), for violation of a patent, which

they claim title to, as assignees of the patentee ; and, among other

charges, the bill for this purj^ose alleges, that the original patentee

(Alonzo D. Phillips) had before his assignment to these parties

assigned a limited right therein to one John Brown, under whom
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the defendant claims a still more limited title, as a sub-purchaser

pro tanto, and insists that his acts done in supposed violation of

the patent, are rightfully done under this sub-title. The patent is

alleged to bear date on the 2-ith of October, 1837 ; the assignment

to Brown, on the 2d of January, 1837; the assignment to Brooks,

on the 18th of September, 1837; but it was not recorded until the

15th of July, 1839; and the assignment to Byam, on the 38th day

of July, 1838, under whom the other defendants (Whitney and

others) derive title, which was only recorded within the time pre-

scribed by law, whereas the assignment to Brown was not. Under

these circumstances the bill charges, that Byam at the time of the

assignment to him and the other defendants (and, among them,

Whitney) at the time of the assignment to them by Byam, had

knowledge and information, and good cause of belief of the prior

assignment to Brown. And in the interrogatory part of the bill

the defendants are required "full, true, direct, particular, and per-

fect answer and discovery to make, and that not only according

to the best of their knowledge, but to the best of their respective

information, hearsay, and belief, to all and singular the matters

and allegations and charges aforesaid."

Now, the answer of the defendant, Wliitney (which is cxcept<>d
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call upon the plaintiff for proof thereof, or he admits it, or he
waives any controversy a:bout it.
Upon thi ground my opinion i , thart the exception i well
founded, at lea t, as to ome of the allegations in the an wer. 1t
may, perhap , be sufficient for the Court merely in this general
manner to intimate its pre ent opinion upon the case; and it will
be a y for the coun el to make it application to the variou parts
of the an wer complained of. But to make my elf more clearly
under tood, I wi h to give an illustration of the principle, drawn
from the pre ent bill and an wer, pecially as the nature of the
objection may thereby be een in a more trong and exact light.
The object of the bill is to obtain, among other things, a perpetual injunction to a suit now pending, on the Law ide of this
Court, brought by the defendants in the bill (Byam and others )
again t the plaintiff (Brooks), for violation of a paiten t, which
they claim title to, as as ignees of the patentee; and, among· other
charge , the bill for thi purpose alleges, that the original patentee
(Alonzo D. Phillips) hail before his a ignment to these parties
assigned a limited right therein to one John Brown, under whom
the defendant claims a till more limited title, as a sub-purchaser
pro tanto_, and in ist:s that his acts done in supposed violation of
the patent, are rightfully done under this sub-title. The patent is
alleged to bear date on the 24th of October, 1837; the assignment
to Brown, on the 2d of January, 1837; the a ignment to Brook ,
on the 18th of ptember, 1837; but it wa not recorded until the
15th of July, 1839; and the assignment to Byam, on the 28th day
of July, 1838, under whom the oth r defendant (Whitney and
other ) derive title, which was only r corded within th time pres ·rib cl by law wherea the a ignment to Brown wa not. Und r
th ~ circum tanc the bill cha·rges, that Byam at the time of the
a jgnment to him and the other defendants (and, among them,
Whitney) at the time of the a ignment to th m by Byam, had
knowl dg and information, and good cau e of belief of the prior
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to), states, that he (the defendant) does not of his own knowledge

know, whether, at the time of the assignment to Byam, he (Byam)

had any information, or knowledge, or had any cause to believe,

that Phillips had previously made any conveyance to Brown, or

Brown to the plaintiff (Brooks) as alleged in the bill; but this

defendant has been informed by said Byam, that at the time, when

the said Phillips conveyed and assigned to him all his right and

interest in and to the patent right, the said Byam had no knowl-

edge, information, or cause to believe, that the said Phillips had

made any conveyance to the said Brown, or that the said Brown

had made any conveyance to the complainant ; and this defendant

has no knowledge, information, or belief, that the information so

derived from the said Byam is not true. Now, it is to the matter

and form of this last clause (and a like allegation is to be found in

other parts of the answer), that the objection is taken by the ex-

ception. The argument is, that the clause is ambiguous; that it

does not assert, in direct terms, that the defendant believed or

disbelieved the statement of Byam ; or that the defendant had no

belief, or was unable to form any belief about the matter, and,
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therefore, required the plaintiff to prove the knowledge, informa-

tion, or belief of Byam at the time of the assignment to him. So

that, in fact, the defendant, by the form of his allegation, does

not positively put the asserted fact in controversy, as to the knowl-

edge, information, or belief of Byam, by affirming his own belief

of Byam's statement; neither does he dispense with the proof

thereof, by denying his ow^n belief thereof ; neither does he assert,

that he is unable to form any belief upon the subject, and therefore

calls for proof of the allegation of the bill on this point; but he

leaves the matter in a state of am'biguity and open to different

interpretations, as to the true intent and meaning of the answer.

It appears to me, that in this view the exception is well founded.

When the defendant says, that he "Tias no knowledge, information,

or belief, that the information so derived from the said Byam is

not true," he merely pronounces a negative, which may, indeed,

in some sort amount to a negative pregnant, arguendo, that, as he

has no information or belief, that it is not true, therefore he be-

lieves it to be true, which would certainly be a natural, although

not an irresistible presumption. But it seems to me, that the

plaintiff has a right to more than this; to know, whether the

defendant himself has placed confidence in the statement or not,
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to), states, that he (the d f ndant) do not of hi own knowledge
I now, wh ther, at the time of th as ignm nt to Byam, he ( yam)
had an information, or knowl dg , or had any cau e to b li ve,
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th aid hillip onvey d and a igned to him all hi right and
intere t in and to the patent right, th aid Byam had no lmowllg , information, or cau e to beli v , that the aid hillip had
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do not a ert, in direct term , that the defendant beli ved or
di b liev d the tatement of Byam; or that the defendant had no
belief, or wa unable to form any belief about the matter, and,
ther for , r quired th plaintiff to prove the knowledge, informao
tion or belief of Byam at the time of the a ignment to him.
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or whether his mind haugs in dubio, and he is unable to form any

belief either way. In the latter case, certainly, less evidence would

be necessary to infer presumptively the knowledge, information,

or belief of Byam himself, than if the defendant himself believed

Byam's statement, and acted upon that belief; for a Court is not

bound, in favor of a defendant, to have a more confident belief

in a party, than the defendant himself professes to have. But

what I rely on is, that the defendant, by such a form of answer,

leaves it entirely equivocal, whether he believes, or is unable to

form any belief ; and the plaintiff has a right to know positively,

which of the two is his real predicament.

The exception, therefore, on this jDoint, ought to be allowed.

Stafford v. Brown, Jf Paige Ch. (N. Y.) 88. (1833.)

This case came before the court upon exceptions to the master's

report allowing certain exceptions to the defendants' answer.

The Chancellor:

EXCEPTIO:N"S TO

A

SWER

or whether his mind hangs in dubio, and he i unable to form any
belief either way. In the latter case, certainly, less evidence would
be nece ary to infer pre umptively the knowledge, informatiou,
or belief of Byam him elf, than if the defendant himself believed
Byam's tatement, and act d upon that belief; for a Court is not
bound, in favor of a defendant, to have a more confident belief
in a party, than the defendant him elf profes e to have. But
what I rely on i , that the d·e fendant, by such a form of answer,
leaves it entirely equivocal, whether he believes, or is unable to
form any belief; and the plaiinti:ff has a right to kna.w positively,
which of the two is his real predicament.
The exception, therefore, on this point, ought to be allowed.

The question which arises upon the five first exceptions allowed

by the master, is, whether there are any allegations or interroga-

tories in the complainant's bill to authorize him to call upon the

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 16:37 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t3223129q
Public Domain in the United States / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-us

defendants to answer the several matters of those exceptions. In

the case of V/liitmarsli v. Morris & Camphell, and in some other

Stafford v. Brown, 4 Paige Oh. (N. Y.) 88.

(1833.)

cases, none of which have been reported, this court decided that

exceptions to an answer for insufficiency could not be sustained,

unless there was some material allegation, charge or interrogatory

contained in the bill, which was not fully answered. That where

This ca e came before the court upon ex.ceptions to the master's
report allowing certain exceptions to the defendants' answer.

new matter, not responsive to the bill, was stated in the answer,

if such matter was wholly irrelevant and formed no sufficient

ground of defence, the complainant might except to the answer

for impertinence, or might raise the objection at the hearing. All

the writers on the subject of equity pleading, lay down the prin-

ciple, distinctly, that exceptions for insufficiency are founded upon

the supposition that some material allegation, charge or interroga-

tory in the complainant's bill, is not fully answered. In Lord

Redesdale's Treatise it is said, that if the complainant conceives

an answer to be insufficient to the charges contained in the bill,

he may take exceptions to it, stating such parts of the bill as he

THE CHANCELLOR :

The question which airises upon the five first exceptions allowed
by the master, i , whether there are any allegations or interrogatories in the complainant's bill to authorize him to call upon the
defendants to an wer the everal matters of those exception . In
the case of Whitmarsh v. Morris & Campbell, and in some other
cases, none of which have been reported, this court decided that
exceptions to an answer for insufficiency could not be sustained,
unle there wa ome material allegation, charge or interrogatory
contained in the bill, which was not fully answered. That where
new matter, not re ponsive to the bill, was tated in the answer,
if uch matter wa wholly irrelevant and form d no sufficient
ground of defence, th complainant might except to the an w r
for impertinence, or might rai e the obj ction at the hearing. All
the writer on the ubject of equity pl ading, la~r down the prinipl , di tinctly, that xception for in ufficiency ar founded upon
th uppo ition that om material all gation charge or interrogatory in the compla inant' bill, i not fully an w r d. In Lord
R d dale' Treati e it i said, that if th complainant cone iv 'S
an an wer to b in ufficient to the charge contain d in the bill,
h may take exceptions t-0 it tating u h part of the bill a he
1
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conceives are not answered, and praying that the defendant may

in such respects put in a full answer to the bill. (Mitf. PL 4 Lond.

cd. 315.)* Cooper says, the exceptions for insufficiency are to

l)e in writing, stating the parts of the bill which the complainant

alleges are not answered. (Cooper's PI. 319.) Xewland also says,

that exceptions for insufficiency are allegations in writing, stating

the particular points or matters in the bill which the defendant

has not sufficiently answered. (1 Newl. I'r. 3 Lond. ed. 259.)

And Lube, in his analysis of the principles of equity pleading,

says the exception must state the precise points in the bill un-

answered, or which are imperfectly answered. (Lube's Eq. PL

87.) Although it may not be necessary in the exception to state

the precise words of the allegation, charge or interrogatory in the

bill, which is not fully answered, yet the substance at least must be

stated; so that by referring to the bill alone, in connection with

the exception, the court may see that the peculiar matters to which

a further answer is sought, are stated in the bill, or that such an

answer is called for by the interrogatories. (See Hodgson v. But-

tcrp.cld, 2 Sim. & Stu. 23G.) As the general denial of all the
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matters of the bill not before answered, with which the answer

usually concludes, is sufficient as a pleading to put the several

matters of the bill in issue, the principal object of the exceptions

for insufficiency is to examine the defendant on oath, for the pur-

pose of discovery merely. For this purpose the complainant may

even anticipate the defence of the defendant, and may obtain a

*An insufficient answer, is no answer. (M'Laughlin's Adm'r v. Daniel,

8 Dana, 184.) [Vide 8 Ves. 87; Story's Eq. PI. 465, 469, 646, 647, 648, 649.]

It has been held that an answer clearly evasive on its face, and no reason

assigned, should be considered a contempt of court. (lb.) [I'idc 14 Ves.

415.] Where an answer is believed to be designedly defective, for the pur-

pose of imposing on the plaintiff the burthen of proving what the defend-

ant is, in conscience, bound to admit, the proper course is to except to the

answer, and compel the defendant to put in a complete one. {Luini v.

Jolmson. 3 Iredell's Eq. Rep. 70.) An exception to an answer for insuffi-

ciency, should state the charges in the bill, the interrogatory applicable

thereto, to which the answer is responsive, and the terms of the answer

verbatim. (Brooks v. Byam. i Story's Rep. 297.) Exceptions to an an-

swer do not lie for irregularities in the practice. (Vcrmilyea v. Christie,

4 Sandf. Ch. Rep. 376.) By excepting for insufficiency, the complainant

necessarily assumes that the answer is valid, and properly before the court,

(lb.) The verification of an answer taken abroad, it was alleged, was not

properly authenticated, whereupon the complainant excepted to certain

portions of the answer for insufficiency, relying solely upon its being no

answer, by reason of the defect in its verification. Held, that he had mis-

taken his remedy, which was by moving to take it from the files of the

court. (lb.)

2-l !

24J: Exceptions to Answer

discovery of matters connected with sucli defence, which are in

nowise responsive to the main charges in the bill upon which the

complainant's equity is supposed to rest. The proper method of

obtaining such discovery, however, is not by exceptions for in-

sufficiency founded upon the answer alone, but by framing the

bill in such a manner as to call for all the particulars of the defence

which it is supposed the defendant will set up. This is effected by

what is usually called the charging part of the bill, in which the

anticipated defence is stated as a pretence of the defendant, sup-

ported by proper charges and interrogatories founded upon such

alleged pretence. In this way the complainant is not only enabled

to anticipate the defence itself, by putting other matters in issue

which will have the effect to displace the equity thereof, but he

is also enabled to examine the defendant on interrogatories in

relation to all the particulars of such defence. (Mitford, 43;

Lube's Eq. PL 241, 268.) By an amendment of the bill the

complainant may generally effect the same object, even after the

defendant has put in an answer setting up such defence.

In the case under consideration the complainant, in his bill,
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has stated the recovery of a judgment against the defendant E.

Brown, on which an execution has been returned unsatisfied. But

as he has left the question of present indebtedness to be presumed,

as an inference of law arising from the facts thus stated, the

defendants were not called upon to do more than to admit the facts

as stated in the bill. The admission, however, did not preclude

them from rebutting this legal presumption of indebtedness by

setting up, as a distinct matter of defence, the payment of the

judgment either wholly or in part. But as this part of the answer

was not called for by the bill and was not responsive to anything

contained therein, it would be no evidence in favor of the defend-

ants unless established by proof. If the complainant had stated

in the bill that the defendants pretended that E. Brown had paid

the whole or part of the judgment, and charged that such pretence

was unfounded, he might in the interogatory part of the bill, have

called for all the particulars as to the time, place, amount and

manner of such pretended payment. But in that case the answer

would have been evidence in favor of the defendants, as to the

matters they were thus called upon to answer. Nothing should

be permitted to remain in an answer, which is neither called for

by the bill, nor material to the defence or with reference to any

EXCEPTIONS TO

Ar.

SvVER

discovery of matters connected with such defence, which are in
nowise-responsive to the main charges in the bill upon which the
complainant's equity is supposed to rest. The prnper method of
obtaining such discovery, however, is not by exception for insufficiency founded upon the answer alone, but by framing the
bill in such a manner a to caill for all the particulars of the defence
which it is supposed the defendant will set up. This is effected by
what is usually called the char:ging part of the bill, in which the
anticipated defence i stated as a pretence of the defendant, supported by proper charges and interrogatories founded upon such
alleged pretence. In this way the complainant is not only enabled
to anticipate the defence itself, by putting other matters in issue
which will have the effect to displace the equity thereof, but he
is also enabled to examine the defendant on interrogatories in
relwtion to all the particulars of such defence. (Mitford, 43 ;
Lube's Eq. Pl. 241, 268.) By an amendment of the bill the
complainant may generally effect the same object, even after the
defendant has put in an answer setting up such defence.
In the case under consideration the complainant, in his bill,
has stated the recovery of a judgment against the defendant E.
Brown, on which an execution has been returned unsatisfied. But
as he has left the question of present indebtedness to be presumed,
as an inference of law arising from the facts thus stated, the
defendant.s were not called upon to do more than to admit the facts
as stated in the bill. The admission, however, did not preclude
them from rebutting this legal presumption of indebtedness by
setting up, as a distinct maitter of defence, the payment of the
judgment either wholly or in part. But as this part of the answer
was not called for by the bill and was not responsive to anything
contained therein, it would be no evidence in favor of the defendants unl
e tabli hed by proof. If the complainant had stated
in the bill that the defendants pretended that E. Brown had paid
the whole or part o.f the judgment, and charged that uch pr tence
wa unfounded, he might in th interogatory part of the bill, have
called for all the particulars as to the time, place, amount and
manner of such pretend cl payment. But in that cas the answer
would have be n vicl nee in favor of the defendant , a · to the
matters they were thu called upon to answer. Nothing should
be permitted to r main in an an w r which i neith r called for
by the bill, nor material to the defence or with reference to any
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decree or order which may be made in the cause. But the proper

mode of maJving the objection to any such immaterial statement

with a view to have it expunged, is by excepting to the answer

for impertinence.

As the whole of the discovery called for by the five first excep-

tions allowed by the master, was founded upon new matters set

up by the defendants in their answer, by way of defence, those

exceptions should have been disallowed.

The matters of the ninth, twelfth and thirteenth exceptions, are

fully answered, so far as any foundation was laid for those excep-

tions by the allegations in the bill; and so far as the exceptions

went beyond the bill they were inadmissible. So much of the

master's report as was excepted to by the defendants, must therefore

be overruled, with costs. And if the complainant does not think

proper to amend his bill within ten days, as authorized by the

190th rule of this court, the defendants must answer the matters

of the eighth, tenth and eleventh exceptions within the time
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specified in the report of the master.

v.

DROWN
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decree or order which may be made in the cause. But the proper
mode of making the objection to any such immaterial tatement
with a view to have it expunged, is by excepting to the answer
for impertinence.
A th whol of the di covery called for by the five fir t exception allow d by the ma t r, wa founaed upon n w matters et
up by the defendants in their an w r, by way of defence, those
exception hould have been di allowed.
The matter of th ninth, twelfth and thirteenth xc ption , are
fully answer d, o far as any foundation was laid for tho e exception by the allegations in the bill; amd o far a the exceptions
went beyond the bill they were inadmis ible. So much of the
ma ter's report as was excepted to by the defendant , must therefore
be overruled, with costs. And if the complainant does not think
proper to amend his bill within ten days, as authorized by the
190th rule of this court, the defendants must answer the matters
of the eighth, tenth and eleventh exceptions within the time
pecified in the report of the master.

V

CHAPTER VII.

FUETHER PROCEEDIXGS OX PART OF PLAINTIFF.

Replication.

CHAPTER VII.

Mason v. Hartford By. Co., 10 Fed. Rep. 334. (1882.)

lu Equity. Decision upon defendants' motions to strike replica-

tions from the files, and to dismiss bill of revivor, and upon com-

plainants' motion to withdraw replications, and amend bill of

FURTHER PROCEEDINGS

O~

PART OF PLAINTIFF.

revivor.

Colt, D. J. :

REPLICATION.
In this cause a bill of revivor was filed August 1-i, 1880, by the

alleged administrators and trustees of Earl P. Mason, the original

complainant. To this bill one of the defendants, William T. Hart,

Mason

. Hartford Ry. Go., 10 Fed. R ep. 334.

(1882.)

put in a plea, setting up that it did not appear by said bill of

revivor that the plaintiffs named therein had ever been appointed

administrators of said estate by any court of competent jurisdiction

in the state of Massachusetts, and that therefore the plaintiffs had

no right to file said bill, that the court had no jurisdiction thereof,

and praying that the bill might be dismissed. The New York &

New England Railroad Company, another defendant, demurred

In Equit:J. Deci ion upon defenda:n t ' motion to trike replication from the files, and to di mi bill of revivor, and upon complainant ' motion to withdraw replication , and amend bill of
rev1vor.
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to the bill upon this as well as other grounds. To this plea and

demurrer the complainants in the bill of revivor filed separate

replications, setting out, among other things, that since the filing

of the plea and demurrer they had been appointed administrators

of the estate of the said Earl P. Mason in the state of Massa-

chusetts.

The defendant William T. Hart now moves — First, that the

replication to his plea be stricken from the files, because it is

special, and sets up new matter, and matter accruing after the

filing of the bill of revivor; and, second, that the bill of revivor

be dismissed, because the complainants have not taken issue on

the plea, nor set the same down to be argued, though the same has

been filed more than a year.

The New York & New England Railroad Company also move

246

COLT, D. J.:
In thi cau e a bill of revivor wa filed Augu t 14, 1880, by the
alleged admini trator and trustee of Earl P. Ma on, the original
complainant. To thi bill one of the defendant William T. Hart,
put in a I lea, etting up that it did not appear by aid bill of
revivor that the plaintiff named therein had ever been appointed
admini trator of aid e tate by any court of competent juri diction
in the tate of Ma sa hu ett , and that therefore the plaintiffs had
no right to file aid bill, that the court had no juri diction thereof
and praying that th bill might be dismi ed. The New York &
New England Railroad Company, another defendant, demurred
to the bill upon this a well a other ground . To thi plea and
demurrer the complainant in the bill of revivor filed eparate
r plication , etting out, among other thing , that ince the filing
of the plea and demurrer they had been appointed admini trator.
of th
tate of the aid Earl P. Ma on in th tate of Ma achu ett .
The
fendant William T. Hart now mov -Fir t that the
r plication to hi plea b trick n from th fil
becau e it i
p cia-1 and t up new matt r, and matt r accruing after the
filing of th bill of r vi or· and econd that the bill of revivor
b di mi ed b cau th complainant ha e not taken i ue on
the plea, nor et the ame down to b argued though the same has
b en :fil d mor than a year.
w Eno-land Railr ad ompany al o move
'1'he _ ew York
T
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that the replication to the demurrer be stricken from the files,

and that the bill of revivor l;e dismissed, because the complainants

have not set the demurrer down for argument, though filed over

one 3'ear before.

It is apparent that the replications here filed are special, setting

up new matter, and matter accruing since the filing of the bill of

revivor; therefore they are irregular. By equity rule 45, of the

United States court, "no special replication to any answer shall be

filed."

In Vattier v. Hinde, 7 Pet. 252, 274, the supreme court declare

that no special replication can l3e filed except by leave of the court ;

holding it to be contrary to the rules of a court of chancery for the

plaintiff to set up new matter necessary to his case by way of repli-

cation ; that omissions in a bill cannot be supplied by averments in

the replication; and that a plaintiff cannot be allowed to make out

a new case in his replication. This is equally true whether it is an

answer or plea that is replied to. See Daniell Ch. PL & Pr. (4th

Ed.) 828, note 1. "Matters in avoidance of a plea, which have

arisen since the suit began, are properly set up by a supplemental
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bill, not by a special replication"; citing Chouteau v. Rice, 1 Minn.

lOG. In Mitford & Tyler, PI. & Pr. in Eq. 412, 413, we find,

"special replications, with all their consequences, are now out of

use, and the plaintiff is to be relieved according to the form of the

bill, whatever now matters have been introduced by the defendant's

plea or answer." The replications to the plea and demurrer can-

not be sustained.

The second motion of the defendants, that the bill of revivor be

dismissed, is based upon equity rule 38, which provides that if the

plaintiff shall not reply to any plea, or set down any plea or de-

murrer for argument, on the rule-day when the same is filed, or on

the next succeeding rule-day, he shall be deemed to admit the truth

and sufficiency thereof, and his bill shall be dismissed as of course,

unless a judge of the court shall allow him further time for the

purpose.

It appears in this case that the bill of revivor was filed August

14, 1880; the plea and demurrer, September 6, 1880; the repli-

cations, July 30, 1881; and that soon after (August 4th) the

plaintiffs' counsel asked the court to fix a day for the argument.

It further appears that after the filing of the plea and demurrer,

September G, 1880, a stipulation was entered into by counsel upon.

• HARTFORD

RY. Co.
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that th r plica ion to th d murrer be trjcken from the file ,
and that th bill of revivor 1 i mi d, becau e the complainant
hav not t th d murrer do-vvn f r argument, though filed o er
one y ar for .
It i appar nt that th r plication h re filed are pecial, etting
up new matt r and matter accruing in th filing of th bill of
r evi or; h r fore they ar irr gular. By equity rule 45, of the
Unit l tat
ourt, "no p cial r plication to any an w r haU be
fil d.'
In Vattier v. H inde, 7 P t. 52, 74, the upreme court declare
that no pecial r plication can be filed except by leave of the court ;
holding it to b contrar to the rule of a court of chancer fo r the
plaintiff to t up n w matter nee ary to hi ca e by wa of replication · that omi ion in a bill cannot b uppli d by av rm nt in
the r plication · and that a plaintiff cannot b allowed to make out
a new ca e in hi r eplication. Thi i equally true whether it i an
an w r or pl a that i replied to.
ee Dani ll Oh. Pl. & Pr. (4th
Ed .)
, not 1. "Matter in avoidance of a plea, which hav
ari en ince the uit began ar properly et up b a upplemental
bill not by a pecial repliootion' ; citing Chouteau v. Rice, 1 Minn.
106. In Mitford & T yler, Pl. & Pr. in Eq. 41 , 413 we find
"pecial r eplication , with all their con equ nee , are now out of
tre and the plain tiff i to be relieved according to the form of the
bill whatever n ew matter have been introdu ed by the defendant
pl a or an wer." The replication to the plea and demurrer cannot be u tained.
The
ond motion of the defendants, that the bill of revivor be
di mi d i ba d upon quity rul 3 whi h pro ide that if the
plaintiff hall not r eply to any pl a or et down any plea or demurrer for argum nt, on th rule-day wh n th ame i filed or on
th n t u ce ding rul -da3 h hall b deemed to admit the truth
and uffi i n y th r of and hi bill hall be di mi ed a of cour e
unl
a judg of the court hall aUow him further time for the
purpo .
It app ar in thi ca e that the bill of revi vor wa ~ :fil d ~ u cru.::t
1-1:, 1 0 · th pl a and d murr r
ptember 6 1
· th r pliJuly 30 1 1 · and that oon after ( ucru t -± h) th
plain i
oun 1 a ked th ourt to fix a day for the anrument.
H forth r app ar that after th filing f th pl a and demurr r
pt m r
1
a tipulation "as; nt red into b · ouns 1 upon
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both sides extending the time for hearing to the November rule-

day, 1880, meantime the complainants to be allowed to file proper

pleadings in reply to said plea and demurrer. By further written

arguments between counsel the postponement provided for by this

stipulation was extended monthly until February, 1881. Then

we find a further stipulation as follows :

"It is hereby agreed that no movement on either side shall be

made "in this cause until May, 1881, without prejudice to com-

plainants' right to file evidence of appointment as administrators

in Boston."

By the affidavit of Mr. Payne, one of complainants' counsel, it

appears that in October or November, 1880, Mr. Lothrop, one of

defendants' counsel, stated, in effect, that while he would sign the

stipulation, the complainants' counsel might take their own time

about bringing the case to a hearing.

In the light of all these circumstances it is fair to presume that

complainants' counsel understood that any rigid enforcement of the

rule now invoked had been waived, impliedly by acts and conduct,

if not in express terms; and we are of this opinion.
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Considering the repeated postponements which had taken place,

for the mutual accommodation of both sides, so far as appears, the

language used by defendants' counsel as to time of hearing; and

bearing also in mind that the replications were filed within three

months after May, 1881; and that within a week thereafter the

plaintiffs moved the court to set a time for hearing, — it would, we

think, be inequitable to allow the defendants' motion to dismiss to

prevail. Indirectly, as bearing on this question of laches, reference

is made to the fact that the original bill in this case was brought in

1871, the answer filed in 1873, the replication not put in until

1875; also, that the original complainant died in 1876, and that

the bill of revivor was not brought until 1880. In answer to this

charge, the complainants say that the delay has been owing to the

pendency of another suit in the state court of Rhode Island,

the determination of whicli might affect the prosecution of this

suit, and that, consequently, the delay was acquiesced in by both

sides. They further state that within a short time after the final

decision by tlic Ehode Island state court the bill of revivor was

filed, and that they are now anxious to speed the cause. Under

these circumstances, and in tbe absence of any motion on the part

of the defendants to speed the cause, we do not see how the charge

REPLICATION

both sides extending the time for hearing to the November ruleday, 18 0, meantime the complainants to be a1lowed to file proper
pleading in r ply to aid plea and demurrer. By further writi;en
argument between counsel the po tponement provided for by this
tipulation wa extended monthly until February, 1881. Then
we find a further tipulation a follows:
"It is hereby agreed that no movement on either side shall be
made ·in thi cause until May, 1881, without prejudice to complainants' right to file evidence of appointment as admini trators
in Boston."
By the affidavit of Mr. Payne, .one of complainants' counsel, it
appea·rs that in October or November, 1880, Mr. Lothrop, one of
defendants' counsel, tated, in effect, that while he would ign the
stipulation, the complainants' counsel might take their own time
about bringing the case to a hearing.
In the light of all these circumstances it is fair to presume that
complainants' counsel understood that any rigid enforcement of the
rule now invoked had been waived, impliedly by acts and conduct,
if not in express terms; and we are of this opinion.
Considering the repeated postponements which had taken place,
for the mutual accommodation of both ides, so far as appea·rs, the
language u ed by defendants' coun el as to time of hearing; and
bearing al o in mind that the replications were filed within three
months a.fter May, 1881; and that within a week thereafter the
plaintiffs moved the court to set a time for hearing,-it would, we
think, be inequitabl to allow the defendant ' motion to dismi to
prevail. Indirectly, as bearing on this question of laches, reference
i made to the fact that the original bill in thi case was brought in
1871, the a·nsw r filed in 1873, the r plication not put in until
1 5; al o that the original complainant died in 1876, and that
the bill of revivor wa not brought until 18 0. In an w r to thi5
charge, th complainant ay that the delay ha b en owing to the
pendency of anoth r uit in th
tat court of Rhode I lant1,
th det rmination of which might a:ff ct the pro e ution of thi.
suit, and that, on equently, th d lay wa a qui c d in by 1 oth
sid . Th y furth r tat that within a hart tim aft r the final
d i ion y th Rh d I land tat ourt th bill of revivor wa,
fil d, and that they ar now anxiou to p d th caus . Un 1er
th
circum tance , and in the ab nee of any motion on the part
of the d f ndants to p d th oau , w do not e how the charg
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of laches can be seriously pressed; at last, so far as the prcsunt

motion is concerned.

Tlie complainants, in the event of their replications being held

to be bad, ask leave to withdraw them, and to amend their bill of

revivor by inserting, among other things, the fact that they were

on the twenty-fifth day of July, 1881, by the court of probate for

the district of Suffolk, in the state of Massachusetts, duly appointed

administrators of the estate of Earl P. Mason. The defendants

object, upon the ground that this is new matter, accruing since the

filing of the bill, which cannot be set up by amendment, but only

by supplemental bill. It is true that events which have happened

since the filing of a bill cannot be introduced by way of amend-

ment, and that as a general rule they may be set out by supple-

mental bill. Equity Rule 57, U. S. Court.

In Daniell, Ch. PL & Pr. (-Ith Ed.) 1515, note 1, we find "an

original bill cannot be amended by incorporating anything therein

wliich arose subsequently to the commencement of the suit. This

should be stated in a supplemental bill." And again, on page 828,

note 1 (already cited), it is laid down that matters in avoidance
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of a plea, which have arisen since the suit began, are properly set

out by a supplemental bill. Mitford & Tyler, PI. & Pr. in Eq.

159; Story Eq. PL § 880. But in this case it is difficult to see

how a supplemental bill can be brought. This bill of revivor has

not become defective from any event happening after it was filed.

But originally, when it was brought, it was wholly defective; for

the fact that the plaintiffs were appointed administrators by the

proper court in Massachusetts was necessary to its maintenance.

Melius V. Thompson, 1 Clif. 125. And yet this event happened,

as the record discloses, nearly a year after it was brought. If the

bill is wholly defective, and there is no ground for proceeding upon

it, it cannot be sustained by filing a supplemental bill, founded

upon matters which have subsequently taken place. Candler v.

Petm, 1 Paige Ch. 168.

In Pinch v. Anthony, 10 Allen, 471, 477, the court observe :

'^e have found no authority that goes so far as to authorize a

party, who has no cause of action at the time of filing his original

bill, to file a supplemental bill in order to maintain his suit upon

a cause of action that accrued after the original bill was filed, even

though it arose out of the same transaction that was the subject

of the original bill." Daniell Ch. PL & Pr. (4th Ed.) 1515, note.

v.

HARTFORD

RY. Co.
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We are of the opinion that this new matter cannot be incor-

porated in the bill of revivor by amendment, nor introduced in

a supplemental bill, and that the proper cause for the complainants

to pursue is to bring a new bill of revivor.

(1) The defendants' motion to strike from the files complain-

ants' replications to plea and demurrer is granted. (3) The

defendants' motion to dismiss bill of revivor is denied. (3) The

complainants' motion to amend bill of revivor is denied.

Brown v. Ricketts, 2 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) Jf25. (1817.)

Bill for a legacy, filed the 3d of October last. The defendants

REPLICA.. TIO N

\\ e are of the opinion that thi new matter cannot be incorporated in the bill of revivor by amendment, nor introduced in
a upplemental bill, and that the proper cau e for the complainants
to pur ue i to bring a new bill of revivor.
(1) The defendant' motion to trike from the files complainant ' r plication to plea and demurrer i granted. ( ) The
d fendan ts' motion to di miss bill of re i vor i denied. ( 3) The
complainant ' motion to amend bill of revivor i denied.

put in their answer the 13th of December, and the plaintiff filed

his replication the 4th of January last. The plaintiff now pre-

sented a petition for leave to withdraw the replication, to enable

him to except to the answer, and to amend his bill.

The petition was not sworn to : a copy of it, with notice of the

Brown v. Ricketts, 2 Johns. Oh. (N. Y.) 425.

{1817.)

motion, was duly served on the solicitor of the defendants.

An affidavit of the plaintiff's solicitor, made since the service of

the notice of the motion, a copy of which had not been served on

the defendants' solicitor, was produced, stating, that the replication
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was filed through misapprehension, on the ground that the answer

was sufficient, arising from his perusal of an imperfect and incor-

rect draft of the bill; and that he had since discovered that the

bill filed charged the matters which he supposed were omitted,

and which were not fully answered.

The affidavit of the defendants' solicitor stated, that the answer

filed was a full answer to the bill; that since the cause was at

issue, no step had been taken by the plaintiff; and that, on the

21st of March, he entered rules to produce witnesses, and to show

cause against publication.

The Chancellor:

The petition states two objects of the motion for leave to with-

draw the replication; the one is, to except to the answer; the

other, to amend the bill.

As to the first object ; the plaintiff does not state, in his petition,

wherein the answer is defective, nor why the defects, if any, were

not discovered l)efore. It is now upwards of three months since

for a legacy, filed the 3d of Octaber la t. The defendants
put in their an wer the 13th of Decemb r, and the plaintiff filed
hi replica.hon the 4th of January last. The plaintiff now pre-·ented a petition for leave to withdraw the replication, to en~ble
him to except to the an wer, and to amend hi bill.
The petition wa not worn to: a copy of it, with notice of the
motion, wa duly erved on the olicitor of the defendant .
An affidavit of the plaiintiff olicitor, made ince the service of
the notice of the motion, a copy of which ha<l not been erved on
the defendants' olicitor, wa produced, tatin , that the replication
was filed through mi appr hen ion, on the ground that the an w r
wa sufficient, ari ing from hi peru al of an imperfect and incorrect draft of the bill; a1nd that h had ince di covered that the
bill filed charg d the matter whi h h upposed were omitted,
and which wer not fully an wered.
The affidavit of the defendant ' olicitor tated, tha.t the an wer
fil d wa a full an wer to the bill · that ince the cause wa at
i . ue, n t p had been taken by th plaintiff; and that on the
21 t of Mar h h entered rule to produc witn e , and to how
·au e again t publi ·ation.
BILL

THE 0II

CELLOR:

The etition tat two obj
f th motion for leave to withc pt to the an wer; the
draw th r pli ation · th n i , to
other, to am nd th bill.
to th fir t 1 j t; th plaintj 1o n t tat in hi petition
wh r i th an w r i d f iv 11 r why th d f t , if an3, wer
n t di. cov r d l r r . It i now upward of three month ince
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the replication was filed. There is, indeed, an affidavit presented

on making the motion, but that affidavit was not served on the

op]X)site solicitor, and if notice of the motion was requisite at all

(which is not disputed), a copy of the affidavit on which it was

founded ought equally to have been served. The affidavit is, there-,

fore, not regularly before me on this motion; and even if it were,

the reason therein assigned for the motion is not sufficient. The

plaintiff's solicitor says, he filed the replication through misappre-

hension, inasmuch as he mistook an incorrect draft of the bill for

the corrected copy on file, and that the answer, though good as to

the former, is not as to the latter. But this affidavit does not

disclose wherein, or to what extent, the answer is insufficient, nor

file, was discovered, nor in what that variation consists. The excuse

itself is feeble and imperfect. The solicitor to the bill compares

the answer with some defective draft of his own bill, and now

comes, three months after the cause it put at issue, with such a plea

of negligence, and with all this want of precision and regularity

in bringing forward the motion, for leave to file exceptions to the
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answer. This would be granting an unreasonable indulgence, and

one leading to vexation and delay in the prosecution of a suit. It

was said, by Lord Hardwicke, in Pott v. BcijnoJch, 3 Atk. 565,

that the Court rarely grants leave to withdraw the replication,

unless there be some special cause shown to induce the Court to

grant this indulgence; and the books say, that as the replication

admits the sufficiency of the answer, it is not usual for the Court

to allow the plaintiff to withdraw it, for the purpose of excepting

to the answer. (Wyatt's P. R. 202. Cooper's Eq. PI. 328.) The

reasons for such an application should be clearly stated, and be

of sufficient import, and the laches of the plaintiff fully accounted

for. The rules of the Court allow only three weeks to except to

the answer. The policy of the rule is to make the party vigilant,

and oblige him to look early and well to the answer. If the object

of the motion was only to set down the cause for hearing, on bill

and answer, I presume that it would be much, of course, according

to the late case of Cowdell v. Tatlocl-, 3 Vesey & Beame, 19.

The other ol)ject of the present motion is to amend the bill.

Tlie petition states, that the bill is materially defective; but the

affidavit of the plaintiff's solicitor states, that the bill fully charges

the matters which he, at first, thought had been omitted, and the

K •TTS
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n if it were,
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same solicitor now states, in support of his motion, that the bill is

full, and that the only amendment desired is one of mere form,

and requiring no further answer. It will readily be perceived,

that this is not sufficient ground for withdrawing a replication

several months after is has been filed. To withdraw the replication

for the purpose of amending the bill, the plaintiff must show the

materiality of the amendments, and why the matter to be intro-

duced by the amendment was not stated before, otherwise the rules

of the Court to prevent vexatious delays of the plaintiff would be

nugatory. (Longman v. Calliford, 3 Anst. 807.)
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The motion is, accordingly, denied, with costs.

REPLICATION

ame solicitor now tates, in upport of his motion, that the bill is
full, and that the only amendment desired is one of mere form,
and requiring no further an wer. It will readily be perceived,
that thi i not sufficient ground for withdrawing a replication
e eral month after i has been filed. To withdraw the replication
for the purpo e of amending the bill, the plaintiff mu t how the
materiality of the amendments, and why the matter to be introduced by the amendment was not stated before otherwi e the rule
of the Court to prevent vexatiou delay of the plaintiff would be
nugatory. (Longman v. Calliford, 3 Anst. 807.)
The motion is, accordingly, denied, with co ts.

CHAPTER VIII.

DECREES.

Nature, Effect, Amending and Enforcing.

CHAPTER VIII.

Hughs V. ^Yashington, 65 III. 21^5. (1S72.)

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Wm.

W. Farwell, Judge, presiding.

Mr. Justice Walker delivered the opinion of the Court:

These cases present substantially the same questions, and wo,

therefore, consider them as one. Tliey were brought by the heirs

T RE, EFF CT,

:JIE Dir G A

:rn

ENFOR ING.

of John A. Washington against George E. H. Hughs and the heirs

of Sanderson Robert. The bills were filed to set aside and annul

II ugh

contracts of sale of large and valuable real estate in the city of

Wa

hington~

65 Ill.

45.

{1 7 .)

Chicago, by Hughs, as the agent of Washington's heirs, to Robert.

pp al from th

The ground alleged for rescinding the contract was fraud.

The cases were heard together, in the circuit court of Cook

county, on the 6th day of May, 1871. The evidence was very

W.

A.RWELL,

ir uit ourt of
Judg pr iding.

ook coun y ; the Hon . WM.

voluminous, and consisted largely of letters sent and received by

the various parties, depositions and other documentary evidence.

After the hearing was had, it is claimed that the court below

decided the cases in favor of the complainants, but, before anv
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decree was rendered or enrolled, the fire of October of that year

destroyed the court house and all the papers in the cases, both

pleadings and evidence.

Counsel agreed upon and restored the pleadings in the cases.

The defendant then made a' motion for time to retake and restore

all of the destroyed evidence, and urged their right to have the

evidence restored and on file before a decree should be passed and

filed for record or recorded.

The motion of the defendants was denied, and the court, from

memory of the evidence, pronounced a decree in each case, and

they were duly enrolled and became final. From that decree the

defendants ap^oeal, and assign the refusal of the court to stay the

rendition of the decree until the evidence could be restored, as one
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of the errors in the case; and, from the view we take of the case,

we deem it unnecessary to consider any other.

According to the ancient practice in the English court of chan-

cery, the decree recited at length the entire pleadings in the case,

and the substance of the evidence contained in the depositions.

That practice has been slightly modified in that court in modern

times, but its decrees still contain full recitals. In our courts of

chancery, the practice has permitted, but not required, such recitals,

especially of the CTidenee. The practice has obtained neither in

Great Britain nor this country to set out the depositions in full,

but simply to recite the substance of the evidence they contain

pertinent to the issue.

As the practice in chancer}^ has always required the evidence

to be in writing, or if oral, to be reduced to writing, and preserved

in the record, it is apparent that the old practice of embodying

it in the decree was not material, as it could at all times be referred

to for the purpose of seeing upon what the decree was based, and

whether it was sustained by the evidence ; and hence, our practice

dispensed with emlx)dying it in the decree. But the practice, as
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modified, does not dispense with the absolute necessity of preserv-

ing the evidence in the record. ]T7n7e v, Morrison, 11 111. 361;

Wilhite V. Pearce, -17 111. 413 ; Hill's Ch. Pr. 319, and numerous

other cases, recognize the rule.

On an appeal from the decree, each party has the right to rely

upon the evidence heard in the c-ourt below, to test the correctness

of the conclusions at which the court has arrived; and, in such

a case, the finding of the facts in the decree will be controlled by

the evidence in the record, where it appears that it has all been

preserved. The appellate court will look into the record to see

whether the evidence warrants the court in its action in finding

the facts stated in the decree, and if, from all the evidence that was

heard, it appears the chancellor erred in the finding of the facts,

the appellate court will disregard the findings, and will be con-

trolled by the evidence. Under the ancient practice, the decrees

in these cases would ha-ve contained a complete record of the case,

and from it alone the appellate court could have determined

whether error had intervened; and if the evidence had been pre-

served in the record, the same result would follow where a complete

record is presented for consideration. But in the position the case

now occupies, the defendant has no jDower to show that the facts

N A..TURE,

EFFECT, A:ME:1""TII:NG A..XD ENFORCING

of the errors in the ca e; and, from the view we take of the ca e,
we deem it unnece ary to con ider any other.
According to the ancient practice in the Engli h court of chancery, the decree recited at length the entire pleadings in the ca e,
and the ub tance of the evidence contained in the depo itions.
That practice ha been lightl modified in that court in modern
tim , but its decree till contain full recital . In our court of
chancer , the practice ha permi ted, but not required, uch recitals,
e peciall of the evidence. The practice ha obtained neither in
Great Britain nor thi country t-0 et out the depo itions in full,
but impl ' to recite the uibstance Gf ·t he evidence they contain
pertinent to the i ue.
A the practice in chancery ha alway required the e'Tidence
to be in writing, or if oral to be reduced to writino- and pre erved
in the record, it i apparent that the old practice of embodying
it in the decree wa not material a it could at all time be r eferred
to for the purpo e of eeing upon what the decree wa ba ed, and
whether it wa u ta•ined b the e idence; and hence, our practice
di pen ed with embod ing it in the decree. But the practice, as
modified, do not di pen e with the ab olute nece ity of pre erving the evidence in the record. TVhite v. Morrison, 11 Ill. 361 ;
Wilhite v. P earce, -± Ill. -±13; Hill' Ch. Pr. 319, and numerous
other ca , recognize the rule.
On an appeal from the decree, each part ha the right to rely
upon the evidence heard in the court below, to te t the correctness
of the conclu ion at which the court ha aorrived; and, in uch
a ca e, the :finding of he facts in the decree will ·be controlled by
the evidence in the record where it appears that it ha all en
pr erved. The appellate court will look into the record to ee
whether the evidence warrants the court in it action in finding
the fact tated in the decree and if, from all the evidence that wa
heard, it appear the chancellor erred in the :finding of the facts,
the appellate court will di regard the finding and will be controll d by the evidence. Under the ancient practice the decrees
in th ~ e 1Ca e would ha·ve contain d a complete record of the case,
and from it alone the appellate court could have determined
whether error had intenen · and if th evidence had b en preserved in the r cord the ame result would follow where a complete
r ecord i pre nted for con ideration. But in the po ition the case
now occupi
the d fendant ha no power to how that the facts
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found by the chancellor in the decree are not warranted by the

evidence.

It is an undoubted right, enjoyed by every litigant, to have the

judgment or decree to which he is a party passed upon and reviewed

by an appellate court. This, the constitution has guaranteed to

him; nor can the courts, by rules of practice, deprive him of the

right, or materially impair its efficiency. And, in all common law

cases, under our statute, it is the duty of the party desiring to have

the case reviewed on the evidence, to preserve it in the record, or the

presumption will be indulged that the court below acted prop-

erly in its decision. Not so with a decree, as no presumption is

indulged beyond the extent to which it is sustained by the proofs

appearing in the record. Hence, it devolves upon the party in

whose favor it is rendered to preserve evidence that will sustain

the decree, or it must find that facts were proved that will sustain

the decree, or it will be reversed.

Did the court below act prematurely in rendering these decrees

before the evidence was restored ?

It is contended that inasmuch as the chancellor had heard the
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evidence, and had announced what his decision would be, and had

written out a statement of the grounds for the decision, it must be

considered that the case was finally decided, and nothing remained

but the formal matter of drawing and passing the decree. This

is manifestly not the correct view of the question. Under the

English practice, after the hearing is had, the chancellor pro-

nounces his decree, and the registrar takes minutes of it, and they

are usually read over by him to the parties, or their solicitors, and

copies of such minutes are generally applied for and furnished to

the parties. If not satisfactory, by reason of their uncertainty, or

that anything has been omitted, and the registrar refuses to correct

them, application may be made to the court to correct them. After

the minutes are settled, the decree is then drawn up by the registrar,

and delivered to the party who demanded it. "The decree having

been returned, and an office copy taken by the adverse party, the

next step to be taken is to have it passed and entered; till which

is done, the decree is only inchoate." 2 Danl. Ch. Pr. 670. But

this practice has not, in form, obtained in this State.

But our practice is, in principle, the same. The decree is m-

clioaie until it is approved by the chancellor and filed for record,

or shall be recorded, which answers to the passing and entering it,

. WA nr
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found by the chancellor in the d cree are not warranted by the
evidence.
It i an undoubted right enjoyed by e ery litigant, to have the
judgment or decre to which he i a part3 pa ed upon and reviewed
by an appellate court. T'hi , the con titution has guaranteed to
him; nor can the court , by rule of practice, deprive him of the
right, or materially impair its efficiency. And, in all common law
ca es, under our tatut , it i the dut of th party de iring to have
the ca r viewed on the evidence, to preserve it in the record, or the
pre umption will be indulged that the court below acted properl3 in it deci i·on. Not o with a decree, a no pre umption is
indulged beyond the ext nt to which it is u tained by the proofs
appearirw in the record. H ence, it devolves upon the party in
who e favor it i rendered to preserve evidence that will ustain
the decree or it mu t find that facts were proved that will su tain
the decree, or it will be reversed.
Did the court below act prema·t urely in rendering these decrees
before the evidence was restored?
It is contended that ina much as the chancellor had heard the
evidence, and had announced what hi decision would be, and had
written out a statement of the grounds for the deci ion, it mu t be
considered that the case w.a finally decided, and nothing remained
but the formal matter of drawing and pa ing the decree. This
is manife tly not the correct view of the que ti on. Under the
Engli h practice, after the hearing is had, the chancellor pronounce hi decree, and the registrar take minute of it, and they
are u ually read over by him to the partie , or their olicitor , and
copie of ucb minute are generally applied for and furni bed to
the parti . If not ati facror3, by rea on of their uncertainty, or
that anything ha been omitted, and the regi trar refu e to correct
them application may be made to the court to correct them. After
the minute are ettled, th decree i then drawn up by the regi trar,
and dehvered to the party who demanded it. "The decree having
b en returned and an office cop3 ilaken by the adverse party, the
next tep to be taken i to have it pa ed and entered; till which
Danl. Ch. Pr. 6 0. But
i done the decree i onl inchoate."
thi practice ha not, in form, obtained in thi tate.
But our pradic i , in principle, the am . The decree i 'in choate until it i approved by the chancellor and fil d for r ord,
or hall be recorded which an wer to th pa jno- and nterino- it,
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in the English court. The mere oral announcement of the chan-

cellor of his decision, and the grounds upon which it is hased, or

the reducing them to writing, is no more than the minutes taken,

in the English practice. The whole matter is completely under the

control of the chancellor until the final decree has been filed or

recorded. Until that time, he may alter, amend, change, or even

disregard, all that he had said in his minutes ; and if, upon further

reflection, he became satisfied his conclusions were wrong, it would

be his duty to reverse his announcement, and to decree as he was

convinced the equities of the case required; or if, upon further

reflection, he should doubt the correctness of his conclusion, he has

the undoubted right to order a rehearing, on his own motion, at

any time before he has passed the decree, and it has been filed for

record, or has been spread upon the record. But after that is

done, the whole matter is beyond his control, unless it be on a bill

of review, or a bill to impeach the decree, or some such subsequent

proceeding. It is then, and not till then, that it is the decree of

the court, and is res ad judicata.

There was, then, no decree of the court until it was approved
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and filed for record, or was recorded; and that was the time the

case was decided and the decree was rendered; and there was at

that time, as a matter of fact, no evidence upon which to base the

decree. Had the fire occurred, and the papers been destroyed

before the court heard the evidence read, no one would pretend the

court could have, after its destruction, rendered a decree until the

testimony was restored, or if the evidence had been but partly read

to the court, the same would be undeniably true; and we presume

it would not be claimed that the court could have proceeded to

decree, had the evidence been destroyed after it was heard by the

court, and before he had announced what decree he intended to

render; and, as we have seen, that announcement concluded no

one, nor did it legally bind the court to adhere to the announce-

ment.

The case, it is true, was before the court for decision, but was

not finally decided until the decree was filed for record; and we

have seen that there was no evidence at that time upon which to

base the decree.

The court below should have allowed the evidence to be supplied

before the decree was passed and filed. It was the only means by

N ATUREJ
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in the Engli h court. The mere oral announcement of the chancellor of hi deci ion, and the grounds upon which it i based, or
the reducing them to writing, is no more than the minutes taken,
in the Engli h practice. The whole maitter is completely under the
control of the chancellor until the :final deoree ha been :filed or
recorded. Until that time, he may alter, amend, change, or even
di r gard, all that he had aid in hi minute ; and if, upon further
reflection, he became aiti :fied hi concl u ion were wrong, it would
be his duty to reverse his announcement, and to decree as he was
convinced the equities of the case required; or if, upon further
reflection, he hould doubt the correctne s of his conclusion, he has
the undoubted right to order a rehearing, on his own motion, at
any time before he has passed the decree, and it has been :filed for
record, ,o r has been pread upon the record. But after that is
done, the whole matter is beyond his control, unles it be on a bill
of review, or a bill to impeach the decree, or some such subsequent
proceeding. It is then, and not till then, that it is the decree of
the court, and is res adjudicata.
There was, then, no decree of the court until it was approved
and filed for record, or was recorded; and that was the time the
case was decided and the decree was rendered; and there was at
that time, as a matter of fact, no evidence upon whioh to base the
decree. Had the :fire occurred, and the papers been destroyed
before the court hea·r d the evidence read, no one would pretend the
court could have, after its destruction, rendered a decree until the
testimony wa re tared, or if the evidence had been but partly read
to the court, the iame would be undeniably true; and we presume
it would not be claimed that the court could have proceeded to
deer e, had the evidence been de troy d after it wa heard by the
court, and before he had announced what decree he intended to
render; and, a we have seen, that announcement concluded no
one, nor did it 1 gally bind the court to adhere to the announcement.
The ca e, it i true, wa b fore the court for d ci ion, but was
not finally decid d until the deer e was :fil d for r cord· and we
have s en that th r was no evidence at that time upon which to
base the decree.
The court 1 elow hould have allow thee idence to be supplied
before th decree wa pa ed and :filed. It wa the only mean by
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which their right of appeal could be rendered availing to the

parties.

The destruction of the evidence was occasioned by one of those

public calamities for which the parties were in nowise responsible ;

and such being the case, neither of them should be prejudiced by

it, beyond what can not be repaired.

We are clearly of opinion that the court below erred in rendering

the decree until the evidence was restored ; and, for that reason, the

decree of the court below must be reversed and the cause remanded,

with leave to appellants to restore the evidence, and, for that pur-

pose, the court below will give them a reasonable time.

Decree reversed.

La. Bank v. Whitney, 121 U. 8. 28^. (1887.)

This was a motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction. The

case is stated in the opinion of the court.

TK

v.

257
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which their right of app al could be r nd r d a·vailing to the
partie .
Th d ruction of th vidence wa occa ion d by one of tho ·e
public calamiti for whi h th parti' w r in nowi r p n ible;
and u h being th ca , n ith r of them houlcl b rejudic d by
it, b yond what an not b r air c1.
We ar cl arly f opinion ihai th ourt b low rr d in rend ring
the d er until th vi nee
r tor d; and, f r that rea on the
d er of th ourt b low mu t b r v r d and th cau e r mandecl,
with 1 a to app Hant to r tor the vid nee, and, for that purp 'e, the ourt below will giv them a r a onabl time.
Decree reversed.

Mr. Chief Justice Waite delivered the opinion of the court.

This is a proceeding begun May 22, 1883, by Mrs. Myra> Clark

Gaines, then in life, to subject a certain sum of $40,000 on deposit
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in the Louisiana National BanJc to the payment of a judgment

La. Bank v. Whitney, 1 1 U.

in her favor against the City of New Orleans. There is no dispute

. 84.

{1887.)

about the fact that the money in question was on deposit when the

proceeding was begun and the bank served with process, but the

Board of Liquidation of the City Debt has made claim to it as

part of the fund appropriated by Act No. 133 of 1880 to the pay-

THIS wa a motion to di mi for want of juri diction.
ca e i tated in the opinion of the court.

The

ment and liquidation of the bonded debt of the city. Pending

the determination of the questions involved, the court, March 15,

1880, ordered the money paid into the registry of the court. From

this order the bank has appealed, and also sued out a writ of error,

and the Board of Liquidation has likewise appealed. The repre-

sentatives of Mrs. Gaines, who were made parties to the proceeding

after her death, now move to dismiss both the writ of error and

the appeals, tecause the order to be brought under review is not

a final judment or decree within the meaning of that terra as used

in the acts of Congress giving this court jurisdiction on appeals

and writs of error.

We have no hesitation in granting the motion. Tlie court has

17

MR. CHIEF Ju TI E WAITE d livered th opinion of the court.
Thi i a proceeding begun May 22, 18 3, by Mrs. 1yrai lark
Gaine , then in life, to ubj ct a certain um of $40,000 on depo it
in the Loui iana ational Bank to the payment of a judgment
in her favor again t the ity of New Orlean . Ther i no di pute
about the faict that th mon y in que tion wa on depo it when the
pro ding wa b gun and the bank erved with proc , but the
Boar of Liquidation of the ity ebt ha mad laim to it a
part of the fund appropriat d by ct o. 133 of 1 0 to th paym nt and liquidation of the bond d d bt of the it . Pending
t11 d t rmination f the que tion involved the court Uar h 1-,
1 6 ord r d th m n y paid into th r gi try of the ourt. 1 ·om
thi ord r th bank ha app al d and al o u d out a writ of rror
oar 1 f iquidation ha lik wi e app aled. Tb r pr an l th
who \\r r mad partie to the pr c din
nta ti
f Ur .
to di mi both the writ of rr r an
ord r t b brought und r r vi ~ i n t
within th m anino- f that t rm a u ~
giYin thi
urt jnrisdi ti n n app al~
an l nit of rror.
\\ ha1 n h itati n in (}'ranting th m tion. Th ourt has
1•

17
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not adjudicated the rights of the parties concerned. It has only

ordered the fund into the registry of the court for preservation

during the pendency of the litigation as to its ownership. Such

an order it has always been held is interlocutory only and not a

final decree. Forgay v. Conrad, 6 How. 20-i; Grant v. Phoenix

Ins. Co., 106 U. S, 431. If in the end it shall be found tha:t

the fund belongs to the Board of Liquidation, it can be paid from

the registry accordingly, notwithstanding the order that has been

made. The money when paid into the registry will be in the hands

of the court for the benefit of whomsoever it shall in the end be

found to belong to.

Both the appeals and the writ of error are dismissed.

Winthrop Iron Co. v. Meelcer, 109 U. S. ISO. (1S83.)

Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the

Western District of Michigan. — Motion to dismiss the appeal.

Mr. Chief Justice Waite delivered the opinion of the court.

NATURE, EFFECT, AMENDING AND ENFORCING

not adjudicated the righ of the parties concerned. It ha only
ordered the fund into the regi try of the court for preservation
during th pendency of the litigation .a to its ownership. Such
an order it ha alway been held is interlocutory only ~nd not a
final decree. Forgay v. Conrad, 6 How. 20-1; Grant v. Phwnix
In . Co., 106 U. . 431. If in the end it hall be found that
the fund belongs to the Board of Liquidation, it cam be paid from
the registry accordingly, notwith tanding the order that has been
made. The money when paid into the registry will be in the hands
of the court for the benefit of whom oever it hall in the end be
found to belong to.
Both the appeals and the writ of error are dismissed.

This is a motion to dismiss an appeal because the decree ap-

pealed from is not a final decree. The motion papers show
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that the appellees, Meeker, Brown, and Brooks, a minority of

the stockholders of the Winthrop Iron Company, on or about

the 12th of November, 1881, filed a bill in equity in the Circuit

Winthrop Iron Co. v. Meeker, 109 U.

. 180.

{1883.)

Court of the United States for the Western District of Michigan

against the Winthrop Iron Company, the Winthrop Hematite

Company, and certain directors of the Iron Company who were

the stockholders of the Hematite Company, the object and purpose

APPEAL from th Circuit Court of the United Stat for the
We tern Di trict of Michigan.-Motion to di miss the aippeal.

of which was to set aside as fraudulent and void the proceedings

of the stockholders of the Iron Company at a meeting held in

Chicago on the first of October, 1881, and to have a receiver

appointed to take possession of the property of the company and

manage its affairs. The effect of the proceedings of the meeting

complained of was, as alleged, to authorize a lease of the property

of the Iron Company to the Hematite Company from and after

the first of December, 1882, for the personal advantage of the

majority stockholders of the Iron Company, regardless of the

rights of the minority. The stockholders of the Hematite Company

were also elected directors of the Iron Company, and constituted

MR. CnrnF J STICE WAITE deliv ed the opinion of the court.
Thi i a motion to di miss an appeal because the decree appealed from i not a final decree. The motion paper show
thait the appellee , Meeker, Brown, and Brook , a minority of
the tockholders of the Winthrop Iron Company, on or about
the 1 th of November, 1 1, filed a bill in quity in th Circuit
Court of the United States for the Western Di trict of Michigan
again t the Winthrop Iron Oompany, the Winthrop Hematite
ompany, and certain dir ctor of the Iron Company who were
the tockholders of the Hematite Company, th object and purpo e
of which wa to et a ide a fraudulent and void the proceeding
of th to khold r of the Iron Company at a meeting held in
hi a o on th fir t n£ ctober, 1 81, and to hav a r eiver
ion of the prop rty of the company and
appoint d to tak po
mana e i affair . The ff t of th pro dingo of th m eting
mplained of wa a all g d, to auth rize a 1 a e of th prop rty
f th Iron ompany to the H matit
ompany from and aft r
th fir t of
mber, 1 2, for the per anal advantage of th
of the
majority tockh 11 r of th Iron ompany, r gardl
ematit ompany
right of th minority. The tockholders of th
w r al o elect d dir ctor of the Iron ompany an 1 con tituted
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a majority of the board. On the second day of October, 188'^, the

cause was submitted to the court upon the pleadings, proofs, and

arguments of counsel. From the proofs it appeared that notwith-

standing the pendency of the suit, the Iron Company had, on

the 30th of Xovember, 1881, executed a lease to the Hematite

Company, according to the vote of the stockholders. On the

6th of April, 1883, a decree was rendered which, in effect, ad-

judged that the proctn^dings of the meeting were in fraud of

the rights of the minority stockholders, and that the lease which

had been executed in accordance with the authority then given

was "null and void, for the fraud of the defendants, the Win-

throp Hematite Company and the St. Clair Brothers," the ma-

jority stockholders and directors of the Iron Company, "in pro-

curing the same." By the same decree a receiver was appointed

to take charge of and manage the business of the Iron Com-

pany, evidently because a majority of the board of directors,

after the election at the October meeting, were considered unfit

to control its affairs, as their personal interests were in conflict
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with the interests of the company. Both the Iron Company and

Hematite Company, as well as the defendant directors of the Iron

Company, were ordered to "forthwith surrender and deliver to"

the receiver all the property of the Iron Company, and "all cor-

porate records and papers." Tlie recei's^r was fully authorized to

''continue the management of the business of the . . . com-

pany, with power to lease or operate its mines and plants until the

further order of the court." The decree further ordered an

accounting before a master by the Hematite Company and the

defendant directors of the Iron Company, for all profits realized

from the use of the leased property after the 1st of Decembei-,

1882, the date of the beginning of the term under the lease which

had been set aside. There was also an order for an accounting

by the defendant directors "concerning the ores mined by them,

and the royalty upon such ores due and owing by them to the

. . . company, and concerning the rights and obligations of

the lessor and lessee, under and according to a lease mentioned in

the bill, . . . expiring on December 1st, 1882." At the foot

of the decree is the following: "And the court resen-es to itself

such further directions as may be necessary to carry this decree

into effect, concerning costs, or as may be equital)le and just."

From this decree the appeal was taken.

ROT

1

0.
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a majority of the board.
n the econd day of ctober, 1 8·, the
cau v a ubmitt d to th ourt upon th pleading , proof , anrl
argum nt of oun 1. From th pr f it appear d that notwithtan ing the pend n
i the uit, tl e Iron o pany had, on
the
th of o emb r, 1 1,
cuted
1 a c to th Hematilc
t mpany, according to the vote of the
tockholder . On the
6th 0£ 1..pril, 1
, a de ree wa r nd r d whi h, in eff ct, adjud5 cl that the proce dings of the meeting w re in fraud of
th rjght of th minori y tockholder , and that the lea e whi ·h
had b n ex cu ed in accordan e with he authorit then given
wa
null and void, for the framd of the d fendants, the
inth rap H matite ornpany and the St. Clair Brother ," the maj ority to kholde1 and directors of the Iron Company, "in procuring th ame.
By the ame decree a recei er was appointell
to take charge of aind manage th bu ine of the Iron ompany, evid ntly becau e a majority of the board of director. ,
aft r th election at the October meeting, were con idered unfit
to ontrol its a:ffai , a their personal inter t were in confii t
with the intere t of the company. Both the Iron ompany and
H mait ite ompany, a well a the defendant directors of the Iron
Company, were ordered to "forthwith urirender and deliver to"
the r c i r all the property of the Iron Company, and 'all corporat r cord and paper .
The receiver wa fully authorized to
' continue the mana ment of the bu ine of the .
. company with pow r to lea e or operate its mine am.d plant until the
furth r order of the court." T'he decree further ordered an
accounting before a mater by the Hematite Company and the
derendant directors of th Iron ompany for all profits r ealized
from th u e of th lea ed propert after the 1 t of December,
1 9 th da.te of th beginning of the term und r the lea e which
ha 1 1 n et a id . Th rn was al o an order for an accounting
b ' th d fendant dir cto1 ' oncerning the or mined by them,
and the ro alty upon uch ore due and owing b them to the
. . compan r and concerninc; the rights and obliga ion" of
th 1 or and le e, un r aind ac ordinc; to a lea e rn ntion d in
th bill
cemb r 1 t 1
H th f ot
of th d r
IT " to it" 1£
such furth r dir ctio
a may be n
ary to carry thi " deer
inl
[ t oncerninc; o ~ t or a may b quitable an ju,.,t.'
rom hi d er the app al ~a tak n.
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In our opinion the decree as entered is a final decree, within

the meaning of section 692 of the Revised Statutes, regulating

appeals to this court. The whole purpose of the suit has been

accomplished. The lease made under the authority of the meet-

ing of October, 1881, has been cancelled, and the management

of the affairs of the company has been taken from the board of

directors, a majority of whom were elected at that meeting, and

committed to a receiver appointed by the court, plainly because,

in the opinion of the court, the rights of the minority stock-

holders would not be safe in the hands of directors elected by the

majority. In order that the receiver may perform his duties, the

defendants are required to turn over to him the entire property

and records of the company. The accounting ordered is only in

aid of the execution of the decree, and is no part of the relief

prayed for in the bill, which contemplated nothing more than a

rescission of the authority to execute the fraudulent lease, or a

cancellation of the lease if executed, and a transfer of the manage-

ment of the affairs of the company from a board of directors, whose
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personal interests were in conflict with the duty they owed the

corporation, to some person to be designated by the court. The

litigation of the parties as to the merits of the case is terminated,

and nothing now remains to be done but to carry what has been

decreed into execution. Such a decree has always been held to

be final for the purpose of an appeal. Bostwick v. Brinkerlioff,

106 U. S. 3, and the cases there cited. In Forgay v. Conrad, 6

How., at p. 204, it was said by Chief Justice Taney, for the

court :

"And when the decree decides the right to the property in

contest, and directs it to be delivered by the defendant to the

complainant, .... and the complainant is entitled to have

such a decree carried immediately into execution, the decree must

be regarded as a final one to that extent, and authorizes an appeal

to this court, although so much of the bill is retained in the

circuit court ae is necessary for the purposes of adjusting, by a

further decree, the accounts between the parties pursuant to the

decree passed. This rule, of course, does not apply to cases where

money is directed to be paid into court, or property to be delivered

to a receiver, or property held in trust to be delivered to a new-

trustee appointed by the court, or- to cases of a like description.

Orders of that kind are frequently and necessarily made in the

NATURE, EFFECT,
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In our opinion the decree as entered i a final decree, within
the meaning of ection 692 of the Revi ed Statute , regulating
appeal to thi court. The whole purpose of the suit has been
accompli hed. The lea e made under the authority of the meeting of October, 1881, ha been cancelled, and the management
of the affair of the company ha been taken from the board of
director , a majority of whom were elected at that meeting, and
committed to a receiver appointed by the court, plainly becau e,
in the opinion of the court, the right of the minority tockholder would not be af e in the hand of directors elected b3 the
majority. In order that the receiver may perform his duties, the
defendant are required to turn over to him the entire propeTty
and record of the company. The accounting ordered is only in
aid of the ex cution 0£ the decree, and i no part of the relief
prayed for in the bill, which contemplated nothing more than a
re cission of the authority to execute the fraudulent lease, or a
cancellation of the lease if executed, and a transfer of the management of the affairs of the compa,ny from a board of directors, who~ e
personal intere t were in conflict with the duty they owed the
corporation, to ome person to be designated by the court. The
litigation of the parties a to the merits of the case is terminated,
and nothing now remains to be done but to carry what has been
d creed into execution. Such a decree has always been held to
be final for the purpose of an appeal. Bostwick v. Brinkerhoff,
106 U. S. 3, and the cases there cited. In Forgay v. Conrad, 6
Ho"., at p. 204, it was said by Chief Justice Taney, for the
court:
" nd when the decree decides the right to the property jn
contest, and directs it to be delivered by the defendant to the
complainaint, . . . . and the complainant is entitled to have
such a decree carried immediately into execution, the decree must
be regarded as a final on to that extent, and authorizes an appeal
to thi court, although o much of the bill i r tain c1 in the
circuit court as is nee ary for the purpo es of adjusting, by a
furth r d cree, th ac oun betw n the parti pur uant to the
deer c pa d. T'hi rule of our , do not apply to a e where
mon i dir t d to be paid int court or property to b delivered
to a receiv r, or property held in tru t to be deliv red to a new
tru. t appoint d by the court or· to ca e of a like d · riptjon.
Or
of that kin are frcqu ntly and neces a·ril made in the
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progress of a cause. But they are interlocutory only, and intended

to preserve the subject-matter in dispute from waste or dilapidation,

and to keep it within tlie control of the court until the rights

of the parties concerned can be adjudicated by a final decree."

Here the rights of the Hematite Company and the defendant

directors of the Iron Company liave been adjudicated and definitely

settled. Their lease, which was in reality the subject-matter of

the action, has been cancelled, and a deliver}' of the leased property

to the Iron Company has been ordered. The complainants arc

entitled to the immediate execution of such a decree. The receiver

to whom the delivery is to be made was not appointed to hold

the property until the rights of the parties could be adjudicated,

but to stand, subject to the direction of the court, in the place

of and as and for the corporation, because, under the circumstances,

the corporation is incapacitated from acting for itself. His posi-

tion is like that of the guardian of the estate of an incompetent

person. He represents the Iron Company, and a delivery of the

leased property to him is a delivery in fact and in law to the
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company itself; that is to sa}^, to the party for whose use the suit

was prosecuted. The complainant stockholders sue for the com-

pany, and the delivery to the receiver is a delivery to the company

that has been adjudged to be entitled to immediate possession,

notwithstanding the lease to the Hematite Company. The de-

fendant directors have not in form been removed from their office,

but their power as directors has been taken from them, and they

are no longer able to carry into effect the orders of the stock-

holders made in fraud of the rights of the minority at the meeting

in October. A new officer has been appointed to stand in the place

of the directors as manager of the affairs of the company. In the

words of ]\Ir. Justice McLean in Craighead v. Wilson, 18 How.,

at p. 201, the decree is final "on all matters within the pleadings,"

and nothing remains to ]yc done but to adjust the accounts between

the parties growing out of the operations of the defendants during

the pendency of the suit. The case is altogether different from

suits by patentees to establish their patents and recover for the

infringement. There the money recovery is part of the subject-

matter of the suit. Here it is only an incident to what is sued for.

The motion to distniss is denied.

TT IIR P

IR

..._T

'o. v.

M EEKER

261

proe;r
f a au .
ut th ar int rlocutory only, and int nded
th ubj t-mat r jn :ti pute from wa t OT dilapidation,
t pr
p it itl in th
ntr 1 f the ourt until the rights
and t
of th parti c n ern
an b adjudicat d by a final decree."
matite ompany and th d f ndant
re th righ
tor of the ron ompan ha l en adjudi ated and d finit ly
Th ir 1 a , whi h wa in r ality th ubj ct-ma·t ter o-f
th a ti n ha~ be n an 11 d and a delivery of th lea ed prop rty
to th Ir n ompan ha b n ordered. The complainan ar
nti 1 d to the imm diate e ution of uch a d re . The rec iver
to whom th d li\' ry i to b made wa not appointed to hold
the prop rty until t he right of th parti could be adjudicat 1,
but to tand, ubj t to the dfrection of th court, in the place
of and a and for th corporation, becau e, under the circum tance
the corporation i incapacitat d from acting for it elf. Hi po ition i like tha.t of th guardian of the esfate of an incomp tent
pe on. H e repre ent th Iron Company, and a delivery of the
1 a d property to him i a delivery in fact and in law to th
company it elf; that i to ay, to the party for who e u e the uit
wa pro,.ecuted. The complainant tockholder ue for the company, and the deliv ry to the receiver is a delivery to the companv
that ha b en adjudg d to be entitled to imm diate po e, ion_,
notwith tanding the lea e to the H ematite ompany. The defendant director have not in form been remov d from their office,
but th ir power a director ha been taken from them, and they
are no Jonaer able to carry into effect the order of the tockholder made in fraud of the rights of the minority at the meeting
in October. A n w offi er has b en appointed to tand in the place
of the director a mana er of the affair of the company. In the
word of Ur. Ju tic 1\IcL an in Oraigheacl . TVil on~ 18 How.
at p. 201 the d er i final 'on all matter within the pleading, '
an i n thing remain t b don but to adju t th accoun b t"' en
th parti
towin ou f the operation of the d f ndan durina
th p nd n
of the uit. Th a e i altog th r diff r nt from
uit b pat nt
to
abli h th ir patent and r cover for the
infrin m nt. Th r th mone recovery i part of the u je 1.matt r of the uit.
r it i onl r an incident t what i "u d :for.
Th e motion to di nii is denied.

262

N ATUREJ

EFFECTJ AMENDING AND ENFORCING

262 Nature^ Effect, Amending and Enforcing

Giant Powder Co. v. Cal Powder Co., 5 Fed. Rep. 197. (1880.)

In Equity. Petition for rehearing.

Field, C. J.:

This ease was heard b}^ me whilst holding the circuit court in

Giant Powder Go. v. Gal. Powder Go.J 5 Fed. Rep. 197.

(1880.)

San Francisco, in the month of September last, and was decided

on the twelfth of October following. The decision was against the

IN

EQUITY.

Petition for rehearing.

complainant, and a decree was entered dismissing the bill. The

complainant's counsel now present to me at Washington a petition

for a rehearing.

The case was elaborately argued at the circuit, counsel occupying

several days in the presentation of their views. Their arguments

were taken down by a short-hand writer, and printed, thus enabling

me to read what I had patiently listened to in the oral discussion.

The question before the court was the validity of the re-issued

patent to the complainant. The main objection urged to its

validity was that it was for a different invention from that de-

scribed in the original patent. And upon that point the argument

was full, elaborate, and able. It is difficult to see how the position
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of the complainant in support of the patent could have been more

cogently presented.

The original patent was for a compound of nitro-glycerine, with

an inexplosive porous absorbent, which would take up the nitro-

glycerine, and render it safe for transportation, storage, and use,

without loss of its explosive power. The re-issued patent is for a

compound of nitro-glycerine with any porous absorbent, explosive

or inexplosive, which will be equally safe for transportation,

storage, and use, without loss of explosive power. In other words,

the re-issued patent drops the limitation of the original, and seeks

to cover all compounds in which nitro-glycerine is used, in con-

nection with a porous absorbent, in the production of blasting

powder, thus practically securing to the patentee a monopoly of

nitro-glycerine in the manufacture of that powder. The court

held that the re-issued patent was, therefore, more extensive in its

scope than the original patent, and on that ground was invalid.

It covered a different invention.

The court also hold that the original patent was neither invalid

FIELD,

c.

J. :

Thi ca e wa heard by me whil t holding the circuit court in
San Franci co, in the month of September last, and was decided
on the twelfth of October following. The deci_,ion was against the
complainant, and a decree was entered di mi sing the bill. The
complainant's counsel now present to me art Washington a petition
for a rehearing.
The ca e wa elaiboraitely argued at the circuit, counsel occupying
everal day in the presentation of their view . Their arguments
were taken down by a short-hand writer, and printed, thus enabling
me to read what I had patiently li tened to in the oral discu sion.
The qu tion before the court was the validity of the re-is ued
patent to the complainant. The main objection urged to its
vahdity was that it was for a different invention from that decribed in the origina·l patent. And upon that point the argument
wa full, elaborate, and able. It is difficult to ee how the po ition
of the complainant in upport of the patent could have been more
cogently pre ented.
The original patent was for a compound of nitro-glycerine, with
an inexplo ive porou absorbent, which would take up the nitroglycerine, a1nd render it safe for transportation, torage, and use,
without los of it explo 'ive power. The re-issued patent is for a
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storag , and u e, without lo of explosive power. In other word.,
the re-i ued patent drops the limitation of the OTiginal, and eek:;
to cover all compound in which nitro-glycerjne is u ed, in connection with a p-orou aib rib nt, in the production of blasting
powder, thu practically ecuring to the pat nt e a monopoly of
nitro- ly erine in the manufacture of that powder. The court
h ld that the re-i ued patent wa , therefore, more exten ive in it
cope than th original pat nt, and on that ground wais invalid.
t cover a di:ff rent invention.
The court a1 o h ld that the original patent wa n ith r invalid
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nor inoperative from any defective specification, but was valid and

operative for the invention described; and that this appeared upon

a comparison of the two patents, the re-issued patent differing

from thu original only in the extent of its claim ; and that, there-

fore, the commissioner exceeded his jurisdiction in granting a

re-issue at all, as well as on the ground that the re-issued patent

was for a different invention. This latter position was not, it is

true, discussed in the oral argument, but it is raised by the plead-

ings, and the attention of complainant's counsel at San Francisco

was called to it, and a note of authorities on the point was received

from him, embracing the greater part of those mentioned in the

petition for rehearing. ^^Tiether the position be well taken or not

cannot affect the decision of the case, if the re-issued patent cover

a different invention from that described in the original patent.

But the petition cannot now be considered by me at Washington.

It is not an ex parte proceeding; it can only be presented on

notice, and can only be considered after the other side has had an

opportunity to answer it. The ex parte presentation by counsel has
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evidently been made from a failure to distinguish between an

application for rehearing after the decision of an appellate tribunal,

and an application for a rehearing in a court of original jurisdic-

tion after entry of a final decree. The distinction between applica-

tions for rehearing in the two cases is pointed out by Chief Justice

Taney, in Brown v. Aspden, 1-i Howard, 26: "By the established

rules of chancery practice/' said the chief justice, "a rehearing,

in the same sense in which that term is used in proceedings in

equity, cannot be allowed after the decree is enrolled. If the party

desires it, it must be applied for before the enrollment. But no

appeal will lie to the proper appellate tribunal until after it is

enrolled, either actually or by construction of law; and, conse-

quently, the time for a rehearing must have gone by before an

appeal could be taken. In the house of lords in England, to which

the appeal lies from the court of chancen% a rehearing is alto-

gether unknown. A reargument, indeed, may be ordered, if the

house desires it for its own satisfaction. But the chancery rules in

relation to rehearings, in the technical sense of the word, are

altogether inapplicable to the proceedings on the appeal.

"Undoubtedly, this court may and would call for a reargument

where doubts are entertained, which it is supposed may be re-

moved by further discussion at the bar. And this mav be done
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after judgment is entered, provided the order for reargument is

entered at the same term. But the rule of the court is this —

that no reargument will be heard in any case after judgment is

entered, unless some member of the court who concurred in the

judgment afterwards doubts the correctness of his opinion, and

desires a further argument on the subject. And, when that hap-

pens, the court will, of its own accord, apprise the counsel of its

wishes, and designate the points on which it desires to hear them."

According to the practice in the supreme court, if the court

does not, of its own motion, desire a rehearing of a case decided,

counsel are at liberty to submit without argument a brief petition

or suggestion of the points upon which a rehearing is desired. If,

then, any judge who concurred in the decision thinks proper to

move for a rehearing, the motion is considered by the court;

otherwise, the petition is denied, of course. Public Schools v.

Wallace, 9 Wall. 604.

A similar course of procedure would be appropriate in any

appellate tribunal. To allow an argument upon such a petition
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would lead, in a majority of cases, to a mere repetition, with more

or less fullness, of the points presented on the original hearing, and

cause infinite delays to the prejudice of other suitors before the

court.

There is another observation to be made upon rehearings in

equity after a final decree in courts of original jurisdiction. The

practice in this country and that which formerly prevailed in

England are essentially different. According to the practice in the

English courts, a rehearing previous to the enrollment of the

decree, when the petition was approved by the certificate of two

counsel, was granted almost as a matter of course. Eepeated re-

hearings in the same cause were not uncommon, and the consequent

delays and expenses from this practice were so great as to lead

to the interposition of parliament for its correction. This subject

is mentioned by Chief Justice Taney in his opinion in the case

in Howard. There, when a case was decided, memoranda for the

decree were entered in the minutes of the court; in some instances

the final decree was thus entered; but the decree was not con-

sidered as strictly a record until it was engrossed, signed, and

entered at length in the rolls of the court. Between the time of

the decision and the entry of memoranda for the decree, and the

time the decree took a definite shape 1\y enrollment, it was open
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after judgment i entered, provided the ordeT for reargument is
entered at the ame term. But the rule of the court is thisthat no reargument will be heard in any case after judgment is
entered, unle s some member o.f the court who concurred in the
judgment afterwards doubts the correctne s of his opinion, and
desires a further argum nt on the ubject. And, when that happen , the court will, of its own accord, apprise the counsel of its
wi hes, and de ignate the points on which it desires to hear them."
According to the practice in the supreme court, if the court
does not, of its own motion, desire a rehearing of a case decided,
coun el are at liberty to submit without a:rgument a brief petition
or suggestion of the points upon which a rehearing is desired. If,
then, any judge who concurred in the decision thinks proper to
move for a rehearing, the motion is con idered by the court;
otherwise, the petition is denied, of course. Public Schools v.
Wallace, 9 Wall. 604.
A similar course of pTocedure would be appropriate in any
appellate tribunal. T'o allow an argument upon such a petition
would lead, in a majority of cases, to a mere repetition, with more
or less fullness, of the points presented on the original hearing, and
cause infinite delays to the prejudice of other suitors before the
court.
There is another observation to be made upon rehearings in
equity after a final decree in courts of original jurisdiction. The
practice in this country and that which formerly prevailed in
England are essentially different. According to the practice in the
Engli h courts, a rehearing previous to the enrollment of the
decree, when the petition was approved by the certificate of two
coun el, wa granted almo t as a matter of course. Repeated rehearing in the ame cause were not uncommon, and the con equent
delay and expen e from thi practice were o great as to lead
to the interpo ition of parliament for its correction. Thi ubject
i mention d by hi f Ju ti e Taney in hi opinion in the ca e
in Howard. T'h r , wh n a ca wa decid d memoranda for the
d cree were enter din th minut of th court· in om in~tance
the final deer e wa thu nt r d; but th d cree wa not conidered as trictly a r cord until it wa ngro d, igned, and
nt red at length in th roll of the court. B tw n the time of
the d i ion and the ntry of memoranda for the d cree, and the
tim th d er took a d finite hap by enrollment, it wa open
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to modification and correction, and even to entire change. But

when once enrolled the decree was not subject to change except

in the house of lords, or by a bill of review. 2 Daniell's Chancery

Practice, 1018.

In this country there is not, except, perhaps, in one or two

states where the old forms of equity practice are retained, any

such proceeding as the formal enrollment of decrees. Here, when

a case in equity is decided, a decree is drawn up and signed by

the judge, and entered on the records of the court, with about

the same formality as a judgment in a case at law. And rehearings

are then granted, except when the judge acts of his own motion,

only upon such grounds as would authorize a new trial in an action

in law; that is, for newly-discovered evidence or errors of law

apparent upon the record. All the limitations which control courts

in actions at law, in considering allegations of newly-discovered

evidence and of errors at law, apply to applications for rehearing

in such cases. Bentley v. Phelps, 3 W. & M. 403. See, also,

Doggett v. Emerson, 1 W. & M. 1; Emerson v. Daniels, Id. 21;
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Tufts V. Tufts, 3 W. & M. 426; and also Clapp v. Thaxter, 7

Gray, 38G.

Tlie course of procedure for the complainant, therefore, is to

file its petition with the clerk of the circuit court at San Fran-

Cisco, and obtain from the court or circuit judge an order upon

the defendants to show cause on the following rule day, or some

other day mentioned, why its prayer should not be granted. The

defendants can then answer the petition, and upon the petition

and answer the application can be heard. A rehearing should not

be granted for newly-discovered evidence where the evidence could

have been obtained by reasonable diligence on the first hearing,

nor when it is merely cumulative to that previously received, nor

when, if presented, it would not have changed the result. And as

to errors of law, they should be such as are clearly shown by

considerations not previously presented. A new hearing should not

be had simply to allow a rehash of old arguments. The proper

remedy for errors of the court on points argued in the first hearing

is to be sought by appeal, when the decree is one which can

reviewed by an appellate tribunal. See Tufts v. Tufts, supra.

The petition, therefore, cannot be heard by me ex parte at

Washington. The complainant must pursue the regular course

of procedure, and give notice to the opposite party. If the peti-

o. v.
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to modification and corr ction, and ven to entir change. But
when once enrolled the decree wa not ubject to change except
in the hou of lords, or by a bill of review. 2 Daniell's Chancery
Practice, 1018.
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state wh r the old form of quity practic are retained, any
such pro e ding a th formal enrollment of decree . Her , when
a case in qu.ity i decid d, a deer e i drawn up and igned by
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tion be filed during the term, the court will retain jurisdiction

over the case, and may subsequently decide upon the application.

The eighty-eighth rule in equity applies only where no petition

is presented during the term.

As the circuit court in San Francisco will be held by the circuit

judge in my absence, he will direct its clerk to forward the petition

and answer to me, at Washington, accompanied with such briefs

as counsel may file within a reasonable time to be allowed by the

court. The application will then be taken up and disposed of,

and my judgment sent to the circuit court and there entered.

Where cases have been heard by the circuit judge sitting alone,

I do not myself hear applications in them for a rehearing, or

motions for a new trial, except by his request. This consideration

to the different judges composing the court is essential to the

harmonious administration of justice therein. As observed by me

in a case reported in 1 Sawyer : "The circuit judge possesses equal

authority with myself on the circuit, and it would lead to unseemly

conflicts if the rulings of one judge, upon a question of law, should
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be disregarded, or be open to review by the other judge in the same

case." Page 689.

The petition contains what purports to be a copy of my opinion,

but it is a copy of the opinion before it was revised. The opinion

should not have been published until it had received my revision,

as counsel very well know. In any petition hereafter filed it is

expected that a correct copy will appear, if any one is given. If the

present petition is used, the opinion must be corrected in accordance

with the revised copy.

Before concluding, it may not be amiss to invite the attention

of complainant's counsel to the language of Judge Story, in the

case of Jenkins v. Eldridge, with respect to the earnestness with

which counsel, in applying for rehearings, sometimes asseverate

their convictions of the errors of the court; and, to repeat what is

there said, "that if any judge should be so unstable in his views,

or so feeble in his judgment, as to yield to them, he would not only

surrender his independence, but betray his duty. However humble

may be his own talents, he is compelled to treat every opinion of

counsel, however exalted, which is not founded in the law and the

facts of the case, to be voiceless and valueless." 3 Story, 303.

Nothing can be gained by the strong language expressed by counsel

in presenting the petition as to the supposed errors of the court,
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tion be :filed during the term, the court will retain jurisdiction:
over the case, and may sub equently decide upon the application.
The eighty-eighth rule in equity applies only where no petition
i pre ented during the term.
As the circuit court in San Francisco will be held by the circuit
judg in my ab ence, he will direct its clerk to forward the petition
and answer to me, at Washington, aiccomrpanied with such briefs
a coun el may file within a reasonable time to be allowed by the
court. The application will then be taken up and disposed of,
and my judgment sent to the circuit court and there entered.
Where ca e have been heard by the circuit judge itting alone,
I do not myself hear applications in them for a rehearing, or
motions for a new trial, except by his request. This consideration
to the different judges compo ing the court is essential to the
harmoniou administration o.f justice therein. As ob erved by me
in a case reported in 1 Sawyer: "The circuit judge po e ses equal
aiuthority with myself on the circuit, and it would lead to unseemly
conflicts if the rulings of one judge, upon a question of law, should
be disregarded, or be open to review by the other judge in the same
case." Page 689.
The petition contains what purpmts to be a copy o·f my opinion,
but it is a copy of the opinion before it was revised. The opinion
hould not have been published until it had received my revi ion,
as counsel very well know. In any petition hereafter filed it is
expected that a correct copy will appear, if any one is given. If the
present petition is used, the opinion must be corrected in accordance
with the revised copy.
Before concluding, it may not be amiss to invite the attention
of complainant's counsel to the languag of Judge Story, in the
ca e of J enkins v. Eldridge, with respect to the earnestness with
which coun el, in applying for rehearing , ometimes as everat
their convictions of the errors of the court; and, to repeat what is
there aid, "that if any judge hould be o· un table in his view~,
or o feeble in hi judgment a to yield to th rn, he would not only
urrender hi ind p ndence, but b tray hi duty. However humble
may b hi o·wn tal n , he i comp 11 d to treat every opinion of
oun 1, however exalted, whi h i not found d in the law and th
fact. of the ca e, to b voic 1
and va1lu le ." 3 Story, 30 .
othing can be gain d by th trong larnruag xpre ed by coun .,l
in pre enting th p tHion a to th uppo d rror of the court,
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nor by the statement a^ to what may have been said of the decision

by other counsel, who have neither examined, studied, nor under-

.

2 7

,.. IDDER

nor by th tat m nt a to what may hav b n aid of the deci ion
by oth r un el, who have neither xamin d, tudied, nor understood th ca e.

stood the case.

Eider v. Kidder, 12 Yes. Jr. 202. (1806.)

A MOTION was made by the Plaintiff, for a short Order upon the

Defendant, to transfer the stock under the Decree in this cause;

and that service upon the Clerk in Court may be good service.

Mr. Bell, for the Defendant, opposed the Motion ; insisting upon

the general rule, that nothing can be done for the purpose of bring-

ing a man into contempt without personal service. An attachment

will not issue, except upon personal service of the writ of execution

Rider v. Kidder, 12 Ves. Jr. 202.

of the Decree; and the Court giving the indulgence of a short

Order, which is not the regular process of the Court, will not put

{1806.)

the Defendant in a worse situation.

The Solicitor-General [Sir Samuel Eomilly], and Mr. Hart, in

support of the Motion, took the distinction, that, this application

being for service of the writ of execution of the Decree, the De-

fendant being present in Court, must have had notice; and the
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only object of requiring personal service is to prevent surprise. It

was observed, that the reason of applying for a short Order is to

prevent expense.

The Lord Chancellor [Erskine] :

The practice in this Court, that in order to fix a person with

contempt, the service must be personal, has a strong analogy to

the practice in Courts of Common Law upon attachment. The

sernce must be personal, unless upon some very special application

it is dispensed with; which may be under circumstances certainly.

The reason of requiring personal service is, non constat, that there

is a contempt; that the party knows, that he has neglected to do

any thing ho was called upon to perform. But in this instiince, a

Decree made, when the Defendant was present in Court, she knows,

she has not done what she was directed to do, and must therefore

wa made by the Plaintiff, for a hart Order upon the
Defendant, to tran fer the tock under the Decree in thi cau e;
and that rvice upon the Clerk in Court may be good service.
Mr. Bell, for the Defendant, oppo ed the Motion; insi ting upon
th gen ral rule, that nothing can be done for the purpo e of bringing a man into contempt without per anal service. An attachment
will not i ue, except upon per onaJ ervice of the writ of execution
of the D cree; and the Court giving the indulgence of a hart
Order, which i not the r gular proce of the Court, will not put
the
fendant in a war e ituation.
The oli itor- eneral [Sir Samuel Romilly ], and Ir. Hart, in
upport of th l\1otion, took the di tinction, that, thi application
b ing for ervice of the writ of execution of the D ere , the Def n iant being pr ent in ourt, mu t hav had notice; and the
onl) object of requiring per onal ervice i to pr vent urpri e. It
wa ob r d, that the r a on oif applying for a hart Order is to
pr vent xpen .
A

MOTIO

The Lord II NCELLOR [ R KINE] :
The pra ti in thi
ourt that in order to fix a pe on with
rvice mu t be per onal, ha a trong anafog to
ont mpt, th
th 1 ra ti e in
urt f ommon aw upon atta hm nt. Th
nic mu t b p r anal unl
upon om ver p ial application
it i di p n ed with; which may b under cir um ta nee ertainl y.
Tb r a on of r quirinO' p onal erri i non con tat that there
t
o
i a cont mpt; that h part 1-now hat b ha n gl
an ' thin h wa call d upon to p rf rm. But in thi in t.anc a
r mad wh n the ef n ant wa pre nt in ourt h know
d to d an mu t her fore
b ha not don hat he a dir

R68
868 Natuke, Effect, Amending and Enforcing

be conscious, that she is in contempt. If this course cannot be

taken, the Defendant might, when called upon to pay money, keep

out of the way; and so prevent the effect of a Decree or Order

made, when he was present in Court.

The same point arising in the case of De Manneville v. De Manne-

ville, the Order in this case was postponed; that the practice might
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be looked into.

N .ATURE,

EFFECT, AME:t>.TDING .AND ENFORCING

be conscious, that she is in contempt. If this course cannot be
taken, the Defendant might, when called upon to pay money, keep
out of the way; and so prevent the effect of a Decree or Order
made, when he was present in Court.
The same point arising in the case of De Manneville v. De Manneville, the Order in this case was postponed; that the practice might
be looked into.

CHAPTER IX. Y/^-^ l)P

AMENDMENTS, BILL OF REVIEW, NE EXEAT, PRODUC-

TION OF PAPERS, ABATEMENT, ETC.

CHAPTER IX.
\J

Amendments.

VerplancJc v. Mercantile Co., 1 Edwd. Ch. (N. Y.) Jf6. (1831.)

In this case, Ogden Edwards, Esq. as Vice-Chancellor of the

first circuit, had granted a general injunction, and allowed of the

AMENDME T , BILL
TI
F P
E

EXE T, PRODUC~
TE IE T, ETC.
1

appointment of a receiver. Appeals were had; and by an order

of the Chancellor, dated at Albany, on the twenty-first day of June,

MEND IE TS.

1831, the orders granting the injunction and appointing a receiver

were vacated with costs. The following is a part of the Chancellor's

order: — "It is ordered, that the said orders granting a general

Verplanck v. Mercantile

o., 1 Edwd.

h. ( . Y.) 46.

{1831.)

injunction in the said bill and appointing a receiver in this cause

be and the same are hereby reversed and vacated, with costs on

the appeals therefrom, to be paid by the respondents to the

solicitor of the appellants. And it is further ordered, that the

proceedings be remitted back to the Vice-Chancellor of the first

circuit; with permission to the complainants to apply to the said

Vice-Chancellor to amend their bill of complaint so as to make the
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corporation of the Mercantile Insurance Company defendants

therein,* and otherwise as they may be advised, upon due notice

*The prayer in the original bill went against the President and Direc-

tors of the Mercantile Insurance Company of New York, whereas the style

of the Company, by the act of incorporation (April lo, i8i8), was. The

Mercantile Insurance Company of New York. In the opinion which his

Honor the Chancellor gave, in relation to setting aside the orders for the

injunction and a receiver, he says, ''The first objection is, that although the

order appointing a receiver purports to have been entered in a suit against

'The Mercantile Insurance Company of New York,' under which order the

appellants have been deprived of the possession of their property, they were

not, in fact, parties defendant in the bill ; as the prayer of process was only

against the officers of the corporation. The name of the corporation is as

before stated. The prayer for process is. that the subpoena may be directed

to the president and directors of said company. This was undoubtedly

owing to the mistake of the solicitor who drew the bill; and who proba-

bly did not intend to make the president or directors, but only the corpora-

tion and Joseph Barker, parties to the suit. The same mistake exists as to

I thi ca , gden E<lward, E q. a Vice- hancellor of the
fir t circuit, had grant d a g n ral injunction, and aHowed of the
ppeal were had; and by an order
appointment of a recei r.
of the han ellor, dat d at Albany, on the twenty-fir t day of June,
1 1, th order granting the injurnction and appointing a receiver
were vacat d with o t . The following i a part of the hancellor'
order:-' It is ordered, that the aid order granting a general
injunction in the aid bill and appointing a receiver in thi cau"e
be and the ame are her by rever ed and vacated, with co t on
the appeal therefrom, to be paid by the re pondent to the
olicitor of the appellants. And it is furth er 01·dered, that the
proce ding be remitted back to the Vice-Chancellor of the fir.~ t
circuit; with permi ion to the complainant to apply to the aid
Vice-Chancellor to amend their bill of complaint o as to make the
corporation of the Mercantile In urance Company defendant
ther in,* and otherwi e a they may be ad vi ed upon due notice

the prayer for the injunction; and is also carried into the order granting

the injunction. So that the injunction in fact is neither against the corpora-

tion nor its officers, by their proper names. As this objection is merely

260

*The prayer in the original bill went against the Pre ident and Director. of the Mercantile In urance Company of New York, wherea the tyle
of the Company, by the act of incorporation (April IO, 1818) \ a The
Mercantile In urance Company of New York. In the opinion which hi
H nor the Chancellor gave, in relation to etting a ide the order for the
injunction and a r ceiv r, he ay , "The fir t objection is, that although the
ord r appointing a receiver purports to have been enter d in a su it again t
'The ~Iercantile In urance Company of New York, under' hich order the
app ll ant hav b en deprived of the po e ion of their property, they were
not. in fact partie d fendant in the bill; a the prayer of proce wa only
again t the offic r of the corporation. The name of the corporation i a
bef re stat d. The pray r for proce s i , that the ubp na may be directe
to th pr ident and direct r of aid company. Thi wa undoubtedly
owing to the mi take of th olicit r ' ho d rew the bill; and who pr bably did n t int nd to mak th pr ident or dir tor , ut only the orporati n and J ph a rk r partie to the uit. The ame mi : tak .· i t a t
arried int th o rd r ranting
th pray r for th in juncti n · and i al
th injunction.
that th injun ti n in fa ti n ith r again t th co rpo rati n nor it officer , by th ir pr pe r name .
thi o j tion i merely
269

270
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to the solicitor of the appellants, amd of Jacob Barker, of such

application; and upon such amendment being made, an order may

be entered, directing the defendants to show cause before the said

Vice-Chancellor, at such time and upon such notice as he shall

direct, why a general or other injunction should not be granted

and a receiver be appointed," &c. &c.

A petition, in the names of the complainants, was this day

presented to the court. It mentioned the suit; the appeals from

the orders before mentioned; and the reversal of those orders,

referring also to a copy of the Chancellor's order, which was an-

nexed. Also, the necessity of amending their bill. Tlie proposed

amendments were set forth in a schedule. The petitioners further

showed, that the additional facts contained in the said amendments

and schedules, so far as the same differed from the original bill,

had been discovered since the filing thereof, and were truly stated,

according to the best information and belief of the petitioners.

The prayer of the petition was in these words : — "Your petitioners

therefore pray leave to amend their said bill, by striking out that
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l>art of the said bill, after the words, as hij reference to the said

formal, I should not feel disposed to sustain it, if the difficulty could be

obviated by an amendment. As it now stands, it may deprive the appel-

lants of a substantial right. It is somewhat doubtful whether they have the

power to answer this bill. It neither prays process against the corpora-

tion, nor calls upon them to answer. For, by another singular oversight

of the solicitor, that part of the bill merely prays the confederates may

answer upon their corporal oaths. Whereas, the officers of the corporation,

AMENDMENTS

to the olicitor of the appellant , and of Jacob Barker, of such
application; and upon uch amendment being made, an order may
be ntered, directing the d f ndant to how cau e before the said
Vice-Chancellor, at uch time and upon uch notice a he shall
direct, why a general or other injunction hould not be granted
and a receiver be appointed," &c. &c.
A petition, in the names of the complainants, wa this day
pre ented to the court. It mentioned the uit; the appeals from
the orders before mentioned; and the reversal of those order:-;,
referring al o to a copy of the Chancellor's order, which was annexed. Al o, the nece ity of amfmding their bill. The proposed
amendment were et forth in a schedule. The petitioners further
showed, that the additional facts contained in the aid amendments
and chedules, o far a the ame differed from the original bill,
had b en discovered since the filing thereof, and were truly stated,
according to the be t information and belief of the petitioner .
The prayer of the petition wa in these words :-"Your petitioners
therefore pray leave to amend their said bill, by triking out that
part of the aid bill, after the word , as by reference to the said

and not the company, are charged with confederacy ; and they only could

put in their answer on their oaths. It is well settled, that no persons are

parties as defendants in a bill in chancery, except those against whom

process is prayed, or who are specifically named and described as defend-

ants in the bill, (i Marsh. Ken. Rep. 594. 2 J. C. R. 245. 2 Dick. R.

707.) In Elmcndorfv. Dclanccy, i Hopk. R. 555, Chancellor Sandford says,

when it is uncertain who are the complainants, or who are the persons

called to answer, the suit is fundamentally defective, and if the parties

are not clearly designated, it is the fault of him who institutes the suit.'

In answer to this objection, it was suggested by the respondents' counsel,

that it is a mere misnomer of the corporation, and can only_ be taken

advantage of by a plea in abatement. It cannot, however, in this case, be

considered a misnomer. The name of the corporation and the substance

of the charter is distinctly stated in the commencement of the bill,

and the process is then prayed against the officers only. Besides, the ap-

pellants never had an opportunity to make the objection by plea of abate-

ment or in any other form. As the true name of the corporation was

stated, the objection appeared on the face of the bill, and no plea was

necessary to bring the fact to the notice of the court." "The proceedings

must be remitted back to the Vice-Chancellor of the first circuit, with per-

mission to the complainants to apply to him for leave to amend their bill,

so as to make the corporation defendants therein; and otherwise as they

may be advised," &c.

formal, I should not feel di posed to su tain it, if the difficulty could be
obviated by an amendment. A it now stand , it may deprive the appellants of a sub tantial right. It is somewhat doubtful whether they have the
power to answer this bill. It neither prays process against the cor.poration, nor calls upon them to answer. For, by another singular oversight
of the solicitor, that part of the bill merely prays the confederates may
answer upon their corporal oaths. Whereas, the officers of the corporation,
and not the company, are charged with confederacy; and they only could
put in their an swer on their oaths. It is well settled, that no persons are
parties as defendants in a bill in chancery, except those against whom
proce s is prayed, or who are specifically named and described as defendant in the bill. (1 Marsh. Ken. Rep. 594. 2 J. C. R. 24s. 2 Dick. R.
707.) In Elmendo1'f v. Delancey I Hopk. R. SSS, Chancellor Sandford say ,
when it is uncertain who are the complainant , or who are the per ons
called to an w r, the nit is fundamentally defective, and if the parties
are not clearly de ignate<l, it is the fault of him who in titutes the suit.'
In an wer to thi obj ection, it was sugge ted by the re pondents' counsel,
that it is a mere mi namer f the corporation, and can only be taken
advantage of by a plea in abatement. It cannot, however, in this ca e, be
con idered a mi namer. The name of the corporation and the substancl!
of the charter i di tinctly stated in the commencement f the bill,
and the proce s i then prayed again t the officer only.
esides, the appellants never had an opportunity to make the objection by plea of abatem nt or in any other form. A the true nam of the corporation was
tated, the objection appear d on the face of the bill, and no plea was
n ces ary to brin th fact to the notice f the court." "The proceedings
mu t be remitte back to th Vice-Chane llor of the fir t circuit, with permi ion to the c mplainant to apply to him for leave to amend their bill,
so as to make th e corporation defendants therein; and otherwise as they
may be advi ed, ' &c.
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act will more fully and at large appear, in the sixth page of said

bill, to the words as in duty bound," &c. in the twenty-third page

thereof; and "insert the proposed amendment hereto annexed,

marked B; and that the said schedules referred to as such, be

taken as a part of said amended bill ; and that one or more of the

complainants be permitted to verify by oath, in the usual way,

the said amended bill; or, for such other and further order in

the premises as to your honor shall seem meet."

All the complainants resided in the city of N'ew York; but

the petition was only signed and sworn to by their solicitor;

Jurat : "F. S, K., solicitor for the complainants in this cause,

being duly sworn, says, that he has read the foregoing petition,

and knows the contents thereof : that the same is true of his own

knowledge, except as to the matters therein stated to l)e upon his

information and belief, and as to those matters he believes it to

be true. F. S. K. Sworn, &c."

The Vice-Chaxcellor :

A motion is made on the part of the complainants, for leave
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to amend their bill, which was sworn to at the time it was filed,

and upon which, ex parte, an injunction was granted and a

receiver appointed. The orders allowing the injunction and ap-

. MERO

TILE

0.

2 1

act will more fully and at large appear, in th ixth page of ai<l
bill, to the word a in duty bound," & . in th tw nty-third page
thereof ; and "in ert th propo 1 am ndment h reto annexed,
marked B; and that th aid ch dul r f rr d to a uch, be
ta·ken as a part of aid amended bill; and that one or more of the
complainant be p rmitt d to verify by oath, in the u ual way,
the aid am nd d bill; or, for uch oth r and further order in
the pr mi e a to your honor hall eem meet."
All the complainants resided in the city of New York ; but
the petition wa only signed anrd worn to by their olicitor ;
J urat: "F. S. K., olicitor for the complainant in thi cause,
being duly sworn, ay , that he has read the foregoing petition,
and know the contents thereof: that the ame is true of hi own
knowledge, except a to the matters therein tated to he upon his
information and beli f, and a to those mait ters he belie es it to
b true.
F. S. K.
Sworn, &c."

pointing the receiver, were, upon appeal, reversed: with permis-

sion to the complainants to apply for leave to amend the bill,

T HE V ICE- CH.A CELLOR :

so as to make the corporation of the Mercantile Insurance Com-

pany defendants therein; and otherwise, as they might be advised.

The application to amend is accordingly made; and besides

inserting the name of the company, the complainants propose to

strike out the whole stating part of the bill (except the recital of

the charter), the interrogating part and the prayer; and to insert,

as a substitute, and by way of amendment — not a statement of

a new matter entirely — ^but a restatement of the original matter

in a different phraseology; leaving out some of the allegations

or portions thereof; introducing some new and additional matter;

specifying, in some instances, dates and times where none were

mentioned before, omitting the whole of the particular interroga-

tories, and restating the prayer of the bill although, in substance

and effect, the same as is contained in the original.

Tlie question is, as this is a sworn bill, whether amendmenis

can be admitted in this way and to the extent here proposed ? In

A motion i made on the part of the complainants, for leave
to amend their bill, which was worn to at the time it wa filed,
and upon which, ex parte, an injunction wa granted and a

r eceiver appointed. Tib.e orders allowing the injunction and appointing the receiv r, were, upon appeal, rever ed: with permi sion to the complainant to appl:y for leave to amend the bill,
so a to make th corporartion of the Mercantile I n urance Company defendants therein; and otherwi e, a they might be advised.
The application to amend i accordingly made; and b ides
in erting the name of the company, the complainant propo e to
trike out the whole tating part of the bill (except the recital of
the charter), th interrogating part and the prayer; and to in er~,
a a ub titut , and by way of amendment- not a tat ment of
a n w matter entir ly- but a r tatement of th original matter
in a diff rent phra ology; 1 aving out ome of the all ation
or portion thereof· introducing ome new and additional matter;
p cifyin in om in tance date and tim where none were
m ntion d befor omitting the whole of the particular int rro<Yatori
and r tating th pra r of the bill althou<Yh in ub t nee
and ff t th am a j contain d in th ori O'inal
Th qu tion i a thi i a worn bill, wb th r am ndmenl
d? I n
can b admitt d in hi wa an to the ext nt her pro

272
372 Amendments

considering this question, it is necessary to distinguish between

an amendment and matter which would constitute a new bill;

for under the privilege of amending, the party is not to be per-

mitted to make a new bill. Amendments can only be granted

when the bill is found defective in proper parties, in its prayer for

relief, or in the omission or mistake of some fact or circumstance

connected with the substance of the case but not forming the sub-

stance itself. This is the principle laid down in Lyon v. Tall-

madge, 1 J. C. E. 184; and it applies to all bills and to pleadings

in general in this court. When it comes to be applied to injunc-

tion bills or to bills and answers which have been sworn to, other

regulations adopted for the prevention of mischief are to be ob-

served. Thus in Bodgers v. Rodgers, 1 Paige's C. E. 424, upon

an application to amend an injunction bill, the Chancellor held,

that the amendments proposed must be merely in addition to the

original bill and not inconsistent with it; and the complainant

must swear to the truth of the matter proposed to be inserted by

way of amendment and show a valid excuse for not having incor-
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porated it in the original bill. And the latter branch of this rule

was strictly adhered to in the subsequent case of Whitmarsh v.

Campiell, 2 Paige's C. E. 67. It is contended, however, that the

rule in these cases, is to be confined to injunction bills, that is to

say, to cases where an injunction has been issued and is actually

pending and where the complainant asks for leave to amend without

prejudice to the injunction— as was the case in Bodgers v. Bodgers

—and that it does not apply, where a bill has merely been sworn

to and no injunction is outstanding upon it. But I apprehend

it is not to be thus limited in its application ; and that the delay

which would be occasioned by allowing amendments after an in-

junction and in some instances after an answer put in, is by no

means the only reason for the rule.

Another and more important reason for holding a strict hand

over the privilege of amending sworn pleadings is, to check all

temptation to falsehood or perjur}% by not permitting a party

who has once made his allegations or statements under oath to

come in at any time and expunge the same or substitute other

and different matter. If, indeed, it clearly appears there has been

a mistake arising from inadvertency or accident, and that the

statement is not what the party thought it was or intended it

should be at the time of swearing to the pleading, the court will

AMENDMENTS

considering thi question, it is necessary to distinguish between
an amendment and matter which would constitute a new bill;
for under the privilege of amending, the party is not to be permitted to make a new bill. Amendment can only be granted
when the bill is found defective in proper parties, in its prayer for
relief, or in the omission or mistake of some fact or circumstance
connected with the substance of the case but not forming the subtance it elf. This is the principle laid down in Lyon v. Tallmadge, 1 J. C. R. 184; and it applies to all bills and to pleadings
in general in this court. When it comes to be applied to injunction bills or to bills and answers which have been sworn to, other
regulations adopted for the prevention of mischief are to be observed. Thus in Rodgers v. Rodgers, 1 Paige's C. R. 424, upon
an application to amend an injunotion bill, the Chancellor held,
that the amendments proposed must be merely in addition to the
original bill and not inconsistent with it; and the complainant
must swear to the truth of the matter proposed to be inEerted by
way of amendment and show a valid excuse for not having incorporated it in the original bill. And the latter branch of this rule
was strictly adhered to in the subsequent case of Whitmarsh v.
Campbell, 2 Paige's C. R. 67. It is contended, however, that the
rule in these cases, is to be confined to injunction bills, that is to
say, to cases where an injunction has been issued and is actually
pending and where the complainant asks for leave to amend without
prejudice to the injunction-as was the case in Rodgers v. Rodge1·s
-and that it does not apply, where a bill has merely been sworn
to and no injunction is outstanding upon it. But I apprehend
it i not to be thus limited in its application; and that the delay
which would be occasioned by allowing amendment.s after an injunction and in some instances after an answer put in, is by no
means the only reason for the rule.
Another and more important reason for holding a strict hand
over the privilege of amending worn pleadings j to check all
t emptation to fal ehood or perjury, by not permitting a party
who has once made his all gations or statement under oath to
come in at a•ny time and expunge the ame or ub titute other
and differ ent matter. If, indeed, it clearly appears there ha been
a mi take ari ing from inadvertency or accid nt and that the
tatem nt j not what the party thought it wa or intended it
hould he at th time of wearing to th pl adino- the court will
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permit him to amend upon discovery of the error. But, even in

such cases, the court will not suffer the amendment to be made

by striking out any part of the pleading. It can only be done

by introducing an additional or supplemental statement explaining

and correcting the former erroneous one. Thus, in Jennings v.

Merton College, 8 Ves. 79, a motion was made to take the answer

off the file, upon the ground of a mistake which had occurred in it.

The Lord Chancellor refused the application, saying, the safest

way would be to file an additional answer, giving the explanation

so that the court might have the whole before it, without letting

any thing go out of the record. And this course was sanctioned

in the subsequent cases of Bolder v. The Bank of England, 10

Ves. 284, and Wells v. Wood, ib. 401; and several others. The

same question came under consideration in Boiven v. Cross, 4 J. C.

E. 375, where Chancellor Kent, upon a review of all the English

cases, held it to be not only settled, but the safer and wiser practice,

not to permit any thing to be struck out of an answer, even where

a mistake was clearly shown, but (for the purpose of correcting it)
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to give the party leave to file a supplemental or additional answer

— thereby leaving to the parties the effect of what had been sworn

before, with the explanation given by the supplemental answer.

A perusal of his opinion in that ease will show the extreme caution

with which the court permits even this to be done. He says,

"there can be no doubt that the application ought to "hQ narrowly

and closely inspected, and a just and necessary case clearly made

out."

If then, as respects amending an answer, the court is to be thus

watchful to prevent any thing from, being stricken out, though

introduced unintentionally and through mistake, is it not necessary

to be equally particular in regard to a sworn bill, which a com-

plainant may seek to amend in an important and material part?

In some respects, the comparison may not hold good; for the

occasions are much more frequent for amending bills than answers

— and therefore a greater latitude should be given in the former

cases. Yet it will be perceived that the occasions for amending

bills, in which it is necessary to exhibit a greater indulgence, gen-

erally arises from a discovery of a defect in the proper parties, in

the prayer for relief, or in the omission of some fact or circum-

stance rendered necessary to be introduced in consequence of the

defendant's answer (and which a complainant may be permitted

It
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permit him to amend upon di covery of th rror. But, even in
uch ca e , the court will not suffer the amendment to be made
by triking out any part of the pleading.
t can only be done
by introducing an addition 1 or upplemental tatement explaining
and correcting the form r rroneous one. Thu , in J ennings v.
Merton College, 8 Ve. 79, a motion wa made to take the an wer
off the file, upon the ground of a mi take which had occurr d in it.
The Lord Chancellor refu ed the application, aying, the aifest
way would b to file an additional an wer, giving the explanation
o that the court might hav the whole before it, without letting
any thing go out of the record. And thi course wa auctioned
in the sub equent ca es o·f Dolder v. Th e Bank of England, 10
Ve . 284, and Wells v. Wood, i-b. 401; and several other . The
same question came under consrderation in Bowen v. Cross, 4 J. C.
R. 375, where Chancellor Kent, upon a review of all the English
ca.. es, held it to be not only settled, but the safer and wiser practice,
not to permit any thing to be struck out of an answer, even where
a mistake was clearly shown, but (for the purpose of correcting it)
to give the party leave to file a supplemental or additional answer
-thereby leaving to the parties the effect of what had been sworn
before, with the ex.p lanation given by the supple.mental answer.
A perusal of hi opinion in tha1t case will show the extreme caution
with which the court permits even thi to be done. He ay.,
"there can be no doubt that the application ought to abe narrowly
and closely inspected, and a just ·a nd necessary case clearly made
out."
If then, a respects aimending an answer, the court i to be thus
watchful to prevent any thing from~ being tricken out, though
introduced unintentionally and through mi take, is it not nece ary
to b equally particular in r egard to a worn bill, which a complainant may eek to alillend in an important and material part?
n ome re pect , the comparison may not hold goo ·; for the
occa ion ar much mor frequ nt for amending bill than an wers
-and therefore a greater latitud hould be giv n in the former
ca B . Yet it will be perceived that th occasion for amending
bill in which it i neces ary to exh~bit a greater indulO'ence genrall ari e from a di cov r of a defect in th proper parti
in
the pra3 r for relief or in th omi ion of om fact or circumtance rend r
n c ar to b introduc in con equ nc of the
d fendant' an w r ( arrid which a complainant may b
rmitted
u
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to introduce, especially where the defendant, upon exceptions, is

bound to make further answer) and where the matter for amend-

ment does not affect the substance of the case made by the bill.

Where the object of the amendments is to alter or change the

substance of the bill, I hold that the same strictness should be

required as where an answer is in question. The complainant may

amend by introducing new parties; and by making such new

charges, allegations and statements, in addition to the former, as

he can verify by his oath, and which are not inconsistent with his

former allegations. These are the true and legitimate purposes

for which leave to amend may be granted; and it cannot be

extended, with any sort of propriety, to the striking out of former

allegations and substituting others, although they may not be very

different in substance and effect. It has been urged that Renivich

V. Wilson, 6 J. C. E. 81, contains a different doctrine, and that

Chancellor Kent, if he has not so decided, has there, at least,

sanctioned the idea that parts of a sworn bill may be expunged

for the purposes of amendment — and that too, without prejudice
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to an injunction, provided the part expunged does not constitute

the ground upon which the injunction rests. I do not, however,

understand him as going that length. On the contrary, he ex-

pressly limited the amendments, which he permitted to be made in

that case, to additions to the bill; by "inserting such additional

statements, matters and charges as the plaintiff should be advised

"were material;" and this was done without prejudice to the

injunction. At the same time, he says, he could not allow any

part of the bill to be stricken out, without a previous specification

of the parts intended to be omitted. It would seem from this

expression, he considered the court might, in the exercise of its

discretion, permit an amendment by striking out: but I appre-

hend this permission should in no case be extended beyond the

mere formal parts of a bill, and that the Chancellor in that case

did not mean to be understood as intimating an opinion that

any material or substantial allegation of fact, sworn to, might, at

the instance of the party who made it, be withdrawn or obliterated,

so that, if guilty of perjury no vestige of it might remain.

Xo court of justice or equity ought, for one moment, to tolerate

a practice, which would hold out to the designing an opportunity

to commit and yet escape from this crime. By thus adverting to

the danger of such a practice, I do not wish to bo understood as

AMENmrn Ts

to introduce, e pecially where the defendant, upon exception , is
bound to make further an wer) and where the matter for amenclment doe not affect the ub tance of the case made b3 the bill.
Where the object of the amendments is to alter or change the
hould be
ub tance of the bill, I hold that the same strictne
required a where an answer i in que tion. The complainant may
amend by introducing new parti ; and by making uch new
charge , allegation and tatement , in addition to the former, as
he can erify b3 hi oa.th, and which are not inoon istent with his
former allegation . Th e are the true and legitimate purpose
for which leave to amend may be granted; and it cannot be
extended, with any sort of propriety, to the triking out of former
allegation and ub tituting other , although they may not be very
different in ub tance and effect. It ha been urged that Renwick
v. TI ilson~ 6 J. C. R. 81, contain a different doctrine, and that
Chancellor Kent, if he ha not o decided, has there, at lea t,
anctioned the idea that part of a worn bill may be expunged
for the purpo e of amendment-and that too, without prejudice
to an injunction, provided the part expunged doe not con titute
the ground upon which the injunction re ts. I do not, however,
under .. tand him a going that length. On the contrary, he expre .. ly limited the amendment , which he permitt d fo be made in
that ca e, to addition to the bill; by "in erting uch additional
tatement , matter and charge a the plaintiff hould be advi ed
"were material;" and thi wa done without prejudice to the
injunction. At the ame time, he ay , he could not allow any
part of the bill to be stricken out, without a previou peci:fication
of th parts intended to be omitted. It would eem from this
xpr ion, he con idered the court might, in the exerci e of it
di er tion, p rmit an amendment by triking out: but I apprehend thi permi ion hould in no ca e be extended be ond th~
mere formal part of a bill and that the Chane llor in that ca e
did not m a·n to be und r tood a intimating an opinion that
any mat rial or ub tantial all gation of fa t worn to might, at
the in tanc of the party who made it, b withdrawn or obliterated,
o that, if guilt of perjury no ve tig of it might remain .
.J.. o court of ju ti e or
quity ought for one moment to tolerate
a practice, whi h would hold out to th d igning an opportunity
to commit and 3et e cap from thi crime. By thu ad erting to
th dang r of u h a pra ti
I do not wi h t b under toad a"
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refleding in tlio slightest degree upon the complainants. I am

bound to believe and do believe the present application is mado

from pure and honest motives, the better to enable them to present

their case. My object in these observations is merely to show, that

if the bill is permitted to be amended to the extent proposed, it

will be establishing a precedent dangerous in practice — and the

consequences of which might be a reproach to the court. The

only safe and true rule, in my judgment, is the one adopted in

Eodgers v. Bodgers; and I see no reason for confining its applica-

tion to the case of an injunction bill having a writ of injunction

outstanding. It applies, with equal force, to all cases of sworn

bills; and I must, therefore, hold that no bill which has been

sworn to in this court can be amended by striking out the whole

or any portion of the stating part and recasting it in different

phraseolog}', with some omissions of former charges, and the addi-

tion of some new matter. This, instead of being an amendment in

the technical sense of the term, would be converting it into a new

bill : and which the complainants can resort to, if they please.
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Other objections have been urged against the present applica-

tion, namely, that the proposed amendments are not verified by

the oath of the complainants or of any of them; and also, that

the complainants have not sworn as to the information (upon which

the new matter is founded) having come to their knowledge since

the filing of the original bill. The petition is verified by the

affidavit of the solicitor only; and no reason is given, why the

complainants or some one of them have not sworn to it. I am

strongly inclined to think it is insufficient; and that, on this

ground alone, the court would be compelled to deny the motion.

I have thought it my duty, nevertheless, to examine the case and

to express my opinion upon the other and principal question; and

the result is, that I cannot give the complainants permission to

amend, in the way proposed. All I can do upon this application is,

to let them amend by inserting the corporate name of the Mer-

cantile Insurance Company in the place of the President and

Directors: but it must be upon the payment of the costs of op-

posing this motion.

The amendment was made accordingly.

As to the costs of opposing the above motion :

!Mr. Jacob Barker presented to the Yice-Chancellor. as taxing

officer a bill of costs on liis own part. His honor decided, he could

. MERO.A TIL •

0.

refleo1ing in the lighte t d gr e upon the omplainant .
am
bound to belie e and do b li e the pre ent application is mad:..
from pure and hon t motiv , the better to enable them to pre ent
th ir a e. Iy object in the e ol r ation i mer ly to how, that
if th bill i permitt d to b amended to the ext nt propo ed, it
will l
abli hing a precedent dangerou in practice-and the
con qu nces of which might be a reproach to the court. Th
only a-fe and tn1 rule, in my judgment, i th one adopted in
Rodgers . Rodgers.; and I
no rea on for confining it application to th cas of an injunction bill having a writ of injunction
out tanding. It appli , with equal force, to all ca
of worn
bill ; and I mu t, therefor , hold that no bill which ha be n
worn to in thi court cau be amended by striking out the whole
or any portion of the tating part and reca ting it in differen:
phra eology, with ome omi ion of former charge , and the addition of ome new matter. Thi , in tead of being an am ndment in
the technical en e of the term, would be converting it into a new
bill : and which the complainant can r ort to, if they plea e.
Other objection have been urged again t the pre ent application, namely, that the proposed amendment are not Yerified by
the oaith of the complainant or of any of them; and al o, that
the omplainants ha e not sworn ·as to the information (upon which
the new matter i founded) having come to their knowledge ince
the filing of the original bill. The petition is verified by the
affidavit of the solicitor only; a·n d no rea on i given, why the
complainant or some one of them have not worn to it. I am
trongly inclined to think it i insufficient ; and that, on thi ~
ground alone, the court would be compelled to deny the motion.
I have thought it my duty, neverthele , to examine the ca e and
to expre my opinion upon the other and principal que tion; and
the r ul i , tha t
cannot give the complainant permi ion to
11 I can do upon thi application i~
amend in the way propo ed.
to 1 t them amend by in erting the corporate name of the Merantile n urance ompany in the place of the Pre id nt and
ir ctor : but it mu t be upon the payment of the co t of oppo ~ ino- thi motion.
he am nd nt wa made accordingl .
t th o t of oppo ino- the above motion:
:Jir. a ob ark r pr .. oo.t d to th e \ ic - hancellor. a taxin
i d. h ould
o
r a ill of ro t on hi own part. Hi honor
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not tax Mr. Barker any costs for his opposition, he not being an

officer of the court: the Revised Statutes having made provision,

only for fees to "counsellors" and: "solicitors." 2 E. S. 629, 630.

AMENDMENTS

not tax Mr. Barker any costs for his opposition, he not being an
officer of the court: the Revised Statutes having made provision
only for fees to "counsellors" amt "solicitors." 2 R. S. 629, 630.

Thorn v. Germand, ^ JoJins. Ch. (N. Y.) 363. (1820.)

Motion to amend the bill, by adding new and material charges,

after issue joined, a rule to produce witnesses, a commission ta

take testimony sued out, and one witness examined. The petition

stated, that after issue joined, and while the solicitor for the plain-

Thorn v. Germand, 4 Johns. Oh. (N. Y.) 363.

{1820.)

tiffs was preparing to take testimony, the matter proposed to be

introduced by way of amendment, was discovered. The affidavit,

as to the above facts, was sworn to by the solicitor for the plaintiffs.

To oppose the motion, an affidavit of G. B., a third person, was

produced, stating, that before the filing of the bill he communicated

to one of the plaintiffs, the material fact proposed' by way of

amendment viz. the entry of a judgment in the Supreme Court.

The Chancellor:

The application should have been for leave to withdraw the

replication, for the purpose of amending the bill. No amendment
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can be allowed, going to the merits, while the replication remains.

(1 Atk. 51. 1 Ves. jun. 142. Newland's Pr. 82.) And if that had

been the motion, the materiality of the amendment, and why the

matter was not stated before, must have been shown, and satisfac-

torily explained. {Brown v. Ricketts, 2 Johns. Ch. Eep. 425.

Turner v. Clialwin, cited in 1 Fowler's Ex. Pr. 113.)

In this case, it is proved, on the part of the defendants, and it is

to amend the bill, by adding new and material charge3,
after is ue joined, a rule to produce witnesses, a commission to
take testimony sued out, and one witness examined. The petition
stated, that after issue joined, and while the solicitor for the plaintiffs was preparing to take testimony, the matter proposed to be
introduced by way of amendment, wa di covered. The affidavit,
a to the a!bove facts, was sworn to by the solicitor for the plaintiffs.
To oppose the mohon, an affidavit of G. B., a third person, was
produced, stating, that before the filing af the bill he communicated.
to one of the plaintiffs, the material fact proposed- by way of
amendment.. viz. the entry of a judgment in the Supreme Court.
MoTIO.r

not denied by the plaintiffs, that they, or one of them, knew the

existence of the matter now sought to be introduced into their bill,

before the filing of the bill. It is, therefore, not new matter, that

is to be added by way of amendment, but matter before resting

in the knowledge of the party.

There is another fatal objection to the motion. Here has been

a witness already examined in the cause. If no witness had been

examined, an amendment, otherwise proper, and when the omission

was duly accounted for, might have been permitted, for it has been

permitted after publication. (Hastings v. Gregory, cited in W]H.

PI. 258. and 1 Fowler's Ex. Pr. 111.) But after the examination

THE CHANCELLOR :

The application should have been for leave to withdraw the
replication, for the purpose of amending the bill. No amendment
can be allowed, going to the merits, while the replication remains.
(1 Atk. 51. 1 Ves. jun. 142. Newland's Pr. 82.) And if that had
been the motion, the materiality of the amendment, and why the
matter was not stated before, must ha·ve been shown, and satisfactorily explained. (Brown v. Ricketts, 2 Johns. Ch. Rep. -125.
Turn er v. Chalwin, cited in 1 Fowler's Ex. Pr. 113.)
In this ca e, it i proved, on the part of the defendants, and it is
not denied by the plaintiffs, that they, or one of them, knew the
exi tence of th matter now ought to be introduced into their bill,
before the filing of the bill. It i , therefore, not new matter, that
i to be added by wa.y of amendment, but matter before re ting
in the know ledge of the party.
There i another fatal objection to the motion. Here ha been
a witn
already xamin d in th cau . If no witne had be- n
examined, an am ndment, otherwi e proper, and wh n the omL ion
wa duly accounted for, might hav been p rmitt d for it ha been
p rmitt d alt r publi ation. (Hastings . Gregory, cit d in ~fitf.
Pl. 25 . and 1 Fow] r Ex. Pr. 111.) But after th xamination
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of witnesses, the pleadings cannot be altered or amenaed, except

under very special circumstances, or in consequence of some subse-

quent event, unless it be for the sole purjwse of adding parties.

This is the established rule of practice on the subject. (Mitf. PI.

258, 259.) The only course for the plaintiff, in these cases, when

he cannot have permission to alter his original bill by amendment,

is to apply for leave to file a supplemental bill. {Shephard v.

Merril 3 Johns. Ch. Eep. 423.)

Motion denied with costs.

Bill of Review.

2

. - R OLD

of witne ~ e , the pl adin
afilnot be alter d or amenaed, xcept
under very p cial circum tanc , or in con equence of . , ome ub equent event, unl
it b for the ole purpo e of adding partie~ .
Thi i the e tabli h rul of practice on the ubj ct. ( Mitf. Pl.
, 2 9.) Th only cou e for the plaintiff, in the e ca , when
1 e annot hav p rmi ion to alter bi original bill by am ndment,
i to apply for 1 aive to file a upplemental bill. ( hephard v.
Merr,il, 3 John . h. Rep. 4 3.)
Motion denied with costs.

Dexter v. Arnold, 5 Mason, 303. (1829.)

Petition to file a bill for the purpose of obtaining a review of

a decree, rendered in this Court at a former term, in the case of

Edward Dexter v. Thomas Arnold. (See ante. Vol. III. p. 284.)

The original bill, filed at the November Term, 1821, charged

BILL OF REVIEW.

Thomas Arnold, as surviving partner, joint owner, trustee, and

agent of his brother Jonathan Arnold, and as administrator upon

Dexte1· v. Arnold, 5 Mason, 303.

his estate. Upon the bill, answer, and exhibits, an interlocutory
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decree passed, for the defendant to account upon oath, with di-

{1829.)
I

rections to the master as to the mode of taking an account, and

allowing the plaintiff to surcharge and falsify the stated accounts

exhibited by the defendant. A report was made by the master

at the June Term, 1823, and a final decree entered for the plain-

tiff at the following Xovember Term, for five hundred dollars

sixty-six and a half cents.

The grounds, presented by the petition for a review of that

decree, were, the discovery of new facts showing, that several sums

of money had come into the hands of the defenda-nt, belonging

to Jonathan Arnold, which were not entered in Thomas Arnold's

accounts, nor allowed by the master, and that several claims, made

by Thomas Arnold and allowed by the master, were without foun-

dation and erroneous.

Story, J.:

The present is a somewhat novel proceeding in this Circuit ; and

I am not aware, that in any other Circuit of the United States,

to file a bill for the purpo e of obtaining a r eview of
a decree, rendered in this Court at a former term, in the case of
Edwa1·d Dexte1· v. Thomas Arnold. (See ante, Vol. III. p. 284.)
The original bill, filed at the November T erm, 1821, charged
Thoma Arnold, as surviving partner, joint owner, tru tee, and
,ag nt of his brother Jonathan Arnold, and as administrator upon
hi e tate. Upon the bill, an wer, and exhibits, an interlocutory
leer pa ed, for th defendant to account upon oath, with dir ction to the ma ter a to the mode of taking an account, and
allowing the plaintiff to urcb:arge and fal ify the stated accounts
exhibit d by the d fendant . A report was made by the master
at th June T erm, 1 3, and a final decre ent red for the plaintiff at the following
ovember T'erm, for fi e hundred dollars
sixt - ix and a half c nU:.
The ground pr n ed b the petition for a review of that
d r e, wer , th di co ry of new fact bowing, that everal um
of mane had om into the hand of th d fendal!l.t belongincr
to Jonathan rnold which w r not nter d in Thom
rnold ,
a count nor allow by the ma t r and that v ral claim made
b.
mold an allow d b th ma t r were without founP ETITION

J.:
h pr ent i ' a om what o 1 proceedinO' in thi ircuit · an
I am n t awar
hat in a
th r ·r uit f th
ni.t d tat
TRY
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any general course of practice has prevailed, which would super-

cede the necessity of acting upon this, as a case of first impression,

to be decided upon the general principles of Courts of Equity.

It comes before the Court upon a petition for leave to file a

bill of review of a decree rendered in this Court at November

Term, 1823, principally upon the ground of a discovery of new

matters of fact. The petition was filed at November Term, 1837,

and affidavits have been read in support of it. Counter affidavits

have also been admitted on the other side, not for the purpose of

investigating or absolutely deciding upon the truth of the state-

ments in the petition ; but to present, in a more exact shape, some

of the circumstances growing out of the original proceedings,

which may assist the Court in the preliminary discussion, whether

leave ought to be granted to file the bill of review. This course,

though not very common, is, as I conceive, perfectly within the

range of the authority of the Court ;^ and may be indispensable

for a just exercise of its functions, in granting or withholding the

review. If, indeed, it were doubtful, in case the bill of review
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should be allowed, whether the defendants could by plea or answer

traverse the allegation in such bill, that the matter of fact is new,

I should not hesitate to inquire, in the most ample manner, into

the truth of such allegation, before the bill was granted, in order

to prevent gross injustice. But as every such bill of review must

contain an allegation, that the matter of fact is new, it seems to

me clear upon principle, that, as it is vital to the relief, it is

transversable by plea or answer, and must be proved, if not ad-

mitted at the hearing. In Hanhury v. Stevens (178-1), cited by

Lord Redesdale (Redesd. PI. Eq. 80) [3d edition, 70], the Court

is reported to have held that doctrine. The case of Lewcllen v.

Mack worth (2 Atk. R. 40; Barnard, Ch. R. 445), though very

imperfectly, and, as I should think, inaccurately reported, seems

to me to support the same conclusion. It has been relied on by

the best text writers for that purpose.^ Lord Redesdale, in his

original work on Equity Pleadings (Redes. Eq. PI. 80, 2d edition),

stated the point, as one which may be doubted; but upon prin-

ciple I cannot see, how that can well be. And in the last edition,

*See Livingston v. Hitbbs, 3 Johns. Ch. R. 124; Norris v. Lc Neve, 3

Atk 2^

2Rerlesd. PI. Eq. 231 (3d edition); Coop. Eq. PI. 305; Montague, Eq.

PI. 335, note ; Id. 336 ; 2 Montague, Eq. PI. 227, Note 100.

BILL OF REVIEW

any general course of pradice ha prevailed, which would upercede the necessity of acting upon this, as a case of :first impression,
to be dec~ded upon the general principles of Courts of Equity.
It come before the Court upon a petition for leave to :file a
bill of review of a decree rendered in this Court at November
Term, 1823, principally upon the ground of a discovery of new
matter of fact. The petition was :filed at November Term, 1827,
and affidavits have been read in support of it. Counter affidavits
have al o been admitted on the other side, not for the purpose of
investigating or absolutely deciding upon the truth of the statements in the petition; but to present, in a more exact shape, some
of the circumstances growing out of the miginal proceedings,
which may assist the Court in the preliminary discussion, whether
leave ought to be granted to file the bill of review. This course,
though not very common, is, as I conceive, perfectly within the
range of the authority of the Court ;1 and may be indispensable
for a just exercise of its functions, in granting or withholding the
review. If, indeed, it were doubtful, in case the bill of review
should be allowed, whetheT the ·defendants could by plea or answer
traverse the allegation in such bill, that the maitter of fact is new,
I should not hesitate to inquire, in the most ample manner, into
the truth of such allegation, before the bill was granted, in order
to prevent gro s injustice. But as every such bill of review mu t
contain an allegation, thait the matter of fact is new, it seems to
me clear upon principle, that, as it is vital to the relief, it is
transversable by plea or answer, and must be proved, if not admitted at the hearing. In Hanbury v. Stevens (1784), cited by
Lord Red sdale (Red sd. Pl. Eq. 80) [3d edition, 70], the Court
is reported to have held that doctrine. T'he case of Lewellen v.
Mackworth (2 Atk. R. 40; Barnard, Ch. R. 445), though very
imperfectly, and, as I should think, inaccurately reported, seems
to me to support the same conclusion. It ha been relied on by
the best text writer for that purpose. 2 Lord RedesdaJe, in hi
original work on Equity Pleadings (Redes. Eq. Pl. 80, 2d edition),
tated the point, as one which may be doubt d; but upon principle I cannot ee, how that can well be. And in th la t dition,
1

tSee Livingston v. Hubbs, 3 Johns. Ch. R. 124; Norris v. Le N eve, 3
Atk. 25.
2R de d. Pl. Eq. 23T (3d dition) ; Coop. Eq. Pl. 305; Montague, Eq.
Pl. 335, note; Id. 336; 2 Montague, Eq. Pl. n7, Note 100.
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(the third), revised by his Lordship, I find that he has questioned

the propriety of such a doubt.-"^

Before I proceed to consider the particular grounds of the

present petition, it may be well to glance at some of the regula-

tions, which govern Courts of Equity in relation to bills of review,

that we may be better enabled to judge of their application to

the Courts of the United States. The ordinance of Lord Bacon

constitutes the foundation of the system, and has never been de-

parted horn. It is as follows: "j^o decree shall be reversed,

altered, or explained, being once under the great seojl, but upon a

bill of review. And no bill of review shall be admitted, except

it contain either error in law, appearing in the tody of the decree,

without further examination of matters of fact, or some new mat-

ter, which hath arisen after the decree, and not any new proof,

ivhich might have been used, when the decree was made, j^ever-

theless, upon new proof that is come to light after the decree

made, and could not possiVIy have been used at the time when the

decree passed, a bill of review may be grounded by the special
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license of the Court, and not otherwise." ^

A bill of review, therefore, lies only, when the decree has

been enrolled under the great seal in chancery. If it has not

been so enrolled, then for error of law apparent upon the decree

the remedy is by a petition for a re-hearing.^ But if the ground

of the bill is new matter, discovered since the decree, then the

remedy is by a supplemental bill in the nature of a bill of review,

and a petition for a re-hearing, which are allowed by special license

of the Court.*' This distinction between a bill of review and a

bill in the nature of a bill of review, though important in England,

is not felt in the practice of the Courts of the United States, and

perhaps rarely in any of the State Courts of Equity in the Union.

I take it to be clear, that in the Courts of the United States all

decrees as well as judgments are matters of record, and are deemed

to be enrolled as of the Term, in which they are passed. So that

the appropriate remedy is by a bill of review.

3Redesd. PI. Eq. 70 (t,<\ edition).

*Beame's Orders in Chancery, i.

^Pcrry v. PhcUps, 17 Vez. 171, 178.

«Redesd. Eq. PI. 65. [78] 81 : Coop. Eq. PI. 88. 89. 90. 91 ; Beame's Or-

ders m Chan. 2 and 3. notes; Sheffield v. Duchess of Buckingham. 1 West.

R. 682; Montag. PI. Eq. ch. 12, p. 330; Norris v. LeXeve, 3 Atk. 26; Perry

V. Phclips. 17 Vez. 173; Blake v. Foster, 2 B. & Beatty, 457, 460.
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(th third), revi d by hi Lord hip, I :find that he has ue tioneJ
th propri ty of uch a doubt. 3
Before I proce d to on id r the particular ground of the
pr ent petition, it may be well to gla·nce at ome of the r egulation , which govern our of 1 quity in relation to bill of review,
that w may b better enabled to judge of th ir application to
the Court of the United tate . The ordinance of Lord Bacon
on titute the foundation of the y tern, and ha never been depart d from. It i as follow : " o decre hall be rcve etl,
alt red, or xplain d, being once under the great se(J}l, but upon a
bill of review. And no bill of review hall be admitted, xcep t
it contain either rror in law, appearing in the body of the decree,
without further examination of matter of fact, or some new matie'r, which hath ari en after the decree, and not any new proof,
which might have been used, when the decree was made.
everth le , upon new proof that is c01ne to light after the decree
made, and could not possilJly have been used at the time when the
decree passed, a bill of review may be grounded by the special
license of the Court, and not otherwi e." 4
bill of revi w, therefore, lies only, when the decree ha
b n enrolled under the great eal in chancery. If it ha not
be n o enrolled, then for error of la w apparent upon the decree
the remedy is by a petition for a re-hearing. 5 But if the ground
of the bill i new matter, di ·covered ince the decree, then the
r m dy i by a upplemental bill in the nature of a bill of review,
and a petition for a re-hearing, which are allowed by special licen e
of the ourt. G Thi di tinction between a bill of review and a
bill in th nature of a bill of review, though important in England,
i not felt in the practice of the Court of the United State , and
perhap rarely in any of the tate Court of Equity in the Union.
I take it to be cl ar, that in the Court of the United State all
decree a well a judgment are matter of record, and are deemed
to b enrolled a of the T rm, in which they are pas ed. So that
the appropriate rem a i b T a bill of review.
1

BR d d. Pl. Eq. 70 ( d dition).
4
amc' Ord r in h anc ry, I.
5
Pcrry v. Plze lips, 17
z. 173, 178.
6
R d d. Eq. Pl. 65, [7 ] 1; o p. Eq. Pl.
, 9.
, 91 ·
ame'~ Order in han. - and 3, n te ; lreffi Id v. D11clzess of B11cki11 ham. 1 \\ e t.
R. - ; ~Ion ta . Pl. Eq. ch. I-, p. o · Norris v. Le,\ c"l'C, Atk. _6 · P rry
v. Plielif's, 17 V z. 173; Bia~ c . Foster, 2 . & eatt) 47 46o.
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In regard to errors of law, apparent upon the face of the de-

cree, the established doctrine is, that you cannot look into the

evidence in the case in order to show the decree to be erroneous

in its statement of the facts. That is the proper office of the

Court upon an appeal. But taking the facts to be, as they are

stated to be on the face of the decree, you must show, that the

Court have erred in point of law.'^ If, therefore, the decree do

not contain a statement of the material facts, on which the de-

cree proceeds, it is plain, that there can be no relief by a bill of

review, but only by an appeal to some superior tribunal. It is

on this account, that in England decrees are usually drawn up

with a special statement of, or reference to, the material grounds

of fact for the decree.^ In the Courts of the United States the

decrees are usually general. In England the decree embodies

the substance of the bill, pleadings, and answers; in the Courts

of the United States the decree usually contains a mere reference

to the antecedent proceedings without embodying them. But for

the purpose of examining all errors of law, the bill, answers, and
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other proceedings are, in our practice, as much a part of the record

before the Court, as the decree itself ; for it is only by a comparison

with the former, that the correctness of the latter can be ascer-

tained.

In regard to new matter, there are several considerations deserv-

ing attention. In the first place the new matter must be rele-

vant and material, and such, as if known, might probably have

produced a different determination.^ In other words, it must be

new matter to prove what was before in issue, and not to prove

a title not before in issue ;i^ not to make a new case, but to

establish the old one. In the next place the new matter must

have come to the knowledge of the party since the period, in

which it could have been used in the cause at the original hear-

ing. Lord Bacon's ordinance says in one part it must be, "after

"^Mellish V. Williams, i Vern. R. i66; Cranhorne v. Dclahay, 2 Freem.

R. 169; Comhs V. Proivd, 1 Ch. Cas. 54; S. C. 2 Freem. R. 181 ; 3 Rep- Ch.

18; Hard. R. 174; Perry v. Phelips, 17 Vez. 173; O'Brien v. Conner, 2 B.

& Beatt. 146, 154.

^Conibs V. Prozvd, i Ch. Cas. 54; Brend v. Brcnd, i Vern. R. 214; S. C.

2. Ch. Cas. 161; Bonham v. Newcomb, 1 Vern. R. 216; O'Brien v. Conner,

2 B. & Beatt. 146, 154.

^Bennett v. Lee, 2 Atk. 529; O'Brien v. Connor, 2 B. & Beatt. 155;

Portsmouth v. EtHns^hain, i Vez. 429.

i^Coop. Eq. PI. 91; Patterson v. Slaughter, Ambler R. 292; Young v.

Keighley, 16 Vez. 348 ; Blake v. Foster, 2 B. & Beatt. 457, 462.
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In regard to errors of law, apparent upon the face of the decree, the e tablished doctrine i , that you cannot look into the
evidence in the case in order to show the decree to be erroneous
in its statement of the fact . That is the proper office of the
Court upon an appeail. But taking the facts to be, as they are
tated to be on the face of the decree, you must how, that the
Court have erred in point of law. 7 If, therefore, the decree do
not contain a statement of the material facts, on which the decree proceeds, it is plain, that there can be no relief by a bill of
review, but only ·by an appeal to some superior tribunal. It is
on thi account, that in England decrees are usually drawn up
with a pecial statement of, or reference to, the material grounds
of fact for the decree. 8 In the Courts of the United States the
decrees are u ually general. In England the decree embodies
the substance of the bill, pleadings, and answers; in the Courts
of the United States the decree usually contains a mere reference
to the antecedent proceedings without em1bodying them. But for
the purpo e of examining all errors of law, the bill, answers, and
other proceedings are, in our pradice, as much a part of the recorJ.
before the Court, as the decree itself; for it is only by a comparison
with the former, that the correctness of the latter can be ascertained.
In regard to new matter, there are several considerations deserving attention. In the :first place the new matter must be relevant and material, and such, as if known, might probably have
produced a different determination. 9 In other word , it must be
new matter to prove what was before in issue, and not to prove
a title not before in i sue ;10 not to make a new ca e, but to
e tabli h the old one. In the next place th new matter must
have come to the knowledge of the party ince the period, in
which it could ha.ve been u ed in the cause at the original hearing. Lord Bacon' or inance say in one part it mu t be, "after
7 Mellish v. Williams, 1 Vern. R. 166; Cranborne v. Delahay, 2 Freem.
R. 169; Combs v. Prowd 1 Ch. Ca . 54; . C. 2 Fr em. R. 181 ; 3 Rep. Ch.
18; Hard. R. 174; Perry v. Phelips, 17 Vez. 173; O'Brien v. Conner, 2 B.
& Beatt. 146, 154·
8 Combs v. Prowd, l Ch. Cas. 54; Brend v. Brend l Vern. R. 214; S. C.
2. Ch. Ca. 161; Bonham v. Newcomb, 1 Vern. R. 216; O'Brien v. Conner,
2 B. & Beatt. 146, 154·
OBennett v. Lee, 2 Atk. 529; O'Brien v. Connor 2 B. & Beatt. 155;
Portsm01tth v. Effingham, 1 Vez. 429.
1 ocoop. Eq.
I. 91; Patterson v. Slaughter, Am bl r R. 292; Young v.
Keighley 16 Vez. 348; Blake v. Foster, 2 B. & Beatt. 457, 462.
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the decree:" but that seems corrected by the subsequent words,

"and could not possibly have been used at the time when the

decree passed/' which point to the period of publication. Lord

Hardwicke is reported to have said, that the words of Lord Bacon

are dark ; but that the construction has been, that the new matter

must have come to the knowledge of the i>arty after publication

passed {Paterson v. tilaughier. Ambler, E. 293). The same doc-

trine was held in N orris v. LeNeve (3 Atk. E. 25, 34), and has

been constantly adhered to since. A qualification of the rule

quite as important and instructive is, that the matter must not

only be new, but that it must be such as that the party, by the

use of reasonable diligence, could not have known; for if there

be any laches or negligence in this respect, that destroys the title

to the relief. That doctrine was expounded and adhered to by

Lord Eldon in Young v. Keighley (16 Yez. 348), and was acted

uix>n by Lord Manners in Barrington v. O'Brien (2 B. & Beatt.

140), and Blake v. Foster (2 B. & Beatrt. 457, 461). It was fully

recognized by Mr. Chancellor Kent, and received the sanction of
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his high authority in Wiser v. BlacUey (2 Johns. Ch. E. 488),

and Barrow v. Bliinelander (3 Johns. Ch. E. 120). And in the

very recent case of Bingham v. Dawson (3 Jac. & Walk. 243),

Lord Eldon infused into it additional vigor.

Upon another point perhaps there is not a uniformity of opinion

in the authorities. I allude to the distinction taken in an anony-

mous case in 2 Freem. Eep. 31, where the Chancellor said, that

"where a matter of fact was particularly in issue before the for-

mer hearing, though you have new proof of that matter, upon that

you shall never have a bill of review. But where a new fact is

alleged, that was not at the former hearing, there it may be a

ground for a bill of review." Now, assuming that under certain

circumstances new matter, not evidence, that is, not in issue, in the

original cause, but clearly demonstrating error in the decree, may

support a bill of review, if it is the only mode of obtaining re-

lief /^ still it must be admitted, that the general rule is, that the

new matter must be such as is relevant to the original case in

issue. Lord Hardwicke, in Xorris v. Le Neve (3 Atk. 33, 35),

^^SecNorrisy.LcNcve, 3 Atk. 33, 35; Roberts v. Kincslcv. i Vez. 238;

Earl of Portsmouth v. Lord EfRugham. i Vez. 4^9; Redesdalc, Eq PI 67

&c. (last edition.) : i Montag. PI. Eq. 332. 2>3}.\ Wilson v. Jl'cbb. 2 Cox, 3;

Staiidisli V. r<adlcy, 2 Atk. 177; see also Lord Redesdale's Observations in

his third edition of his Equity Pleadings, p. 67.
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the decree:" but that e m corr ct d by the ub equent word··,
"and could not p i•bly have been u ed at the time when the
decree pa ed,' whi h poin to the p riod of publication. Lord
aid, that the word of Lord Bacon
Hardwi ke i r port d to ha
aire dark; but that h on tru tion ha been, that the n w matter
mu t have come to th knowl dge of th arly after pUblication
passed (Paterson v. laughter, Ambler. R. 293). The same doctrine wa held in Norris v. L eNeve (3 Atk.
, 3 ), and has
b n con tantly adh r d to ince. A qualification of the rule
quite a importa·n t an instructive i , that the matter mu t not
only be new, but that it mu t be such a that the party, by the
u e of reasonable diligence, could ndt have known; for if there
be any laches or negligence in thi re pect, that de troy the title
to the relief. That doctrine wa expounded and adhered to by
Lord Eldon in Young v. KeighZey (16 Vez. 348), and was acted
upon by Lord Manners in Barrington v. O'Brien (2 B. & Beatt.
HO), and Blak e v. Foster ( 2 B. & Beai1t. 457, 461). It wa fully
recognized by Mr. Chancellor Kent, a.nd received the anction of
hi high authority in Wiser v. Blackley (2 John. Ch. R. 488) ,
and Barrow v. Rhinelander ( 3 Johns. Ch. R. 120). And in the
very r cent case of Bingham v. Dawson (3 Jae. & Walk. 243),
Lord Eldon infu ed into it aidditional vigor.
Upon another point perhap there i not a uniformity of opinion
in th authoriti . I allude to the distinction taken in an anonymou ca e in 2 Freem. Rep. 31, where the Chancellor aid, that
"wh r a martter of fact wa particularly in i ue before the former h aring, though you have new proof of that matter, upon that
you hall n ver ha e a bill of review. But where a new fact i ~
all g 1 that wa not at the former hea ring, there it ma be a
ground for a bill of r view." Now, a urning that under certain
circum tance" new matter not evidence, that i , not in i ue in the
but cl arl demon trating error in the d cree ma)
oriainal cau
upp rt · bill of r iew, if i i the 0 nly mod of obtaining reli f ;11 till it mu t b admitt d, that the gen ral rule i that the
n w m tt r mu t b uch a i relevant to the original ca"c in
i u . Lord ardwi k in L\ 01·ris . Le eve ( 3 tk. 3 3 )
1

1

11
orri '. L
v , 3 tk. , S · Roberts v. Kin as/ y, I \ ez. - ;
Earl of Portsm outh v. Lcrd Effi11ghal/l. r ez . ..µ9 · R ed al . Eq. I. 67.
&c. (lat diti n.); r l\IontaO'. Pl. Eq.
, 1· Wilso11 \.TT ebb. 2 Cox. ;
ta11dis'1 v. Rad/ )', 2 tk. 177 · e al
Lord R d dale' 0 ervation in
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Equity Pl adin
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is reiDorted to have admitted, that a bill of review might be

founded upon new matter not at all in issue in the former cause,

BILL OF REVIEW

i reported to have admitted, that a bill of review might be
founded upon new matter not at aU in issue in the former cau e,
which eem conrtrary to hi s opinion in Patterson v. Slaughter
(Ambler, 93), 12 or upon matter, which was in issue, but discovered since the hearing. But the very point in 2 Freeman, 31
(if I rightly understand it), is, that a newly discovered fact is
ground for a bill; but not newly di covered evidenoe in proof of
any fact already in issue. This seems to me at variance with
Lord Bacon's ordinanice, for it is there said, that there may be a
review u on "new matter, which hath arisen in time after the
decree," and also "upon new proof, thart has come to light after
the decree made, and could not possiibly have been used at the
time when the decree pa ed." It i also contrary to what Lord
Hardwicke held in the ca es cited from 3 Atk. 33, and Ambler,
293. Lo-rd Eldon, in Young v. Keighley (16 Vez. 348, 350),
said, "The ground (of a bill of review) i error apparent on the
face of the decree, or new evidence of a fact mwterially pressing
upon the decree, and discovered at least after publication in the
cause. If the fact had been kno1wn before publication, though
some contradiction appears in the cases, there is no authority,
that new evidence would not be sufficient ground." That was
also the opinion of Lord Manners in Blake· v. Foster (2 B. &
Beatt. 457). Mr. Cha:rucellor Kenrt, in Livingston v. Hubbs,
(3 Johns. Ch. 124), adopted the like conclu ion; and he seemed
to think, that such new evidence must not be a mere aiccumulation of witnesses to the same fact; but some stringent written evidence or newly discovered papers. Gilbert, in his Forum Romanum, ch. 10, p. 186, leans to the ame limitation, for he says,
that in bill of review, "they can examine to nothing, that was
in the original cause, unless it be matter happening subBequent,
which wa not before in i ue, or upon matter of record or writing
not known b fore, for if the Court should give them leave to
enter into proofs upon the ame points that were in issue, that
would be und r the same mischief as the examination of witnesses after publication, and an inlet info manife t perjury." ta
1

which seems con^trary to his opinion in Patterso?i v. Slaughter

(Ambler, 293),^^ or upon matter, which was in issue, but dis-

covered since the hearing. But the very point in 2 Freeman, 31

(if I rightly underetand it), is, that a newly discovered fact is

ground for a bill; but not newly discovered evidence in proof of

any fact already in issue. This seems to me at variance witli

Lord Bacon's ordinance, for it is there said, that there may be a

review upon "new matter, which hath arisen in time after the

decree," and also "upon new proof, that has come to light after

the decree made, and could not possibly have been used at the

time when the decree passed." It is also contrary to what Lord

Hardwicke held in the cases cited from 3 Atk. 33, and Ambler,

293. Lord Eldon, in Young v. Keighley (16 Vez. 348, 350),

said, "The ground (of a bill of review) is error apparent on the

face of the decree, or new evidence of a fact materially pressing

upon the decree, and discovered at least after publication in the
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cause. If the fact had been known before publication, though

some contradiction appears in the cases, there is no a'uthority,

that new evidence would not be sufficient ground." That was

also the opinion of Lord Manners in Blalce v. Foster (2 B. &

Beatt. 457). Mr. Chamcellor Kent, in Livingston v. HuhhSj

(3 Johns. Ch. 124), adopted the like conclusion; and he seemed

to think, that such new evidence must not be a mere accumula-

tion of witnesses to the same fact ; but some stringent written evi-

dence or newly discovered papers. Gilbert, in his Forum Eo-

manum, ch. 10, p. 186, leans to the same limitation, for he says,

that in bills of review, "they can examine to nothing, that was

in the original cause, unless it be matter happening subsequent,

which was not before in issue, or upon matter of record or writing

not known before, for if the Court should give them leave to

enter into proofs upon the same points that were in issue, that

would be under the same mischief as the examination of wit-

nesses after publication, and an inlet into manifest perjury." i***

i2See also Young v. Keighley, i6 Vez. 348, 354; Blake v. Foster, 2 B. &

Beatt. 457, 462.

^'See also Barton, Eq. 216; Tovers v. Young, Prec. Ch. 193; Taylor V.

Sharp, 3 P. Will. 371 ; Standish v. Radlcy, 2 Atk. 177; Chambers v. Green-

hill, 2 Chan. Rep. 66; Thomas v. Harvic's Heirs, 10 Whcaton, R. 146.

12 S ee al o Young v. Keighley, I6 Vez. 348, 354; Blake v. Foster, 2 B. &
Beatt. 457, 462.
13See also arton, Eq. 216; Tovers v. Young, Pree. Ch. 193; Taylor v.
Sharp, 3 P. Will. 371; Standish v. Rad?e/', 2 . tk. 177; hambcrs v. Greenhill, 2 Chan. Rep. 66; Thomas v. H arvi s H eirs, IO Wheaton, R. 146.
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There is much good sense in such a distinction, operating upon

the discretion of the Court in refusing a bill of review, and I

should be glad to know, that it has always been adhered to. It

is certain, that cumulative written evidence has been admitted;

and even written evidence to contradict the testimony of a wit-

ness. That was the case of Attorney General v. Turner

(Ambler, 587). Willati v. Willun (IG Yez. 72, 88) supposes,

that new testimony of witnesses may be admissible. If it be ad-

missible (upon which I am not called to decide), it ought to be

received with extreme caution, and only when it is of such a

nature as ought to be decisive proof. There is so much of just

reasoning in the opinion of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky

on this subject, that I should hesitate long before I should act

against it.i'*

In the next place it is most material to state, that the granting

of such a bill of review is not a matter of right, but of sound dis-

cretion in the Court.^^ It may be refused, therefore, although

the facts if admitted would change the decree, where the Court,
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looking to all the circumstances, deems it productive of mischief

to innocent parties, or for any other cause unadvisable. Bennet

V. Lee (2 Atk. 528), Wilson v. Wehh (2 Cox, 3), and Young

V. Keigliley (16 Vez. 348), are strong exemplifications of the

principle.

These are the principal considerations, which appear to me

useful to be brought into view upon the present occasion. Let

us now advert to the grounds upon which the petition is framed,

and see how far any are applicable to them.

Tlie original bill was brought against Thomas Arnold (whose

administrator is now before the Court), for an account and set-

tlement of his brother Jonathan Arnold's estate, upon which he

had administered. The case is reported in the third volume of

!^[r. Mason's Ecports, page 284, and I refer to that for a sum-

mar}' of the proceedings and final decree.

In preferring the present petition, the proper course of pro-

ceeding has been entirely mistaken. The present counsel for

the petitioner is not responsible for those proceedings, they hav-

"Sce Rcspass v. McClauahan. Hardin, Ky. R. 342; Head v. Head. 3

Marsh. Kv. R. 121 ; Raitdolfyh's Executors v. Randolph's Executors, i H.

&. M. 180:

^■'Sheffield V. Duchess of Buchiu}:hatii. 1 West. 682; Norris v. Le Neve,

3 .\tk. 33; Gould v. Tattered, 2 Atk. 533.
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T here i mu ·h g od n in uch a: di Linction, op rating upon
the di er tion of the ourt in rcfu ing a bill of re iew, and I
hould b glad t kno , that it ha alway b n adh red to. It
i certain, that cumulati e written vid nee ha be n admitted;
and en written id nee to contradict the testimony of a witThat wa the c
of Attorney General v.. Turner
n
( mbler,
) . Willan . 11 illan ( 16 Vez.
, 8 ) uppo e ,
that new te imony of witn e may be admi ible. If it be admi ibl (upon which I am not called ito decide), it ought to he
r c iv d with xtr m caution, and only when it i of uch a
nature a ought to be deci i e proof. Ther i o much of ju t
re, oning in the opinion of the Court of App al of Kentucky
on thi ubject, that I hould hesitaite long before I hould aot
again t i t. 14
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the fad if admitted would change the decree, where the ourt,
looking to all the circum tance , deem it pro luctive of mi chief
to innocent partie , or for any other cau e unadvisable. Bennet
v. Lee (2 Atk. 5 8), Wilson . Webb (2 Cox, 3), and Young
v. Keighley (16 Vez. 348), are trong exemplification of the
principle.
The e are the principal con ideration , which appear to me
ti._eful to be brought into view upon the pre ent ooca ion. Let
u now advert to the ground upon which the petition i framed,
an e how far any are applicable to them.
Th original bill wa brought aga·i n t T'b.oma Arnold (who e
admini tra tor i now b fore the ourt), for an account an 1 ~et
tl m nt of hi brother Jonathan Arnold
tat upon which he
had admini tered. The ca e i reported in th third volume of
~fr . Un on
port page
4 and
refer to that for a ummary of the i:iroc din and :final decree.
In preferrinO' th pr ent p titian the proper course of proding ha been ntir 1 mi tak n. The pre ent coun 1 .for
th p tition r i no.t r pon ibl for tho e pr c din
t hey ha H
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ing taken place before he came into the cause. A petition for

leave to file a bill of review for newly discovered matter should

contain in itself an abstract of the former proceedings, the bill,

answers, decree, &c. and should then specifically state what the

newly discovered matter is, and when it first came to the party's

knowledge, and how it bears on the decree, that the Court may

see its relevancy and the propriety of allowing it.^^ The present

petition, in its original form, contained nothing of this sort, but

referred to an accompanying bill of review, as the one, which it

asked leave to file, and then simply affirmed the facts stated in

it to be true. This was sufficiently irregular. But upon looking

into this bill of review the grounds of error are stated in a very

loose manner, and in so general a form as to be quite inad-

missible.

The first error assigned is in matter of law, and it is, that

Thomas Arnold, the administrator, ought to have been charged

with interest upon all sums of money, which he had received as

administrator, because the said sums were used by him. The
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master in his report had declined to allow interest; and upon an

exception taken the Court confirmed his report on tliis point. I

see no reason for changing the decree on this point, for the rea-

sons stated in the cause in 3 Mason, 288, 290; and there is no

pretence to say, that there is any such proof of the use of the

money in the report of the master, as justifies a different con-

clusion. There is no error in this respect apparent on the face of

the master's report, or the decree. The allowance or disallow-

ance of interest rests very much upon circumstances, and slight

errors in this respect are not always held fatal.^'' There is no

error apparent, therefore, on which a review ought to be granted.

The next ground assigned is, that Thomas Arnold did receive

large sums of money and other property, which he has not ac-

counted for before the master, and for which he ought to ac-

count; and that since the decree, the petitioner hath discovered

new and further evidence in relation thereto, which would have

materially changed the report of the master and the decree.

Tlie petition does not state what the new evidence is, nor when

discovered, and it is quite too vague for any order of the Court.

The bill then proceeds, very irregularly, to require, that the ad-

i®Coop. Eq. PI. 92.

"See Gould v. Tancred, 2 Atk. 533.
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with interest upon all sums of money, which he had received as
administrator, because the said sums were u ed by him. The
master in his report had declined to allow interest; and upon an
exception taken the Court confirmed his report on this point. I
see no reason for changing the decree on this point, for the reason stated in the cause in 3 Mason, 288, 290; and there is no
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mon y in the report of the master, as justifies a different conclu ion. There i no error in this respect apparent on the face of
the master's report, or the decree. The allowance or disallowance of interest rests very much upon circumstances, and slight
errors in this respect a·r e not always held fatal.1 7 T'here is no
error apparent, therefore, on which a review ought to be granted.
The next ground assigned is, that Thomas Arnold did receive
large urns of money and other property, which he has not accounted for before the master, ·a nd for which he ought to account; and that since the decree, the petitioner ha.th di covered
new and further evidence in relation thereto, which would have
materially changed the report of the ma ter and the decree.
The petition does not tate what the new eviden~e i , nor when
di covered, and it i quite too vague for any order of the Court.
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ministrator of Thomas Arnold should answer certain interroga-

tories as to the cargoes of the ship Friendship. It then states, that

Thomas Arnold received six shares in the Tennessee Land Com-

pany; and that he received 8,000 dollars on a policy of insurance

on the brig Friendship; and that he received large consignments

of property from Vincent Gray in Cuba in bills of exchange, &c.

belonging to Jonathan's estate; and finally, that he received

divers other large sums of money as agent of Jonathan. Now,

it must be manifest, that upon allegations so general and indis-

tinct no bill of review would lie. Here is no assertion of newly

discovered evidence to maintain one. Such a bill, so framed,

ought never to be allowed by a Court acting upon the correct

principles of Chancery jurisdiction.

Afterwards, an amendment of this bill of review was filed, con-

taining more distinct specifications of new matter, most of which,

however, as I shall have occasion to notice hereafter, are open to

the same objections as those already stated.

But the radical objection to both bills is, that they are im-
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properly introduced into the cause at all. A bill of review can only

be filed after it is allowed by the Court, and upon the very

grounds allowed by the Court. The preliminary application by

petition to file it should state the new matter shortly, distinctly,

and exactly, so that the Court may see how it presses on the

original cause; and it is not i>ermissible to load it with charges

and allegations, as in an original seeking bill in equity. In the

sense of a Court of Chancery there is not before this Court any

sufficient petition, upon which it can act.

But as the proceeding is a novelty in this Circuit, much indul-

gence ought to be allowed to the original counsel in the cause

(for the present counsel is not at all chargeable) for irregulari-

ties of this nature, upon the first presentation of the practice. I

advert to the posture of the cause, therefore, not so much with

an intention to subject it to close criticism, as for the purpose of

declaring, that, even if I could gather from the papers, that there

is matter, upon which a bill of review would lie, it is not before

the Court in such a shape, that the Court could judicially pass

an order of allowance.

Tlie case has, however, been argued, aiid with great ability,

upon its merits; and waiving for the present any further refer-

v.
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ence to the form of the proceedings, I will proceed to the con-

sideration of the points made at the bar.

The first point is one made by the defendant, and being pre-

liminary in its nature, must be disposed of before the plaintiff

can be further heard. It is said to be a rule in equity, that where

a party has less decreed to him than he thinks himself entitled

to, he cannot bring a bill of review ; for that lies only in favor of

a party against whom there is a decree. For this the opinion of

elementary writers,!^ and the case of Glover v. Partington (2

Freeman E. 183; S. C. 2 Eq. Abrid. 17-i), is cited. The

case, as here reported, certainly supports the doctrine. But it

appears to me, that, if the doctrine is correct, it is so only in

cases, where there is no erroT apparent on the face of the decree,

and no newly discovered matter to support a bill of review, for

then the proper remedy is by appeal. If there be no such rem-

edy by appeal, but only by bill of review, it would be strange, if

a material error could not be redressed upon such a bill by the

party to whom it had been injurious; that if a man had 10,000
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dollars due him, and had a decree for 100 dollars, he was con-

clusively bound by an error of the Court. The decision, reported

in 2 Freem. R. 182, was made by the Master of the Rolls, who

allowed the demurrer; but from the report of the same case

in 1 Ch. Cas. 51, it appears, that it was afterwards re-heard be-

fore the Lord Chancellor and Baron Rainsf ord ; and the demurrer

was overruled?-^ So that the final decision was against the doc-

trine for which it is now cited. And Lord Nottingham, a few

years afterwards, in Vandebende v. Levingston (3 Swanst. E.

625), resolved, that the plaintiff may have a bill of review to

review a decree made for himself, if it be less beneficial to him

than in truth it ought to have been. We may then dismiss this

objection.

We may now advance to the examination of the points made

by the petitioner in support of his petition for a review, assuming

that the amended bill of review is to be received, pro hoc vice,

as such a petition. I have already stated, that it is utterly de-

fective in the essential ingredients of such a petition, in not stat-

ing with exactness the nature of the new evidence, and when it

was first discovered. It is not sufficient to say, that the petitioner

182 Madd. Pr. 412; i Harris Pr. 86.

i»See S. C. cited Com. Dig. Chancery ; G. to the same effect.
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can be further heard. It is said to be a rule in equity, that where
a party has less decreed to him than he thinks him elf entitled
to, he cannot bring a bill of review; for that lies only in favor of
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a material error could not be redressed upon such a bill by the
party to whom it had been injurious; that if a man had 10,000
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in 2 Freem. R. 182, was made by the Mater of the Rolls, who
allowed the demurrer; but from the report .of the same case
in 1 Ch. Oas. 51, it appears, that it was afterwards re-heard before the Lord Chancellor and Baron Rainsford; and the demurrer
was overruled. 19 So that the final deci ion was against the doctrine for which it is now cited. And Lord Nottingham, a few
years aft erward , in Vandebende v. Levingston ( 3 Swanst. R.
62·5), resolved, that the plaintiff may have a bill of review to
review ai decree made for himself, if it be less beneficial to him
than in truth it ought to have been. We may then dismiss this
objection.
We may now advance to the examination of the points made
by th petition r in upport of hi petition for a review, a urning
that the am nded bill of revi w is to be received, pro hoc vice,
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expects to prove error in this or that respect: or that he has

discovered evidence, which he hopes will establish this or that

fact. But he must state the exact nature and form of the evi-

dence itself, and when discovered. If written evidence, it must

be stated, and its direct bearing shown. If of witnesses, what

facts the witnesses will prove; and when the party first knew

the nature of their testimony. It is impossible otherwise for the

Court to judge, whether the evidence is decisive, or is merely

presumptive or cumulative; whether it goes vitally to the case,

and disproves it, or only lets in some new matter, confirmatory

or explanatory of the transactions in the former decree. The

party must go further, and establish, that he could not, by reason-

able diligence before the decree, have procured the evidence.

Now, in every one of these particulars, the amended bill, quasi

a petition, is extremely deficient. I have looked it over care-

fully, and cannot find, that it points out a single written paper,

which disproves the original case, or names a single witness,

whose testimony, if admitted, would overturn it. It deals alto-
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gether in general allegations, that certain things are expected to

be proved; and, like an original bill, proceeds to ask a discovery

from the defendant of letters and papers in her possession as ad-

ministrator, relative thereto. There are indeed, in the accompany-

ing affidavits, some papers produced and relied on ; but they cannot

supply the defects of the original petition.

1. The first charge is in effect, that Thomas Arnold, as ad-

ministrator of Jonathan Arnold, received certain property from

Vincent Gray in Cuba, belonging to Jonathan's estate, which he

has never inventoried or accounted for. The specifications under

this head are, (1.) The receipt of -10 boxes of sugar, upon which

charges were paid out of Jonathan's estate, amounting to $190:

(2.) The remittance of a bill to Thomas Arnold, drawn by Andrew

Davis on \Yilliam Davis, Philadelphia, for $1222: (3.) The re-

ceipt by Captain Mathewson of $500. All these transactions took

place in the year 1808, Jonathan having died in June, 1807.

Now, the original bill charged a partnership between Jona-

than and Thomas, and asked for an account and settlement of

the partnership concerns, as well as of the administration. After

the answer it was referred to a master to take the accounts, and

he made a report accordingly, after hearing the parties many

times. In the hearing before the master, the accounts with Vin-

.
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cent Gray were in controversy between the parties, and Thomas

Arnold was interrogated as to the whole subject, and made his

disclosures. So that the existence of an account with Gray,

and the dispute, as to the receipts from him on account of Jona-

than's estate, were matter of examination before the master.

There is no pretence, that the residence of Gray was not well

known; or that the plaintiff could not at that time, by reason-

able dihgence, have obtained his testimony, if he had desired it.

He does not show, that he made any effort to obtain it; and if he

had, the very papers now produced would have been obtained.

What then is the posture of the case? The plaintiff goes on to

a decree without seeking for evidence, though within liis reach,

and contents himself with such explanations as the defendant then

gave; and now, after the lapse of several years, the defendant

being dead, asks this Court to grant him a bill of review for

errors in the account, which ordinary diligence would have recti-

fied at that very time. If such a course should be allowed, it

would furnish a perfect immunity for the grossest negligence.
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According to my understanding of the principles, upon which

bills of review are granted, this Court, under such circumstances,

is not at liberty to grant it. In Bingliam v. Dawson (3 Jac. &

Walk. 243), Lord Eldon refused to allow a bill of review under

far less cogent circumstances, deeming it a most mischievous prac-

tice; and Mr. Chancellor Kent acted most deliberately to the

same effect in Livingston v. Hubls (3 Johns. Ch. R. 124).

But as to the matter of fact; Mr. Gray's letters show, that the

40 boxes of sugar belonged to Thomas Arnold, and not to Jonathan

Arnold, thus establishing the incorrectness of this part of the peti-

tioner's case, and leaving only the $190 in his favor. Then, as to

the bill on Davis ; Thomas Arnold, on his examination before the

master, expressly stated, that it had never been paid, Davis being

insolvent. And there is not a tittle of new evidence, now offered,

to show that he did receive it. It is therefore a mere effort to re-

hear the original cause on this point. Then, as to the 500 dollars

received by Mathewson. In the report 270 dollars is credited to

Jonathan's estate on this account; and the only question is,

whether the remaining 230 dollars ought to have been credited.

Mr. Gray, in his letters (which, by the by, are mere statements

now made, and not originals written at the time of the transactions,

and are not sworn to by him), does not pretend to any absolute

8
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certaint)^, as to the parties to whom the money belonged. He says

in that of the 14th of April, 182 G, that he had received of De la

Motte $1,984, part of which he remitted to Thomas Arnold by the

bill drawn on Davis. He did not then recollect how, or when, the

balance \v&& remitted. In his letter of the 14th of April, 1827, he

states, that on exami-ning his old accounts, &c., he finds, that he

passed to the credit of the ship Tyre, Mathewson, master, for

account of Thomas Arnold, in July 1808, $230, and in September

of the same year, $270, in all 500 dollars; and he presumes, that

this was the balance then collected. In his letter of the 27th of

February, 1828, he adds, that the money, collected of De la Motte,

belonged to Jonathan Arnold, and that the bill on Davis, the $500,

the $190, and his commissions, made up the whole sum. Such is

the explanation given by Mr. Gray, at the distance of 20 years after

the original transactions; and it is too much to say, that his

recollections, after such a length of time, ought to overturn the

solemn proceedings before the master. It is, at best, testimony

only of a presumptive character, cumulative in its nature, to a
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litigated fact, and, if admissible at all, as a ground for a review,

is open to the suggestion of possible mistake. But it does so hap-

pen, that there is before the Court a letter of Mr. Gray to Thomas

Arnold, written on the 12th of April, 1808 (and which, there is

much to believe, was, among other papers from him, laid before

the master upon the hearing), which may fairly lead to the belief,

that Gray is now mistaken in supposing, that the money belonged

exclusively to Jonathan Arnold. That letter begins by saying,

"I have liquidated your accounts with Don Pablo de Motta, and

taken the acceptance on the widow P. & H. for the balance due,

&c., for 2088 dollars 3^." It then goes on to state, that Mr.

Barker, of Charleston, has requested him to pay into his hands

the money received from De la Motte, which he declined. It then

adds, "On examination of the accounts, if any thing should appear

to be due to Mr. Barker over and above the 1000 dollars heretofore

received, I will remit it to him, or pay it into the hands of Mr.

Bower. However, as you know better than I do, what sum ought

to be paid to Mr. Barker, I wish you to settle the amount with

him." If any thing is clear, from this language, it is, that Mr.

Barker had, or was supposed to have, an interest in this very fund,

and that Thomas Arnold was called upon to discharge it. And

the first words in the letter, "your accounts," seem to indicate, that
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certainty, a to the partie to whom the mon y belonged. He ay.
in that of the 1 th of pril, 1826, that h had recei d of De la
Mott $1,98±, part of whi h he r mitted to boma Arnold by the
bill drawn on a i .
did not then recollect how, r when, the
balanc w r mitted. In hi lett r of the 14th of pril, 1 , he
tat , that on e amining hi old account , &c., he find , that he
p
d to the er dit of th hip Tyre, 1athew on, ma ter, for
account of Thoma
rnold, in July 180 , $ 30, and in eptember
of the ame y a:r, $ 0, in all 500 dollar ; and he pre ume that
thi wa the balance then collected. In hi lett r of the 2 h of
F bruar , 1 , h add , that the money, collected of D la fotte,
belonged to Jonathan Arnold, and that the bill on avi , the 500,
the $190, and hi commi ion , mad up the whole um.
uch i ~
the explanation given by Mr. Gray at the di tance of 20 year after
the original tran action ; and it is too much to ay, that his
recall ction , after such a length of time, ought to overturn the
olemn proceeding before the mwster. It i , at best, te timony
only of a pre umptive character, ·cumulative in it nature, to a
litigated fact, and, if admi ible at all, as a ground for a review,
i open to the ugge tion of po ible mi take. But it d-0e o happen, that there i before the Court a letter of Mr. Gray to Thoma
Arnold, written on the 12th of April, 1808 (and which, there ia
much to believe was, among other papers from him, laid before
th ma ter upon the hearing), which may fairly lead to the belief,
that Gray i now mistaken in upposing, that the money belonged
exclu ively to Jonathan Arnold. That letter begin by aying,
'I have liquidated your accounts with Don Pablo de :Motta, and
taken the ace ptance on the widDw P. & H. for the balance due,
&c. for 0
dollar 3f." It then goe on to tate, that :Mr.
ark r, of harle ton ha reque ted him to pa into hi hand
th money r c iv d from D la Motte, wh~ch he declined. It th n
add ' On examination of th account if any thing hould appear
to b due to Ur. Barker over and above the 1000 dollar heretofore
r c iY d I will remit it to him, or pa it into th band of :Jir.
Bow r.
ow v r a you know b tter than I do wha·t um oucrbt
t b paid to Mr. Barker,
wi h ·OU to .. ttl the amount with
him.
If a.n thin i cl ar from thi Ian uacr
that Ir.
ark r had or a uppo d to hav an int r
an that Thoma" rnol wa called upon t
n
th fi "t word in th 1 tter ·our accounL
hat
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Thomas Arnold also might have a personal interest in the fund.

If Mr. Barker had an interest, what proof is there, that it did

not amount to the 230 dollars, now sought to be credied in Jona-

than's account? After this, what safe reliance can be placed upon

Mr. Gray's recollection as to the $190 being paid out of the funds

of Jonathan Arnold in his hands ? It is certain, that, at that very

time, he was collecting money for Thomas Arnold. Tlie letter of

instructions to Mathewson, in 1808, shows, that money was to be

collected on the personal account of Thomas Arnold, as well as on

account of Jonathan Arnold's estate. And Mr. Gray is certainly

mistaken in supposing it was credited to the brig Tyre ; for it was

credited to the brig Perseverance. I do not mean to cast the slight-

est imputation upon this gentleman's credit. I do not doubt, that

he relates the transactions, as he now supposes them to have been.

But with the most perfect respect for his veracity, it is not too

much to say, that, after such a length of time, no Court would be

safe to grant a bill of review upon such proofs, at once inconclusive

and unsatisfactory. It is to be remembered, that the case stands
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here very differently from what it would on an original bill. Here,

the onus prolan di is on the petitioner to establish the error, and

it must be proved by newly discovered evidence or facts, to entitle

him to a review. Great reliance has been placed, at the argument,

upon Moore v. Moore, 2 Vez. 596, as a case of relief founded upon

analogous principles. Without doubt, if a substantial error is con-

clusively ascertained by newly discovered evidence, that furnishes

a ground for a review. But that case was not like the present.

There John Moore was made a party to a bill for an account, as

one of the executors of C. M. ; and the plaintiffs insisted, that he

acted as executor. That was not proved; and therefore he was

not decreed to account as executor, and he refused to account.

Afterwards it was discovered, that he had received £2500 mortgage

money of the testator's estate. Lord Hardwicke thought this was

proper matter for review ; and that Moore ought to have disclosed

the fact on his original answer, although he had not acted gener-

ally as executor. Xow, there was nothing in this case to put the

plaintiffs upon any inquiry as to any mortgage. They asked for an

account generally of the testator's estate from his executors, in

order to have a decree for their legacies. It would have been dif-

ferent, if the very mortgage had been in controversy between the

parties, and brought out upon the account.
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Thoma Arnold al -0 might have a personal intere t in the fund.
If Ur. Barker had an interest, what proof is there, that it did
not amount to the 230 dollar , now sought to be credied in Jonathan account? After thi , what af reliance can b placed upon
Ir. Gray' recollection a to the $190 being paid out of the fund
of Jonathan rnold in hi band ? It i certain, that, at that very
tim , he was collecting money for Thoma Arnold. The letter of
in truction to fathew on, in 1808, show , that money was to be
collected on the personal account of Thomas Arnold, a well a on
account of Jonatha·n Arnold' estate. And Mr. Gray i certainly
mi taken in uppo ing it wa credited to the brig Tyre; for it was
credited to the brig Perseverance. I do not mean to ca t the slightt imputation upon this gentleman's credit. I do not doubt, that
be relate the t•r an action , a be now suppo es them to have been.
But with the mo t perfect re pect for bis veracit;, it i not too
much to ay, that, after such a length of time, no Court would be
af to grant a· bill of review upon such proof , at once inconclusive
and un ati factory. It i to be remembered, that the ca e stands
here very differently from what it would on an original bill. Here,
the onus probandi i on the petitioner to e tabli b the error, and
it mu t be proved by newly di covered evidence or facts, to entitle
him to a review. Great reliance has been placed, at the argument,
upon Moore v. Moore, 2 \ ez. 596, a a ca e of r lief founded upon
analogou principle . Without doubt, if a ub tantial error is conlu ivel a cerlained by newly di covered evidence, that furni hes
a ground for a review. But that ca e wa not like the pre ent.
There John Moore was made a party to a bill for an account, as
one of the executors of C. M.; and the plaintiffs in i ted, that he
acte 1 a executor. That wa not proved; and therefore he was
not decreed to ac aunt a executor, and he refu ed to account.
Afterward it wa di covered that he had r ceived £2500 mortgage
man y of th t tator' esta.te. Lord Hardwicke thougl1t thi wa,
prop r matter for r view; and that 1\loore ought to have di clo ed
th fa t on hi ori inal an w r, although he had not acted generow ther wa nothin in thi ca e to put the
ally a executor.
plaintiff upon any inquiry a to any mart age. They a ked for an
a count generally of the t tator
tate from his ex cutor , jn
order to hav a d er e for th ir legacie . It would hav b en diff rent, if the ery mortgag had been in controver y between the
partie and l rouaht out upon the acmunt.
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2. The next charge is, that in the account settled on the 31st of

March, 1801, between Thomas Arnold and Jonathan Arnold, there

was debited an item for one half of tlie premium on the schooner

Fame, on her voyage home, of 180 dollars and 12 dollars interest,

in all 192 dollars; which it is now said is erroneous, because no

such insurance was made, or premium paid, the vessel and her

cargo being then insured out and home, by the Providence Insur-

ance Compan}^, for more than the value of both. One of the

charges, in the original bill, was of errors in the settlement of this

very account; and upon the hearing, the Court decreed, that the

account should stand, subject to any surcharge and falsification

by the plaintiff. Of course, this item was open for contestation

before the master. It was confirmed, as to this item, by the mas-

ter; and if the Court now reviews it, it undertakes, after a lapse

of 28 years and the death of both parties, to open a settled account

upon a mere presumption of mistake, founded upon a very im-

perfect knowledge of the real circumstances. Thomas Arnold

was liable to examination before the master for every item in his
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account. He might have been inquired of, as to the facts, where

the insurance was made, and when the premium was paid; and

as to all other material circumstances. The petitioner waived

such inquiry in the very case, in which he was keenly on the

scent to discover errors. It does not appear, that he made any

inquiry, or was misled by any attempted misrepresentation or

concealment on this head. If he then used no reasonable diligence

in the matter, then before him, it must be a strong case to justify

an interposition of the Court now in his favor.

But what is the newly discovered evidence to falsify the item?

It now appears, that by a policy underwritten on the 24th of

July, 1800, by the Providence Insurance Company; Thomas

Arnold for Jonathan Arnold, Barker & Lord, and James Schmei-

bar, caused insurance to be made of 9000 dollars on the schooner

Fame and cargo, viz. 7000 dollars on the cargo, and 2000 dollars

on the vessel, from Charleston to j\Iartinico, at and from thence

to any one port in the United States, at a premium of 17 per

'cent. ; with liberty to proceed from Martinico to any other port

or ports in the West Indies, by adding three per cent, for every

English windward port, and five per cent, for every other port.

Upon the back of the office copy of the policy is the following

indorsement. "October 26. Received information of her safe
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2. The next charge i , that in the account ettled on the 31 t of
March, 1801, betw en Thoma
rnold and J onathain Arnold, there
wa c1 bited an it m for on half of he premium on th chooner
Fam , on her voyag horn , of 1 0 dollar and 1 dollar intere~ t,
in all 19 dollar ; whi h it i now aid i rron ou , becau e no
u h in urance wa mad , or premium paid, th ve el and her
arao l ing then in ured out an:d home, by the rovidence In urance ompany, for more than the value of both. One of the
charge , in the original bill, wa of error in the ettlement of thi ·
ery account; and upon the hearing, the ourt decreed, tha·t the
account hould tand, ubj ct to any urcharge and fal i:fication
by the plaintiff. Of cour e, thi item wa open for conte tation
before the ma ·t r . It wa confirmed, as to thi item, by the ma ter; and if th
ourt now review it, it undertake , after a lap e
of 2 ) ear and the death of both partie , to open a ettled account
upon a mere pre umption of mi take, founded upon a ecy imperfect knowledg of the real circumstance . Thoma Arnold
wa liable to examination before the ma ter for every item in hi
account. H e might have been inquired of, a to the fact , where
the in urance wa made, and w_hen the premium wa paid; and
as to all other material circumstance . The petitioner waived
uch inquiry in the very ca e, in which he wa keenly on the
cent to di cover error . It does not appear, that he made any
inquiry, or wa mi led by any attempted mi representation or
concealment on thi head. If he then u ed no reasonable diligence
in th matter, then before him, it must be a trong case to ju tify
an interposition of the Court now in his favor.
But what i the newly di covered evidence to fal ify the item ?
It now appear , that b) a policy underwritten on the 24th of
J uly 1 00, by the Providence In uranc Com pan ; Thoma
Arnold for Jonathan Arnold, Barker & Lord, and Jame chmeibar, au ed in urance to b mad of 9000 dollar on the chooner
Fam and cargo, iz. 000 dolla·r on the cargo and 000 dollars
on the e el from Charle ton to Uartinico at and from th nee
to any one port in the Unit d State , at a premium of 1 per
'Cent. · with liberty to proceed from Martinico t an other port
r port in th W t Indi , b a'dding three per cent. for ' ry
nali h windward port and five per cent. for ery other port.
pon the back of th o c cop of th poli y i th followinO'
indorement.
tol r
c i ed information of her afe
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arrival at Charleston; touched at Trinidad and St. Thomas; for

which add 8 per cent, to the premium. Return 9 per cent, on

$ deficiency of cargo from St. Thomas." This indorsement

was doubtless made by the proper officer of the Insurance Com-

pany ; but what settlement was actually made does not appear by

any competent evidence. It appears, however, from William

Holroyd's papers, that Barker & Lord were charged in settle-

ment by Thomas Arnold with one half of the premium of the

cargo of the Fame, $986.48; and the other half of the premium

on the same cargo, viz. $986.48, was charged to Jonathan Arnold,

in the above account, settled in March, 1801. It is impossible,

I think, from such facts alone, to ascertain, whether the charge

of the 192 dollars for premium on the vessel liome was correct or

not; non constat, that there might not have been another policy,

on which it was paid. The very terms of the charge suppose it

to be a premium, not for the whole voyage, but for the return

voyage only. Besides, it does not appear from this policy, or

the other papers, that Barker & Lord had any interest in the
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vessel. The charge against them is for premium on cargo only;

and if they had had any interest in the vessel, and the sum

charged included both, it would probaibly have been mentioned.

The very circumstance, that there is a distinct charge of the pre-

mium on the vessel, following that of the cargo, which is stated to

be settled with William Holroyd, in the account of March, 1801,

is strong presumptive proof, that Jonathan Arnold was the sole

owner of the vessel. And ihis is quite compatible with the

terms of the policy of insurance. And, after all, the conjecture

of the counsel may be well founded, that the settlement under

the policy, whatever it was, was by compromise. Who can say,

after such a length of time, when the transactions are involved

in so much obscurity, that he now understands them better

than the parties did at the time, when they were fresh in their

minds, and were settled in their accounts? There would be, as

I think, much rashness in such an assertion. But, supposing

there might be some doubt, is that a ground for unravelling an

intricate, settled account, after such a lapse of time? Was

there ever a bill of review maintained under such circumstances,

especially, when a prior decree had given the party leave to

surcharge and falsify? In short, can it be endured, that a bill

of review should be allowed, but upon proofs, which, standing
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arrival at Charleston; touched at Trinidad and St. Thomas; for
which add 8 per cent. to the premium. Return 9 per cent. on
$-- deficiency Df cargo from Sit. Thomas.'' This indorsement
wa doubtle s made by the proper ,officer of the Insurance Company; but what ettlement was actually made does not appear by
any competent evidence. It appears, however, from William
Holroyd s papers, that Barker & Lord were cha-rged in settlement by Thomas Arnold with Dne half of the premium of the
cargo of the Fame, $986.48; and the other half of the premium
on the ame cargo, viz. $986.48, was charged to Jonathan Arnold,
in the above account, etitled in March, 1801. It is imp-0 sible,
I think, from uch facts alone, to ascertain, whether the cha,.rge
of the 192 dollars for premiurm on the vessel home was correct or
not; non constat, that there might not have been another policy,
on which it was paid. The very terms of the charge suppose it
to be a premium, not for the whole voyage, but for the return
voyage only. Besides, it does not appear from this p-0licy, or
the other papers, that Barker & Lord ha:d any ini:€rest in the
vessel. The charge against them is for premium on cargo only;
and if they had had any interest in the vessel, and the sum
charged included both, it would probrubly have been mentioned.
The very circumstance, that there is a distinct charge of the pre:.
mium on the vessel, following that of the cargo, which is stated to
be settled with William Holroyd, in the account of March, 1801,
is strong presumptive proof, that Jonathan Arnold was the sole
owner of the vessel. And ibis is quite compatible with the
terms of the policy of insurance. And, after all, the conjecture
of the coun el may be well founded, that the settlement under
the policy, whatever it was, was by compromise. Who can say,
after such a length of time, when the transactions are involved
in o much ob curity, that he now understands them better
than the parties did at the time, when they were fre h in their
minds, and were settled in their acoounts ? There would be, as
I think, much r a hnes in uch an a ertion. But, uppo ing
there might be some doubt, is that a ground for unravelling an
intricate, ettled account, after uch a lap e of time? Was
there ever a bill of r view maintain d under u h circum tance ,
especially, when a prior decree ha'd given the party leave to
surcharge and fal ify? In short, can it be endure<l, that a bill
of review hould be allowed, but upon proof, which, standing
1
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alone, would overturn the decree, and would be conclusive on the

point? Ought they not to be direct, plain, unequivocal?

Tlie next item is a supposed error in the account settled in

March, 1801, where Jonathan Arnold is charged with the pay-

ment of $2207.82, principal and interest on his note to Joseph

Eogers. It is now said, that by newly discovered evidence the

petitioner can show, that only $1693.95 was in fact paid on that

account; and for the payment of this, Thomas Arnold had, in

1798, bills, the property of Jonathan, to the value of £800 ster-

ling, which he had used and enjoyed the interest of. Many of the

remarks already made apply with increased force to this item.

In the first place, there is a settled acknowledgment between the

parties, that the sum is right, and the note was paid. In the next

admitted in the same account, as correctly applied. How then

can we say, that they were used differently from what the parties

intended? There is no new evidence, as to these bills; and they

were included in the report of the master. But what is the new
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evidence now suggested as to the item of $2267.82? It is

simply this. Mr. William Holroyd was agent of some sort for

Eogers (we do not know how far), and in his books (for he is

dead) there are now found two credits to Joseph Eogers, one,

under date of October 5, 1799, of $600, "received from Thomas

Arnold in part of Jonathan Arnold's note;"' the other under

date of November 9, of the same year, of "amount of Thomas

Arnold's note, $1100, deduct discount, $6.05, viz. $1093.95,"

making together the amount of $1693.95. No other credits

appear on Holroyd's books. Eogers is also dead, and in his

books no other credits can be found in his accounts with. Hol-

royd; and what is curious enough, the credit of $600 is stated

to be "cash in part of T. Arnold's note," and not of Jonathan's.

And in Eogers's cash account even the whole of these sums is

not credited. What then is the plain amount of this evidence?

not, that Thomas Arnold never paid the sum of $2267.82 on

Jonathan's note; but that the payments cannot be distinctly

traced, at this distance of time, in either Holroyd's or Eogers's

books. And suppose they cannot. Is a settled account to be

opened, because third pei'sons, to whom payments have been made,

omit to keep correct books, or enter full credits? Is their omission

to prejudice the rights of others; and to overturn the deliberate
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alone, would overturn the d r e, and would be conclu ive on the
point?
ught th y not to b dir t, plain, unequivocal?
The n xt it m i a uppo d rror in th account ettled in
March, 1 01, where Jonathan rnold i charged with he payment of $ G . , prin ipal and intCTe t on hi norte to J oseph
Roger . It i now aid, that by newly di co ered vidence the
petitioner ca1n how, that only $1693.95 wa in fact paid on that
account; and for the payment of thi , Thoma Arnol had, in
00 ter1798, bill , the property of Jonathan, to the alue of
ling, which h had u d and njoyed the int re t of. Many of the
remark alr ady made apply with incr a ed force to thi item.
In the :fi t place, there i a ettled acknowledgm nt between the
partie , that th um i right, and the note wa paid. In the n ext
place, a to th bill of exchange. They are duly credited and
admitted in the ame account, a correctly applied. How then
can we ay, that they were u ed differently from what the partie
intended? There i no new evidence, a to the e bill ; and they
were included in the report of the ma ter. But what i the new
evidence now ugge ted as to the item of $226 .82 ? It i
simply thi . Mr. William Holroyd wa agent of some sort for
Rogers (we do not know how far), and in his books (for he i
dead) there are now found two credits to Joseph Rogers, one,
under date of October 5, 1799, of $600, "received from Thoma
Arnold in part of Jonathan Arnold's note ;:' the other under
date of November 9, of the ame year, of "amount of Thoma
Arnold note, $1100, deduct di count, $6.05, viz. $1093.95,"
making together the amount of $1693.95. No other credit
appear on Holroyd book . Roger i al o 'dead, and in hi
books no oth r er dit can be found in hi account with H olro d; and what i curiou nough the credit of $600 i tat d
to be "ca h in part of T. Arnold n-0te," and not of Jonathan ~ .
And in Roge ' ca h account e en the whole of th
um 1~
not credited. What th n i th plain amount of thi e-1idenc ?
not that Thoma
rnold never paid th um of $ ... 26 . ~ n
Jonathan' note; but that th pa ment cannot be di ~ tinc tl
traced at thi di tance of time in ither Holroyd or R a
book .
nd uppo e th
cannot. I a ettled accoun to
op n d b cau third p on to whom paTID nt ha"le b n mad
omi to k p orrect bo k.. or nt r full er dit ? r~ their omis ~i n
to r judi e th riaht of oth r · and to OY rturn th d lib rate
1

place, as to the bills of exchange. They are duly credited and
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settlements of parties? Are we to indulge in presumptions, that

the parties did not know their own concerns, and that there has

been fraud or mistake, because we cannot now trace back the origin

of payments acknowledged by them? What proof have we, that

the sums stated in these books were payments on account of the

very note charged in the settlement? The payment of $1093.95

purports to be on Thomas's note; how can we say, that it was on

Jonathan's? The Court is, then, called upon to re-examine this

account upon mere surmises and conjectures; and the petitioner

now demands, that the original note of Jonathan should be proved

to verify the payment, exactly as if this were an original bill for

an account, and a discovery. The original bill sought to set aside

the settled accounts ; leave was given to surcharge and falsify ; and

after a decree confirming the account, a discovery is sought upon

new evidence of tlie loosest texture, and most inconclusive nature.

The evidence, such as it is, was open to the plaintiff at the origi-

nal hearing, if he had chosen to look for it, and by reasonable

diligence it might then have been obtained, as well as now. If it
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had been obtained, I think it would have come to nothing. But

as a foundation of a bill of review it is wholly inadmissible. I

observe too, that the master states, that this very item was in con-

troversy before him; and that Holroyd's books were examined

for the purpose of explaining one or more payments to Rogers

by Thomas Arnold on Jonathan's account.

The next item is, that there was an insurance at Malaga, of

$8000, on the brig Friendship's cargo, from that port to the

Mediterranean and home; that she was captured in 1797 on the

voyage home; and that one half of this cargo belonged to Jona-

than, and therefore half of the insurance ought to be credited to

him. Now, this very item was not only in controversy before

the master (as he states), but it was made the subject of a

special interrogatory in the original bill, and a discovery prayed."

Thomas Arnold, in his answer, expressly stated, that he had no

knowledge of any insurance at Malaga; but had been informed,

that there had been a policy there procured by Captain Proud

(the master), on the cargo from Malaga to Genoa only; and as

that risk terminated without loss, and the vessel was captured

afterwards on her voyage home, he never received anything on

that insurance. Here, then, the petitioner was bound to use

reasonable diligence, if he did not choose to rely upon the state-
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settlements of parties? Are we to indulge in presumptions, that
the parties did not know their own concerns, an·d that there has
been fraud or mistake, becau e we cannot now traice back the origin
of payment acknowledged by them? V\ hat proof have we, that
the sum stated in these books were payments on account of the
very note charged in the settlement? The payment of $1093.95
purport to be on Thomas's note; how can we say, that it was on
Jonathan's? The Court is, then, called upon to re-examine this
account upon mere surmises and conjectures; and the petitioner
now demands, that the original note of Jonathan should be proved
to verify the payment, exactly as if this were an original bill for
an account, and a disicovery. The original bill sought to set aside
the settle'd accounts; leave was given to surcharge and falsify; and
after a decree confirming the account, a discovery is sought upon
new evidence of the loosest texture, and most inconclusive nature.
The evidence, such as it is, was open to the plaintiff at the original hearing, if he had chosen to look for it, and by reasonable
diligence it might then ha;ve been obtained, as well as now. If it
had been obtained, I think it would have come to nothing. But
as a foundation ·of a bill of review it is wholly inadmissible. I
observe too, that the master states, that this very item was in controversy before him; and that Holroyd's books were examined
for the purpose of explaining one or more payments to Rogers
by Thomas Arnold ·On Jonathan's account.
The next item is, that there was an insurance at Malaga, of
$8000, on the brig Friendship's cargo, from that port to the
Mediterranean and home; that she was captured in 1797 on the
voyage home; and that one half of this cargo belonged to Jonathan, and therefore half of the insurance ought to be credited to
him. Now, this very item was not only in controversy before
the ma ter (as he states), but it was made the subject of a
special interrogatory in the original bill, and a discovery prayed.
Thomas Arnold, in his answer, expressly stated, that he had no
knowledge of any insurance at Malaga; but had been informed,
that there had been a policy there procured by Captain Proud
(the ma ter), on the caro-o from Malaga to Genoa only; and as
that ri k terminat d without lo s, and the ve 1 wa captured
afterwards on her voyage home, he never received anything on
that insurance.
Here, then, the p titioner was bound to u-·e
rea onal le diligence, i£ he did not choo e to r ly upon the state-
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mcnt in the defendant's answer, and subsequent examination be-

fore the master. But he never sent to Malaga; and never made

any search for Captain Proud or his papers. Captain Proud is

now dead. There is not now tlie slightest proof, that any money

ever was received from the insurance in Malaga. The petitioner

now calls upon the other party for a discovery, exactly as he did

in the original bill; not because any new fact has come to his

knowledge since the decree; but because he has now discovered

an old letter, unsigned and unfinished, in the handwriting of

Captain Proud (which does not appear ever to. have been sent to

the owners), in which a suggestion is found about insurance made,

or to be made by him, on cocoa (part of the cargo), up the Straits,

and advising the owners to procure insurance on the vessel from

Malaga home. The letter is exceedingly obscure in its terms, and

it is utterly impossible to ascertain what were the precise terms

or nature of the insurance; though I should conjecture from its

language, that it was limited to the cargo from Malaga to Genoa.

If so, it stands completely in harmony with the original answer,
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and supports it. But if it were otherwise; what ground is here

laid for a review? The paper, if newly discovered, is not evidence;

and it establishes no receipt of any money by Thomas Arnold on

the insurance, which is the material fact. A bill of review is not

a bill for a discovery ; but a bill founded upon a discovery already

made of evidence material and decisive to the issue.

The next charge is, that in the master's report an allowance

is made for a note of Jonathan Arnold to Minturn & Champlin,

indorsed by Thomas Arnold, and by him paid to Joseph Jenkins,

viz. $834,121^; whereas Minturn & Champlin had received 33

bags of pimento belonging to Jonathan, and had sold the same

for $253, and applied the proceeds towards the discharge of the

same note. It is sufficient to say, that there is no proof to this

effect; nor any newly discovered evidence offered to support the

statement. Xo reason is pretended, why Minturn & Champlin's

accounts were not investigated at the original hearing.

The next charge is, as to the Tennessee Land Company shares,

owned by Jonathan Arnold, the proceeds of which had been re-

ceived by Tliomas Arnold. The whole number owned by Jonathan

was fifteen ; Thomas accounted before the master for nine shares,

as all received by him. The petitioner had the most ample means,

by a search in the proper public office at Washington, to have

v.
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ment in the de.fendant' an wor, and ub equent examination before the ma t r. But he nev r ent to Malaga; and never made
any ear h for Captain Proucl or hi pap r . Captain Proud is
now dead. There i not now the lighte t proof, that any money
ever wa receiv d from the in urance in Malaga. The p titioner
now call upon the other pa·r ty for a discovery, exactly as he did
in the original bill; not becau e any new fact ha come to his
knowledge since the decree; but becau e he ha now di covered
an old letter, un igned and unfini hed, in the handwriting of
Captain Proud (which doe not appear ever to have been ent to
the owner ) , in which a: ugg stion is found about insurance made,
or to be made by him, on cocoa (part of the cargo), up the traits,
and advising the o·wners to procure insurance on the vessel from
Malaga home. Th letter is ·exceedingly ob cure in it term , and
it is utterly impo ible to ascertain what were the preci e terms
or nature of the insura'Il·c e; though I should conjecture from its
language, that it was limited to the cargo from Malaga to Genoa.
If so, it stands completely in harmony with the original answer,
an 1 supports it. But if it were otherwise; what ground i here
laid for a review? The paper, if newly di covered, is not evidence;
and it establishes no receipt of any money by Thomas Arnold on
the insurance, which is the material fact. A bill of review i not
a bill for a discovery; but a bill founded upon a di covery already
made oif evidence material and decisive to the i ue.
The next charge is, that in the master's report an allowance
is made for a note ·Of J ona:than Arnold to Minturn & Champlin,
indor ed by Thomas Arnold, and by him paid to Joseph Jenkins,
viz. $824.12i; whereas Minturn & Champlin had received 32
bags of pimento belonging to Jonathan, and had sold the same
for $253, and appli d the proceeds towards the di charge of the
ame note. It i ufficient to a , tha·t there is no proof to thi
effect; nor any newly di co ered evidence offered to upport the
statement. No rea on i pr tended, why 1inturn & ·hamplin'"'
account were not in e tigat d at the original hearing.
The next charge i a to the Tennes ee Land ompany har ,
own d by J ona·t han Arnold, the proceed of which had been rec iv d b Thoma Arnold. The whole numoor owned by Jonathan
wa :fifteen· Thoma account d before th ma t r for nin hare"'
a all r c i d b him. Th petitioner had the mo t ampl means.,
b a carch in the prop r public office at Wahington to ha\e
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ascertained the whole amount received by Thomas on the shares,

if he had used any diligence. The case, therefore, falls precisely

within the doctrine of Lord Eldon in Bingham v. Daivson (3 Jac.

& Walk. 243). But the receipt, now produced from the public

records at Washington, signed by Samuel Dexter, satisfactorily

establishes, that Jonathan had long before sold the six shares, now

in controversy, to Dexter. And that was the very explanation

asserted before the master by Thomas Arnold. There is not a

shadow of proof, that he ever received on these shares any money,

which he has not accounted for.

I pass over the next charge, which respects the £100 note, in-

cluded in the mortgage on the Paget farm. It was disposed of

upon an exception of the plaintiff in the former decree, which is

reported in 3 Mason R. 284, 286. jSTo new evidence on this point

is pretended.

The next item is for an allowance made out of Jonathan's

estate in the master's report of the sum of $4800 and upwards,

due from Jonathan's estate to the estate of Welcome Arnold, and
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secured by a mortgage given by Jonathan to Tliomas Arnold, as

administrator of Welcome, and which was allowed him upon his

agreeing to cancel the mortgage, which he has not done, but

refused ever afterwards to do. The mortgage appears to have

been given to Samuel G. Arnold, as attorney of Thomas Arnold

and Patience Arnold, administrators of Welcome Arnold. I agree,

that it was the duty of Thomas Arnold to procure a cancellation

of that mortgage after the credit was allowed, whether he made

an express promise to do so, or not. If he had a right of retainer,

as administrator on both estates, he had a right to the credit

allowed in settling the account. It was not matter of exception,

at that time, that it was done; and it furnishes no ground of

review now. The proper remedy is by an original bill to compel

satisfaction to be entered on the mortgage, and a re-delivery or

cancellation of it. To such a bill the administratrix of Thomas

Arnold might be properly made a party, at least for the purpose

of compelling an application, or re-payment of the sum credited,

if the mortgage deed is not cancelled, and the credit has not been

already made to Welcome's estate. If such a suit should be un-

productive, I do not mean to say, that there might not be circum-

stances, upon which this Court might give leave for a bill of

review, in order, that the credit might be struck out, if Jonathan's
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a certained the whole amount received by Thomas on the shares,
if he had u ed any diligence. The ca e, therefore, falls precisely
within the doctrine of Lord Eldon in Bingham v. Dawson (3 Jae.
& Walk. 243). But the receipt, now produced from the public
records at Washington, igned by Samuel Dexter, satisfactorily
e tabli hes, that Jonathan had long before old the six hares, now
in controversy, to Dexter. And that wa the very explanation
a erted before the ma ter by Thomas Arnold. There is not a
shadow of proof, that he ever received on the e shares any money,
which he has not accounted for.
I pass over the next charge, which re pects the £100 note, included in the mortgage on the Paget farm. It was disposed of
upon an exception of the plaintiff in the former decree, which is
reported in 3 Mason R. 284, 286. No new evidence on this point
is pretended.
The next item is for a.n allowance made out of Jonathan's
e6tate in the ma ter's report of the um of $4800 and upward8,
due from Jonathan's estate to the e tate of Welcome Arnold, and
secured by a mortgage given by Jonathan to Thomas Arnold, as
administrator of Welcome, and which was allowed him upon his
agreeing to cancel the mortgage, which he has not done, but
refused ever afterwards to do. The mortgage appears to have
been given to Samuel G. Arnold, as attorney of Thomas Arnold
and Patience Arnold, administrators of Welcome Arn-0ld. I agree,
that it was the duty of Thomas Arnold to procure a cancellation
of that mortgage after the credit was allowed, whether he made
an express promi e to do so, or not. If he had a right of retainer,
a admini trator on both estates, he had a right to the credit
allowed in ettling the aiccount. It wa not matter of exception,
at that time, that it wa done; ~n<l it furni hes no ground of
review now. The proper remedy i by an original bill to compel
sati faction to be entered on the mortgage, and a re-delivery or
cancellation of it. To uch a bill the admini tratrix of Thoma
Arnold might be pmperly made a party, at lea t for the purpo~e
of compelling an application, or re-paym nt of the um credited,
if the mortgage deed i not cancelled, and the credit ha not been
already made to Welcome
tate. If uch a uit hould be unproductive, I do not m an to ay, that there miaht not be cir umstance , upon which thi
ourt might give leave for a bill of
review, in order, that the credit might be truck out, if Jonathan's
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estate was to sustain a real injury, as if possession under the mort-

gage was insisted upon, and held at law under the mortgage. At

present I do no more than say, that the matter now presented

furnishes no such ground.

I have thus gone over all the principal grounds for the bill of

review, supposing them to be before the Court with all due distinct-

ness and particularity, and in a shape regular and tangible. If I.

had more leisure I might comment, somewhat more at large, upon

the principles applicable to this subject. But it being my deliberate

judgment, that the case is not a fit one for a review, I content

myself with ordering, that the petition be dismissed with costs.

The District Judge concurs in this opinion, and therefore let

the petition be accordingly dismissed.

Hin v. Phelps, 101 Fed. Rep. 650. (1900.)

Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the

Eastern District of xA.rkansas.

This is an appeal from an order which dismissed a bill of review

gage was insisted upon, and held at law under the mortgage. At
pre ent I do no more than ay, that the matter now pre ented
furni he no uch ground.
hav thu gon over all the principal ground for the bill of
review, u ppo ing them to b before the ourt with all due di tinctne and particularity, and in a hape regular and tangibl . If
had more lei ure I might comment, omewhat more at large, upon
the principles applicable to thi ubject. But it being my deliberate
judgment, that the ca e is not a fit one for a review, I content
my elf with ordering, that the petition be di mi ed with co ts.
The Di trict Judge concurs in this opinion, and therefore let
the petition be accordingly dismissed.

upon demurrer. The bill was filed on April 20, 1898, and sought
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a modification of a decree of the court below rendered on December

22, 1897. The material facts it set forth were these : On July 3,

1894, J. M. Phelps and A. C. Phelps made their promissory note

Hill v. Phelps, 101 Fed. Rep. 650.

for $5,927.70 on account of a debt which they owed to the ap-

pellants. Afterwards A. C. Phelps made his individual note for

this indebtedness, and induced the appellants, by false representa-

tions, to accept that note in lieu of the joint note. On June 3,

1896, the appellants obtained a judgment against A. C. Phelps

upon this note for $6,881.25, and caused an execution to be issued

thereon, which was returned nulla bona. Meanwhile A. C. Phelps,

for the purpose of defrauding the appellants out of their debt,

made to the appellee Adolph Sloan, as trustee, a deed of trust of

his lands to secure an alleged indebtedness of $10,279.38 to the

appellee the Lawrence County Bank, and alleged debts of $1,000

to each of the appellees F. G. Williams, Mary A. Lester, and J. M.

Cook ; and the bank, for the purpose of defrauding the appellants,

of preventing them from collecting their debt, and of covering up

the land, extended the time of payment of its claim of $10,279.38

for five years. Tliereupon the appellants brought suit in the court

(1900.)
;

from the Circuit Court of the United State for the
Ea tern Di trict of Arkan as.
Thi i an appeal from an order which dismissed a bill of review
upon demurrer. The bill was filed on April 20, 1898, and sought
a modification of a decree of the court below rendered on December
22, 1897. The material facts it set forth were these: On July 3,
1894, J. M. Phelp and A. C. Phelp made their promis ory note
for $5,997.70 on account of a debt which they owed to the appella·nts. Afterwards A. C. Phelps made his individual note for
thi indebtedne , and induced the appellant , by fal e r epre entation , to accept that note in lieu of the joint note. On June 3,
1896, the appellants obtained a judgment again t A. C. Phelp
upon thi note for $6,881.25, and cau ed an execution to be i ued
thereon, which wa returned nulla bona. Meanwhile A. C. Phelps,
for the purpo e of d frauding the appellant out of their debt,
made to th appellee Adolph loan, a tru tee, a deed of tru t of
to he
hi land to ecur an all g d indebtedne of $10 1 9.
app llee the Lawrence County Bank and alleged debt of 1 000
to ach of the appellee F. G. William Iary . Le ter and J. :JI.
oak; and th bank for the purpo e of defrauding the appellants,
of preventing th m from collectin their debt and of co"erino- up
the land xtended th time of paym nt of it laim of 1 21 .3
for five ear . Thereupon the appellant brought uit in th ourt
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below to reinstate the joint note of A. C. Phelps and J. M.

Phelps in place of the separate note of A. C. Phelps, and to set

aside the trust deed; and on December 22, 1897, a decree was

rendered in that suit to the effect that the joint note should be

substituted for the separate note, and that J. M. Phelps should

pay it. The evidence in that suit indicated that the deed of trust

to secure the Lawrence County Bank was made to hinder and

delay the collection of the appellants' debt, but the court declared

that as J. M. Phelps was amply solvent, and the decree against him

would be sufficient to enable the appellants to recover the debt, it

would not carry the adjudication further than was necessary to

attain the ends of justice, and for this reason it denied any further

relief. The appellants prayed an appeal from this decree, but the

appellees paid off the decree, so that they could not prosecute their

appeal to a hearing. At the time of the execution of the trust

deed, A. C. Phelps owed another debt to the appellants, upon

which they recovered judgment on December 26, 1896, for $58,-

641.41. On June 18, 1897, $40,708.60 was paid on this judgment,
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and the balance has not been paid. The appellants allege that they

could not include this latter judgment in their suit without making

their bill multifarious, and that the decree refusing to set aside

the deed of trust in that suit is a conclusive adjudication against

them, and bars a new suit for that purpose upon their second

judgment; and for this reason they pray that the decree of De-

cember 22, 1897, be so modified as to adjudge the trust deed to

Adolph Sloan to have been fraudulent in so far as it undertook

to secure the payment of the debt to the Lawrence County Bank;

that the land described in that deed be sold, and the proceeds

thereof, so far as the interest of the bank is concerned, be applied

to the pa3Tiient of the second debt to the appellants, or, if this relief

cannot be granted, that the decree be so modified as to dismiss

the suit in which it was rendered, without prejudice to the rights

of the appellants to proceed against the bank and Sloan.

Sanborn, Circuit Judge, after stating the case as above, de-

livered the opinion of the court.

The purpose of a bill of review is to obtain a reversal or modi-

fication of a final decree. There are but three grounds upon which

such a bill can be sustained. They are (1) error of law apparent

on the face of the decree and the pleadings and proceedings upon

which it is based, exclusive of the evidence; (2) new matter which

BILL OF REVIEW

below to reinstate the joint note of A. C. Phelps and J. M.
Phelps in place of the separate note of A. C. Phelps, and to set
aside the trust deed; and on December 22, 1897, a decree was
rendered in that suit to the effect that the joint note should be
substituted for the separate note, and that J. M. Phelps should
pay it. The evidence in that suit indicated that the deed of trust
to secure the Lawrence County Bank was made to hinder and
delay the collection of the appellants' debt, but the court declareJ
that as J. M. Phelps was amply solvent, and the decree against him
would be sufficient to enable the appellants to recover the debt, it
would not carry the adjudication further than was necessary to
attain the ends of justice, and for this reason it denied any further
relief. The appellants prayed an appeal from this decree, but the
appellees paid off the decree, so that they could not prosecute their
a:ppeal to a hearing. At the time of the execution of the trust
deed, A. C. Phelps owed another debt to the appellants, upon
which they recovered judgment on December 26, 1896, for $58,641.41. On June 18, 1897, $40, 708.60 was paid on this judgment,
and the balance has not been paid. The appellants allege that they
could not include this latter judgment in their suit without making
their bill multifarious, and that the decree refusing to set aside
the deed of trust in that suit is a ·conclusive adjudication against
them, and bars a new suit for that purpose upon their second
judgment; and for this reason they pray that the decree of December 22, 1897, be so modified as to adjudge the trust deed to
Adolph Sloan to have been fraudulent in so far as it undertook
to secure the payment of the debt to the Lawrence County Bank;
that the land described in that deed be sold, and the proceeds
thereof, so far as the interest of the bank is concerned, be applied
to the payment of the second debt to the appellants, or, if this relief
cannot be granted, that the decree be so modified as to dismiss
the suit in which it was rendered, without prejudice to the rights
of the appellants to proceed against the bank and Sloan.
SANBORN, Circuit Judge, after stating the case as above, delivered the opinion of the court.
The purpose of a bill of review is to obtaii n a reversal or modification of a final decree. There are but three grounds upon which
such a bill can be sustained. They are ( 1) error of law apparent
on the face of the decree and the pleadings and proceedings upon
which it is based, exclusive of the evidence; (2) new matter which
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has arisen since the decree; and (3) newly-discovered evidence,

which could not have been found and produced, by the use of

reasonable diligence, before the decree was rendered. No departure

has ever been made from the rules applicable to such a bill, which

were declared by Lord Chancellor Bacon, in the first of his ordi-

nances in chancery, in these words:

"No decree shall be reversed, altered, or explained, being once

under the great seal, but upon bill of review. And no bill of review

shall be admitted, except it contain either error in law, appearing

in the body of the decree, without further examination of matters

in fact, or some new matter, which hath arisen in time after the

decree, and not any new proof, which might have been used, when

the decree was made. Nevertheless, upon new proof, that is come

to life after the decree was made, which could not possibly have

been used at the time when the decree passed, a bill of review may

be grounded by the special license of the court, and not otherwise."

Beames, Orders Ch. 1; Story, Eq. PI. § 404; 2 Daniel, PL &

Prac. p. *1575; Kennedy v. Banh, 49 U. S. 586, 609, 12 L. Ed.
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1209.

The error in law which will maintain a bill of review must con-

sist of the violation of some statutory enactment, or of some recog-

nized or established principle or rule of law or equity, or of the

settled practice of the court. Error in matter of form or in the

propriety of a decree, which is not contrary to any statute, rule

of law, or to the settled practice of the court, is not suflScient to

maintain a suit to review a final decree. Freeman v. Clay, 2 U. S.

App. 254, 267, 2 C. C. A. 587, 593, 52 Fed. 1, 7; Hoffman v.

Pearson, 8 U. S. App. 19, 38, 1 C C. A. 535, 541, 50 Fed. 484, 490.

Eesort cannot be had to the evidence to discover this error of law.

It must be apparent from the pleadings, proceedings, and decree,

without a reference to the evidence, or it will not avail to sustain

a bill of review. Whiting v. Bank, 13 Pet. 5, 14, 10 L. Ed. 33 ;

Kennedy v. Banlc, 49 U. S. 586, 609, 12 L. Ed. 1209 ; Putnam v.

Day, 22 Wall. 60, G6, 22 L. Ed. 764; Buffington v. Harvey, 95

U. S. 99, 24 L. Ed. 381. The new matter which will authorize a

review of a final decree must have arisen after its rendition. The

newly-discovered evidence which may form the basis of such a

review must be, not only evidence which was not known, but also

such as could not, with reasonable diligence, have been found be-

fore the decree was made. City of Omaha v. Fedicl-. 27 U. S.

v.
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has ari en since the decre ; and (3) newly-di covered evidence,
which could not have b en found and produc d, by th u e of
rea onable dilig nc , before ihe decree wa r ndered. No d parture
has ever been mad from the rule applicabl to uch a bill, which
were declared by Lord Chane llor Bacon, in the fir t of his ordinances in hancery, in these words :
"No decree hall be reversed, alter d, or explained, being once
under the great eal, but upon bill of review. And no bill of review
..,hall be admitted, except it contain either error in law, a1ppearing
in the body of the decree, without further examination of matters
in fact, or some new matter, which hath arisen in time after the
decree, and not any new proof, which might have been used, when
the decree was made. Nevertheless, upon new proof, that i come
to life after the decree was made, which could not po ibly have
been used at the time when the decree passed, a bill of review may
be grounded by the special license of the court, and not otherwise:''
Beames, Orders Ch. 1; Story, Eq. Pl. § 40-±; 2 Daniel, Pl. &
Prac. p. *1575; Kennedy v. Bank, 49 U. S. 586, 609, 12 L. Ed.
1209.
The error in law which will maintain a bill of review must consist of the violation of some statutory enactment, or of some recognized or established principle or rule of law or equity, or of the
'Settled practice of the court. Error in matter of form or in the
propriety of a decree, which is not contrary to any statute, rule
of law, or to the settled practice of the court, is not sufficient to
maintain a suit to review a final decree. Freeman v. Clay, 2 U. S.
App. 254, 267, 2 C. C. A. 587, 593, 52 F ed. 1, 7; Hoff man v.
Pearson, 8 U. S. App. 19, 38, 1 C C. A. 535, 541, 50 F ed. 48-±, -±90.
Resort cannot be had to the evidence to. discover this error of law.
It must be apparent from the pleadings, proceedings, and decree,
without a reference to the evidence, or it will not avail to u tain
a bill of review. Whiting v. Bank, 13 Pet. 5 14, 10 L. Ed. 33;
Kennedy v. Bank, 49 U. S. 586, 609, 12 L. Ed. 1 09; Putnam v.
Day, 22 Wall. 60, 66, 22 L. Ed. 76-±; Buffington v. Harvey_, 95
U. S. 99, 2-± L. Ed. 381. The new matter which will authorize a
r view of a final decree mu t have arisen after it rendition. Tbe
newly-di covered evidence which may form th ba i of uch a
review mu t be not op.ly evid nee which wa not known but al~o
. uch a ould not with r a onable dilig nee ha been found b<:fore the decree wa made.
ity of Omaha . R edick.
. S.
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App. 204, 211, 11 C. C. A. 1, 6, 63 Fed. 1, 6; Bias v. Merle, 4

BILL OF REVIEW

App. 204, 211, 11 C. C. A. 1, 6, 63 Fed: 1, 6; Dias v. Merle, 4
Paige, 259, 261; H en ry v. Insurance Co. ( C. C.) 45 Fed. 299,
303; Story, Eq. Pl. §§ 338a, 423; 1 Barb. Ch. Prac. 363, 36-±;
1 Hoff. Ch. Prac. 398; Fost. Fed. Prac. § 188, note 19.
The sole purpose of the original suit in equity in this case was to
enforce the collection of the claim of the appellants for the $6,881.25
evidenced by their judgment of June 3, 1896. In order to accomplish this purpose, they asked that the court would reinstate the
joint indebtedness of J. M. Phelps and A. C. Phelps in the place of
the separate debt of A. C. Phelps, upon which that judgment was
rendered, and that it would et aside the trust deed of the lands of
Phelp to Sloan, which wa made to secure the indebtedness of the
Lawrence County Bank. The court granted all the relief necessary
to effect the object of the suit. It substituted the joint debt for the
separate debt, and adjudged that J. M. Phelps should pay it. He
did so, and the entire purpose of that litigation ha.a been served.
The court refused to avoid the trust deed, because J. M. Phelps
was solvent, and because the relief which it granted was ample,
without more, to enforce the collection of the only claim which
appeared in that suit. The bill of review seeks a; modification of
this decree on the sole ground that the failure of the court to grant
this unnecessary relief may estop the appellants from avoiding this
trust deed, and thereby enforcing the collection of their second
claim, evidenced by their judgment of December 26, 1896, which
was in existence during the entire pendency of their suit in equity
upon their first cla,im, but which was neither pleaded, proved, nor
presented to the court in any way in that suit. There may be some
doubt whether or not the decree, as it stands, has the effect to estop
the appellants from avoiding the trust deed, for fraud, in a suit
brought upon their second .claim. While such a suit will be between
the same parties and those in privity with the same parties named
in the first suit, it will be upon a different cause of action, and the
decree in the fir t suit will operate as an estoppel only upon the
point and questions which were actually litigated and determined
in it. Whether or not the fraudulent charaieter of the trust deed,
a against the second claim of the appellants, was actually raised,
litigated, and determined in their suit in equity upon their first
cla·im, may be the subject of pleading and proof. Board v. Sutliff,
38 C. C. A. 167, 97 Fed. 270, 274 ; Cromwelll v. Sac Co., 94 U. S.
351, 352, 24 L. Ed. 195; Nesbit v. District, 144 U. S. 610, 618,
1

Paige, 259, 261; Hetiry v. Insurance Co. (C. C.) 45 Fed. 299,

303; Story, Eq. PL §§ 338a, 423; 1 Barb. Ch. Prac. 363, 364;

1 Hoff. Ch. Prac. 398; Post. Fed. Prac. § 188, note 19.

The sole purpose of the original suit in equity in this case was to

enforce the collection of the claim of the appellants for the $6,881.25

evidenced by their judgment of June 3, 1896. In order to accom-

plish this purpose, they asked that the court would reinstate the

joint indebtedness of J. M. Phelps and A. C. Phelps in the place of

the separate debt of A. C. Phelps, upon which that judgment was

rendered, and that it would set aside the trust deed of the lands of

Phelps to Sloan, which was made to secure the indebtedness of the

Lawrence County Bank. The court granted all the relief necessary

to effect the object of the suit. It substituted the joint debt for the

separate debt, and adjudged that J. M. Phelps should pay it. He

did so, and the entire purpose of that litigation had been served.

The court refused to avoid the trust deed, because J. M. Phelps

was solvent, and because the relief which it granted was ample,
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without more, to enforce the collection of the only claim which

appeared in that suit. The bill of review seeks a modification of

this decree on the sole ground that the failure of the court to grant

this unnecessary relief may estop the appellants from avoiding this

trust deed, and thereby enforcing the collection of their second

claim, evidenced by their judgment of December 26, 1896, which

was in existence during the entire pendency of their suit in equity

upon their first claim, but which was neither pleaded, proved, nor

presented to the court in any way in that suit. There may be some

doubt whether or not the decree, as it stands, has the effect to estop

the appellants from avoiding the trust deed, for fraud, in a suit

brought upon their second claim. While such a suit will be between

the same parties and those in privity with the same parties named

in the first suit, it will be upon a different cause of action, and the

decree in the first suit will operate as an estoppel only upon the

points and questions which were actually litigated and determined

in it. Whether or not the fraudulent character of the trust deed,

as against the second claim of the appellants, was actually raised,

litigated, and determined in their suit in equity upon their first

claim, may be the subject of pleading and proof. Board v. 8utliff,

38 C. C. A. 167, 97 Fed. 270, 274; Cromwen v. 8ac Co., 94 U. S.

351, 352, 24 L. Ed. 195; Nesbit v. District, 144 U. S. 610, 618,
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12 Sup. Ct. 746, 36 L. Ed. 562; Board v. Piatt, 49 U. S. App.

216, 223, 25 C. C. A. 87, 91, 79 Fed. 567, 571.

Conceding, however, but not deciding, that the decree in the suit

upon the first claim renders the question whether or not the trust

deed should be avoided for fraud res adjudicata in a subsequent

suit for that purpose on the second claim, no ground for review

or modification of the decree is presented by the allegations of the

bill before us. There was no error in law in that decree. It fol-

lowed the pleadings, and determined all the issues which they

presented. Whether or not it was warranted by the evidence, and

whether or not the evidence authorized other or further relief, are

questions that are not open for consideration here, because the error

that will sustain a bill of review must be apparent upon the plead-

ings, the proceedings, and the decree, without reference to the evi-

dence. There was no error in the failure of the court to grant

more relief than the substitution of the joint debt for the separate

debt, because it granted ample relief to accomplish the purpose

of the suit, and because, in the absence of the evidence, which we
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cannot consider, it does not appear that the proofs would have

sustained any other relief. One cannot successfully assail the decree

of a court of chancery, which has procured him all the resulting

benefit he sought, because the court did not make further adjudica-

tions and grant other relief, which were not necessarj^ to the ac-

complishment of the purpose which he disclosed to the court. It

is not error for a court of chancery, which grants sufficient relief

to enable a complainant to reap all the fruits which he seeks by his

litigation, to refuse to exercise all its powers and make other and

unnecessary adjudications. The court granted relief which en-

forced the collection of the only claim which the complainants

presented to it. They have received payment of that claim. They

suffered nothing in that suit from the failure of the court to avoid

the trust deed, because they could have obtained nothing more if

it had done so. Courts of equity do not attempt to right wrongs

at the suit of those who have suffered nothing from them, or to

grant decrees that can give their suitors no relief. Darragh v.

Manufacturing Co., 49 U. S. App. 1, 16, 23 C. C. A. 609, 618, 78

Fed. 7, 16. No error appears in the pleadings, proceedings, or

decree on account of the fact that the latter may have the effect to

estop the appellants from collecting their second claim, by avoiding-

tlie trust deed for fraud, because that claim was not pleaded, proved"

v.
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12 Sup. Ct. 746, 36 L. Ed. 562; Boa1·d v. Platt, 49 U. S. App.
216, 223, 25 C. C. A. 87, 91, 79 Fed. 567, 571.
Conceding, however, but not deciding, that the decree in the suit.
upon the first claim render the question wheth r or not the tru t
deed hould be avoided for fraud res adjudicata in a sub equent
uit for that purpo e on the econd claim, no ground for review
or modification of the decree i presented by the allegations of the
bill before u . There was no error in law in that decree. It followed the pleadings, and determined all the is ue which they
presented. 'Vhether or not it wa warranted by the evidence, and
whether or not the evidence authorized other or further relief, are
question thait ar not open for con ideration here, becau e the error
that will u tain a bill of review must be apparent upon the pleading , the proceedings, and the decree, without reference to the evidence. There was no error in the failure of the court to grant
more relief than the sub titution of the joint debt for the eparate
debt, because it granted ample relief to accompli h the purpo e
of the suit, and because, in the absence of the evidence, which we
cannot consider, it does not appear that the proofs would have
sustained any other relief. One cannot successfully assa·i l the decree
of a court of chancery, which has procured him all the resulting
benefit he sought, becau e the court did not make further adjudication and grant other relief, which were not neces ary to the accompli hment of the purpose which he disclosed to the court. It
is not error for a court of chancery, which grants sufficient relief
to enable a complainant to reap all the fruit which he seek by his
litigation, to refuse to exercise all its powers and make other and
unnecessary adjudications. The court granted relief which enforced the collection of the only claim which the complainants
presented to it. They have received payment of that claim. They
suffered nothing in that suit from the failure of the court to avoid
the tru t deed, becau e they could have obtained nothing more jf
ii. had done o. Court of equity do not attempt to right wrongs
at the suit of tho e who have u:ffered nothing from them, or to
grant d cree that can give their uitors no relief. Darragh v.
Manufacturing Co., 49 U. S. App. 1, 16 23 C. 0. A. 609, 618, 8
F d. 7, 16. No error appear in the pleadina proce diner~ or
d cree on account of the fact that the latt r ma3 have the e:ff ct to
. . top th appellan from oll ctino· their econd claim, by a-raiding
the tru t de d for fraud b cau that claim wa not pl ad d, proved,
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or presented in the suit upon which the decree is based, and its

existence was unknown to the court when it rendered its decree.

As the question of the effect of its decree upon this second claim

vras not presented to, considered or decided by, the court below

when it entered its decree, it could not have erred upon that ques-

tion. The bill of review discloses no error in law in the decree

which it assails. Nor does the bill disclose any new matter or any

newly-disoovered evidence which will warrant the relief it seeks.

The sole ground for that relief is that the decree of December 22,

1897, estops the appellants from enforcing the collection of their

judgment of December 26, 1896, by an avoidance of the trust deed

for fraud. But the debt upon which that judgment is founded

existed during the entire pendency of the suit in equity upon the

first claim of the appellants, and all the facts which condition the

effect of the decree in that suit upon their second claim were as

well known to the appellants at the time that decree was rendered

as they ever have been since. Mr. Justice Story, at section 423 of

his Equity Pleadings, says:
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"If, therefore, the party proceeds to a decree after the discovery

of the facts upon which the new claim is founded, he will not be

permitted afterwards to file a supplemental bill in the nature of

a bill of review, founded on those facts ; for it was his own laches

not to have brought them forward at an earlier stage of the cause."

The decree cannot be modified on account of new matter or

newly-discovered evidence, because the matter set forth in the bill

existed, and the evidence it pleads was known, before the decree was

rendered.

There is another reason why the decree in this case cannot be

reviewed. It is that the appellees have paid, and the appellants

have accepted, the entire debt which the decree was rendered to

enforce. One who accepts the benefits of a verdict, decree, or judg-

ment is thereby estopped from reviewing it, or from escaping from

its burdens. Albright v. Oyster, 19 U. S. App. 651, 9 C. C. A.

173, 60 Fed. 644; Chase v. Driver, 92 Fed. 780, 786, 34 C. C. A.

668, 674; Brigham City v. ToUec Ranch Co. (C. C. A.) 101 Fed.

85. The decree below is affirmed.

BILL OF REVIEW

or presented in the suit upon which the decree is based, and its
exi tence was unknown to the court when it rendered its decree.
A the question of the effect of its decree upon this second claim
wa not presented to, considered or decided by, the court below
when it entered its decree, it could not have erred upon that question. The bill of review discloses no error in law in the decree
which it assails. Nor does the bill disclose any new matter or any
newly-discovered evidence which will warrant the relief it seeh.
The sole ground for that relief is that the decree of December 22,
1897, e tops the appellants from enforcing the collection of their
judgment of December 26, 1896, by an avoidance of the trust deed
for fraud. But the debt upon which that judgment is founded
exi ..ted during the entire pendency of the suit in equity upon the
fir t claim of the a·ppellant , and all the facts which condition the
effect of the decree in that suit upon their second claim were as
well known to the appellants at the time that decree was rendered
as they ever have been since. Mr. Justice Story, at section 423 of
his Equity Pleadings, says:
"If, therefore, the party proceeds to a decree after the discovery
of the facts upon which the new claim is founded, he will not be
permitted afterwards to file a supplemental bill in the nature of
a bill of review founded on tho e facts; for it was bis own laches
not to have brought them forward at an earlier stage of the cause."
The decree cannot be modified on account of new matter or
newly-di covered evidence, becau e the matter et forth in the bill
exi ted, and the evidence it pleads was known, before the decree was
rendered.
There is anot:!:ier reason why the decree in thi case cannot be
reviewed. It i that the appellees have paid, and the appellants
have accepted, the entire debt which the decree was rendered to
enforce. One who accept the benefit of a verdict, decree, or judgment is thereby estopped from reviewing it, or from e caping from
it burdens. Albright v. Oyster~ 19 U. S. App. 651, 9 0. 0. A.
173, 60 Fed. 644; Chase v. Driver~ 92 Fed. 780, 786, 34 0. 0. A.
668, 674; Brigham City v. Toltec Ranch Co. ( C. C. A.) 101 Fed.
85. The decree below is affirmed.
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Ne Exeat.

NE EXE.AT.

Dunham v. Jackson, 1 Paige Cli. (N. Y.) 029. (1829.)

In this cause the bill of the complainant had been dismissed

with costs; and the complainant had suspended the proceedings

Dunham v. J ackson, 1 Paige

h. ( . Y.) 6 9.

(18 9.)

to collect the costs by an appeal to the Court of Error.

The Chancellor:

The object of the writ of ne exeat is to obtain equitable bail,

and may be applied for in any stage of the suit. The complainant

intends to leave the state before the appeal can be determined.

The defendant is not obliged to follow her to Florida to obtain

IN thi cau e the bill of the complainant had been di mi ed
with co t ; and the complainant had u p nded the proceedings
to collect the co t by an app al to the ourt of Error.

satisfaction of the costs decreed. In Stewart v. Stewart (1 Ball &

Beatty, 73), a ne exeat was granted against a complainant who

THE OH NCELLOR :

was about to leave the country before the decree for costs could be

made effectual against him.

The ne exeat must be granted in this case unless the complainant

gives security to abide the final decree.

Denton v. Denton, 1 Johns. Ch. 36Jt. (1815.)

The petition of the plaintiff stated, that, in January last, she
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filed her bill against the defendant, setting forth that she was mar-

ried to the defendant on the 25th of October, 1795, in this state,

and that they were then, and still are, citizens and residents of

this state. That on the 20th of April, 1814, the defendant broke

up housekeeping, though for years before, his annual expenses for

housekeeping were between 4 and 5,000 dollars. That the defend-

ant abandoned the plaintiff without home or support, and had since

treated her with great cruelty and persecution, and denied her all

support: that she had no means of living: that the defendant

The object of the writ of ne exeat is to obtain equitable bail,
and may be a·pplied for in any stage of the uit. The complainant
intend to leave the state before the appeal can be determined.
The defendant i not obliged to follow her to Florida to obtain
.,atisfaction of the co t decreed. In Stewart v. Stewart (1 Ball &
Beatty, 3), a ne exeat was granted against a complainant who
was about to leave the country before the decree for costs could be
made effectual again t him.
The ne exeat mu t be granted in thi ca e unless the complainant
gives security to abide the final decree.

was a man of large fortune, and threatened to leave the United

States. And she prayed a writ of ne exeat, and a writ of suppli-

cavit, to restrain the defendant from disturbing her retreat, and

for security, and for money to prosecute the suit, and also for a

Denton v. Denton, 1 Johns. Ch. 364.

(1815.)

weekly or monthly allowance. The bill for a divorce was filed

but no answer was yet put in.

The facts stated in the petition were supported by affidavits.

THE petition of the plaintiff tated, that, in January la t, he
:filed her bill against the defendant, etting forth that she was married to the defendant on the 25th of October, 1795, in this state,
and that they were then, and till are, citizens and re idents 1Jf
this state. That on the 20th of April, 1814, the defendaint broke
up hou ekeeping, though for years before, hi annual expen e for
hou ekeeping were between 4 and 5,000 dollars. That the defendant abandoned the plaintiff without home or support, and had ince
treated her with great cruelty aud per ecution, and denied her all
. , upport: that he had no mean of living: that the defendant
was a man of large fortune, and threatened to leave the United
States. And he prayed a writ of ne exeat, and a writ of supplicavit, to re train the defendant from di turbing her retreat, and
for security, and for money to pro ecute the uit and al o for a
weekly or monthly allowance. The bill for a divorce wa filed,
but no an wer wa yet put in.
The fact tated in the petition w re upported b affidavit ,
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from which it also appeared that the defendant was a man of

NE EXEAT

from which it al o appeared that the defendant was a man of
fortune, and worth above 200,000 dollars.

fortune, and worth above 200,000 dollars.

The Chancellor:

The bill filed in this ca^use states matter properly cognizable in

equity. It is as well for alimony as for other relief. The allow-

ance of a ne exeat, when the husband threatens to leave the state,

and his wife without any support, is essential to justice, and has

been granted in like cases. (2 Atk. 210. Amb. 76. Dickens, 154.)

From what was said in the case of Mix v. Mix, as well as from

the cases now cited, the rule appears to be, that the wife who is

under the necessity of carrying on a suit against her husband, or

of defending one against him, is entitled, as well to a reasonable

allowance to be paid by the husband for the necessary expenses

of the suit, as to an allowance for alimony pending the prosecu-

tion.

I shall, accordingly, allow the ne exeat, and direct security under

it to be taken, in the sum of 25,000 dollars, and shall, also, allow

at the rate of 100 dollars per month, for alimony, and the further
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sum of 250 dollars, to be paid by the defendant to the plaintiff, or

to the register, or assistant register, on her behalf, towards de-

fraying the necessary charges of the suit, on her part.

Porter v. Spencer, 2 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 1G9. (1816.)

The bill, which was for an account and a 7ie exeat, stated that

the plaintiffs were merchant tailors, and had sold clothing to the

defendant on a credit of six months; that on the 1st of January

last, there was a balance of account due to them from the defend-

ant, with interest, of 317 dollars and 85 cents. To recover this

sum, the plaintiffs had brought an action at law against the de-

fendant, and held him to bail; and the defendant had pleaded the

general issue, merely for delay. That the defendant's father was a

special bail, and had, as the plaintiffs were informed, and verily

TRE CHA CELLOR :

The bill filed in thi cause states matter properly cognizable in
equity. It i as well for alimony a for other relief. The allowance of a ne exeat, when the bu band thr aten to leave the state,
and his wife without any support, is essential to justice, and has
b en granted in like ca e . ( 2 Atk. 210. Amb. 76. Dickens, 154.)
From what was said in the case of Mix v. Mix, as well as from
the ca es now cited, the rule appears to be, that the wife who is
under the necessity of carrying on a suit against her husband, or
of defending one aga1inst him, is entitled, as well to a reasonable
allowance to be paid by the husband for the necessary expenses
of the uit, as to an allowance for alimony pending the prosecution.
I shall, accordingly, allow the ne exeat, and direct ecurity under
it to be taken, in the sum of 25,000 dollars, and shall, also, allow
at the rate of 100 dollars per month, for alimony, and the further
sum of 250 dollars, to be paid by the defendant to the plaintiff, or
to the register, or assistant register, on her behalf, towards defraying the necessary charges of the uit, on her pa:r t.

believed, sold all his property in this state, and was about to remove

permanently from the state. That the defendant was also about

to remove immediately with his father, without leaving any prop-

erty behind.

Porter v. Spencer, 2 Johns. Oh. (N. Y.) 169.

(1816.)

'^riio h\]\ was sworn to, and was accompanied also with an

affidavit, as to the truth of the material facts charged.

THE bill, which was for an account and a; ne exeat, stated that
th plaintiff were merchant tailors, and had sold clothing to the
d f ndant on a credit of ix month ; that on the 1st of January
la t, there wa a balance of account due to them from the defendant, with intere t, of 317 dollars and 85 cent . To recover this
um, the plaintiff had brought an action at law against the def ntlant, and h ld him to bail; and the d fendant had pleaded the
gen ral L_ue, merely for delay. That the defendant' father wa a
pe ·ial hail, and ha 1, a the plaintiffs were informed, aind verily
b li ved, "old all hi property in thi tate, and wa about to remove
p rmanently from the . tate. That the d .fenaant wa al o about
to remove immediat ly with hi father, without leaving any property behind.
Th bill wa worn to, and wa a•ccompani d al
with an
afficlaYit a. to th truth of the material .fa t harO'ed.

PORTER V.
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The Chancellor:

Tlie general language of the cases prior to the time of Lord

Elclon is, that the writ of ne exeat is not to be granted, if the

demand be not purely and exclusively equitable. {King v. Smith,

Dickens, 8"3. Brocher v, Hamilton, Dickens, 154. Peartie V. Lisle,

Amb. 75. Anon. 2 Atk. 210. Crosley v. Marriot, Dickens, 609.)

If the demand be actionable at law, and the party can be arrested

and held to bail, there is no necessity for the writ ; and if the case

be not bailable, the granting of the writ would be holding the

party to bail, when the plaintiff was not entitled to bail at law.

The ne exeat has accordingly been refused, when the demand was

in prosecution at law, and not hailahle, though the defendant was

about to remove with his effects. {Crosley y. Marriot, Dick, GOO.

Case of Gardner, 15 Vesey, 444.)

But where a defendant, after a verdict at law, and before judg-

ment, was threatening to go beyond sea, the ne exeat was allowed

in an early case {ex parte BrunJcer, 3 P. Wms. 312), by the master

of the rolls, though Lord Talbot afterwards discharged the writ,
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and on the ground, principally, that no bill was filed. He added,

also, "that the writ ought not to be made use of where the demand

is entirely at law, for there the plaintiff has hail, and he ought not

to have double hail, hoth at law and in equity"

The import of this case is, that the rule against the allowance

of the writ, where the matter was of legal cognizance, was not

then understood to be inflexible, but would be made to yield to

cases of necessity, when justice would be defeated without the aid

of the writ. In Athinson v. Leonard (3 Bro. 218), Lord Thurlow

laid down the rule, that if chancery had concurrent jurisdiction,

as in the case of a lost bond, it was sufficient to authorize the

PE

ER

305

Trrn Cn OELLOR :
Th g n ral language of the ca c prior to the time of Lorcl
ElJon i that th writ of ne exeat i not to be granted, if the
d mand be not I ur ly and
lu iv 1 qui table. (King v. 1 mith,
Di ken
. Bro h;er v. Jiamillon, i k n , 1 . Pearne v. Lisle,
Amb. 5. Anon.
k. 10. Oro ley . Marriot, icken , 609.)
I.f i.h demand b a tionabl at law, and the party can be arrc ted
and h ld to bail, th re i no nee i ty for the writ; and if the ca c
be not bailable, th aranting of th writ would be holding the
party to bail when th plaintiff wa not entitled to bail at law.
'Ih ne exeat ha a ordingly been r fu ed when the demand wa
in pro ecution at law, and not bailable, though th defendant wa
about to r mov with hi :ff c . (Crosley v. Marriot, Dick. 609.
Case of Gardner, 15 Ve ey, 444. )
But wh r a d fondant, after a verdict at law, and before judgment, wa thr at ning to go b yond sea, the ne exeat wa allowed
in an early ca e (ex parte Brunk er, 3 P. Wm . 312), by the ma ter
of the roll , though Lord Talbot afterward di charged the writ,
and on the ground, principally, that no bill wa :fi.l d. He added,
al o, 'that the writ ought not to be made u e of where the demand
i entirely at law, for there the plaint'iff has bail, and he ought not

writ, if the demand was an equitable one; and he granted it as

a measure to compel the party to give security to abide the decree ;

and Lord Loughborough only doubted, in Eussel v. Ashy (5 Vesey,

90). whether the ne exeat would lie when the defendant mic^ht be

held to bail at law.

Since the time of Lord Eldon, however, it has become settled

in the English chancery, that though the plaintiff may sue at law

for the balance of an account, and hold the party to bail, yet,

as chancery holds a concurrent jurisdiction upon the head of

account, the plaintiff may have the ne exeat, on a positive affidavit

of a threat or purpose of going abroad, even though the defend-

to have double bail, both at law and in equity."
The import of thi ca e i , that the rule again t the allowance
of the writ, where the matter wa of legal cognizance, wa not
then under tood to be inflexible, but would be made to :; ield to
ca e of n ce ity, when ju tice would be defeat d without the aid
of th writ. In Atkin on v. Leonard (3 Bro. 21 ) , Lord Thurlow
laid down th rule, that if hancery had concurrent juri diction,
uffici nt to authorize the
a in the ca e of a lo t bond, it w
writ if th d mand wa an quitable on · and he granted it aN
a mea ure to com I 1 the party to gi v
curi ty to abil the d cree ;
and Lord Loughborouah nly 1 ubt d in Ru el . . . by ~ Y ey
) . wh th r th ne e. ·eat would Ii wh n the def ndant might be
hell t bail at law.
th tim of Lord 1 ldon h w v r it ha become ttle
1 nali h
han er · that thouah th plaintiff may ~ ue at law
alan of an account and hold the I arty to ail 1 t.
a chan ry holl a on urr nt juri c1i tion up n th h a of
ay haY th 11 e.reat, n a p sifr1
account th 1 lainti
of a thr at or purpo of g ing abroad ' n thouah h

ro

306
306 Ne Exeat

ant's general residence was abroad. (Jones v. Alephsin, 16 Vesey,

■iTO. 11 Vesey, 54. and 1 Ves. & Beame, 132, 133. Howden V.

Rogers). In Amsinck v. BarUay (8 Vesey, 594), tlie defendant

was arrested at law, and surrendered into custody; he was then

held to bail on ne exeat for the same sum, and afterwards dis-

charged in the suit at law for want of proceeding. The ne exeat

was discharged on the ground that the defendant had first been

arrested at law and kept in custody, and then discharged; and in

Jones V. Sampson (8 Vesey, 593), the chancellor admitted his

authority to grant the writ where the jurisdictions were concurrent ;

but he observed (p. 598), that if the plaintiff was actually arrested

at law, he would not grant the writ.

In the present case, I have some doubts, whether the bill states

a matter of account on which the jurisdiction of the Court can

attach. To sustain a bill for an account, there must be mutual

demands, and not merely payments by way of set-off. A single

matter cannot be the subject of an account. There must be a

series of transactions on one side, and of payments on the other.
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{Dinwiddle v. Bailey, 6 Vesey, 136. and Wells v. Cooper, there

cited). I place my interference on the necessity of the case.

From the facts charged and sworn to, it appears to me that the

remedy in the suit pending at law would be absolutely defeated

without the interposition of this Court. The books assume and

admit principles that will justify the allowance of the writ under

the peculiar circumstances of the present case. Tlie remedy sought

is indispensable to prevent a failure of justice, and this creates a

marked difference between this and the ordinary cases. I should

think it would reflect discredit on the administration of justice,

if the plaintiff could find no relief from the impending mischief

arising from a failure of the remedy at law, by the immediate

removal of the defendant and his bail. I have no option or dis-

cretion to refuse the writ, when a case is brought within the

established rules of the Court.

This is not holding a party to bail when he is not entitled to it.

Nor is there double bail, for the first bail is going abroad with all

his effects, and that too in connection with the defendant; and

though I am not free from diffidence, as to the view I have taken

of this caee, T feel myself bound to declare, from the best judg-

ment I can form at present, that a we exeat ought to be granted.

Writ of ne exeat granted in the sum of 500 dollars.

NE EXEAT

ant' gen ral re ~ idence wa abroad. (Jones v. Alephsin, 16 Vesey,
-1 0. 11 Ve e ·, 5-±. wd 1 Ve . & Beame, 132, 133. How den v.
Roge1·s). In Amsinck v. Barklay (8 Ve ey, 59-1), the defendant
was ar:re ted at law, and surrendered into custody; he was then
held to bail on nei. exeat for the same um, and afterwards discharged in the suit ak law for want of proceeding. The ne exeat
wa di charged on the ground that the defendant had first been
arre ted at law and kept in custody, and then di charged; and in
Jones v. Sampson (8 Vesey, 593), the chancellor admitted his
authority to grant the writ where the juri dictions were concurrent;
but he observed (p. 598), that if the plaintiff was actually arrested
at law, he would not grant the writ.
In the pre ent case, I have some doubts, whether the bill states
a matter of account on which the jurisdiction of the Court can
aittach. To sustain a bill for an account, there mu t be mutual
demands, and not merely payments by way of set-off. A single
matter cannot be the subject of an account. There must be a
eries of transactions on one side, and of payments on the other.
(Dinwiddie v. Bailey, 6 Vesey, 136. and Wells v. Cooper, there
cited). I place my interference on the nece ity of the case.
From the fact charged and sworn to, it appears to me that the
remedy in the suit pending a.t law would be absolutely defeated
without the interposition of this Court. The book assume and
admit principles that will justify the allowance of the writ under
the peculiar circumstances of the present case. The remedy sought
is indi pen able to prevent a failure of justice, and this creates a
marked difference between this and the ordinary cases. I should
think it would reflect discredit on the admini tration of justice,
if the plaintiff could find no relief from the impending mischief
arising from a failure of the remedy at law, by the immediate
removal of the defendant and his bail. I have no option or dj cretion to refu e the writ, when a case is brought within the
e taibli hed rule of the Court.
Thi i not holding a party to bail when he i not entitled to it.
Nor i there double bail, for the first bail is going abroad with all
hi effects, and that too in conn ction with the defendant; and
though I am not free from diffidence, a to the view I have tak n
of thi case, I fe 1 myself bound to declare, from the be t judgment I can form at preoont, that a ne exeat ought to be granted.
Writ of ne exeat granted in the sum of 500 dollar .

KELLY

v.

3'07

ECKFORD

Kelly v. Eckford 307

Production of Papers.

Kelhj V. Eckford, 5 Paige Ch. (N. Y.) oJfS. (1S36.)

This was an appeal, by the complainants, from an interlocu-

PROD

tory order of the vice chancellor of the first circuit, directing

TIO.i:

OF

P

PER .

them to deposit certain partnership books and papers with a

master, for the inspection of the defendants, before answer. The

K elly v. E

kford~

5

aige

h. ( . } .)

4 .

{1836.)

bill was filed by the complainants, as the assignees of J. Beacham,

for an account and settlement of a partnership transaction between

Beacham and H. Eckford, the defendants' testator. The petition,

upon which the order of the vice chancellor was founded, stated

that an inspection of the partnership books and papers, in the

hands or under the control of the complainants, was necessary

to enable the defendants to answer the bill, and to make their

defence with a due regard to the interests of tlie estate of the

decedent.

The Chancellor:

In ordinary cases the defendant is not entitled, by motion, to

call upon the complainant for the production of his books, or other
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documentary evidence in his possession, before answer, to enable

such defendant to make his defence. The case of The Princess of

Wales V. The Earl of Liverpool (1 Swans. Eep. 114, 2 Wils. Ch.

Eep. 29, S. C), in which such an order was made by Lord Eldon,

and where he subsequently dismissed the bill because the note

stated in such bill was not produced, has always been considered

as a political decision. The decision of Jones v. Lewis (2 Sim. &

Stu. 242), by Sir John Leach, the only case in which it has been

Trn wa a·n app al, by the complainant , fr m an interlocutory ord r of th
ice chancellor o.f th~ fir t ·ircuit, dir cting
th m to depo it certain artn r hip book and paper with a
ma ter, for the in p ction o.f the d f ndant , before an w r. The
bill wa filed by the complainant , a th as ign es of J. Beacham,
for an account and ettlement of a partner hip tran action between
Beacham an l . E kford, the d fendant te ta tor. The petition,
upon which the ord r of the ice chan ellor wa founde , tated
that an in pe tion of the partner hip book and paper , in the
hand or und r the control of the complainants, was n eces ary
to enable the defendant to an wer the bill, and to make their
defence with a due regard to the inter t of the e tate of the
decedent.

followed in England, was afterwards reversed by Lord Eldon him-

self. (See 4 Sim. Eep. 324.) And in the recent case of Pen fold

V. Nunn (5 Sim. Eep. 409), where the defendant asked for the

production of documents in the hands of the complainants, to

enable him to answer the bill, Sir Launcelot Shadwell said he

never understood the reason upon which the decision in The Prin-

cess of Wales V. Lord Liverpool proceeded, and that he could not

accede to it; that if the defendant wanted to prove, in the action

which he had brought, the consideration given for the bill of

THE CHANCELLOR :

In ordinary ca
the defendant i not entitled, by motion, to
call upon the complainant for the production of hi book , or other
docum ntary evidence in hi po e ion, before an wer, to enable
uch defendant to make hi defence. The ca e of The Princess of
Wales v. The Earl of Liverpool (1 Swans. Rep. 11±, 2 Wil . Oh.
Rep. 2 9, S. 0.), in which · uch an order was made by Lord Eldon,
and where he ub quently di mi ed the bill becau e th note
tatecl in uch bill wa not proclu
ha alway been con id red
a a political deci ion. The d ci ion of Jones v. L ewis (2 im. &
tu. 2±2), by Sir John L ach the only ca e in which it ha b n
f llow d in England, was aft rward r v r d by Lord Eldon himlf. ( ee ± Sim. R p. 3 ±.)
nd in the r cent case of P enfold
v. Nunn ( 5 Sim. Rep. ±09) wher the def ndant a k d for the
pr auction of document in th hand of th complainants to
nable him to an w r th bill
ir Launc lot hadw 11 aid he
y
r
und
rstood
th
rea
on
upon
whi
h th le i ion in Tlz e Prin11
e of TI ale . Lord Liverpool proc d d and that h coul not
a cede to it; that if th ] f n font want d to pr 1c. in th a ti on
which he had brouO'ht th
on id ration ofr n f r th
ill of
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308 Production of Papers

exchange whicli he then sought to have delivered up, he ought

to have filed a bill against the plaintiff, for a discovery of the docu-

ments which he then asked to have produced ; that the defendant

was at liberty to call upon the plaintiff to produce the documents,

and if the latter refused to do so, he could not afterwards com-

plain that the answer was insufficient; and that if the defendant

required them for the purposes of his defence in the suit, he ought

to file a cross bill against the plaintiff for a discovery of them.

A similar decision was made by this court, a. few days since, in

the case of Coming v. Heartt. (In Chanc. Dec. 2-^, 1835. See

also Lupton v. Pearsall, 2 John. Ch. Eep. 429 ; Denning v. Smith,

3 Idem, 409 ; Spragg v. Corner, 2 Cox's Cas. 109 ; Hare v. Collins,

Hogan's Eep. 193.)

This principle of requiring the defendant to file a cross bill of

discovery only applies, however, to those cases in which the de-

fendant wants the inspection of the complainant's documentary

evidence to enable liim to put in his answer, or to make out his

defence to the suit. But it is not applicable to the case of part-
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nership books and papers in the hands of one of the partners,

or his assignees or representatives, where both parties have an

equal right to the examination and inspection thereof for the

purposes of the suit. In such cases it is the constant and uniform

practice of this court, upon the application of either party, and in

any stage of the suit, to order the adverse party to deposit any

of the partnership books and papers, which belong equally to both,

in the hands of an officer of the court, for the examination and

inspection of the adverse party; and to permit copies thereof to

be taken by the several partners, or their representatives. It was

to a case of this kind that Lord Eldon referred, in the case of

Pickering v. Righy (18 Ves. 484), and in Micllethwait v. Moore,

(3 Meriv. 296), although he does not appear to have expressed

his meaning very clearly in either case, or to have explained the

true principles upon which the production is refused in the case

of the plaintiff's own papers, while it is granted as to the partner-

ship books and papers to which both parties have an equal right.

In a court of law it is a matter of course to compel one party,

who has the possession of a document which belongs equally to

both, to produce the same for the inspection of his adversary,

for the purposes of the suit. (See Reid v. Coleman, 2 Cromp. &

Meeson, 456; 4 Tyrwh. 274, S. C.)

PRODUCTION OF

p APERS

•xchange which h then ought to have delivered up, he ought
to have filed a bill again t the plaintiff, for a: di covery of the document which he th n a ked to have produced; that the defendant
wa at liberty to call upon the plaintiff to produce the documents,
and if the lait ter refu ed to do o, he could not afterward complain that the an wer was in ufficient; and that if the defendant
required them for the purpo es of hi defence in the suit, he ought
to file a cro bill against the plaintiff for a discovery of them.
A imilar deci ion was made by thi court, ai few day since, in
the ca e of orning v. H eartt. (In Chane. Dec. 24, 1835. See
al o Lupton v. Pearsall, 2 John. ·ch. Rep. 429 ; Denning v. Smith,
3 Idem, 409; Spragg v. Corner, 2 Cox's Oas. 109; Hare 7. Collins,
Hogan's Rep. 193.)
Thi principle of requiring the defendant to file a cro bill of
di"covery only applie , however, to tho e cases in which the defendant want the in pection of the complainant' documentary
evidence to enable him to put in his an wer, or to make out his
d fence to the uit. But it i not applicable to the case of partner hip book and paper in the hand of one of the partner,
or hi a ignee or representatives, where both partie have an
equal right to the examination and inspection thereof for the
purposes of the suit. In such case it i the constant and uniform
practice of thi court, upon the application of either party, and in
any stage of the suit, to order the adver e party to depo it any
of the partnership books and paper , which belong equally to both,
in the hand of an officer of the court, for the examination and
in pection of the adverse party; and to permit copie thereof to
be taken by the everal partner , or their repre entative . It wa
to a ca e of thi kind thait Lord Eldon ref erred, in the ca e of
Pickering v. Rigby (1 V . 4 4), and in Miclclethwait v. ]foore,
(3 :M:eriv. 296), although he doe not app ar to hav xpr ed
hi meaning very clearly in either ca e, or to have explained the
true principl upon whi h the production i refu cd in the ca e
of the plaintiff own pap r , while it i grain ted a to th partn rhip book and pap rs to which both parti have an equal right.
n a court of law it i a matt r of our e to compel one part)
who ha the po
ion of a docum nt which belong equally to
both to produc the aime for th in p ction of hi adv r ar ,
for the purpo
o·f the uit. (
Reid v. Coleman, 2 Cramp. &
Me on 4
T ·rwb.
.)

LEG ETT

Leggett v. DcBois 309

There was no evidence before the vice chancellor that the defend-

ants had any books or papers, belonging to the partnership, in

their possession. The order appealed from was therefore right;

and it must be affirmed with costs. If the defendants have in

their custody or power any of the partnership books or papers, the

plaintifl's will be entitled to an inspection thereof, upon an affidavit

that such an inspection is necessary for the purposes of the suit,

on making a proper application to the vice chancellor for such an

order.

Abatement and Revivor.

Leggett v. Dubois, 2 Paige Ch. (N. Y.) 211. (1830.)

.

309

B 1

Th re wa no vidence b fore th vice chancellor that the defendant had any book or pap r , l longing to the partner hip, in
their pos es ion. Th order app aled from wa th r fore right;
and it mu t be affirm d ith co t .
f the d f ndant have in
their u tody or power any of the partn r hip book or pape , the
plaintiff will be entitl d to an in pection thereof, upon an affidavit
that u h an in p ction i nece ary for the purpo e of the uit,
on making a proper application to the vice chancellor for uch an
ord r.

The bill in this cause was filed to compel the specific perform-

ance of an agreement made by the Eev. J. Sellon, now deceased,

with the complainant, relative to the sale or exchange of a small

piece of land between Beekman and Ann streets in the city of

New- York; of which land it was alleged that Sellon was the real

owner, or the cestui que trust, and that H. Walton was his trustee.

AB

TE 1ENT

ND R EVIVOR.

It was further alleged in the complainant's bill that the land in
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question was conveyed to the other defendants, or some of them,

Leggett v. DuboisJ 2 Paig e Oh. (N. Y.) 211.

(1830.)

after notice of the complainant's rights, and while it was held

adversely by him. An answer having been put in by a part of

the defendants, the cause was at issue as to them. The answer

of Sellon was adjudged insufficient; and he was in contempt for

not answering at the time of his death in March last.

The Chancellor:

The cases intended to be embraced by the 107th section of the

title of the revised statutes which relates particularly to this court

(2 R. S. 184), are those where the right of the deceased party

vests in some or one of the survivors; so that a perfect decree

may be made as to every part of the subject of litigation, without

any alteration of the proceedings, or bringing any now parties

before the court. Such is the case of a suit brought by or against

two or more executors, trustees or joint tenants; where, on the

death of one, the whole right of action or ground of relief survives

in favor of or against the other. In such cases, there is in fact

THE bill in thi cau e wa filed to compel the specific performance of an agreement made by the Rev. J. Sellon, now deceased,
with the complainant, relative to the sale or exchange of a mall
piece of land between Beekman and Ann treets in the city of
New-York; of which la;nd it was alleged that Sellon was the r eal
owner, or the cestui que trust, and that H. Walton wa hi tru tee.
It wa further alleged in the complainant' bill that the land in
que tion wa conveyed to the other defendant , or ome of them,
after notice of the complainant' righ , and while it wa " held
ad er el by him. An an wer having been put in by a part of
the defendants, th cau e wa at i ue a to them. The an wer
of Sellon wa adjudg d in ufficient; and he wa in contempt for
not an w ring at th time of hi death in :Mar h la t.
T ; H .[.,. ELLOR :
Th ca e intend d to be embraced by the 10 th ction of the
titl of the re i ed tatute which relate particularly to thi court
( R. . 1 ±) ar tho e wher the right of the d c a.. ed party
ye t in ome or one of the urrirnr · o that a p rf ct decree
ma, b made a to ever part of the ubject of litio-ation without
an alt ration of th proce dino- or bringino- any new partie
uch i th ca e of a uit br ucrht by or again t
b f r th ourt.
t o or more executor tru tee or joint tenan :: · where n the
dea of one the wbol ricrbt of a tion or gr unc1 of r lief ur ·,
in fa or of or a ain t th o h r.
n u h a' ", th r i in fact

310
310 Abatement and Eevivor

no abatement as to the survivors; and upon a proper application

by either party on affidavit, showing the fact of the death, and

that the cause of action has survived, the court will order the suit

to proceed. The 108th section provides for another class of cases,

where some of the parties survive and the rights of the parties

dying do not survive to them, but some other person becomes

vested with the rights and interests, or is subject to the liabilities

of those who are dead. In such cases, the complainants may pro-

ceed without making those persons parties, provided a decree can

be made between the surviving parties without bringing such per-

sons before the court. The decree, in that case, will not effect

those in whom the rights of the deceased parties have become

vested. Under a similar provision in the former statutes of this

state, Chancellor Sanford decided that it was optional with the

surviving complainant to revive the suit or to proceed without

reviving; but that he was not bound to do either; that he might

elect to abandon the suit. (1 Hopk, R. -iSO.) The revised statutes

have provided for such cases; and the surviving defendants may
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now revive the suit if the complainants, or those who are entitled

to revive in the first place, neglect to do so within such time as

may be allowed by the court for that purpose. The proceedings to

obtain a revival of the suit, under these provisions of the revised

statutes, must be by petition; and an order for that purpose

cannot be granted on motion founded on affidavit only. The

petition is the substitute for a bill of revivor. But a formal bill

may perhaps be necessary where the representatives of the deceased

party cannot be found, or where they are infants. (7 Jolin. R.

613, per Van ISTess, J.) It is undoubtedly the duty of the com-

plainant to revive, if he wishes to proceed with the suit, and to

have the benefit of the previous proceedings. And where a suit

abates by the death of either of the parties pending an injunction,

the defendant or his representatives may have an order that the

complainant or his representatives revive the suit, within a) reason-

able time, or that the injunction be dissolved. (1 Hen. & Munf.

203. 1 Cox's Ca. 411. 2 id. 50.)

In this case, there has not as yet been any unreasonable delay

on the part of the complainant; but he must, within sixty days,

proceed to revive the suit against the legal representatives of

Sellon, or consent to proceed against the surviving defendants only,

or the injunction must be dissolved.

ABATEMENT AND REVIVOR

no aba.tement a to the urvivor ; and upon a proper application
by either part; on affidavit, showing the fact of the death, and
that the cau e of action has urvived, the court will order the suit
to proceed. The 108th section provides for another dass of cases,
wh re some of the parties survive and the rights of the parties
dying do not survive to them, but some other person becomes
ve ted with the rights and interests, or i subject to the liabilities
of tho e who a·re dead. In such cases, the complainants may proceed without making those per on parties, provided a decree can
be made between the surviving parties without bringing such person before the court. The decree, in that case, will not effect
those in whom the rights of the deceased parties have become
ve ted. Under a similar provi ion in the former tatutes of this
state, Chancellor Sanford decided that it was optional with the
surviving complainant to revive the suit or to proceed without
reviving; but that he was not bound to do either; that he might
elect to abandon the suit. ( 1 Hopk. R. 450.) The revised statutes
have provided for such cases; and the surviving defendants may
now revive the suit if the complainants, or tho e who are entitled
to revive in the first place, negl ct to do so within such time as
may be allowed by the court for that purpo e. The proceedings to
obtain a revival of the suit, under these provisions of the revised
statutes, must be by petition; and an order for that purpose
cannot be granted on motion founded on affidaivit only. The
petition is the substitute for a bill of revivor. But a formal bill
may perhap be nece sary where the representatives of the deceased
party cannot be found, or where they are infants. (7 John. R.
613, per Van Ne s, J.) It is undoubtedly the duty of the complainant to revive, if he wishes to proceed with the suit, and to
have the benefit orf the previous proceeding . And where a suit
abates by the death of either of the parlie pending an injunction,
the defendant or hi representatives may have an order that the
complainant or hi repr entatives revive the uit, within ai rea onable time, or that the injunction be di olved. (1 Hen. & Munf.
203. 1 Cox's Ca. 411. 2 id. 50.)
In thi ca e, th r ha not as yet been any unrea onaible delay
on the part of th complainant; but he mu t, within ixty day ,
proc d to revive the uit again t the 1 gal r re entative of
ellon, or con ent to proce d again t the surviving defcndaints only,
or the injun~tion mu t be di solved.

CHAPTER X.

CROSS BILL, INTEHPLEADEE, PERPETUATE

CHAPTER X.

TESTIMONY, ETC.

Cross Bill.

Lowenstein v. GUdewell, 5 Dillon, 325. (1878.)

Subpoena to Answer Cross-Bill. — Service on Solicitor. — Bill

ORO

E , PE

BILL,

ETC.

and Cross-Bill. — Right of Voluntary Dismissal.

The plaintiffs filed their bill to foreclose a deed of trust on

real estate. R. D. Partee and wife, among others, were made

RO

defendants, upon the allegation that they had some interest in the

ILL.

said mortgaged premises, or some part thereof, as purchasers,

judgment creditors, or otherwise, which interests, if any, have

Lowenstein

. Glidewell, 5 Dillon, 3 5.

{1878.)

accrued subsequent and are Junior to complainants' lien, and sub-

ject thereto. Partee and wife answered, alleging they were the

owners in fee of the property by purchase from one Christman,

from whom Parish, the grantor in the deed of trust, derived his

title; that the sale of the premises by Christman to Partee and

wife was made long before the conveyance by Christman to

Parish, and Parish to plaintiffs; that all these parties had full
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notice of the purchase by Partee and wife; that a suit for spe-

cific performance of the contract for the sale of the property

was brought by Partee and wife against Christman in the Pu-

laski chancery court, and was pending at and before the convey-

ance of the property by Christman to Parish, and Parish to

plaintiffs, aod that said parties had notice of the pendency of

such suit, and that that court decreed a conveyance of the prop-

erty from Christman to Partee and wife, the title under such

conveyance to relate back to the 20th day of December, 1876.

Partee and wife also filed a cross-bill against the plaintiffs,

setting up the same facts set out in their answer, and praying for

the cancellation of the plaintiffs' deed of trust, and for a decree

against plaintiffs for the rents and profits of the property received

by them between the 23d of January, 1877, and the 27th of

December, 1877, from the trustee in the deed of trust, who was

in possession as such under said deed, and collected the rents of

311

to An wer Oro -Bill.- ervice on olicitor.-Bill
and ro -Bill.-Right of Voluntary Di mis al.
The plaintiff fil d their bill to foreclo e a deed of tru t on
real e tate. R. D. Partee and wife, among other , were ma.de
defendant , upon th allegation that they had ome intere t in the
aid mortgaged premi , or ome part thereof, a purcha ers,
judgment reditor , or otherwi e, which intere ts, if any, have
accru d ub equent and are junior to complainants' lien, and ubject ther to. Parte and wife answered, alleging they were the
owner in fee of the property by purchase from one Chri tman,
from whom Pari h, the grantor in the deed of tru t, derived hi
title; that the ale of the premi es by Ohri tman to Partee and
wife wa made long before the conveyance by Ohri tman to
Pari h, and Pari h to plaintiff ; that all th e partie had full
notice of the purcha e by Partee and wife; that a uit for pecific performance of the contract for the ale of the property
wa brought by Partee and wife again t hri tman in the Pula ki chancery court, and wa p nding at and before the conveyance of th property by Chri tman to Pari h, and Pari h to
plaintiff , aIDd that aid partie had notice of the pend ncy of
uch uit, and that that court decreed a conveyance of th property from Ohri tman to Partee and wife, th title und r uch
conveyance to relate back to the 20th day of December 1 6.
Part and wife aJ o filed a er -bill agai t th plaintiff~,
etting up the am fact et out in their answer, and pra ina for
the cancellation of th plaintiff de d of tru t and for a d cree
pr fit ~ of the prop rtv r cefre
again t laintiff for th r n
b • th m b tw en th 2 d of anuary 1
an th ~ ,, h of
, from th tr.1 t in th d d f tru t wh wa ..
in po e ion a uch und r ai 1 d ed, and ollect the r n
f
SUBPOENA
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the property and paid the same to the plaintiffs for the period

mentioned. The cross-bill was filed February 4th, 1878. No

process has issued thereon, and the defendants, who are plaintiffs

in the original bill, have not entered their appearance thereto.

The plaintiffs in the original bill now move for leave to dismiss

the same. To this motion Partee and wife, who are named among

the defendants in the original bill, and who are plaintiffs in the

cross-bill, object, and tliey also move for a decree pro confesso on

their cross-bill.

Plaintiffs claim the dismissal by them of the original bill oper-

ates to dismiss the cross-bill.

Caldwell, J. :

The plaintiffs in the original bill have the right, as a matter

of course, at any time before decree, to dismiss their bill at their

own costs. (1 Barbour's Chancery Practice, 225, 228; 1 Daniell's

CROSS BILL

the property and paid the same to the plaintiffs for the period
mentioned. The cross-bill was filed February 4th, 1878. No
process has i ued ther~on, and the defendants, who are plaintiffs
in the original bill, have not entered their appearance thereto.
The plaintiffs in the original bill now move for leave to dismiss
the same. To this motion Pa-rtee and wife, who are named among
the defendants in the original bill, and who are plaintiffs in the
cross-bill, object, and they also move for a decree pro confesso on
their cross-bill.
Plaintiff claim the dismissal by them of the original bill operates to dismi s the cross-bill.

Chancery Practice, 792.)

The cause is not at issue on the original bill — no replication

to the answer having been filed — and the defendants in that bill,
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under rule 66, might have obtained an order, as of course, for a

dismissal of the suit for this reason.

The motion of plaintiffs to dismiss their bill is granted, and

the same will be dismissed at their costs.

The motion of plaintiffs in the cross-bill for a decree pro con-

fesso thereon against the defendants therein named is denied.

If the defendants in the cross-bill had been served with process,

or had voluntarily entered their appearance to the cross-bill, the

plaintiffs therein would have been entitled to a decree pro confesso

after the lapse of the time allowed defendants by the rules to

answer.

The bill and cross-bill in equity do not necessarily constitute

one suit, and, according to the established practice in equity, the

service of a subpoena on the defendants in the cross-bill, although

they are parties in the original bill, and in court for all the pur-

poses of the original bill, is necessary to bring them into court

on the cross-bill, unless they voluntarily enter their appearance

thereto, which is the usual practice. And the general chancery

rule is, that service of the subpoena in chancery to answer a cross-

bill cannot be made upon the solicitor of the plaintiff in the

original bill. (1 Hoffman's Chancery Practice, 355, and note 4.)

J. :
The plaintiffs in the original bill have the right, as a matter
of course, at any time before decree, to di miss their bill at their
own costs. (1 Barbour's Chancery Practice, 225, 228; 1 Daniell's
Chancery Practice, 792.)
The cause i not at issue on the original bill-no replication
to the answer ha·ving been filed-and the defendants in that bill,
under rule 66, might have obtained an order, as of course, for a
dismissal of the suit for this reason.
The motion of plaintiffs to· dismiss their bill is granted, and
the same will be di missed at their costs.
The motion of plaintiffs in the cross-bill for a decree pro conf esso thereon against the defendants therein named is denied.
If the defendants in the cross-bill had been served with process,
or had voluntarily entered their appearance to the cross-bill, the
plaintiffs therein would have been entitled to a decree pro confesso
after the lap e of the time allowed defendants by the rules to
answer.
The bill amd cro s-bill in equity do not necessarily constitute
one suit, and, according to the establi hed practice in equity, the
ervice of a 11bpama on the defendant in the cro -bill, although
they are partie in the original bill, and in court for all the purposes of the original bill, i neces ary to bring them into court
on the cro -bill, unle they volunta.rily ent r their appearance
th reto, which i the u ual practice.
nd the g neral chancery
rule i that ervic of the ubpmna in chancery to an wer a cro bill cannot be mad upon the solicitor of the plaintiff in the
original bill. ( 1 Hoffman's Chancery radice, 355, and note 4.)
CALDWELL,

LOWENSTEIN V. GLIDEWELL

LowENSTEiN V. Glidewell 313

In the chancery practice of the circuit courts of the United

States there are two exceptions to this rule — (1) in case of in-

junctions to stay proceedings at law, and (2) in cross-suits in

equity, where the plaintifl' at law in the first and the plaintiff in

equity in the second case reside beyond the jurisdiction of the

court. In these cases, to prevent a failure of justice, the court

will order service of the subpcena to be made upon the attorney

of the plaintiff in the suit at law in the one case, and upon his

solicitor in the suit in equity in the other. {Eckert v. Bauert, 4

Wash. 370; Ward v. Sebring, lb. -172; Dunn v. Clarh, 8 Pet.

1; and for application of analogous principles to parties to cross-

bills, see Schench v. Peay, 1 Woolw. 175.)

It not unfrequently occurs that the facts constituting defend-

ant's defences to an action or judgment at law are of a character

solely cognizable in equity; and in suits in equity it often hap-

pens that the defendant can only avail himself fully and success-

fully of his defence to the action through the medium of a cross-

bill. In suits in these courts the plaintiff is usuall}'^ a citizen of
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another state, and hence beyond the jurisdiction of the court, and

in such cases defendants who desire to enjoin proceedings at law,

and defendants in equity cases who desire to defend by means of

a cross-bill, would, but for this rule of practice, be practically

cut off from their defences by reason of their inability to make

service on the plaintiff in the action. It would be in the highest

degree unjust and oppressive to permit a non-resident plaintiff

to invoke the jurisdiction of the court in his favor, and obtain

and retain, as the fruits of that jurisdiction, a judgment or

decree to which he was not in equity entitled, by remaining be-

yond the jurisdiction of the court whose jurisdiction on the very

subject matter, and against the very party, he had himself first

invoked. The reason of the rule would seem to limit it in equity

cases to cross-bills either wholly or partially defensive in their

character, and to deny its application to cross-bills setting up facts

not alleged in the original bill, and which new facts, though they

relate, as they must, to the subject matter of the original bill,

are made the basis for the affirmative relief asked. The cross-bill

in this case is of this latter character, and, without deciding that

this fact alone would preclude the court from directing service of

the subpoena on the solicitors of the plaintiffs in the original bill.

313

In the chancery practice of the circuit courts of the United
States there ar two xception to thi rule-(1) in ca e of injunctions to tay proceeding at law, and ( 2) in er - uit in
quity, where the plaintiff at law in the first and the plaintiff in
equity in th econd ca c reside b yond the juri diction of the
ourt. In the e ca e , to pr nt a failur of ju tice, the court
will order ervi e of the ubpoona to be mad upon the attorney
of the plaintiff in the uit at law in the one ca e, and upon hi
olicitor in the uit in equity in the other. (Eckert v. Bauert, 4
Wash. 370; Ward v. Sebring, lb. 472 ; Dunn v. Clark, 8 Pet.
1; and for application of analogou principle to parties to cro bill , ee chenck v. Peay, 1 Woolw. 175.)
It not unfr qu ntly o curs that the facts constituting defendant's defenc to an action or judgment at law are of a character
solely cognizable in equity; and in uits in equity it often happens that the defendant can only avail himself fully and succes fully of his defence to the action through the medium of a cro bill. In suit in the e courts the plaintiff i usually a: citizen of
another tate, and hence beyond the juri diction of the court, anc1
in such ca e defendant who desire to enjoin proceeding at law,
and defendant in equity ca es who desire to defend by mean of
a cro -bill, would, but for this rule of practice, be practically
cut off from their defences by reason of their inability to make
service on the plaintiff in the action. It would be in the high t
degree unju t and oppressive to permit a non-re ident plaintiff
to invoke the juri diction of the court in hi favor, and obtain
and retain, a the fruits of tha:t juri diction, a judgment or
decree to which he wa not in equity entitled, by remaining beyond the juri diction of the court who e juri diction on the very
ubj ct matt r and again t the very party, he had him elf first
invoked. The r ea on of the rule would eem to limit it in equity
ca e to cro -bills either wholly or partiaHy defen ive in their
character, and to d n its application to cro -bill etting up fa t
not alleg d in the original bill and which new fact thoucrh they
relate, a they mu t to the ubj ct mait ter of the original bill
are mad th ba i for the affirmati e reli f a ked. The cro -bill
in thi a i of thi latt r hara t r and without decidincr that
thi fa t alon would pr lu 1 th ourt from directin er ic of
the ubpoona on the olicitor of the plaintiff in e original bill,

31±
314 Cross Bill

such an order will not be made after plaintiffs have filed their

motion to dismiss their bill — a motion grantable as of course.

Whether the dismissal of the original bill carries with it the

cross-bill depends on the character of the latter. If the cross-

bill sets up matters purely defensive to the original bill and

prays for no affirmative relief, the dismissal of the latter neces-

sarily disposes of the former. But where the cross-bill sets up,

as it may, additional facts not alleged in the original bill, relating

to the subject matter, and prays for affirmative relief against the

plaintiffs in the original bill in the case thus made, the dismissal

of the original bill does not dispose of the cross-bill, but it re-

mains for disposition in the same manner as if it had been filed

as an original bill. (Warrell v. Wade, 17 Iowa, 96; 2 Daniell's

Chancery Practice, 1556.)

The cross-bill in this case is of this character, and it will re-

main on the docket, and the plaintiffs therein can take such action

in relation thereto as they may be advised, but no steps can be

taken in the case until defendants are brought into court.
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Ordered accordingly.

Coach V. Jiidge, 97 Mich. 563. (1893.)

Mandamus. Argued October 31, 1893. Granted November 24,

1893.

Eelator applied for mandamus to compel respondent to vacate

an order setting aside a default. The facts are stated in the

opinion.

Hooker, C. J.:

RO

BILL

uch an order will not be made after plaintiff have filed their
motion to di mis their bill-a motion grantable a of course.
Whether the di mi sal of the original bill carries with it the
era -bill dep~nd on the character of the latter. If the era shill et up matt r purely defen ive to the original bill and
pray for no affirmative relief, the dismis al of the latter nece arily di poses of the former. But where the era s-bill sets up,
a it may, additional fact not alleged in the original bill, relating
to the subject matter, and pray for affirmative relief again t the
plaintiff in the original bill in the ca e thu made, the di missal
of the original bill does not dispose o·f the era s-bill, but it remain for dispo ition in the same manner as if it had been filed
a an original bill. (Warrell v. Wade, 17 Iowa, 9 6; 2 Daniell's
Chancery Practice, 1556.)
The era -bill in thi ca e i of this character, and it will remain on the docket, and the plaintiffs therein can take such action
in relation therefo as they may be advi ed, but no teps can he
taken in the case until defendants are bTOught into court.
Ordered accordingly.

Defendant, having filed an answer in which he claimed the

ri<Tht to affirmative relief as though upon a cross-bill, entered the

default of the complainant for his failure to file an answer to

the new facts set up in defendant's answer upon which the claim

to affirmative relief was asked, a replication in the usual form only

Coach v. Judge, 97 Mich. 563.

having been filed. This default having been set aside upon motion,

{1893.}

defendant asks a mandamus requiring the circuit judge to vacate

his order, it being contended that the replication is not a suf-

ficient denial of the matter set up in the answer.

Chancery Kule No. 123 was intended to supplant the practice

MANDAMUS.

Argued October 31, 1893. Granted November 24,

1893.
Rela,tor applied for mandamus to compel respondent to vacate
an order setting aside a dda ult. The facts are stated in the
opinion.

c.

J. :
Defendant, having filed an answer in which he claimed the
right to affirmative relief as though upon a cro s-bill, entered the
d fault of the complainant for hi failure to file an an wer to
th new fact et up in d fendant an wer upon which the claim
ked, a replication in the u ual form only
to affirmati e relief wa
having been filed. Thi efault having been et a ide upon motion,
defendant asks a mandamus requiring the circuit judge to vacate
hi order, it being contended that the replication is not a suffici nt denial of the matt r et up in the an wer.
o. 123 was inrended to upplant the practice
thancery Rul
HOOKER,

KILE
Kile v. Goodrum 315

of filing a formal cross-bill by a simpler method. To that end it

was provided that a pereon might have all the benefits of a cross-

bill upon an answer containing the proper averments and prayer.

There is nothing in the rule that deprives the complainant of the

right to answer {IlacMey v. Mack, GO Mich, 591) ; and we think

it may also be said that there is nothing in the rule to deprive

the defendant of the benefit of an answer, the same as though a

cross-bill had been filed. The general replication, while technically

a denial of the truth of the answer, is a formal paper, intended

to complete an issue. But it cannot properly take the place of an

answer. A cross-bill proper may be taken as confessed, in jvhich

case the allegations of such bill are taken as true. 2 Barb. Ch.

Pr. 135. We think the same practice proper in case of an answer

claiming the benefits of a cross-bill. In such case the replication

puts the original case as made by bill and answer at issue, while

those averments which are properly in the answer only as the basis

of a cross-claim, under the rule, must be answered specifically,

according to the usual practice. Complainant's default was there-
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fore properly entered, and the order vacating the same, and striking

the papers on which said order pro confesso was based from the

files, should be vacated. A writ of mandamus requiring this will

issue, without costs.

It is not intended hereby to foreclose the right of the com-

plainant to apply for, and the court to grant, an order setting aside

the order pj-o confesso upon a proper showing, if such relief shall

be within the proper discretion of the court.

The other Justices concurred.

Interpleader.

Kile V. Goodrum, 87 III. App. ^62. (1899.)

Mr. Justice Burroughs delivered the opinion of the court.

"We have examined the amended bill of interpleader filed by

appellant in the Circuit Court of Edgar County against appellees,

and find that it properly avers that appellees each claim from

the estate of H. N. Guthrie, deceased, of which appellant is the

administrator, the amount of a cert<iin board bill owino- bv said

deceased, in his lifetime, to one of them, but which one appellant

v.

1

00DR

315

I

of filing a formal cro -bill by a irnpler m thod. To that end it
wa pro id cl tba1t a p on might ha e all the b nefits of a cron bill upon an an w r ontaining the prop r a _,rments and prayer.
Th r i nothing in the rule that depriv th complainant of the
right to an w r (Ilackley . Mack; 60 :Mich. 91); and we think
it may al o be aid that ther i nothing in the rule to deprive
th d f ndant of the benefit of an an w r, the ame a though a
era -bill had b en filed. Th gen ral replication, while technically
a denial o.f the truth of the an wer, i a formatl. paper, intended
to ompl te an i ue. But it cannot prop rly take the place of an
an w r. A cro -bill proper may be tak n a confe d, in _which
a the all gation of uch bill aire taken a true. 2 Barb. Ch.
Pr. 13 .
e think th ame practice proper in ca e of an an wer
claiming the benefits of a cro -bill. In uch case the replication
put the original ca e a made by bill and answer at i ue, while
tho e averments whi h a'I'e properly in the an wer only a the ba is
f a cro -claim, under the rule, must be an wered pecifically,
according to the u ual practice. Complainant' default wa therefore properly entered, and the order vacating the ame, and triking
th papers on which said order pro confesso was based from the
fil
hould be vacated. A writ of mandamus requiring thi will
i ue, without co ts.
It i not intended hereby to foreclose the right of the comla-inant to apply for and the court to grant, an order ettino- a ide
the order pro conf e o upon a proper bowing, if uch relief hall
b within the proper di cretion of the court.
The other Ju tice concurred.

INTERPLEADER.

Kile v. Goodrum, 87 Ill. App. 462.

{1899.)

1R. J STICE BURROUGHS delivered the opinion of the court.
We ha-ve examin d the amended bill of interpleader fil
b
appellant in the Circuit Court of Edgar Count ao-ain t app llee,.,,
and find that it properl. ave that appellee each claim from
th e tat of H. N. uthri d c a ed of which appellant i" th
a mini trator th amount of a certatin boar bill wino- bv " i
d c n eel in hi lif tim to on of them but hi h on a pellant

316
316 Perpetuate Testimony

does not know ; that each of the appellees are prosecuting a claim

against said estate for said board bill ; and that appellant fears he

may be compelled to pay the same twice, for which reason he asks

the court to compel them to answer his bill of interpleader, and

allow the court to determine to which one he shall pay said board

bill. By his bill appellant offers to bring the amount due from

said estate for said board into court for the benefit of such one

of the appellees as the court shall determine it belongs, and he

disclaims all interest in such board bill, or that he has in any

manner obligated himself to pay the same to one of the appellees

in preference to the other, but that he stands indifferent between

them ; thus filling every requirement of a good bill of interpleader,

as defined by Sec. 1332 in 3 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence:

(1) that the same thing, debt or duty is claimed by both or all

of the parties against whom relief is demanded; (3) all the

adverse title or claim is dependent on or is derived from a common

source; (3) the person asking the relief does not have or claim

any interest in the subject-matter; (4) he stands perfectly indif-
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ferent between those claiming the thing, debt, or duty, being in the

position merely of stakeholder. See also Newhall v. Kastens et al,

70 111. 156; Ryan v. Lamson et al., 153 111. 520; Platte Valley

Bank v. Nat. Bank, 155 111. 250; and Morrill v. Manhattan Life

Ins. Co., 183 111. 260.

It was, therefore, error for the court to sustain the demurrer

to appellant's amended bill, for which reason we reverse the decree

appealed from, and will remand the case with directions, to over-

rule the demurrer to the amended bill, and then proceed as to law

and justice appertain. Eeversed and remanded with directions.

Perpetuate Testimony.

Booker v. Booker, 20 Ga. 777. (1856.)

In Equity, in Wilkes Superior Court. Decision by Judge

James Thomas, September Term, 1856.

This was a bill filed by James J. Booker and others to perpetuate

the testimony of one Moses Sutton, an aged man, and of infirm

health, laboring under two diseases, viz: consumption and dys-

pepsia; as to the value of the hire and other things in reference

PERPETUATE TESTIMONY

does n-0t know; that each of the appellees are prosecuting a claim
against said estate for said board bill; and that appellant fears he
may be compelled to pay the same twice, for which reason he asks
the court to compel them to answer hi bill of interpleader, and
allow the court to determine to which one he hall pay aid board
bill. By hi bill a1p pellant offers to bring the amount due from
aid estate for aid board into court for the benefit of such one
af the appellees a the court shall determine it belongs, and he
di claims all interest in such board bill, or that he ha in any
manner obligated himself to pa1y the same to one of the appellees
in preference to the other, but that he stand indifferent between
them; thu filling every requirement of a good bill of interpleader,
as defined by Sec. 1332 in 3 Pomeroy' Equity J uri prudence:
(1) that the ame thing, deibt or duty i claimed by both or all
of the partie against whom relief is demanded; ( 2) all the
a·dverse title or claim is dependent on or i derived from a common
source ; ( 3) the person asking the relief does not have or claim
any interest in the subject-matter; ( 4) he stands perfectly indifferent between tho e claiming the thing, debt, or duty, being in the
po ition merely of takeholder. See also Newhall v. Kastens et al.,
70 Ill. 156; Ryan v. Lamson et al., 153 Ill. 520; Platte Valley
Bank v. Nat. Bank, 155 Ill. 250; and Morrill v. Manhattan Life
Ins. Co., 183 Ill. 260.
It was, therefore, error for the court to ustain the demurrer
to appellant's amended bill, for which rea on we revere the decree
appealed from, and will remand the case with directions, to overrule the demurreT to the amended bill, and then proceed as to law
and justice appertain. Reversed a1nd remanded with directions.

PERPETUATE TESTIMONY.

Booker v. Booker, 20 Ga. 777.

{1856.)
I

I
EQUITY, in Wilk
uperior Court. Deci ion by Judge
Jame Thoma , S ptember Term, 1 56.
Thi wa a bill filed by Jame J. Booker and others to perpetuate
utton, an ag d man, and of infirm
the testimony of one Mo
h alth, laboring under two di ea e , viz: con umption and dysp p ia; a to th value of th hire and other things in reference

BOOKER

Booker v. Booker 317

to a certain slave for whicli the complainants intended to bring

suit against the executors of R. Booker; but which suit could not

be brought, because 12 months had not expired since the death of

E. Booker. Tb this bill a demurrer was filed,

1st. Because this was not a case authorizing such a bill.

2d. Because the name of the slave is not given, and the facts

are too loosely stated.

The Court over-ruled the demurrer, and this decision is assigned

as error.

By the Court. — McDonald, J. delivering the opinion.

The bill in this case was filed to perpetuate the testimony of

v.

BOOKER

317

to a certain slave for whi h the complainant intended to brfog
suit again t the x cutor of . Booker; but which uit could not
be brought, becau e 1 month had not expired ince the death of
R. Book r. Tb thi bill a d murr r was filed.
1 t. Becau e thi was not a ca e authorizing uch a bill.
2d. Becau the name of the lave is not gi en, and the fact
are too loo ely tat d.
Th
ourt over-ruled the demurrer, and tbi decision i a igned
a rror.

Moses Sutton. The prayer is, that the testimony may be taken

de hene esse. The complainants allege in their bill that they are

about to file a bill in Equity against the defendants, as the executors

of Richardson Booker, deceased, for an account of a certain slave

and other property held, by the testator in his lifetime, the prop-

erty of the complainants, and the profits and income arising from

the hire and labour of the slave and other property; that the
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testator, in his lifetime, and the defendants, his executors, since

his death, have failed to account for the said slave, other property

and profits; that suit has not been instituted, l>ecause twelve

months have not elapsed since the probate of the will; that Moses

Sutton, 70 years old or upwards, of infirm health, afflicted with

consumption and dyspepsia, is the sole witness to a material fact

in the cause to be instituted, to-wit : that the defendant's testator,

in his lifetime, acknowledged his obligation to account to the com-

plainants for the negro and his annual value, and the value of other

property ; and that there is danger of said evidence being lost to

complainants.

The defendants demurred to the bill on two grounds:

1st. That complainants have no right, in Equity, upon the

facts stated in their bill, to proceed to take the testimony of

Moses Sutton, the witness, de hcne esse, there being no allegation

that an action at Law was pending in any Court for and concern-

ing the matters stated in said bill, which must have been the case

to take the testimony de bene esse.

2d. That the charges and allegations of complainants in said

bill, respecting the rights therein spoken of, are so general, and

By the Oourt.-l\1c o

LD,

J. d livering the opinion.

Tb bill in thi ca e wa filed to perpetuate the testimony of
Mo e
utton. The pra er i , that the t timony may be taken
de bene es e. The complainant allege in their bill that they are
about to file a: bill in Equity against the defendant , as the executors
of Richard on Booker, deceased, for an account of a oertain lave
and other property held by the testator in hi lifetime, the proprty of the complainant , and the profits and income ari ing from
the hire amd labour of the slave and other property; that the
t tator, in his lifetime, and the defendants, his executor , since
hi d ath, have failed to account for the said lave, other property
and profits; that suit has not been instituted, becau e twelve
month have not elapsed since the probaite of the will; that Mo es
Sutton, 70 years old or upward , of infirm health, afflicted with
con umption and dyspep ia, is the ole witne to a material fact
in the cause to be instituted, to-wit: that the defendant's testaitor,
in his lifetime acknowledged hi obligation to ac ount to the complainants for then gro and hi annual value and the value of other
propert ; and thait there i danger of aid evidence being lo t to
complainant .
Th d fondant d murred to the bill on two ground :
1 t. That co plainants have no right, in Equity, upon the
fact tated in th ir bill, t-0 proceed to take the te timony of
:Mo e Sutton, the witn , de bene esse, there being no all gation
that an action at Law wa pending in any Court for and concerning th matter ta d in aid bill, which must have been the a e
to tak th te timony de bene esse.
2d. T'hat th harg and all o-ation of complainant in aid
bill, r peeling th ri 0 ht th r in pok n of ar
n ral and
0
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inadequate, and uncertain, that no equitable relief can be granted

respecting tlie same.

Tlie Court below over-ruled the demurrer, and his decision is

excepted to.

[1.] The defendants' Counsel insist that the bill cannot be sup-

ported to take the testimony of the witness de bene esse, because

there is no action pending. Every bill to perpetuate testimony is

a bill to take testimony de bene esse; that is, to take the depositions

of the witness to be allowed at the hearing of the cause pending

or to be instituted, on condition that the witness, for any cause

cannot, be produced for examination ; or that it is just and proper,

under a full consideration of the circumstamces of the case, that

the evidence should be read.

[2.] So, every bill to take testimony de bene esse, is a bill to

perpetuate testimony. It is to take the evidence of a witness who,

for certain specified reasons, might not be able to attend the trial.

The American Editor of Mitford's Chancery Pleading remarks,

that "bills to perpetuate testimony seem divisible into two kinds,
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namely: bills to perpetuate testimony specifically, so called; and

bills to take testimony de bene esse." (P. 62, N. (1.)

[3.] It seems, from an order of the Court of Chancery in Eng-

land, in tlie reign of Philip & Miary, that the Chancellors had

placed many restraints on the perpetuation of testimony, but that

the examiners of the said Courts had not, until recently, been

restrained in the examination of witnesses in perpetual memory,

in their offices, whereunto they had been sworn; whereupon, that

order was passed which is, undoubtedly, the foundation of the bills

since used to perpetuate evidence. (See 2 Am. Ed. Gresley's Eq.

Ev. 129.)

By that order, the party who desired to have a witness examined,

was required to frame a bill containing the cause why he would

have the witness examined ; and thereupon, should sue out a writ

for that purpose ordained, and deliver it to the opposite party,

whereby he might have notice to have the same or any other wit-

nesses examined. (Id.) Bills which are now called bills to per-

petuate testimony, and bills to take evidence de bene esse, have this

common origin. In neither case can the evidence taken under this

proceeding be used, if the witness is at the trial or is able to attend,

or his testimony can be had in the usual way.

[4.] It is a departure from the ordinary mode of taking evi-
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inadequate, and uncertain, that no equitable relief can be granted
re pecting the ame.
The ourl below over-rul d th demurr , and hi deci ion is
excepted to.
[l.] The defendant ' Coun el insi t that the bill cannot be supde bene esse, becatre
ported to take the te timony of the witn
ther i no action pending. Every bill to perpetuate te timony i~
a bill to take te timony de bene esse; that i , to take the depo ition
of the witnes to be allowed at the hearing of the cause pending
or to be instituted, on condition that the witnes , for any cau ·e
cannot, be produced for examination; or that it i ju t and proper,
under a full con ideration of the circumsta!Ilces of the case, that
the evidence hould be read.
[2.] o, every bill to take te timony de bene esse, i a bill to
perpetuate te timony. It i to take the evidence of a witness who,
for certain pecified reason , might not be able to attend the trial.
The American Editor of Mitford' Chancery Pleading remarks,
that ''bill to perpetuate testimony eem divi ible into two kinds,
namely: bill to perpetuate te timony specifically, o called; and
bill to take te timony de bene esse." (P. 62, N. (1.)
[3.J It eems, from an order of the Court of Chancery in England, in the reign of Philip & MJary, that the Chalilcellors had
placed many re traint on the perpetuation of te timony, but that
the examiners of the aid Courts had not, until recently, been
re train d in the examination of witnesses in perpetual memory,
in their office, whereunto they had been worn; whereupon, that
order wa pa ed which i , undoubtedly, th foundation of the bills
ince u ed to perpetuate evidence. ( ee 2 Am. Ed. Gre ley' Eq.
Ev. 1 9.)
By that order, the party who d ired to have a witn
examined,
wa required to frame a bill containing the cau e why he would
ha e the witn
·amin d; and ther upon, hould ue out a writ
for that purpo ordain d, and deliver it to the oppo ite party,
whereby he might have notice to have the ame or any other witn
examined. (Id.) Bill which are now called bill to perp tu te te timony, and bill to take vidence de bene esse, hav thi
ommon origin. In neither ase , n the evidence tak n under thi
proceeding b u cd if the witn ~ i at th trial or i able to attend,
r hi t timony an b ha in th u ual way.
[ 4.
t i a d partur from th ordinary mode of taking evi-
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dence, and the Court of Chancery has been very strict in its

requisitions upon parties who aipply for the extraordinary privilege,

tliat it may be well assured that the exigency of the case demand it.

[5.] The Court will not allow its authority to l)e used to fish

for evidence to sustain a projected law suit; hence, where the

application is to perpetuate testimony in cases where there is no

suit, or one party is impeded by the act of the other, from prose-

cuting a pending suit, the applicant must show that "the facts to

which the testimony of the witnesses proposed to be examined

relates, cannot be immediately investigated in a Court of Law;

or, if they can be so investigated, that the sole right of action

belongs to the other party; or that the other party has interposed

some impediment (as an injunction) to an immediate trial of the

right in the suit at Law; so that before the investigation can take

place, the evidence of a material witness is likely to be lost, by his

death or departure from the country." (Story's Eq, Pleading,

§303.)

[6.] An opinion seems to prevail to some extent, that a bill to
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perpetuate testimony will not lie at the instance of a party who

has not possession of the property which is to be the subject of

litigation; and that such proceeding will only be allowed to a

party who is in possession, whose right or title is liable to dis-

turbance at the instance of another whose movements the com-

plainant cannot control. This is a mistake. It is true, that a

complainant who has a right of action for property out of his

possession, cannot sustain a bill to perpetuate testimony before

action brought, because he has it in his power to sue and obtain

the evidence in the usual way.

But the instance stated is not the only one in which testimony

may be perpetuated. In ever}' case in which a complainant has a

vested interest in a matter which is likely to become the subject

of litigation, however small or contingent, and it cannot be investi-

gated in a Court of Law or Equity, either from his inabilit}' from

any legal cause to institute a suit, if he should be the plaintiff;

or having sued, he is impeded by the act of the other party from

prosecuting his suit, and his interest may be endangered if the

evidence in support of it is lost, he may have the testimony of his

witnesses perpetuated. This is the principle to be collected from

the authorities, and it is in accordance with justice and common

. BOOKER
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dence, and th Court of hanc ry ha b n ery trict in it
r qui itions upon parti who · pply for th xtraordinary privilegt-,
that it may be w 11 a ured that the xig n ' f th ca d mand it.
ourt will not allow it authorit to
u
to :fi h
[ 5.J h
tain a proj ected law uit; h nee, where the
for evi cnce to
application i to p rpetuate te timony in a e wh r th re i no
u.it, or on party i imp d d by the act of the other fr m proseuting a pending u.it, the applicant mu t how that 'the fact to
propo ed to b xamined
which the te timony of th witn
relat , annot b immediately investigated in a ourt f Law;
or, if th y can be o inve tigated, that the 010 right of action
belong to th oth r party ; or that the other party ha interpo ed
some imp diment (as an injunction) to an immediate trial of the
right in the u.it at Law; o that before the investigation can take
pla e he evid nc of a material witne i likely to be lo t, by hi
d a h or departure from the country." (Story' Eq. Pleading,
303 .)

[ .] n opm10n eem to prevail to ome extent, that a bill to
perp tuate te timony will not lie at the in tance of a party who
ha not po e ion of the property which i to be the ubject of
litigation; and that uch proceeding will only be allowed to n.
party who i in po
ion, whooe right or title i liabl to disturbance at the in tance of another who e movements the complainant cannot control. This i a mi take. It i true, that a
complainant who has a right of action for property out of hi
po e ion, cannot ustain a bill to perpetuat t timony b fore
action brought, becau e he has it in hi power to ue and obtain
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id nee in the u ual way.
ut the instance tated i not the only one in which t timony
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sense. (Story's Eq. PL § 301, &c.; Lube's Eq. PL 134; Gres. Eq.

Ev. 130; Smiths Ch. Pr. 484.)

[7.] The bill should state every matter which is necessary to

entitle the complainants to this remedy, to-wit: their interest;

the reason* why suit cannot be instituted ; the subject matter of

the controversy, and the proof they propose to make; the interest

or the duty of the defendants to contest the right or title; the

ground of necessity for perpetuating the evidence.

This bill is full on these points, and we are of opinion that

the prayer merely, that the testimony may be taken de bene esse,

does not divest it of its distinctive character as a bill to perpetuate

testimony given to it by its structure. The bill is amendable, in

this respect, if an amendment was necessary. A bill to perpetuate

testimony may be amended, in England, after the testimony has

been taken under it. (Story's Eq. PL note to § 306.)

Under our liberal Statutes of amendment, it is impossible that

a bill should be dismissed for a mere technical error. The first

ground of demurrer ought to have been over-ruled.
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[8.] The second ground of demurrer raises the question of the

sufficiency of the allegations to entitle the complainant to tlie order

he prays for. It is insisted that the allegations of the bill are

insufficient, because the name of the slave is not set forth, for

whom and for whose hire an account is to be asked, and because

the other property is not described. The allegations in regard to

the slave and the hire, are as full as usual in a bill calling a party

to account for the value and hire of slaves, but not so in respect

to the other property. The bill was amendable in that particular,

and an amendment ought to have been ordered by the Court, if he

had considered it defective. The testimony sought for had been

taken; and if it is confined to the slave and the hire, it ought

unquestionably to be received; and if it goes beyond, to other

property, it will depend on the notice which the defendant had,

through the direct interrogatories, of the evidence sought to be

made, so as to enable him to cross-examine the witness in regard

thereto, whether that part of the evidence should be read at the

hearing of the cause. We will not send the case back merely for the

purpose of making an amendment which would be allowed as a

matter of right.

Judgment affirmed.

PERPETUATE TESTIMONY

en e. (Story' Eq. Pl. § 301, &c.; Lube's Eq. Pl. 134; Gres. Eq.
Ev. 130; Smith's Ch. Pr. 484.)
[7.J The bill hould state every matter which is necessary to
entitle the complainants to this remedy, to-wit: their interest;
the reason· why suit cannot be instituted; the subject matter of
the controversy, and the proof they propose to make; the interest
or the duty of the defendants to contest the right or title; the
ground o·f necessity for perpetuating the evidence.
Thi bill i full on these point , and we are of opinion that
the prayer merely, that the testimony may be taken de bene esse,
does not divetit it of its di tinctive character as a bill to perpetuate
te timony given to it by its structure. The bill is amendable, in
thi re.spect, if an amendment wa necessary. A bill to perpetuate
testimony may be amended, in England, after the testimony has
been taken under it. (Story's Eq. Pl. note to § 306.)
Under our liberal Statutes of amendment, it is impossible that
a bill should be dismissed for a mere technical error. The first
ground of demurrer ought to have been over-ruled.
[8.J The second ground of demurreT raiseti the quetition of the
sufficiency of the allegations to entitle the ·c omplainant to the order
he prays for. It is insisted that the allegations of the bill are
insufficient, because the name of the slave is not set forth, for
whom and for whose hire an account is to be asked, and because
the other property is not described. The allega·tions in regard to
the lave and the hire, are as full as usual in a bill calling a party
to account for the value and hire of slaves, but not so in respect
to the other property. The bill was amendable in that particular,
and an amendment ought to have been ordered by the Court, if he
had con idered it defective. The testimony sought for had been
taken; and if it is confined to the slave and the hire, it ought
unquc tionably to be received; and if it goes beyond, to other
property, it will depend on the notice which the d fendant had,
through the direct interrogatories, of the evidence ought to be
made, o a to enable him to cro -examine the witn
in regard
thereto, whether that part of the evidence hould be r ad at the
hearing of th cau e. W will not nd the ca e back merely for the
purpo e of making an amendment which would be allowed as a
matter of right.
J udgm n t affirmed.

RICIITER

v.
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Examine Witness De Bene Esse.

Ricliter v. Jerome, 25 Fed. Rep. 679. (18S5.)

In Equity. On motion to set aside order pro confesso, and for

1 XAMI

leave to answer.

E WrTNES

D E B ENE

SSE.

This was a bill to take testimony de bene esse. The bill stated, in

Richter v. J erome, 5 Fed. Rep. 6 9.

substance, the filing of a bill by the plaintiff, in the Western dis-

{1 885.)

trict of this state, against the defendants in this bill, the object of

which was to charge with a lien certain lands l}ang in that district ;

that defendants demurred to this bill for want of equity ; that the

demurrer was sustained, and the bill dismissed; that the cause is

now pending on appeal in the supreme court of the United States,

and tliat it will not be reached within two years, and if it be

reversed there will be a delay of six months more before evidence

can be taken. The bill further set forth that the testimony of four

witnesses, now living, was necessary to the maintenance of plain-

tiff's case, whose testimony, in the inevitable lapse of time before

it can be taken in the ordinary course of business, is in danger

of being lost; that one of these witnesses was over 65 years old,
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another over 70, and both somewhat infirm, and that they were the

only witnesses to the facts which he proposes to prove by them.

The bill further set forth the facts which the plaintiffs expected

to prove by the testimony of each of these witnesses, and showed

the same to be material; that plaintiff had been advised that he

had no remedy for perpetuating the testimony of these witnesses,

according to the general rules and practice of this court, and could

only have relief under a bill of this nature. The prayer was for a

substituted scr\'icc upon the attorneys of the non-resident defend-

ants, and that a commission might issue to take the testimony

of the witnesses named in the bill, to be road, provided the case is

reversed 1)y the supreme court, and remanded for hearing in the

circuit. Annexed to this bill as an exhibit was a copy of the

original bill, filed in the Western district, the purpose of which

was to set aside the judicial sale of a large tract of land as a fraud

upon the plaintiff, and others standing in like situation with him.

Upon the filing of this bill an order was entered that substituted

service as to the non-resident defendants be made, bv serving the

IN EQ ITY. On motion to t a ide order pro conf esso, and for
leave to an weT.
Thi was a bill to take t e timony de bene esse. The bill tated, in
ub tance, the filing of a bill by tb e plaintiff, in the We tern di trict of thi tat , again t thei defendaint in thi bill, the object of
which was to charge with a li n certain land lying in that di trict;
that defendant demurr d to thi bill for want of equity ; that the
demurrer was u tain d, and the bill di mi sed ; thait the cau e i
now pending on appeal in the upreme court of the United State~,
and that it will not be r ached within two year , and if it be
r ver ed there will be a delay of six month more before evidence
can be taken. The bill further et forlh that the te timony of four
witnes e, now living was necessary to the maintenance of plaintiff~s ca e, whose testimony, in the inevitabl lapse of time before
it can be taken in the ordinary course of busine s, is in danger
of being lost; that one of these witnesses was over 65 years old,
another over 70, and both somewhat infirm, and that the were the
only witnesse to the facts which he propose to pro e by them.
The bill further set forth the facts which the plaintiff expected
to prove by the testimony of each of these witne es, and howed
the same to be material; that plaintiff had been ad vi ed that he
had no remedy for perpetuating the t estimon of th e witnes e
according to the general rules and practice of thi court and could
only hav reli f under a bill of this nature. Tbe pra er wa for a
ub tituted ervice upon the attarney of the non-r id t defendant, and that a commi ion might i ue to tak th te ~ timon
of th witn e nam d in th bill, to be read, provided the c e is
rev red by the upr me court and remand d for hearincr in the
nn x d to thi bill a an e hibit w a cop of th
ircuit.
ori inal bill fil d in the W t rn di tri t th pur .. of -which
wa to et a id th judicial al of a lall' tra t of land a a fraud
upon th plaintiff and other tandincr in lik ituation with him.
Upon the filincr of hi bill an order w ent re that u .. ti.tuted
crvic
to th non-r id nt d f ndant b ma , b
nincr the
1

!t

322
323 Examine Witness De Bene Esse

subpoena upon their solicitors in the main case. This order was

afterwards vacated and set aside as beyond the power of the court,

and the case left to pax3ceed against the defendant Jerome, the

only resident of the state. He afterwards suffered default, and,

upon the eve of signing a decree against him, came in and moved

to set aside the order pro confesso, and for leave to answer, aecom-

panjdng his motion with a copy of the proposed answer.

Brown, J. :

This bill is an anomalous one. So far as we are informed there

EXAMINE WITNESS DE BENE EssE

subpcenai upon their solicitors in the main ca e. T'his order was
afterwards vacated and set aside as beyond the power of the court,
and the case left to proceed against the defendant Jerome, the
only resident of the state. He afterwards suffered default, and,
upon the eve of igning a deoree against him, came in and moved
to et a ide the ordeT pro confesso, and for leave to answer, accompanying his motion with a copy of the proposed answer.

is no case to be found in the reports of this country of a bill solely

to perpetuate testimony. To entitle the party to maintain a bill

J.:
This bill is an anomalous one. So far as we are informed there
is no case to be found in the reports of this country nf a bill solely
to perpetuate testimony. To entitle the pa,r ty to maintain a bill
of this description the plaiintiff must aver: (1) That there is a
suit depending in which the testimony of the witnesses named will
be material. Story, Eq. § 307. (2) T'hat the suit is in uch condition that the derpo itions cannot be taken in the ordinary methods
pr-escribed by law, and that the aid of the court of equity is necessary to perpetuate the testimony. (3) The facts which the pla,inti:ff
expects to prove by the testimony of the witnesses sought to be
examined, that the court may see that they are material to the
controversy. ( 4) The necessity for taking the testimony, and the
danger that it may be lost by delay.
A failure to make the proper averment in any of these particulars
i good ground for a; demurrer, but we do not under tand that as a
rule the allegation of the bill can be put in is ue by an answer. In
ca es of bills strictly to perpetuate testimony (which will only lie
when no suit has been commenced), the defendant may allege by
way of plea any fact that may tend to show that there i no occasion
to perpetuate the testimony; as, for instance, that there eri t no
such di pute or controversy as that alleged in the bill, or that
plaintiff has no such interest in it as will ju tify his a,pplication
to perpetuate the te timony. Story, Eq. Pl. 306a. But in bills
to take testimony de bene esse there mu t be a uit depending in
. omc court, and thi of its lf i evidence of a controv rsy between
the parties. In Ellice v. Roupell, Story, Eq. Pl. 306a, note, Sir J.
Romilly stated th rule to be in regard to bill for perp tuating
t . timony that def ndant, by con enting to answer the plaintiffs
hill admitted hi right to examine witnes e jn the ca e, and that
implies all that is demandable. "For if there is really any bona
fide controv y betw n the parti ~ the riO'ht to perpetuate the
BROWN,

of tills description the plaintiff must aver: (1) That there is a

suit depending in which the testimony of the witnesses named will

be material. Story, Eq. § 307. (2) That the suit is in such con-

dition that the depositions cannot be taken in the ordinary methods

prescribed by law, and that the aid of the court of equity is neces-

sary to perpetuate the testimony, (3) The facts which the plaintiff

expects to prove by the testimony of the witnesses sought to be
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examined, that the court may see that they are material to the

controversy. (4) The necessity for taking the testimony, and the

danger that it may be lost by delay,

A failure to make the proper averment in any of these particulars

is good ground for a demurrer, but we do not understand that as a

rule the allegations of the bill can be put in issue by an answer. In

cases of bills strictly to perpetuate testimony (which will only lie

when no suit has been commenced), the defendant may allege by

way of plea any fact tliat may tend to show that there is no occasion

to perpetuate the testimony; as, for instance, that there exists no

such dispute or controversy as that alleged in the bill, or that

plaintiff has no such interest in it as will justify his application

to perpetuate the testimony. Story, Eq, PI, 306a, But in bills

to take testimony de bene esse there must be a suit depending in

some court, and this of itself is evidence of a controversy between

the parties. In Ellice v. Roupell, Story, Eq, PI, 306^^ note. Sir J.

Romilly stated the rule to be in regard to bills for perpetuating

testimony that defendant, by consenting to answer the plaintiff's

bill, admitted his right to examine witnesses in the case, and that

implies all that is demandable. "For if there is really any lona

fide controversy between the parties, the right to perpetuate the

RICHTER
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testimony follows as a matter of course." In a case of the kind

under consideration, where a hearing cannot be had in the supreme

court in less than two or three years, and the witnesses are some

of them old and infirm, it is obvious that the plaintiff ought in

some way or another to be able to secure their testimony against

the contingency of death, absence, or mental alienation. At the

same time resort ought not to be had to the extraordinary power

of a court of equity, if the usual methods of procedure prescribed

by statute are competent to afford relief. The case is no longer

"depending" in the circuit court, and hence is removed from the

operation of the act of congress permitting depositions to be taken

de bene esse. Eev. St. § 8G3. From the time the appeal was per-

fected, the jurisdiction of the circuit court was suspended and so

remains until the cause is remanded from the appellate court.

Slaughter-house Cases, 10 Wall. 273. It has also l)een expressly

held that this act has no application to cases pending in the

supreme court. The Argo, 2 Wlieat. 287.

Acting upon this theory that the deposition could not be taken
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upon notice under the statute, it seems tliat plaintiff applied both

to the circuit and to the supreme court for leave to take his testi-

mony by deposition under equity rule 70, but this application was

refused upon the ground that he might proceed to take tlie deposi-

tions in perpetuam rei memoriam under Eev. St. § 866. Ricliter

V. Union Trust Co., 115 U. S. 55; S. C. 5 Sup. Ct. Eep. 1162.

This section provides that "in any case where it is necessary, in

order to prevent a failure or delay of justice, any of the courts of

the United States may grant a dedimus potestatem to take deposi-

tions according to common usage; and any circuit court, upon

application to it as a court of equity, may, according to the usages

of chancery, direct depositions to be taken in perpetuam rei me-

moriam, if they relate to any matters that may be cognizable in

any court of the United States." The first clause of tliis section

clearly has no application, since the supreme court has refused a

dedimus potestatem, and the circuit court has no power to grant

one by reason of the supersedeas. We must look, then, to the second

clause, for the power of this court to order these depositions to be

taken in perpetuam, and to "usages of chancery" for the manner

in which such power shall be exercised. Before adverting to this,

however, we are bound to consider whether a remedy is not afforded

by section 867, which provides "that any court of the United States

v.

3 3

JEROME

testimony follows a a. matt r of cour e." n a case of the kind
un ler con idera tion, where a h aring cannot be had in the supreme
ourl in le than two or thr yea
and the wi tne es are ome
of them old and infirm, it i obviou that the plaintiff ought in
ome way or another to be able to ecur their te timon aga·i n t
th contingency o·f death, ab ence, or mental ali nation.
t the
am time r ort ought not to be had to the extraordinary power
of a court of quity, if the u ual method of procedure pr cribcd
by tatute air competent to afford relief. The ca e i no longer
"dep nding" in the circuit court, and hence i remo ed from the
operation of the act of congress permitting depo itions to be taken
de bene e se. Rev. St. § 863. From the time the appeal wa p rf cted, the juri diction of the circuit court wa u pended and o
r main until the cau e i remanded from the appellate court.
laughter-hou e Ca e , 10 Wall. 273. It ha al o been xpres ly
held that thi act has no application to cases pending in the
supreme court. The Argo, 2 Wheat. 287.
Acting upon thi theory that the depo ition could not be taken
upon notice under the tatute, it seems that plaintiff applied both
to the circuit and to the supreme court for leave to take hi testimon; by deposition under equity rule 70, but this application was
refu ed upon the ground that he might proceed to take the depositions in perpetuam rei memoriam under Rev. St. § 866. Richter
v. Union Trust Co., 115 U. S. 55; S. C. 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1162.
This section provides that "in any ca e where it is neces ar , in
-Order to prevent a failure or delay of justice, any of the courts of
the United States may grant a dedimus potestatem t-0 take deposition acco.rding to common u age ; and any circuit court, upon
application to it a ai court of equity, may, aceording to th u ag ~
-0f chancery, direct deposition to be taken in perpetuam rei memoriam, if they relate to any matter that may be oognizable in
any court of the United Stat ." The fir t clau e of thi ection
dea·rly ha no application, ince the upreme court ha refu ed a
ded,imus potestatem, and the circuit court ha no power to grant
one by rea on of he supersedeas.
e mu t look th n, to the econd
clau e, for th power of thi court to ord r the e dep ~ition to be
tak n in perpetuam, and to "u ag of chancer for th manner
in which uch power hall b exerci ed. B for adverting to thi
however w ar bound to con ider wh ther ai r m d i not a ord
tat
b 1 ction 6 whi h provide 'that an court of the Unit
T
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may, in its discretion, admit in evidence in any cause before it any

deposition taken in perpetuam rei memoriam which would be so

admissible in the courts of the state wherein such cause is pending,

according to the laws thereof."

If, then, there be any law of this state under which these deposi-

tions can be taken, and in such manner as to be admissible in the

courts of the state, we think we are bound to presume that the cir-

cuit court for the Western district would exercise its discretion and

receive these depositions, and hence that this bill is unnecessary.

On referring, however, to the various statutes of this state upon

the subject (2 How. St. §§ 6647, 7416, 7433, 7460, 7475, 7476), we

find they all refer to cases pending in some court within the state,

except section 7476, which authorizes "any person who expects to be

a party to a suit to be thereafter commenced in a court of record"

to cause the testimony of any material witness to be taken condi-

tionally and perpetuated. But the difficulty witli this section is

that the plaintiff is not a person who expects to be a party to a suit

to be hereafter commenced, but is already a party to a suit begun
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and disposed of by the court in which it was commenced, but which

is liable to be remanded to that court for trial or hearing. Sections

7452 to 7458, prescribing the method of taking depositions to be

used in the courts of other states, have no application, since the

case, as it now stands in the supreme court, is in no condition

for the taking of testimony, and never will be until it is remanded

to the circuit court.

What are, then, the usages according to which depositions may

be taken in perpetuam rei memoriam under section 866 ? We think

an answer to this question must be found in general equity rule 90,

which, in cases where the general equity rules do not apply, requires

the practice of the circuit court to be regulated by the high court of

chancery in England, so far as the same may reasonably be applied

consistently with the local circumstances and conveniences of the

district. In England bills to perpetuate testimony axe not uncom-

mon, though much less frequent now than formerly. Upon the

whole, in view of the great doubt whether there is any statute,

either state or federal, or any established practice under which this

testimony can be taken for use in the circuit court after this case

ehall have been remanded, we have come to the conclusion that the

case is a proper one for a bill to take the testimony of these wit-

EXAMINE WITNESS DE BENE ESSE

ma;, in it di cretion, admit in evidence in any cau e before it any
depo ition tak n in perpetuam rei memoriam which would be so
admi ible in the court of the tate wherein uch cau e i pending,
according to the la·ws thereof."
If, i:hen, there be any law of thi state under which these deposition can be taken, and in uch manner as to he admi ible in the
courts of the state, we think we are bound to presume that the circuit court for th W tern district would exerci e ii:s discretion and
receive these depo itions, and hence that this bill i, unnecessairy.
On referring, however, to the various statutes of thi state upon
i:he ubject (2 How. St.§§ 6647, 7416, 7433, 7460, 7475, 7476), we
find they all refer to cases pending in some court within the state,
except section 7476, which authorizes "any person who expects to be
a party to a suit to be thereafter commenced in a court of record"
to cause the testimony of ainy material witness to be taken conditionally and perpetuated. But the difficulty with this section i ~
that the plaintiff is not a person who expect to be a party to a suit
to be hereafter commenced, but is al.ready a party to a suit begun
a·n d di posed of by the court in which it was commenced, but which
is liable to be remanded to that court :for trial or hearing. Section
7452 to 7458, prescribing the method of taking depo itions to be
used in the courts of oilier states, have no application, since the
ca e, as it now stands in the supreme court, is in no condition
for the taking of testimony, and never will be until it is remanded
to the circuit court.
What are, then, the usages according to which depositions may
be taken in perpetuam rei memoriam under section 866? We think
an an wer to thi question mu t be found in general equity rule 90,
which, in ca e wher the general equity rules do not apply, require
th practice of the circuit court to be regulated by the high court of
chancery in England, o far a the ame may rea onably be applied
con i t ntly with the local circumstance and conveni nee of the
di trict. n Englan bill to perpetuat te timony ar not uncommon, though much 1 fr quent now than formerly. Upon the
whol , in view of the gr at doubt wh th r there i any tatut ,
eiili r tate or f d ral, or any fabli h d practi e under which thi
t timony an b taken for u in the cir uit court after thi ca e
hall hav been remand d, we have cmne to the onclu ion that the
ca e i a proper one for a bill to take the t timony of these wit.-
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nesses de bene esse, provided the plaintiff has, by his bill, made a

case in other respects for the interference of a court of equity.

The answer sets up in defense that, before the bill was dismissed,

the case was pending in the circuit court for some 17 months, dur-

ing all of which time this testimony might have been taken de hene

esse under the act of congress. We do not think, however, that the

plaintiff was at fault in this particular. He was not bound to pre-

sume that the circuit court would sustain the demurrer and dismiss

his bill, or to act upon any such supposition. Tlio ordinary course

is not to begin taking proofs until after the case is at issue upon

answer and replication, and we think plaintiff is not chargeable

with laches in pursuing the usual course in that regard, particularly

in view of the fact that the defendant appears to have suffered no

injury by the delay. Defendant also denies, upon information and

belief, that the witness Anthony has such knowledge of the facts

or will give such testimony as plaintiff professes to expect, and

avers that his only object is "to fish something out of him which

will have a tendency to establish his case." We do not think this
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allegation of the bill can be traversed in this way. We have the

right to infer that plaintiff would not seek to examine a witness

unless he expected to obtain something material to his case, and

we are not at liberty to inquire in this proceeding whether his

testimony is likely to be favorable to him or not. If the original

case were in a condition to permit the testimony to be taken, the

plaintiff would have the right to do exactly what defendant charges

him with wishing to do, viz., to probe the knowledge and conscience

of these witnesses — to ascertain the exact facts which he alleges

constitute a fraud upon his rights. We think that all doubts with

regard to the materiality^ of his testimony should be construed in

favor of the plaintiff.

The allegations of the answer, that the testimony of the other

witnesses is not material, and that they are not the only witnesses

by whom the facts can be shown, are open to the same objection.

The court cannot properly pass upon these questions until the

testimony is given, when the court in which the depositions are

read will determine how far they are maiterial to the plaintiffs

case. Still less are we at liberty to inquire into the exact age, or

mental or physical infirmities, of these witnessee. It is true the

allegations with respect to these are necessary to be made in the

bill, as a basis for taking the testimony, but we do not understand
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de bene e e, provid d th plaintiff has, by his bill, made a
c in other r p ts for th int rier nee of a court of equity.
The an wer t up in def n that, before the bill wa di mi sed,
th case wa p nding in th circuit court for ome 17 month , during all of whi h tim thi t timony might hav b n taken de bene
e se und r th act of ongre .
e do not think, how v r, that the
plaintiff wa at fault in thi particular. He wa n t bound to pre~ ume that th circuit court would u tain the d murr r and di mi
hi bill, or to act upon any u h uppo ition. The ordinary cour e
i not to begin taking proofs until aft if the case i at i ue upon
an wer and repli ation, and we think plaintiff i not chargeable
with lach in pursuing the u ual cour e in that r egard, particularly
in view of the fact that th def ndant appears to have uffered no
injury by the delay. Defendant also denie , upon information and
belief, that the witness Anthony has such knowledge of the :fact
or will give uch testimony as plaintiff prof e to exp ct, aind
avers that his only object is "to fish something out of him which
will have a tendency to 86tablish his ca e." We do not think thi
allegation of the bill can be traversed in this way. We have the
right to infer that plaintiff would not seek to examine a witne
unless he expected to oibtain oimething material to hi ca e, and
we are not at liberty to inquire in this proceeding whether hi.
t timony i likely to be favorable to him or not. If the original
a e were in a condition to permit the testimony to be taken, the
plaintiff would ha:ve the right to do exactly what defendant charges
him with wi hing to do, viz., to probe the knowledg and con cience
of th e witne ffi-to ascertain the exact facts which he allege
con titute a fraud upon hi& right . We think that all doubt with
regard to the materiality of hi testimony hould be con trued in
favor of the plaintiff.
he a· 1 gation of the an wer, that tl:ie testimony of th o ih r
witn
i not mat rial and that they are not the onl witne
b whom the fa ts can be hown, are open to the ame obj ctio .
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n
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them to be traversable to any greater extent than are like aver-

ments in an affidavit to take deposition de bene esse under the act

of congress. If an issue could be made upon these facts, and

testimon}^ taken, more time might be consumed than would be

necessary to take the depositions, and the whole object of the bill

thus be defeated. This object is to obtain a summary examination

of the witnesses, that their testimony may be perpetuated; and,

as before observed, we doubt whether any of the matters of fact

contained in the bill can be put in issue, except, perhaps, with

regard to the existence of the controversy. ISTor can we review

the opinion of the court in sustaining the demurrer to the original

bill, unless, at least, it appears that this bill was so clearly frivolous

that it ought never to have been filed, or plaintiff could have no

reason to expect that his suit could be successful.

We think plaintiff is entitled to a decree for an examination of
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his witnesses.

EXAMINE WIT ESS DE BENE ESSE

w

them
·be traver able to any greater extent than are like averment in an affidavit to take depo ition de bene esse under the act
of congre . If an i ue could be made upon these facts, and
te timony taken, more time might be con urned than would be
n c ary to take the depo itions, and the whole object of the bill
thu be defeated. Thi object i to obtain a ·ummary examination
of the witn es, that their testimony m:xy be p erpetuate~; and,
a before ob erved, we doubt whether any of the matters of fact
ontained in the bill can be put in is ue, except, perhaps, with
r gard to the exi tence of the controversy. Nor can we review
the opinion of the court in ustaining the demurrer to the original
bill, unles , at least, it appeaTS that this bill wa so clearly frivolous
that it ought never to have been filed, or plaintiff could have no
rea on to expect that hi uit could be succe ful.
We think plaintiff is entitled to a decree for an examination of
hi.. witnesses.
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of suit, 309-310.

SIGNATURE:

to bill of equity, 117, 118.

SOVEREIGNS:

suits by and against, 3-7.

STATING PART:

of bill in equity, 76-82, et. seq.

allegations in and proof must correspond, 90.

what much be contained in, 91, 92.

STATUTE:
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when suit commenced to avoid statute of limitations, 134.

SUITS:

by aliens, 1, 2.

by sovereigns, 3-7.

by and against infants, 7-24.

when commenced, 133-141.

SUPPLEMENTAL BILL:

when permitted, 249.

TESTIMONY:

bill to perpetuate, essentials of, 316-320.

de bene esse, 321-326.

UNCERTAINTY:

in pleading may arise in what ways, 123-126.

WRITTEN INSTRUMENTS:

how to plead, 127, 128.
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